People v. Johnson CA5

CourtListener 10382953Calctapp23 apr 2025

Testo completo

Filed 4/23/25 P. v. Johnson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086293
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. DF013055A)
v.

RICHARD K. JOHNSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Judith K.
Dulcich, Judge.
Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and
Henry J. Valle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
A jury convicted defendant Richard Johnson of battery by a prisoner on a non-
confined person. He was sentenced to eight years in prison. Before trial, Johnson moved
to compel production of certain documents from the personnel files of two correctional
officers involved in the incident, alleging they used excessive force and falsified their
reports. The trial court granted Johnson’s request. Thereafter, Johnson filed two other
motions to compel discovery. On appeal, Johnson argues the court erred in denying his
final motion to compel discovery. He contends he provided an adequate factual scenario
to grant the motion. In the alternative, he argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to
request judicial notice of the prior discovery motion’s factual scenario and for failing to
establish a factual scenario adequate to entitle him to discovery of personnel files of other
named correctional officers involved in the incident.
Johnson further contends an allegedly offensive comment about his race was made
by a correctional officer prior to the incident violated the California Racial Justice Act1
(Pen. Code,2 § 745). He argues if the issue was forfeited based upon the failure to bring a
motion on these grounds, his counsel was ineffective on this basis. Johnson also argues
his counsel was ineffective for failure to bring a discovery motion for development of
facts pursuant to the RJA. We reject Johnson’s contentions and affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2018, Johnson filed a motion for discovery pursuant to Evidence
Code section 1043 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess),
seeking discovery and disclosure of the personnel records of four correctional officers:
Eric Smith, Shauna Early, Todd Callen, and Benjamin Lomely.
On February 16, 2018, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation filed an opposition to Johnson’s motion for discovery.
On March 1, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Johnson’s motion for
discovery. The court held Johnson established a plausible factual scenario and ordered an

1 We will refer to the California Racial Justice Act as the Racial Justice Act or
RJA.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
in camera review of the confidential personnel records of Smith and Early for veracity
only. It further ordered an in camera review of the confidential personnel records of
Callen and Lomely for veracity and excessive use of force.
On March 14, 2019, Johnson filed a second Pitchess motion seeking discovery and
disclosure of the personnel records of the same four correctional officers listed in his first
motion and an additional officer, Daniel Guitron.3
On September 16, 2019, Johnson filed a third Pitchess motion seeking discovery
and disclosure of the personnel records of Callen, Lomely, and Guitron as well as other
named correctional officers: Kimberly Joseph, Isaac Lozano, Jaime Short, and Jaime
Felix.
On October 7, 2019, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
filed an opposition to Johnson’s third Pitchess motion. On October 17, 2019, a hearing
was held pursuant to the third Pitchess motion. The trial court denied the motion without
conducting an in camera review.
On April 10, 2023, the Kern County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging Johnson with battery by a prisoner on a non-confined person
(§ 4501.5, count 1). The amended information further alleged the following aggravating
factors: the crime involved great violence or great bodily harm (Cal. Rules of Court,4
rule 4.421(a)(1)), Johnson engaged in violent conduct which indicates a serious danger to
society (rule 4.421(b)(1)), Johnson’s prior convictions are numerous or of increasing
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), and Johnson served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)).
The amended information also alleged Johnson suffered three prior serious felony

3 The record before us does not include a ruling on the second Pitchess motion. It
appears the trial court did not rule on it.
4 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), bringing him within the provisions of the Three Strikes
law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
On April 14, 2023, a jury found Johnson guilty as charged on count 1. In a
bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true beyond a reasonable doubt the three prior
strike allegations and the following aggravating factors: Johnson engaged in violent
conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)), his convictions were
numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), and he served a prior prison
term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). The court did not find true that the crime involved great violence
or great bodily harm (rule 4.421(a)(1)).
On May 15, 2023, the trial court sentenced Johnson on count 1 to the upper term
of four years, doubled to eight years for the strike prior.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Prosecution’s Case
On January 27, 2017, Callen worked as a correctional officer at a prison in Kern
County. He maintained security in the prison and escorted inmates throughout the
facility. On that morning, while working in the program office in “Facility A”, Callen
responded to an incident in the hallway of the program office. He was on his way back
through the hallway of the program area when he encountered Johnson. Callen ordered
Johnson out of the program area and told him to go back to the yard because he was “out
of bounds” and not supposed to be in that area. It was a violation of the prison rules for
Johnson to be in the hallway of the program area. Agitated, Johnson left the area.
Soon after, Johnson returned to the lieutenant’s office for a rules violation hearing.
When he encountered Callen a second time he said, “fuck you, Callen. Do [not] … ever
talk to me like that again.” Callen told Johnson to “calm down” but he was still
murmuring expletives to Callen. Johnson then got in a “fighting stance” with his body

