CourtListener 10381288•Marino v. Rayant
Testo completo
Filed 3/24/25; Certified for Publication 4/18/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
LAWRENCE MARINO, B337874
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STRO06089)
v.
MARK ALON RAYANT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gary Eto, Judge. Affirmed.
The Vora Law Firm and Nilay U. Vora for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Lawrence Marino, also known as Laurent Marino, obtained
an 18-month civil harassment restraining order against
Mark Alon Rayant in a proceeding at which Rayant was not
present. Rayant later appeared, arguing he had not received
notice of Marino’s restraining order request and the request was
without merit. The trial court terminated the restraining order.
Rayant then moved to seal the entire record of the
restraining order proceedings, citing concerns the proceedings
had negatively impacted background checks as he applied for jobs
and subjected him to increased scrutiny by airport authorities
when returning from international travel. The trial court denied
the sealing request because Rayant had not made the necessary
showing for sealing under the California Rules of Court. 1 Rayant
appeals from that order. Marino has not filed a respondent’s
brief.
Rayant contends there is no federal constitutional right of
public access to records of restraining order proceedings, and
therefore the court rules for sealing records, which are based on
federal constitutional requirements as interpreted by our
Supreme Court, are inapplicable.
Although the sealing rules are based on federal
constitutional principles, they provide an independent, statutory
right of public access to court records. The unambiguous
language of those rules creates a broad presumption of public
access to all superior court records with only limited exceptions,
none of which applies in the instant case. The trial court did not
1 Unspecified rule citations are to the California Rules of
Court.
2
err in finding Rayant had not met the high bar for sealing
imposed by those rules.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. Restraining orders
On February 24, 2022, the trial court granted Rayant a
three-year civil harassment restraining order against Marino,
identified in the order as Laurent Marino, under Code of Civil
Procedure section 527.6. At the hearing on the restraining order,
Rayant testified to Marino’s unwanted romantic overtures
towards him. After Rayant rebuffed Marino, Marino continued to
contact Rayant through text messages and e-mail. When Marino
appeared at Rayant’s apartment unannounced, Rayant called the
police.
On September 21, 2022, Marino, identifying himself as
Lawrence Marino, filed for a restraining order against Rayant
under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Marino claimed
Rayant, inter alia, sent him harassing text messages, including
“racist/islamophobic” messages, “made up stories to have my
friends call me in the middle of the night,” “threatened to file
false police reports,” and “contacted my school to get personal
information about me and find my new location.” Marino filed a
proof of service indicating personal service on Rayant at an
address on South Hill Street on September 22, 2022.
The trial court granted Marino’s restraining order request
on October 12, 2022, and issued an 18-month restraining order
against Rayant. Rayant did not appear at the restraining order
hearing. Marino filed another proof of service indicating the
3
restraining order was mailed to Rayant at the South Hill Street
Address as well as to Rayant’s family home in San Francisco.
2. Request to terminate restraining order
On February 6, 2023, Rayant filed a request to terminate
the restraining order against him. In a supporting declaration,
Rayant averred he had had no voluntary contact with Marino
since 2021 and had never sought to obtain Marino’s contact
information. Rayant further averred he did not live at the South
Hill Street address at the time Marino purportedly served him
with the restraining order request, and “ha[d] never been
personally served with any documents in this case.” Rayant
claimed he did not receive a copy of the restraining order against
him until December 8, 2022 and then only at his family’s home in
San Francisco.
In his memorandum of points and authorities, Rayant
argued Marino obtained the restraining order under false
pretenses, including claiming to have served Rayant when he had
not, and concealing from the court that Rayant already had a
restraining order against Marino. Rayant argued there was no
factual basis for a restraining order against him, and that Marino
should be sanctioned for committing a fraud on the court.
At the conclusion of his memorandum, Rayant requested
the court seal Marino’s restraining order request and the
restraining order itself. Rayant cited his “interest in preventing
future employers, educational institutions, and other personal or
professional contacts from having access to a fraudulently
obtained restraining order . . . .”
