CourtListener 10382016•People v. McNabb CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 4/21/25 P. v. McNabb CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B335849
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA092770)
v.
MARK McNABB,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed.
Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In 2017, Mark McNabb pled no contest to three counts of
second degree robbery and admitted personal use of a firearm
allegations, two prior strike allegations, one prior serious felony
allegation, and two prior prison term allegations. The court
imposed one prior prison term enhancement. In 2023, McNabb
filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.75.1 At resentencing, the court struck the now
invalid prior prison term enhancement but denied McNabb’s
request that it strike the additional enhancements under
section 1385. On appeal, McNabb contends this was an abuse of
discretion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2016, McNabb was charged by information with three
counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 1, 2, & 5).3 As to
each count, the information alleged that he personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The information also alleged that
McNabb had suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12,
667, subds. (b)–(j)), two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)),
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 We do not include a summary of the facts underlying
McNabb’s conviction as they are not relevant to the issue on
appeal.
3 The information also charged two codefendants with second
degree robbery and attempted second degree robbery in counts 2
through 9. Only the codefendants were charged in counts 3, 4,
and 6 through 9.
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and had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In October 2017, McNabb pled no contest to counts 1, 2,
and 5. He also admitted the personal use of a firearm allegations
and that he suffered two prior strike convictions, one serious
prior felony conviction, and two prior prison terms. The court
granted McNabb’s motion to strike a juvenile prior conviction
under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
The People moved to dismiss one prior serious felony allegation,
and the court also recognized that one of the prior prison term
enhancements could not be imposed because it was also the basis
for one of the prior strike allegations.
The trial court sentenced McNabb to a total prison term of
21 years and eight months. The sentence consisted of the
following: five years (the upper term), doubled under the Three
Strikes law, plus one year for the personal use enhancement
(count 1); one year (one-third of the midterm), doubled, plus four
months for the personal use enhancement (count 2); and one year
(one-third of the midterm), doubled, plus four months, for the
personal use enhancement, plus five years, for the prior serious
felony enhancement, and one year for the prior prison term
enhancement (count 5). The trial court granted the People’s
motion to dismiss any remaining counts and strike any
remaining allegations.
In October 2023, McNabb petitioned for resentencing under
section 1172.75, moving to strike the section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement. (§ 1172.75
[deeming § 667.5, subd. (b) prior prison term enhancements
invalid except when based on sexually violent offense, and
creating resentencing procedure].) McNabb additionally
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requested that the court strike the personal use and serious
felony enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c).
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2) [in resentencing, court must apply
changes in law that reduce sentences or give court discretion to
eliminate sentencing disparities and promote uniformity of
sentences].)
In November 2023, the court struck McNabb’s prior prison
term enhancement pursuant to section 1172.75. It then
considered McNabb’s request regarding the remaining
enhancements. The court indicated it had reviewed McNabb’s
points and authorities in support of the petition and supporting
documentation, as well as the probation report and the relevant
portions of the case file, of which it had taken judicial notice. It
provided a tentative ruling indicating it recognized its discretion
under section 1385 and was not inclined to strike the
enhancements.
After hearing argument, including the People’s opposition
to McNabb’s request, the court declined to strike the remaining
enhancements. The court explained:
“The court recognizes its authority to strike
priors and enhancements under [section] 1385 . . . . I
recognize that there is a presumption. I recognize
that there is a preference. And the Legislature has
been clear that they want to—for the court to find
those opportunities to strike enhancements and
allegations in a case, particularly those that would
result in multiple enhancements rising to a sentence
of in excess of 20 years.
“In this case the defendant was charged with
multiple counts of robbery involving a firearm. He
was also looking at multiple life sentences. He
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negotiated the settlement of 21 years and eight
months.
“The State Legislature has [seen] fit that the
court should be able to reexamine negotiated pleas
and determine and exercise its discretion.
Recognizing my discretion, I do think that in the
interest of justice that it would be an abuse of my
discretion to impose a sentence that does not include
these enhancements in light of the conduct and the
pleas that were entered at the time of the sentence in
October of 2017.”
The court resentenced McNabb to a term of 16 years and
eight months. The new sentence consisted of the mid-term on
count 1 (3 years), doubled as a result of the strike, plus one year
for the personal use enhancement; the same sentence on count 2
as previously imposed (2 years and 4 months); and the same
sentence on count 5, without the prior prison term enhancement
(7 years and 4 months).
McNabb filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
McNabb Has Not Established that the Trial Court
Abused Its Discretion in Denying His Request to
Strike His Multiple Enhancements Under
Section 1385
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) amended section 1385. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) As
amended, section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides that “the court
shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by
any initiative statute.” Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) states
that “the court shall consider and afford great weight” to evidence
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of certain enumerated mitigating circumstances. “[T]he presence
of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
(Ibid.) One of the mitigating circumstance is when “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
(Id., subd. (c)(2)(B).)
In his opening brief on appeal, McNabb argued the trial
court erred because section 1385, subdivision (c) requires that the
trial court dismiss all but one enhancement unless it finds
dismissal would endanger public safety. At the time, there was a
split of authority regarding the scope of the trial court’s
discretion not to dismiss enhancements in the absence of a
finding that dismissal would endanger public safety. (Compare
People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087 (Ortiz), with People v.
Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386.)
However, shortly after McNabb filed his opening brief, our
high court clarified the sentencing court’s discretion under
section 1385 in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028
(Walker). In Walker, the court rejected the argument that
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), created a rebuttable presumption
in favor of dismissal that can only be overcome by a finding that
the dismissal would endanger public safety. (Walker, at p. 1033.)
Walker held that “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the
enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.
[Citation.] In other words, if the court does not find that
dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an
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enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may
nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1029.)
McNabb acknowledges Walker in his reply brief. However,
he maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to give great weight to the enumerated mitigating factor of his
multiple enhancements; failing to find “ ‘substantial, credible,
evidence of countervailing factors’ that neutralized the weight of
the mitigating circumstance”; and failing to make a “specific
finding” that dismissal of the enhancements would endanger
public safety.
We review a trial court’s decision declining to strike an
enhancement under section 1385 for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225; People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza); see also
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) A court abuses its
discretion if its decision is “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it” (Carmony, at p. 377), or if
the decision is made without the sentencing court’s informed
discretion or the court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary
powers. (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.)
“ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly
show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.” ’ ”
(Carmony, at p. 376.)
We begin with McNabb’s argument that the judgment must
be reversed because there was an enumerated mitigating
circumstance and the trial court failed to make a specific finding
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that dismissing the enhancements would endanger public safety.
Walker clarified that the trial court has the discretion not to
dismiss enhancements even if such a finding is not made. As the
court explained in Walker, the court may decline to dismiss
enhancements if it finds “substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors” that “ ‘neutralize even the great weight of
the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the
enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ [Citation.]”
(Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.)
We reject McNabb’s contention that the trial court’s ruling
was not based on such substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors. The record indicates the underlying
crimes involved three separate victims, on two different dates,
and McNabb personally used a firearm in each robbery. Further,
according to the probation report, McNabb was on parole for a
prior robbery when he committed the two new charged robberies.
The trial court expressly noted the charges involved multiple
counts of robbery and the use of a firearm, and further noted that
McNabb was exposed to multiple life sentences for the charged
crimes. (See Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 293
[defendant’s use of a firearm to carry out a robbery was evidence
of risk to public safety].)
McNabb does not assert that this evidence was not
reasonable, credible, or of solid value. He makes no specific
argument as to the court’s consideration of his conduct and the
seriousness of the charged crimes, except to assert that the court
incorrectly understood that section 1385 did not apply because
his conviction resulted from a plea. This argument, however,
misconstrues the trial court’s ruling. While the court noted
McNabb’s plea, it did not find that the plea itself precluded
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dismissal of the enhancements. To the contrary, it expressly
recognized that the Legislature allowed the trial court to
“exercise its discretion” to strike enhancements despite a
negotiated plea.
We further reject McNabb’s contention that the trial court
gave insufficient weight to the mitigating factor of his multiple
enhancements. In Walker, the court explained that the term
“great weight” as used in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), “refers
to ‘the trial court’s evaluation of the defendant’s evidence in the
first instance[ ]’ [citation]” and “requires a sentencing court to
‘engage[ ] in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the
enumerated mitigating factors.’ [Citation.]” (Walker, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1034, quoting Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1096, 1098.) Regarding “weighs greatly,” the court reasoned
that this requires the court “ ‘to consider carefully,’ ‘to a great
extent,’ ‘extensively, exceedingly; highly’ ” the mitigating
circumstances. (Walker, at p. 1035.) But the Walker court
emphasized that, “ultimately, the court must determine whether
dismissal is in furtherance of justice.” (Id. at p. 1036.)
Although the trial court here ruled on McNabb’s request
without the benefit of Walker, it expressly acknowledged there
was a legislative preference for dismissal. Indeed, the court
appeared to follow the line of reasoning later rejected in Walker,
which held there is a presumption of dismissal when the
mitigating circumstance of multiple enhancements is present.
Applying this arguably higher threshold, the court indicated it
had reviewed the record and considered the relevant
circumstances. We have no basis to conclude the court failed to
engage in the “holistic balancing” described in Walker, with
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proper consideration of the mitigating factor. (Walker, supra, 16
Cal.5th at pp. 1035–1036.)
Finally, we disagree that the trial court was required to
state that it gave the mitigating factor “great weight,” make
specific findings, or use any precise or specialized language
regarding the “countervailing factors” to establish it properly
exercised its discretion pursuant to section 1385. “[N]o particular
language [is] required for the trial court to decline to dismiss one
of the four enhancements . . . . Section 1385, subdivision (a),
requires a trial court to state its ‘reasons for the dismissal . . .
orally on the record,’ but there is no similar statutory
requirement when a court denies a request to dismiss an
enhancement.” (People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144,
1157, italics added.)
Here, the trial court expressly considered the presence of
an enumerated mitigating circumstance, stated that it
understood its discretion under section 1385, and declined to
strike the enhancements in the interests of justice. “We assume
the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law.” (People
v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724; see also People v.
Calhoun (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 [a court’s sentencing
decision implies requisite subsidiary findings].) McNabb has not
established that the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that dismissing the personal firearm use and serious
felony enhancements was not in furtherance of justice.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
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