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slightly turned and his fists clenched. He told Callen, “fuck you, you bitch[.]”5 Callen
tried to deescalate the situation by again telling Johnson to “calm down.” Callen also put
his hand out to make sure Johnson did not come into his personal space, but immediately
thereafter, Johnson swung at Callen with his right fist and struck Callen on the left side of
the head.
After Johnson punched Callen, Callen grabbed Johnson by his upper chest with
both of his hands and pushed him back towards a printer that was on a stand. Johnson hit
Callen again on the right side of the face with his left hand. After Callen had been
punched twice, he ordered Johnson to “get down” but Johnson failed to listen. The
altercation continued through the doorway of the lieutenant’s office. Both Callen and
Johnson fell to the ground. Lomely was about ten feet away after when he saw Johnson
punch Callen twice. He assisted Callen and got Johnson on the ground. Guitron
responded to the incident after Johnson was on the ground and put handcuffs on Johnson.
After Johnson was in handcuffs he no longer resisted, and he was escorted out of the
lieutenant’s office by Guitron.
Short was assigned to the Investigative Services Unit in the prison, tasked to
investigate crimes, collect and document evidence. After Short read Johnson his rights
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, Johnson agreed to speak to Short
about the incident and made four statements. The interview lasted less than five minutes.
First, Johnson told Short he “blacked out” and could not recall what happened.
Next, Johnson said, “I do [not] know. It just happened.” Johnson then told Short, “I [am
not] no punk. I [am] not going to let no man put his hands on me.” Finally, Johnson
said, “Callen tried to put his hands on me, then it was on.” Johnson continued, “I

5 Lomely heard Johnson’s comments and testified Johnson told Callen, “Fuck you.
You are a little bitch.”

5.
punched him in his head, and we started fighting.” Short did not record Johnson’s
statements with his bodycam or a tape recorder.
B. The Defense’s Case
Johnson testified in his own defense. On the morning of January 27, 2017, he had
an appointment in the lieutenant’s office and went into the building where the
lieutenant’s office was located. Johnson knocked on the door and saw about four
correctional officers already in the office. Then, he opened the door. Callen walked
toward Johnson and told him to “take [his] black ass or ass back out the door.”6 Callen
also told Johnson he would come get him in five to six minutes. In response, Johnson
said, “man, why you talking to me like that? You know, I [am] a man too.”
Johnson waited about six minutes, and Callen told him to come into the office.
Then, Johnson told Callen, “listen, man, you need to learn how to talk to somebody,
okay?” Callen said something “smart and disrespectful.” So, Johnson told him, “F you,
bitch.” Johnson claimed that after he called Callen a “bitch,” Callen initiated a physical
altercation, wrapped his hands around Johnson’s throat and choked him. Johnson
“reacted” and punched Callen about four times and knocked him down, then stepped
back.
Smith tackled Johnson and placed him in handcuffs. After Smith handcuffed
Johnson, Callen got up and slammed Johnson’s head to the floor about four times and hit
him in the face, kicked him in the mouth, and knocked out his left tooth. Later, Johnson
admitted he was not bleeding from his mouth or face and did not have a “busted lip.”
After the incident, Johnson was taken to the gym at the prison. About two hours
later, Short questioned Johnson. Johnson told Short that Callen was “choking me out and
I had to defend myself.” He continued, “[Callen] put his hands on me; so what was I

6 Hereafter we refer to this alleged statement as “the alleged offensive comment.”

6.
supposed to do[?]” Johnson also testified he told Short about the “racial comments”
Callen made prior to the incident.
Johnson insisted he told Short everything that happened during the incident. He
initially said Short forgot to put the alleged offensive comment in his report. On cross
examination, when Johnson was asked why the other statements, including the alleged
offensive comment, and injuries he allegedly sustained were not included in Short’s
report, Johnson said that Short was “lying.” On re-direct, Short testified Johnson never
told him about Callen’s alleged offensive comment.
DISCUSSION
I. Pitchess Motion
Johnson contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his third
Pitchess motion for pretrial discovery as to Callen and Lomely’s personnel files because
defense counsel presented a plausible factual scenario in the first Pitchess motion, which
demonstrated good cause for the third motion’s renewed discovery request. The People
disagree with Johnson’s arguments. We agree with the People.
A. Additional Background
Johnson filed a third Pitchess motion for discovery requesting disclosure of the
personnel records of correctional officers Felix, Joseph, Lozano, Short, and Guitron, and
requested renewed disclosure of the files of Callen and Lomely.
Defense counsel stated in her affidavit that the District Attorney informed her it
was “advisable” to file another Pitchess motion. She asked the court to take judicial
notice of the “previously filed Pitchess motion.”. Defense counsel’s affidavit further
stated she was renewing the request for the personnel files of Callen and Lomely “in light
of the email” from the District Attorney and because the previous Pitchess motion was
granted “over one year” ago.

7.
The motion requested information and records relating to dishonesty, falsifying
and omitting information, instances of unbecoming conduct, and improper use of
procedures for all officers: Felix, Joseph, Lozano, Short, Guitron, Callen, and Lomely.
The motion requested the renewed disclosure of information and records for excessive
use of force as to Callen and Lomely only. In support of Johnson’s motion, defense
counsel asserted these documents were material to the case because he was accused of
“resisting and delaying a peace officer.” Moreover, defense counsel asserted that the
evidence of a law enforcement officer’s tendency to be dishonest supported Johnson’s
theory in the case.
The trial court denied Johnson’s renewed disclosure request of Callen and
Lomely’s personnel files as well as the personnel files of Felix, Joseph, Lozano, Short,
and Guitron. The court’s reasoning was as follows:

“[T]here is no plausible, factual scenario related to dishonesty[,] …
excessive force[,] … following procedures[,] or conduct unbecoming as it
relates to any of the officers.