Marino filed a memorandum and declaration in opposition
in which he offered further explanation for why he sought the
restraining order against Rayant, and disputed the propriety of
4
the restraining order Rayant obtained against Marino. Marino
attached a declaration from the individual who purportedly
served Rayant with the restraining order request, who claimed to
have personally served an individual matching Marino’s
description of Rayant.
The parties appeared for a hearing on Rayant’s motion to
terminate the restraining order on March 9, 2023. At Marino’s
request, the court continued the hearing to April 11, 2023.
Marino, however, did not appear at the continued hearing on
April 11, and the court proceeded without him.
At the April 11 hearing, in response to the court’s
questioning, Rayant testified he had moved out of the South Hill
Street address on June 30, 2022, months before Marino
purportedly served him with the restraining order request on
September 21, 2022, and had never been back to that location.
Rayant had not had contact with Marino since Marino appeared
at his apartment in February 2022. The court asked if Rayant
and Marino had any mutual friends, and Rayant answered he
believed all of their mutual friends had ceased contact with
Marino. Rayant stated he had no reason to have contact with
Marino in the future, and had been trying to avoid him.
The court then found, based on the testimony and the
moving papers, that the restraining order against Rayant should
be terminated in the interest of justice. The court noted that
Rayant had “testified that there . . . has been no contact . . . since
Mr. Marino harassed him by breaking into his home. And there
is no need for this restraining order since Mr. Rayant has no
desire and is, in fact, the protected person” under the earlier
restraining order Rayant obtained against Marino. The court
5
declined to impose sanctions because Marino was not there to
address them.
As for the request to seal, the court stated, “I will deny that
at this point, Mr. Rayant. If there is a need in the future for a
seal, for example, if you are going to be licensed by any licensing
agency of the state or if you need clearance from an employer, the
court will consider it at that point. But I have not received any
information from you that there’s any issue that is ripe right now
for the court to seal any records at this point.”
The court signed the order terminating the restraining
order against Rayant on May 18, 2023, and it was filed on
May 23, 2023.
3. Motion to seal
On June 21, 2023, Rayant and Marino filed a joint
stipulation pursuant to a settlement agreement to terminate
Rayant’s restraining order against Marino. The settlement
agreement provided, inter alia, that the parties would stipulate
to, and not oppose, sealing the records related to both Rayant’s
restraining order against Marino and Marino’s now-terminated
restraining order against Rayant.
On September 29, 2023, Rayant moved to seal the entire
record concerning the restraining order against him. He argued
his privacy interests and the parties’ interest in enforcing their
settlement agreement overcame the public’s right of access “to
Mr. Marino’s fraudulent restraining order application.” He
contended he had been prejudiced by the restraining order,
averring in a supporting declaration he had applied for a job with
the Los Angeles Department of Sanitation in May 2023, a
position that required a background check, and never heard back
about the position. He stated he intended to apply for other jobs,
6
including with government agencies, that required background
checks. He further averred that on June 21, 2023, and again on
August 2, 2023, airport authorities subjected him to multiple
rounds of screening and questioning when he returned from
travel abroad. The authorities told him the additional screening
was because of the restraining order against him. Rayant argued
sealing of the “entire court record” was justified because the
record “only exists because Mr. Marino filed a restraining order
application based on lies.”
In a footnote, Rayant requested, as an alternative to
sealing the record, that the trial court strike the following
documents: Marino’s restraining order request “and related
filings”; the temporary and permanent restraining orders granted
against Rayant; the affidavit of exhibits in support of the
restraining order request; Marino’s response to Rayant’s motion
to terminate the restraining order; the declaration of Marino’s
process server; Marino’s declaration responding to a declaration
submitted in support of Rayant’s motion to terminate the
restraining order; and two proofs of service filed by Marino.
Rayant cited the court’s authority under Code of Civil Procedure
section 436 to strike irrelevant, false, or improper matters from
pleadings.
Marino filed a response in which he requested the court
either seal the record concerning the restraining order against
him as well, or not strike or seal any records at all.
The trial court held a hearing on the sealing request on
December 19, 2023. The judge who presided at the hearing
was not the same judge who terminated the restraining order
against Rayant. Following the hearing the court took the matter
under submission.
