CourtListener 10382518•People v. Wallace CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 4/22/25 P. v. Wallace CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B340347
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA075709)
v.
DENNIS WALLACE,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
Defendant and appellant Dennis Wallace appeals from the
trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).1 Defendant’s
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no substantive change. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its
new numbering.
appointed appellate counsel found no arguable issues and filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). Finding that the argument raised by defendant in
his supplemental brief lacks merit, we affirm the denial of his
section 1172.6 petition.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
A. The murder of Tyronn Bickham (Bickham) and
attempted murder of Emond Taylor (Taylor)
On the night of August 10, 2001, Taylor was standing
outside with Bickham and a woman near the trunk of Bickham’s
car. (People v. Wallace (Jan. 8, 2014, B243535) [nonpub. opn.]
(Wallace).) Taylor saw a white Nissan Altima occupied by four
people, including defendant, who was driving, and Deeya Khalill
(Khalill), who was sitting in the front passenger seat. (Ibid.) “As
the Altima drove by, Taylor heard someone in the car say, ‘“They
get a pass’” or ‘“Hey, you straight.”’” (Ibid.)
“Several minutes later, after the [woman] had departed,
Taylor saw the Altima again. The Altima . . . stopped near an
alley. Taylor could see that [defendant] and Khalill were still in
the front seat of the car. [¶] A person wearing a black hoodie got
out of the back seat and walked to the corner. The person began
shooting. Taylor ran towards his house, and Bickham ran in
another direction. Taylor jumped over his fence, ran into the
back, and entered his house. Taylor told his brother that
someone was shooting at him.
2 We provide these facts, drawn from our nonpublished
opinion in defendant’s direct appeal from his conviction, for
context only.
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“A short time later, Taylor heard a knock on the door.
When Taylor opened the door, he saw Bickham, who had been hit
by gunshots. Bickham fell to the ground. Taylor called 9-1-1. [¶]
Bickham later died from his gunshot wounds.” (Wallace, supra,
B243535.)
A responding sheriff’s deputy recovered 18 expended shell
casings “from ‘7.62 by 39-millimeter’ rounds [that] were all fired
from the same weapon.” (Wallace, supra, B243535.) A month
later, “the sheriff’s department conducted a search of
[defendant]’s residence, which was approximately four blocks
south of where the shooting had occurred. At that time, Khalill
was also in the residence. In a bedroom closet, deputies
recovered a magazine for an AK-47 that was loaded with ‘7.62 by
39-millimeter’ rounds. . . . A white Nissan Altima was located at
the residence . . . .” (Ibid.)
B. The murder of Adiel Quezada (Quezada)
On the night of July 25, 2008, Steven Buchanan
(Buchanan) “heard something that sounded like gunshots. He
went outside and got into a vehicle with his friend. [¶] Three to
five minutes later, Buchanan saw a male clad in a hoodie running
past the car as if ‘he had done something.’ The male ran across
the street and stood on the sidewalk. The man eventually got
into a black Chevy Tahoe that was driving by, and the Chevy
then drove away.” (Wallace, supra, B243535.) A responding
sheriff’s deputy saw Quezada “bleeding from apparent gunshot
wounds to his body. Paramedics unsuccessfully tried to
resuscitate Quezada, who was pronounced dead at the scene.”
(Ibid.)
Samuel Feissa (Feissa) heard about Quezada’s murder
during several conversations. (Wallace, supra, B243535.) These
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included a telephone conversation during which Khalill told
Feissa that, after seeing a rival gang member, he and defendant
drove to Khalill’s house and “retrieved ‘burners’ (guns). They
walked down the street and returned to Quezada, asked him
where he was from, and then Khalill and [Raymond] Gibbs
[(Gibbs)] ‘dumped him out,’ meaning they shot Quezada. . . .
[Defendant] got into a dark blue Chevy Tahoe and left.” (Wallace,
supra, B243535.)
Feissa also had a conversation with Gibbs during which
“Gibbs said that he and Khalill had walked over to Quezada, that
Khalill had asked Quezada where he was from, and that Khalill
and Gibbs had shot him while [defendant] waited across the
street as a ‘lookout and cover.’” (Wallace, supra, B243535.)
II. Procedural History
A. Conviction and sentencing
In 2011, a jury found defendant guilty of the first degree
murder of Quezada (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), the first degree
murder of Bickham (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2), and the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Taylor (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a); count 3).3 The jury found true a multiple murder
special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) As to counts 1 and
2, the jury found true allegations that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
and death. (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1).) As to count 3, the
jury found true the allegation that a principal was armed with a
firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) As to all counts, the jury found
3 Khalill and Gibbs were charged and tried with defendant.
(Wallace, supra, B243535.) Khalill was convicted on counts 1, 2,
and 3; Gibbs was convicted on count 1. (Ibid.) Neither Khalill
nor Gibbs is a party to this appeal.
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true allegations that the offenses were committed for the benefit
of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street
gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for counts 1 and 2, plus two terms of 25 years
to life for the firearm enhancements. Ten-year sentences for the
gang enhancements on counts 1 and 2 were stayed. For count 3,
defendant was sentenced to a term of life, plus 11 years, which
included a 10-year gang enhancement.
B. Direct appeal
On direct appeal, we ordered the 10-year gang
enhancement on count 3 struck and replaced by a 15-year
minimum parole eligibility term. (Wallace, supra, B243535.) We
also ordered the modification of the abstract of judgment to
reflect joint and several liability for victim restitution. (Ibid.)
We otherwise affirmed the judgment. (Ibid.)
C. Section 1172.6 petition
On January 3, 2024, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The People opposed the
petition, arguing that defendant was ineligible for relief because
he was convicted based on a theory of being a direct aider and
abettor and that no jury instructions were given on felony
murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any
other theory of imputed malice. Defendant’s appointed counsel
declined to file a reply.
The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s section 1172.6
petition on July 29, 2024. After entertaining oral argument, the
court denied the petition, concluding that defendant had not
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. The court
noted that aiding and abetting instructions were given to
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defendant’s jury, but they had not been instructed on felony
murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
D. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed from the order denying his
section 1172.6 petition. Counsel was appointed to represent
defendant in connection with the appeal. After reviewing the
record, appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues but
requesting that we exercise our discretion to independently
review the record.
On December 16, 2024, we notified defendant that he had
30 days within which to personally submit a supplemental brief
or letter stating any grounds for an appeal, contentions, or
arguments for us to consider. We also informed defendant that
his appeal could be dismissed if a supplemental brief or letter
was not timely filed. Defendant filed a supplemental brief on
January 2, 2025.
DISCUSSION
We decline appellate counsel’s invitation to undertake an
independent review of the record. Instead, we limit our review of
the order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition to any
argument raised by defendant in his supplemental brief.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 [“If the defendant . . . files
a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is required to
evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to
issue a written opinion”].)
In his supplemental brief, defendant asserts: “In 2001 a
sole eyewitness said I was not the person. Almost ten years later
he changed that. 2008, the sole wit[]ness testified I was not the
person he saw. I still stand convicted.”
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We are unable to provide any relief based on defendant’s
contention. The sole purpose of a section 1172.6 petition is to
allow persons convicted of murder or other eligible crimes to
obtain retroactive relief if they could not now be convicted under
recently amended murder statutes. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957; People v. Duran
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 927.) Section 1172.6 “does not afford
the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or
attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947; see
also People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865
[“Section 1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal”].)
Defendant does not present any cogent argument directed at
whether the summary denial of his section 1172.6 petition was
erroneous, which is the only issue properly before us.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. CHAVEZ, J. RICHARDSON, J.
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