“The actual argument in favor of the court at least getting to that in
camera hearing in some fashion is that the deputy district attorney indicated
it would be advisable to file this motion as it relates to all these officers.
There [is] no authority in front of the court presented by the moving party
as to why that would suffice in lieu of a factual scenario. The … motion
[is] … denied.”
B. Applicable Legal Principles
In Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pages 536–537, the California Supreme Court held
that a criminal defendant has a limited right to discovery of peace officer personnel
records and established the guidelines and motion procedure for such discovery. A
defendant is entitled to discovery of a police officer’s confidential personnel records if
the records contain information that is relevant to the defense. (Id. at pp. 537–538; Evid.
Code, §§ 1043; 1045.) To exercise the discovery of personnel records, the defendant
must file a motion supported by affidavits showing “good cause for the discovery or

8.
disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in
the pending litigation …” and also by “stating upon reasonable belief that the
governmental agency” has the records at issue. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (a), (b)(3).)
The information must be requested with “adequate specificity to preclude the possibility
that [the] defendant is engaging in a ‘fishing expedition.’ ” (Pitchess, at p. 538.)
In Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1025 (Warrick), our
Supreme Court clarified the good-cause requirement for discovery of police personnel
records. Specifically, the attorney affidavit must give a specific “factual scenario” that is
“plausible when read in light of pertinent documents.” (Ibid.) A factual scenario may
consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report and does not have to be
reasonably probable or credible. (Id. at pp. 1024–1025.) A scenario sufficient to
establish a plausible factual foundation “is one that might or could have occurred. Such a
scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is
both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges.” (Id., at
p. 1026.)
“To determine whether the defendant has established good cause for in-chambers
review of an officer’s personnel records, the trial court looks to whether the defendant
has established the materiality of the requested information to the pending litigation.”
(Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) The court accomplishes this by asking the
following questions: “Has the defense shown a logical connection between the charges
and the proposed defense? Is the defense request for Pitchess discovery factually specific
and tailored to support its claim of officer misconduct? Will the requested Pitchess
discovery support the proposed defense, or is it likely to lead to information that would
support the proposed defense? Under what theory would the requested information be
admissible at trial?” (Id. at p. 1027.) The court must balance two competing interests,
the peace officer’s claim to confidentiality and the defendant’s right to relevant
information. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 53.)

9.
Whether the defendant showed good cause is within the trial court’s sound
discretion and a party challenging the court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for discovery is
reviewed for abuse. (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039; People v.
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 827.) The court abuses its discretion when it
“exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that
result[s] in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308,
316.)
C. Analysis
We first turn to whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant
Johnson’s renewed disclosure request as to the confidential personnel files of Callen and
Lomely. We conclude the purported factual scenario did not meet the standards required
to compel an evidentiary hearing even under the “ ‘relatively low threshold for
discovery’ ” used to determine good cause to compel Pitchess discovery. (Warrick,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019.)
Here, defense counsel only made a bald assertion that she was advised by the
district attorney to file the motion. Johnson’s third motion failed to present a “specific
factual scenario” as to why the alleged misconduct of Callen and Lomely that may have
occurred within the year after the first Pitchess motion was granted was relevant to
Johnson’s claim of self-defense.7
Johnson argues the factual scenario set forth in the first Pitchess motion was
sufficient to trigger an in camera review of Callen and Lomely’s more recent files. We
disagree. The factual scenario set forth in Johnson’s first Pitchess motion provided an
insufficient basis for his renewed request. The prior factual scenario failed to explain
what new information may be relative to his defense in the more recent personnel files of

7 The court previously granted Johnson’s first Pitchess motion as to veracity and
excessive use of force of both Callen and Lomely and indicated it would not consider
already litigated issues.

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Callen and Lomely. In Warrick, the defendant did not merely make bald assertions but
provided a specific factual scenario that included an alternate version of events that was
internally consistent and plausible. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1027.) In contrast,
Johnson failed to provide any facts that were consistent with the relevance of obtaining
Callen and Lomely’s personnel records as to veracity and use of force that were different
than what was already produced following the first motion. The court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Johnson’s final Pitchess motion.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel based on Pitchess Motion
Johnson argues his counsel provided ineffective assistance on two grounds. First,
Johnson argues his counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to request the trial
court take judicial notice of his first Pitchess motion at the hearing on his third motion.
Johnson also contends his counsel failed to properly draft his final discovery motion.
Specifically, Johnson argues his counsel did not adequately set forth a plausible factual
scenario sufficient to establish good cause for discovery of the personnel records of Felix,
Joseph, Lozano, Short, and Guitron. The People disagree, arguing Johnson cannot show
deficient performance or prejudice on either of his claims. We agree with the People.
A. Applicable Legal Principles
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, prejudice must be
affirmatively proved; the record must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 (Strickland); People v.
Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 745–746.) Tactical errors are generally not deemed
reversible, and counsel’s decisions are evaluated in the context of the record. (Strickland,
at p. 689.)

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The reviewing court must determine whether the record contains an explanation
for the challenged conduct. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 (Pope).)8 If the
record sheds light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, the
conviction will be affirmed if counsel’s acts or omissions resulted from an informed
tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence. (See People v. Fain (1969)
70 Cal.2d 588, 600.) In contrast, “where the record shows that counsel has failed to
research the law or investigate the facts in the manner of a diligent and conscientious
advocate, the conviction should be reversed since the defendant has been deprived of
adequate assistance of counsel.” (Pope, at pp. 425–426.)
However, in some cases the record on appeal is silent regarding why counsel acted
or failed to act in the manner challenged. These cases are affirmed on appeal “unless
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation[.]” (Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 426.) An assertion
counsel was ineffective on a silent record is more appropriately made in a petition for
habeas corpus, which promotes judicial economy.9 (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th
884, 926 (Dickey); see also People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267.)
B. Analysis
With these principles in mind, we first consider whether Johnson received
ineffective assistance for his counsel’s failure to request the trial court take judicial notice
of his first Pitchess motion. Defense counsel requested the court take judicial notice of
the previous Pitchess motion in her final motion to compel discovery. There is nothing in
the record showing the court did not take judicial notice of the first motion. In making its

8 Overruling recognized on another ground in People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th
544, 559.
9 A habeas corpus proceeding provides an evidentiary hearing and allows trial
counsel the opportunity to set forth his or her reasons for acting or failing to act in the
manner challenged. (§§ 1483, 1484; Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 426.)