7
On February 7, 2024, the trial court issued a written ruling
denying Rayant’s sealing request. The court found the sealing
request “untimely as it dates back to the beginning of this case
which was filed on 9/21/22.” The court cited case law for the
proposition “that courts lack discretion to entertain a motion to
seal documents not made within a reasonable time, or filed
beyond the ten-day limit of . . . rule 2.551(b)(3)(B).” The court
reasoned, “[T]he documents which comprise the file in this case
have been available to the public over the course of the past year
or longer, and it appears that any harm to privacy has already
occurred.” “[Rayant] seeks to avoid the documents in both cases
from being disclosed due to the alleged harm he has faced when
seeking employment and during international travel, [but] he
fails to explain why he did not seek to seal the documents in this
case within the 10-day limit of . . . [r]ule 2.551.”
The court further found the sealing request was not
“narrowly tailored” in that it sought “to seal the entire court file.”
Also, “the declarations accompanying the moving papers do not
provide facts that discuss specific harm or prejudice to the parties
such that sealing documents, let alone the entire file, would be
appropriate. [Rayant] has produced no evidence, aside from the
arguments presented in his moving papers, to support his claims
that he has been prejudiced by the documents in this case.” The
court concluded Rayant had not “m[e]t his burden to show that
his request is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding interest.”
The court did not expressly address Rayant’s alternative request
for a motion to strike.
The court also denied Marino’s request to seal the record of
the restraining order against him.
8
The court’s order indicated Rayant filed a response to
Marino’s request to seal, although that response is not in the
record before us. According to the court, in that response, Rayant
did not oppose Marino’s request, but asked that if the court
denied the request, the court in the alternative should strike a
number of documents from the record. These were not the same
documents Rayant requested be stricken in Rayant’s own sealing
motion. The court denied the request to strike, finding Rayant
had “fail[ed] to specify which portions of the pleadings are
irrelevant, false or improper and merely makes a blanket
statement as to all of these documents.”
Rayant timely appealed from the denial of his sealing
request. 2
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Rayant challenges only the denial of his motion
to seal. He raises no arguments regarding his alternative motion
to strike, which we therefore do not address. (Sierra Palms
Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension
Construction Authority (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1136 [issue
not raised in appellate briefing forfeited].)
A. Governing Law
Rules 2.550 and 2.551 govern the sealing of court records.
(See rule 2.550(a)(1).) These rules are based on standards set
forth in NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court
2 “Orders concerning the sealing and unsealing of
documents are appealable as collateral orders.” (Overstock.com,
Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471,
481, fn. 2.)
9
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178 (NBC Subsidiary). (See Advisory Com.
com., rule 2.550.) We begin with a summary of NBC Subsidiary.
1. NBC Subsidiary
In NBC Subsidiary, our Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution “provides a right
of access to ordinary civil trials and proceedings.” (NBC
Subsidiary, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on decisions by the United States
Supreme Court establishing a First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings. (Id. at pp. 1197–1207.) In those decisions,
the United States Supreme Court identified two factors pertinent
to determining whether particular proceedings are presumptively
open under the First Amendment—“(i) historical tradition and
(ii) the specific structural value or utility of access in the
circumstances.” (Id. at pp. 1202–1203, citing Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 457 U.S. 596 (Globe Newspaper).)
Applying this rubric, the United States Supreme Court
concluded “criminal trials historically have been open.” (NBC
Subsidiary, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1203, citing Globe Newspaper,
supra, 457 U.S. at p. 605, fn. 13.) As for the utility of open
proceedings, our Supreme Court cited a concurring opinion by
Justice Brennan identifying interests served by public access to
criminal trials, including “demonstrat[ing] that justice is meted
out fairly, thereby promoting public confidence in such
governmental proceedings”; “provid[ing] a means . . . by which
citizens scrutinize and ‘check’ the use and possible abuse of
judicial power”; and “enhanc[ing] the truth-finding function of the
proceeding.” (NBC Subsidiary, supra, at pp. 1201–1202, citing
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) 448 U.S. 555, 594–
597.)