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ruling, the court concluded there was no plausible, factual scenario related to dishonesty
or excessive use of force regarding the officers’ misconduct justifying a renewed
disclosure request. While the record does not show the reason defense counsel did not
orally request judicial notice, it is reasonable to conclude defense counsel, acting as a
diligent advocate, made a tactical decision not to make an oral request for judicial notice
of the first Pitchess motion because she may have reasonably believed that there was no
basis for an additional request.
However, even if Johnson demonstrated his counsel’s performance was deficient,
there is no reasonable probability that a different result would have occurred absent the
error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see also, People v. Nguyen (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1478 [the proper standard for reviewing a defendant’s posttrial
Pitchess motion was whether a reasonable probability existed that disclosure of the
requested records would have led to a different result at trial].)
Johnson concedes prejudice cannot be shown but requests us to remand the case to
the trial court with directions to conduct an in camera hearing. In support of his
argument, Johnson cites People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410 (Hustead). There,
the defendant was entitled to discovery of incidents concerning false reports by the
arresting officer where the defendant was charged with felony evasion under Vehicle
Code section 2800.2 and alleged the officer had lied about his driving maneuvers. (Id. at
pp. 416–418.) This court found the Pitchess motion advanced a plausible factual theory
of officer misconduct that supported the defense, and the court abused its discretion by
failing to hold an in camera hearing. (Id. at p. 418.) However, this court found a “special
disposition” was required because the reviewing court could not conclude “that there was
any discoverable information” in the officer’s file. (Id. at pp. 418–419.) Thus, the
Hustead court remanded the case for an in camera review of the personnel records with
directions to grant a new trial only if the court found there was a reasonable probability of
a different outcome after the evidence was obtained. (Id. at p. 423.) Johnson urges us to

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follow this procedure. We decline to do so because Hustead differs from the present
case.
Defense counsel sought a renewed discovery request for Callen and Lomely’s
personnel records and asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the previous Pitchess
motion. Even if defense counsel orally requested or otherwise directed the court to take
judicial notice of the factual scenario presented in the first Pitchess motion at the hearing,
the factual scenario presented in the first Pitchess motion was neither complete nor
consistent with a renewed discovery request.10 Unlike Hustead, Johnson failed to
demonstrate a plausible factual theory to grant his renewed discovery request. We need
not remand the case to the court to the conduct an in camera review on the discovery
motion because good cause was not shown in the first instance. (Hustead, supra,
74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 418–419.) Moreover, prejudice cannot be shown on this record,
where judicial notice was requested by defense counsel and there is nothing showing the
court did not take judicial notice of the previous Pitchess motion.
We then turn to whether Johnson received ineffective assistance for defense
counsel’s failure to provide a plausible factual scenario as to officers Felix, Joseph,
Lozano, Short, and Guitron. The record again does not reveal the reason defense counsel

10 We note the third Pitchess motion requested judicial notice of the “previously
filed Pitchess motion.” On appeal, Johnson only argues the first Pitchess motion
provided an adequate factual scenario, and the court erred in failing to grant his third
motion on that basis. He does not argue the facts set forth in the second motion provided
an adequate factual scenario. However, even were we to consider the facts set forth in
both the first and second Pitchess motions, we still find no prejudice on this record. In
the second motion, defense counsel stated she received information from the investigator
for the district attorney regarding Callen’s use of force on an inmate in 2016. However,
because the incident of excessive force occurred in 2016, the time period suggests those
documents were already disclosed when the first Pitchess motion was granted. There
were no further facts showing good cause to support Johnson’s renewed request for a
different time than what was already covered when the court granted his first discovery
motion.

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did not provide a plausible factual scenario as to these officers.11 However, we find
defense counsel may have had a reasonable, tactical explanation for not providing an
additional factual scenario in the third Pitchess motion.
Johnson’s theory at trial was that he acted in self-defense. He further argued the
witnessing officers used excessive force and falsely reported the incident. Specifically,
Johnson claimed the officers who witnessed the incident and wrote incident reports
stating Johnson was the initial attacker lied to cover up the assault.12 Felix, Joseph,
Lozano, Short, and Guitron neither witnessed the incident nor was it alleged that the
officers used excessive force on Johnson.13 Thus, the truthfulness of these five officers
was not a material issue at trial. (C.f. Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 418–419
[Pitchess motion supported by declaration of counsel asserting that officer had made
material misstatements and stating that officer’s credibility would be material issue in
trial]; People v. Gill (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 743, 750–751 [good cause for Pitchess
discovery was established when the defendant sought complaints against the specific
officer who searched him and alleged the officer had planted the contraband to cover up
for the use of excessive force].)
At the hearing, the trial court rightly pointed out there was no plausible, factual
scenario related to dishonesty, excessive force, failing to follow procedures, or

11 We again note that claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately made
in a petition for habeas corpus. (See, e.g., Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 926.)
12 The record includes reports of the incident authored by Lomely, Callen, Smith,
and Early. These reports alleged Johnson swung at Callen first. Johnson argued the
reports were false, the officers were dishonest and claimed self-defense. We note there is
testimony which indicates that there were reports authored by Guitron and Short,
however, these reports are not part of the record on appeal. Thus, we will consider only
Guitron and Short’s testimony at trial. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1249
[“we cannot consider on appeal evidence that is not in the record”].)
13 While Johnson alleges Guitron witnessed the incident, the record indicates
otherwise. Guitron responded to the incident after it occurred.

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unbecoming conduct as it related to any of the officers. There was no objection to this
conclusion by either party and defense counsel reiterated his entire argument was set
forth in his motion. Given the facts of this case, as noted by the court without objection
by defense counsel, it is reasonable to assume there was no plausible factual scenario and
defense counsel wisely concluded offering any additional facts would be futile. (See,
e.g., People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 931 [no ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to make a frivolous motion].) Because there was a satisfactory explanation for
counsel’s inaction, Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot succeed.
Johnson also fails to show he was prejudiced by his attorney’s decision not to
include a plausible factual scenario as to the misconduct of Felix, Joseph, Lozano, Short,
and Guitron in his third Pitchess motion. Johnson again concedes prejudice cannot be
shown on the record, and requests remand for an in camera review of the personnel files
to determine whether he suffered prejudice. (See, Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 418–419.) We decline to remand for the reasons set forth below, because Johnson
failed to demonstrate a plausible factual theory to grant his discovery request as to Felix,
Joseph, Lozano, Short, and Guitron, and, in light of the record, Johnson was not
prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to provide a plausible factual scenario as to the
five above-named officers. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [prejudice must be
affirmatively proved; the record must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different”].)
We first point out that Felix, Joseph, and Lozano did not testify at trial or author
reports regarding the incident. The record shows Felix and Lozano escorted Johnson to a
holding cell after the altercation, however, there were no statements made by Felix or
Lozano in the reporting. Joseph took Callen’s picture after the altercation occurred. The
photograph was offered into evidence; the record does not show Joseph had any other

16.
involvement in the incident. Guitron responded to the incident after it occurred and
assisted Callen and Lomely in placing Johnson in handcuffs.
Short investigated the incident after it took place.14 Johnson now argues on appeal
that he made statements to Short that were omitted from Short’s testimony and report,
suggesting Short was dishonest. However, the record shows Short’s statements
substantially comported with Johnson’s version of the incident. Johnson testified that he
had to “defend” himself against Callen after he “put his hands on [him].” This is
consistent with Short’s testimony.
We note two instances where Johnson’s and Short’s testimony differ: Short said
Johnson never told him about Callen’s alleged offensive comment about his race or his
excessive use of force. While Johnson’s and Short’s testimony differ in these two
respects, we cannot conclude Johnson suffered prejudice by his counsel’s failure to
provide a plausible factual scenario that may have led to the discovery of Short’s
personnel records. Both Johnson and Short testified at trial, but the jury rejected
Johnson’s version of events. There is no reason to believe the failure to provide an
additional factual scenario in a pre-trial discovery Pitchess motion, which may have been
successful in obtaining Short’s personnel records, impacted the verdict.
In In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 730, the defendant claimed his counsel was
ineffective for failing to make a Pitchess motion to challenge the officer who the
defendant alleged beat him during an interrogation. Our high court rejected the
defendant’s claim because he did not present any evidence, other than his “bare
assertion,” to add to the evidence before the court or explain what his counsel would have

14 Short asked Johnson questions regarding the incident and took photos. As
previously set forth, Johnson’s four statements to Short are as follows: First, Johnson
told Short “he did [not] know what happened.” Then, Johnson said, “[i]t just happened.”
Third, Johnson told Short, “I [am not] no punk. I [am] not going to let no man put his
hands on me.” Lastly, Johnson stated, “Callen tried to put his hands on me, then it was
on. I just punched him in the head.”

17.
discovered had he made a Pitchess motion. (Avena, at p. 730.; see also California
Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1024–1025 [rejecting
“ ‘fishing expeditions’ ” into personnel records based on an unsupported allegation that
police officers are known to lie or that an “officer’s credibility is always at issue”].)
Similarly, the allegations here allow for little more than speculation about what may have
been discovered or added to the evidence from the personnel records of Felix, Joseph,
Lozano, Short, and Guitron. (See, e.g., People v. Collins (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137,
151 [trial court’s denial of the defendant’s Pitchess motion was not an abuse of discretion
when the defendant failed to show how the officers were involved or allege any facts that
provided reason to believe misconduct had occurred]; see also People v. Sanderson
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341.) The record fails to show Johnson suffered
prejudice by his attorney’s failure to include an additional factual scenario as to Felix,
Joseph, Lozano, Short, and Guitron in his third Pitchess motion.
We also reject Johnson’s claim that his due process rights were violated by
defense counsel’s failure to provide a plausible factual scenario for the renewed
discovery request as to Callen and Lomely and the alleged misconduct as to Felix,
Joseph, Lozano, Short, and Guitron that led to the denial of Johnson’s third
Pitchess motion. A defendant has the right to material evidence to receive a fair trial.
(Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 86–87 [nondisclosure by the prosecution violates
due process of the Fourteenth Amendment “where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment”]; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1225 [the prosecution has a
“constitutional obligation” to disclose “material exculpatory evidence so as not to
infringe the defendant’s right to a fair trial”].) However, California’s Pitchess standard
allowing defense discovery of officer personnel records “entitles a defendant to
information that will ‘facilitate the ascertainment of the facts’ at trial” and creates both a
“broader and lower threshold for disclosure than does the high court’s decision in Brady.”
(City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 14.) Johnson was unable to