10
Our Supreme Court concluded the United States Supreme
Court’s reasoning concerning public access to criminal
proceedings “suggests that the First Amendment right of
access . . . encompasses civil proceedings as well.” (NBC
Subsidiary, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1207.) Our high court
outlined the requirements to be met before a trial court could
close the courtroom or seal transcripts in “proceedings that
satisfy the [United States Supreme Court’s] historical
tradition/utility considerations.” (Id. at p. 1217.) First, the court
must provide notice to the public. (Ibid.) Second, the court “must
hold a hearing and expressly find that (i) there exists an
overriding interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is
a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced
absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or
sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and
(iv) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding
interest.” (Id. at pp. 1217–1218, fns. omitted.)
In a footnote, our Supreme Court limited the scope of its
holding: “We observe that various statutes set out, for example,
in the Code of Civil Procedure, Family Code, and Welfare and
Institutions Code provide for closure of certain civil proceedings.
We address herein the right of access to ordinary civil
proceedings in general, and not any right of access to particular
proceedings governed by specific statutes.” (NBC Subsidiary,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1212, fn. 30.)
2. Rules 2.550 and 2.551
Rules 2.550 and 2.551 appear in title 2 of the California
Rules of Court, the “Trial Court Rules.” (Rule 2.1.) “The Trial
Court Rules apply to all cases in the superior courts unless
otherwise specified by a rule or statute.” (Rule 2.2.) Rayant does
11
not dispute the Trial Court Rules apply to the trial court that
presided over the instant matter.
Rules 2.550 and 2.551 “apply to records sealed or proposed
to be sealed by court order.” (Rule 2.550(a)(1).) “ ‘[R]ecord’
means all or a portion of any document, paper, exhibit,
transcript, or other thing filed or lodged with the court, by
electronic means or otherwise.” (Rule 2.550(b)(1).)
“Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are
presumed to be open.” (Rule 2.550(c).) To overcome that
presumption and order that a record be sealed, the court must
make the following express factual findings, consistent with NBC
Subsidiary: “(1) There exists an overriding interest that
overcomes the right of public access to the record; [¶] (2) The
overriding interest supports sealing the record; [¶] (3) A
substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be
prejudiced if the record is not sealed; [¶] (4) The proposed sealing
is narrowly tailored; and [¶] (5) No less restrictive means exist to
achieve the overriding interest.” (Rule 2.550(d).)
Rule 2.551 sets forth the procedures for filing records under
seal. A party seeking to seal a record “must file a motion or an
application . . . . accompanied by a memorandum and a
declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing.”
(Rule 2.551(b)(1).) “The court must not permit a record to be filed
under seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the
parties.” (Rule 2.551(a).)
Certain records are expressly exempt from rules 2.550 and
2.551. Specifically, those rules “do not apply to discovery motions
and records filed or lodged in connection with discovery motions
or proceedings. However, the rules do apply to discovery
materials that are used at trial or submitted as a basis for
12
adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or
proceedings.” (Rule 2.550(a)(3).)
B. The Sealing Rules Apply to the Records Rayant
Seeks To Seal
1. The sealing rules apply to civil harassment
restraining order proceedings under Code of
Civil Procedure section 527.6
Rayant’s primary argument is that civil harassment
restraining order proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure
section 527.6 are not “ordinary civil trials and proceedings” as
that phrase is used in NBC Subsidiary, but “special proceedings
that are limited in remedies and conducted pursuant to special
statutory authorization.” 3 He further contends restraining order
proceedings do not satisfy the ”historical tradition/utility
considerations” test for access under the First Amendment as
articulated in NBC Subsidiary, and thus there is no First
Amendment right of public access to those proceedings. By
extension, he argues, rules 2.550 and 2.551, which are based on
NBC Subsidiary, do not apply to records of civil harassment
restraining order proceedings, and the trial court erred in
requiring Rayant to meet the criteria set forth in those rules.
3 Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 allows a person
who has suffered “harassment” to seek a temporary restraining
order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment. (Id.,
subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘Harassment’ is unlawful violence, a credible
threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct
directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or
harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(3).)
13
These arguments present questions of law we review de novo.
(See Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th
60, 81 (Mercury) [reviewing de novo whether sealing rules apply
to particular documents].)