18.
satisfy the Pitchess requirements nor was he able to prove prejudice on this record.
Therefore, there was no due process violation.
III. Racial Justice Act
Johnson argues for the first time on appeal that his conviction should be reversed
because the statements Callen made to him prior to their altercation reflected law
enforcement was biased and the comment was prejudicial to the outcome of his case in
violation of the Racial Justice Act (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)). He further contends, if the issue
is forfeited, his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion on these grounds
(§ 745, subd. (c)).
The People respond Johnson forfeited his RJA claim. Reaching the merits, the
People assert Johnson’s claim fails because Callen was a victim and not “a law
enforcement officer involved in the case.” Specifically, the People maintain Callen was
not involved in the collection of evidence and did not make a racial comment during any
of the proceedings.
We conclude Johnson forfeited his RJA claim, and he failed to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. Additional Background
In defense counsel’s affidavit filed in support of Johnson’s first Pitchess motion,
defense counsel claimed prior to the altercation, Callen made an alleged offensive
comment to Johnson.
At trial, Johnson detailed the verbal exchange leading up to the altercation: he
was called for a disciplinary hearing on the prison’s loud speaker and knocked on the
door to the building where it was held. Callen made an alleged offensive comment to
Johnson. Johnson left the building. In response to Callen, Johnson said, “man, why you
talking to me like that? You know, I [am] a man too.” When Johnson returned to the
office, Callen said “something else smart and disrespectful” and because of this, Johnson

19.
told Callen, “F you, bitch.” Johnson claimed that after he called Callen a “bitch,” Callen
initiated a physical altercation.
Callen said he ordered Johnson out of the program area because he was “out of
bounds[.]”
Short testified Johnson never told him about Callen’s alleged offensive comment
during the interview after the altercation.
There were no further comments regarding Johnson’s race during any of the trial
proceedings.
B. Overview of California’s Racial Justice Act
Effective January 1, 2021, the Racial Justice Act prohibits state criminal
convictions or sentences “on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745,
subd. (a).) The purpose of the RJA is “to eliminate racial bias from California’s
criminal justice system because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal
trial, is intolerable [and] inimical to a fair criminal justice system[.]” (Stats. 2020,
ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).)
“A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of
evidence, that any of the following” individuals involved in the case, including a judge,
attorney, law enforcement officer, expert witness, or juror, “exhibited bias or animus
towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
(§ 745, subd. (a)(1).) The statute defines the phrase “ ‘[r]acially discriminatory
language” as “language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to
racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language,
language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the
defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin. Evidence that
particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the
defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining
whether language is discriminatory.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).) Once the defendant has

20.
learned a violation under the RJA occurred, a motion should be made “as soon as
practicable[.]” (§ 745, subd. (c).) “After a judgment has been entered, if the court finds
that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall
vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new
proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).)
Effective January 1, 2024, a new provision to the RJA was added by the
Legislature through Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1118),
permitting a claim to be raised on direct appeal alleging a violation of section 745,
subdivision (a), and authorizing a defendant to move to stay the appeal and request
remand to the superior court to file a motion. (Stats. 2023, ch. 464, § 1; § 745, subd. (b).)
However, “[t]he statute does not state that a defendant may raise a section 745 claim on
direct appeal for the first time and does not refer to the general appellate rules governing
the preservation or forfeiture of claims presented on direct appeal.” (Ibid; see also
People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 810 (Lashon).)
C. Johnson Forfeited His Claim
Johnson argues Callen exhibited racial bias when he made an alleged offensive
comment because Johnson is a “Black man.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(1).) Johnson argues his
RJA claim may be raised for the first time on appeal, citing In re Sheena K. (2007) 40
Cal.4th 875, 887–888, footnote 7, for the proposition that the forfeiture rule is
inapplicable when a defendant raises constitutional claims on appeal that involve pure
questions of law or when it is uncertain whether the forfeiture rule applies. He requests
this court exercise our discretion to reach his RJA claim on the merits. (People v.
Abbaszadeh (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 642, 649.)
We are not persuaded this case presents circumstances warranting an exception
from general forfeiture rules. Only Johnson injected the alleged offensive comment into
the trial proceedings. Johnson’s testimony is also ambiguous as to whether the comment
occurred. No less than two times Johnson testified Callen made an alleged offensive

21.
comment or simply told him to take his “ass” out the door. Johnson’s claim is not a
constitutional challenge that presents pure question of law but requires reference to and
consideration of circumstances of the case and the record. (See, e.g., People v. Potts
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1035–1036.)
Moreover, defense counsel became aware of Callen’s alleged offensive comment
at least on or before January 2018 when he filed Johnson’s first Pitchess motion.
Defense counsel never filed a motion based on the RJA even though the jury rendered a
guilty verdict over two years after the RJA became effective.15
We note section 745, subdivision (b) was amended by AB 1118 to permit a
defendant to “raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from
the conviction or sentence.” However, two recent decisions held the general forfeiture
rules apply to section 745 claims raised on direct appeal despite AB 1118. (People v.
Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 113 (Singh); Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 812
[“a section 745 claim like any other appellate claim, is subject to the general appellate
rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been but were not made in
the trial court”].)
The court in Lashon considered the legislative history of the RJA and noted “the
Legislature did not intend to allow a defendant to pursue such a claim for the first time on
direct appeal where it could have been but was not raised in the trial court.” (Lashon,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813; see also Singh, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 113 [the
defendant forfeited his RJA claim for failure to raise it first in the trial court despite
AB 1118’s amendment to section 745].)
We agree and apply these authorities to the instant case. Johnson’s RJA claim is
forfeited for failure to file a motion in the trial court. However, because Johnson

15 An amended information was filed on April 10, 2023, and a jury trial took place
a few days later, with the jury rendering a guilty verdict on April 14, 2023.