The central premise of Rayant’s argument is that
applicability of Rules 2.550 and 2.551 in a given circumstance
depends on a case-by-case analysis under NBC Subsidiary. This
premise is incorrect. Rule 2.550 defines precisely what records
fall under the sealing rules, and that is “court records,” meaning
“all or a portion of any document, paper, exhibit, transcript, or
other thing filed or lodged with the court.” (Rule 2.550(b)(1), (c).)
The only exceptions are records “that are required to be kept
confidential by law,” and discovery motions and related materials
unless the discovery materials “are used at trial or submitted as
a basis for adjudication of matters other than discovery motions
or proceedings.” 4 (Rule 2.550(a)(2), (3).)
The language of rule 2.550 is unambiguous: all superior
court records are presumptively open and subject to the sealing
rules, regardless of the particular court proceeding to which those
records apply, unless the records fall within the confidentiality or
discovery exceptions under subdivisions (a)(2) and (3) of that rule,
or a statute or rule exempts the court from the sealing rules.
Nothing in the rule requires a case-by-case analysis of whether
the records arise in an “ordinary” court proceeding under NBC
Subsidiary. “ ‘Rules of court have the force of law and are as
4 As we discuss post, case law has interpreted the
discovery materials exception to include discovery materials
attached to pleadings, so long as the materials are not introduced
at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication. (See Mercury,
supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 100.)
14
binding as procedural statutes as long as they are not
inconsistent with statutory or constitutional law. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 279,
fn. 3.) Rayant makes no argument rule 2.550 conflicts with
statutory or constitutional law, or that a statute or rule exempts
the trial court that presided over the instant matter from the
rule. He therefore offers no basis to deviate from rule 2.550 in
this case.
Rayant cites Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 409 (Sorenson) as an example of a court
conducting a case-specific analysis under NBC Subsidiary to
conclude a proceeding was not presumptively open. That case,
however, is consistent with our reasoning. Sorenson addressed
the public right of access to transcripts of involuntary civil
commitment trials under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act). (Sorenson, supra, at
p. 416.) The Court of Appeal first concluded an LPS trial “is a
‘special proceeding’ that is a creature of statute, rather than an
‘ordinary civil proceeding[ ]’ ” under NBC Subsidiary. (Sorenson,
at pp. 430–431.) Applying NBC Subsidiary’s “ ‘historical
tradition/utility considerations’ ” test, the court further concluded
“there is no constitutional right of public access to LPS
proceedings, including trials.” (Sorenson, at p. 436.)
The Sorenson court acknowledged that its inquiry did not
end with the constitutional question, because the public also has
a statutory right of access under Code of Civil Procedure
section 124, “ ‘California’s long-standing “open-court” statute’
15
[citation].” 5 (Sorenson, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 437.) The
court concluded, however, that the language of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 5118, which at that time provided that
“any party to the [LPS] proceeding may demand that the hearing
be public,” must be read to mean that LPS trials were
presumptively nonpublic, and was therefore a statutory exception
to Code of Civil Procedure section 124. (Sorenson, supra, at
pp. 416, 438.)
Sorenson illustrates there are two bases for a presumption
of public access to court proceedings: a constitutional basis under
NBC Subsidiary’s tradition/utility test, and a statutory basis,
which in Sorenson was Code of Civil Procedure section 124, and
in this case is rule 2.550(c). This means if a particular
proceeding is not exempt from the statutory presumption of
public access, there is no need to engage in the constitutional
tradition/utility test. Put another way, if a statute requires a
particular proceeding to be open, it is immaterial that the First
Amendment arguably does not so require, because “states are
free to enact greater protections than those required by the
federal Constitution.” (People v. Perry (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 444,
466; see ibid. [“The United States Constitution provides the floor,
rather than the ceiling, for the protection of individual
liberties.”].)
Our conclusion is consistent with the other public access
cases cited in Rayant’s briefing. Those cases concern statutory
exemptions from public-access statutes, and apply NBC
5 Code of Civil Procedure section 124 states, “Except as
provided in Section 214 of the Family Code or any other law, the
sittings of every court shall be public.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 124,
subd. (a).)