22.
contends his counsel was ineffective, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of his
contentions. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161‒162, fn. 6 (Williams)
[an appellate court has authority to reach a forfeited claim].)
D. Defense Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assistance for Failing to File a
RJA Motion
To circumvent forfeiture, Johnson argues his counsel provided ineffective
assistance for his failure to file a motion based on a violation of the RJA. As set forth
above, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must
establish deficient performance and resulting prejudice. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 687.) “A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a trial attorney’s failure to
make a motion … must demonstrate not only the absence of a tactical reason for the
omission (People v. Fosselman [(1983)] 33 Cal.3d [572,] 584), but also that the
motion … would have been meritorious if the defendant is to bear his burden of
demonstrating that it is reasonably probable that absent the omission a determination
more favorable to defendant would have resulted.” (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d
826, 876.)
The record is silent as to why defense counsel failed to file such a motion.16
However, we find that there was a reasonable, tactical reason why defense counsel failed
to file a RJA motion. Defense counsel could have reasonably believed Callen’s alleged
offensive comment to Johnson was not in violation of section 745, subdivision (a).
Johnson injected the alleged offensive comment into the proceedings. No other witness
corroborated his version of events. The prosecution and defense did not refer to
Johnson’s race during the trial, nor was it ever argued Johnson’s race was a factor in the
altercation. The alleged offensive comment occurred prior to the altercation and had

16 Claims of ineffective assistance on a silent record are more appropriately made
in a petition for habeas corpus. (See, e.g., Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 926.)

23.
nothing to do with his claim of self-defense. For example, Johnson did not argue Callen
initiated the altercation or used “excessive force” because of his racial bias/animus.
Accordingly, defense counsel could have reasonably concluded a motion on this basis
would not have been meritorious, particularly because the comment was introduced into
the trial proceedings by Johnson and all other witnesses’ discussion of the events leading
up to the altercation did not include language referencing his race.
We also find Johnson failed to establish but for counsel’s failure to file a motion,
“the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 694.) The record is not clear in this case as to whether the trial court would have
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Callen’s alleged offensive comment to
Johnson established Callen “exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of
the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin,” or was a use of “racially
discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin” such
that it amounted to a violation of section 745, subdivision (a). Here, Johnson argued
Callen made an alleged offensive comment. If true, this is “language that references the
defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745,
subd. (h)(4).) However, even assuming Callen made the alleged offensive comment
when he ordered Johnson out of the area, there is no evidence that Callen’s comment or
actions, either implicitly or explicitly, showed racial bias. “Certainly, an officer (or other
participant in the criminal justice process), observing that a defendant is Black, could
‘unintentionally’ treat them differently.” (Bonds v. Superior Court (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 821, 829.) But there is no evidence showing Callen ordered Johnson out
of the area because of his race; instead, Callen directed Johnson to leave because he was
“out of bounds[.]” As previously stated, the language Callen used when he commanded
Johnson to leave the area had nothing to do with the altercation or Johnson’s defense
theory at trial. Johnson’s claim is circular: he argues Callen made an alleged offensive
comment one time, therefore the RJA was violated.

24.
In People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323, 336, a case relied upon by
Johnson, the Second District held the prosecutor’s comment violated subdivision (a) of
section 745 because it equated the defendant’s “skin tone and ‘ethnic presentation’ with
deception, implying that [the defendant] was not a credible witness because the color of
his skin fooled women and confused strangers.” The Simmons court found the suggestion
that a witness is lying based on nothing more than his complexion is “baseless” and
exactly the kind of racially biased language that section 745 targets. (Ibid.)
The facts of our case are not analogous. The only racial comments that infiltrated
the trial proceedings were elicited by Johnson’s own testimony. Neither party urged the
jury to convict Johnson on that basis. (Cf. People v. Stubblefield (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
896, 923 [the prosecutor’s closing argument statements, arguing that the defendant’s race
was a central factor in the explanation for the decision not to search the defendant’s
house for a firearm constituted “racially discriminatory language” in violation of RJA].)
Moreover, the evidence shows Callen was the victim in this case and Johnson claimed
Callen made the comment to justify his verbal confrontation prior to the altercation.
We also point out that there were several factual disputes as to the precise
language used by Callen or whether the comment actually occurred. Johnson testified
Callen made an alleged offensive comment, however, Johnson omitted the reference to
his race two different times while being questioned at trial. Because of these omissions,
it is reasonable to conclude the reference to Johnson’s race was simply how he referred to
himself rather than a cultural or racially biased term allegedly used by Callen. All other
testifying witnesses denied the racial comment was made. This is not a situation in which
we could decide, if Johnson made a motion under the RJA, it would have been
meritorious. (See, Singh, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 119.)
Johnson fails to persuade us that had defense counsel made a timely motion
asserting that the People violated the RJA, the motion would have been granted. Johnson

25.
has not established either deficient performance or the resulting prejudice required to
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
E. Defense Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assistance for Failing To File a
RJA Motion for Discovery
Finally, Johnson argues he received ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s
failure to file a discovery motion that would have enabled him to develop further facts in
support of his RJA motion. Johnson contends his account of the events surrounding the
incident provided a plausible scenario that a RJA violation “could or might have
occurred” in his case. The People respond Johnson cannot show a plausible factual basis
to support his claim or that he suffered prejudice as a result. We agree with the People.
Subdivision (d) of section 745 allows a defendant to file a motion requesting
disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential RJA violation. Once the
defendant has shown good cause, the court shall order the records to be released. (§ 745,
subd. (d).) “[T]he good cause requirement for discovery under the [RJA], like the
showing required for the disclosure of law enforcement records under Pitchess, requires a
defendant ‘only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a
violation of the [RJA] “could or might have occurred’ in his case.” ’ ” (People v. Garcia
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 290, 296–297 (Garcia).) The standard is minimal and even more
relaxed than the good cause standard for Pitchess discovery. (Id. at p. 297.) The RJA
counterpart to Pitchess materiality is “ ‘relevan[ce] to a potential violation of
[section 745,] subdivision (a).’ ” (Young v. Superior Court of Solano County (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 138, 160 (Young).)
We turn to whether Johnson received ineffective assistance because his counsel
failed to move the court for discovery under the RJA. The record is silent as to the
reason why defense counsel did not move for discovery under the RJA. However, for the
reasons set forth above, defense counsel could have reasonably concluded a plausible,
factual foundation that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred, did not exist.

26.
(See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 804 [defense counsel’s decision not
to file a motion he believes would be futile does not impair defendant’s right to effective
assistance of counsel].)
Regardless, Johnson failed to establish he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s
failure to file a motion for discovery pursuant to the RJA. (§ 745, subd. (d).) The First
District articulated the relatively relaxed standard courts should use when assessing
whether the defendant presented a plausible justification for discovery under the RJA.
(Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159–161.) In order to obtain discovery under the
RJA, the defendant must show relevance to a potential section 745, subdivision (a)
violation—“that is, each request for disclosure must be reasonably calculated to lead to
discovery of admissible evidence probative of a section 745, subdivision (a) violation.”
(Id. at p. 160.)
In Young, the trial court denied the defendant’s discovery motion ruling that it was
based on nothing more than the defendant’s race. (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 145.) In vacating the court’s order denying discovery, the reviewing court reasoned
the lower court was factually incorrect; the defendant presented specific allegations of a
racially motivated traffic stop. (Id. at p. 144, 161.) The defendant argued “he is black …
studies in California have shown black drivers are more likely to be stopped by police
than any other racial group, and … the circumstances of the traffic stop leading to [the
defendant’s] arrest suggest[ed] the traffic stop … was racially motivated.” (Id. at p. 161.)
For example, the defendant contended he was stopped for traffic infractions, but he was
never cited for any. (Id. at p. 161.) He further claimed the stop was a pretext to search
his vehicle, he was forcibly beaten when he questioned the officer’s desire for him to
leave his vehicle, and the officer who stopped him had “ample opportunity to observe
him and take note of his skin color” which may amount to racial profiling. (Ibid.)
The First District summarized the defendant’s theory for discovery: “Police
officers exercise broad discretion in carrying out their power to arrest, and if there is

27.
racial bias at the level of who is arrested for possession of [drugs] for sale, the
discretionary choices officers make will be reflected in the pool of suspects the district
attorney ultimately decides to charge, and may therefore taint the charging process.”
(Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) The reviewing court vacated the trial court’s
ruling and remanded the matter for consideration of the defendant’s facts and theory
relied upon against the backdrop of the RJA’s relaxed plausible justification standard for
obtaining discovery. (Id. at pp. 159–160, 169.)
The facts of our case are far less specific than the theory presented in Young.
Here, Johnson failed to set forth any specific reasons why there was a violation of the
RJA other than prior to the altercation, Callen made an alleged offensive comment There
were no facts suggesting racial profiling played a part in Johnson’s charge, warranting
discovery. (See, e.g., Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 166; see also, Garcia, supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 296–297.) As the Young court pointed out, “if [the defendant] indeed
argued nothing more than that he is a black person who was charged with felony
possession of [drugs] for sale—the court would have been right to deny his discovery
motion.” (Id. at p. 161.) This is the situation we have here. Johnson’s only plausible
justification was his race. Johnson does not specify any facts or evidence supporting a
section 745, subdivision (d) discovery motion, and the record fails to disclose any
information that may be relevant to Johnson’s claim. While the threshold showing
requires only a “plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation …
‘could or might have occurred,’ ” here, Johnson’s contentions identify no such facts
justifying discovery. (Young, at p. 159.) Johnson failed to demonstrate a plausible
factual scenario that a RJA violation could or might have occurred. (Id., at pp. 144–145.)
Thus, Johnson cannot show he was prejudiced for his counsel’s failure to bring a
discovery motion under the RJA. Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
For these reasons, we also reject Johnson’s due process challenge. Because the
record does not show a plausible factual scenario that a RJA violation could or might

28.
have occurred or any resulting prejudice, Johnson’s trial was not fundamentally unfair
such that it was a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

FAIN, J.*
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

PEÑA, J.

* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

29.

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