16
Subsidiary and/or the tradition/utility test to assess whether
those exemptions survive First Amendment scrutiny. (Mercury,
supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 100–101 & fn. 31 [concluding,
based on Advisory Committee comment, the exemption under
rule 2.550(a)(3) extends to discovery materials attached to
complaints, and the exemption is consistent with NBC
Subsidiary]; In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th
1045, 1048, 1055–1056 (Burkle) [applying tradition/utility test to
invalidate statute requiring sealing of certain records in divorce
proceedings at party’s request]; San Bernardino County Dept. of
Public Social Services v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d
188, 203, 205 (San Bernardino County) [applying “historical
experience”/“societal values of openness” test to conclude
Legislature constitutionally may limit access to juvenile court
proceedings under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 346].) 6 None of these
cases holds or suggests courts should apply the tradition/utility
test in the absence of an exemption to statutory public access.
Rayant’s argument, therefore, that civil harassment
restraining order proceedings are not “ordinary civil proceedings”
under the tradition/utility test, is beside the point unless he can
demonstrate records of those proceedings also are exempt from
the statutory presumption of openness under rule 2.550(c)—that
is, that the records “are required to be kept confidential by law,”
or are discovery motions or discovery materials not used at trial
or as a basis for adjudication. (Id., subd. (a)(2), (3).) As we
6 San Bernardino County predated NBC Subsidiary, but
similarly relied on United States Supreme Court decisions to
derive the constitutional test for public access, including the
history/utility analysis. (San Bernardino County, supra,
232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 195–197.)
17
discuss next, he does not establish either of these exceptions
apply.
2. Rayant does not contend the records he seeks to
seal are confidential by law
Rayant does not contend civil harassment restraining order
records are required by law to be kept confidential. Rather, he
argues Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (v),
which allows courts to keep confidential certain information
concerning minors involved in civil harassment restraining order
proceedings, suggests “there is no presumption of public right of
access” to restraining order proceedings.
In fact, even when minors’ privacy is at issue, Code of Civil
Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (v) requires findings
mirroring those in rule 2.550(d) and NBC Subsidiary before a
court may order information concerning minors be kept
confidential. 7 In any event, Rayant does not contend any minors
were involved in his restraining order proceedings, nor does he
identify any other subdivision or statutory section extending
those confidentiality provisions to adults. He identifies no other
law rendering restraining order proceedings confidential. He
7 Those findings are: “(A) The minor’s right to privacy
overcomes the right of public access to the information. [¶]
(B) There is a substantial probability that the minor’s interest
will be prejudiced if the information is not kept confidential. [¶]
(C) The order to keep the information confidential is narrowly
tailored. [¶] (D) No less restrictive means exist to protect the
minor’s privacy.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (v)(2).)
18
therefore fails to show the records he seeks to seal “are required
to be kept confidential by law.” (Rule 2.550(a)(2).)
3. Rayant does not demonstrate the exception for
discovery materials applies
To recap, rules 2.550 and 2.551 “do not apply to discovery
motions and records filed or lodged in connection with discovery
motions or proceedings. However, the rules do apply to discovery
materials that are used at trial or submitted as a basis for
adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or
proceedings.” (Rule 2.550(a)(3).)
Rayant does not contend he is seeking to seal “discovery
motions and records filed or lodged in connection with discovery
motions or proceedings.” (Rule 2.550(a)(3).) He nonetheless
argues the records he seeks to seal fall within that exception
because those records were “not the basis for adjudication.”
Plaintiff relies on Mercury, in which the plaintiffs in a
shareholder derivative suit filed a complaint under seal that
attached 17 exhibits produced in discovery pursuant to a
stipulated protective order. (Mercury, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 68–69.) Representatives of the media moved to unseal the
complaint and exhibits, and the trial court granted the motion.
(Id. at p. 69.) Shortly thereafter, the trial court dismissed the
complaint upon concluding the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
a derivative suit. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal reversed the order unsealing the
exhibits. (Mercury, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 108.) The court
observed the exhibits fell into a gray area in rule 2.550(a)(3),
because while they were not filed in connection with discovery
motions or proceedings, neither were they used at trial or
submitted as a basis for adjudication. (Mercury, supra, at p. 100.)
19
The court noted that “pleadings, including complaints, are not
typically evidentiary matters that are submitted to a jury in
adjudicating a controversy.” (Id. at p. 103.) The court further
noted the demurrer that led to dismissal of the complaint was
based on standing, an issue to which the exhibits did not pertain,
and thus the exhibits “were not submitted as a basis for
adjudication in connection with the court’s disposition of
defendants’ demurrer.” (Id. at pp. 103–104.)
After reviewing NBC Subsidiary and the comments of the
Advisory Committee to rule 2.550, the court concluded the crux of
the exception under rule 2.550(a)(3) is not that the discovery
materials are attached to a discovery motion, but that the
discovery materials are not used at trial or submitted as a basis
for adjudication. (Mercury, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 100–
101.) In particular, the court relied on the Advisory Committee
comment that “ ‘[t]he sealed records rules . . . do not apply to
discovery proceedings, motions, and materials that are not used
at trial or submitted to the court as a basis for adjudication,’ ” a
different articulation of the rule 2.550(a)(3) exception that the
court found reflected “the intent of the Judicial Council” when
promulgating the rule. (Ibid.) The court concluded the exhibits
at issue therefore were exempt from the sealed record rules
despite being attached to a complaint as opposed to a discovery
motion. (Id. at p. 105.)
Rayant argues Mercury is analogous to the instant
circumstances because the records he seeks to seal were not “part
of any basis for the court’s adjudication of any legal issue.” He
contends there was a procedural bar to Marino filing his
restraining order request in the first place, because Rayant had
already obtained a restraining order against him, and Marino
20
“was barred from now . . . belatedly seeking a restraining order
against Rayant when those facts had already been adjudicated
through doctrines of preclusion.” Rayant argues, “[D]ismissal on
the basis of preclusion is a procedural bar that operates in
virtually identical ways to dismissal for lack of standing,” the
basis of the demurrer in Mercury. In other words, Rayant
construes the order terminating the restraining order to
constitute, in essence, a finding that Marino’s restraining order
request was precluded from the outset, and therefore no records
related to that precluded request should be deemed submitted to
the court as a basis for adjudication.
We reject this argument. Although Mercury expanded the
exception under rule 2.550(a)(3) to include discovery materials
attached to complaints as well as discovery motions, it
nonetheless limited its holding to discovery materials, the subject
of the Advisory Committee comment on which Mercury relied.
(See Mercury, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 104 [“Our holding
is not meant to encourage the filing of complaints or other
pleadings under seal, nor is it intended to suggest that pleadings
should not, as a general rule, be open to public inspection.”].)
Rayant’s motion to seal is far broader than discovery materials
attached to pleadings—it encompasses the pleadings themselves,
as well as court orders, including the restraining order against
him and the order lifting the restraining order. None of these can
reasonably be construed as discovery materials within the
language of rule 2.550(a)(3), even as interpreted in Mercury.
Assuming arguendo Mercury can be read to include
documents other than discovery materials so long as they are not
used as a basis for adjudication, Rayant’s argument still fails.
Marino clearly submitted his restraining order request and
21
accompanying materials as a basis for adjudication—he was
seeking a protective order from the court. That his request
arguably was procedurally improper, an issue on which we
express no opinion, does not change the fact that he sought
adjudication of that request and submitted materials for that
purpose.
In sum, Rayant has failed to show the records he seeks to
seal are exempt from the requirements of rules 2.550 and 2.551.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Denying the Sealing
Request
Having concluded rules 2.550 and 2.551 apply to the
records Rayant seeks to seal, the next question is whether the
trial court erred in finding Rayant had not met his burden under
those rules. In reviewing the denial of an order to seal, we review
the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, and
“review de novo questions of law raised by the trial court’s order.”
(In re M.T. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 322, 336.)
We repeat the showing necessary to seal documents under
rule 2.550: “(1) There exists an overriding interest that
overcomes the right of public access to the record; [¶] (2) The
overriding interest supports sealing the record; [¶] (3) A
substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be
prejudiced if the record is not sealed; [¶] (4) The proposed sealing
is narrowly tailored; and [¶] (5) No less restrictive means exist to
achieve the overriding interest.” (Rule 2.550(d).)
According to Rayant, he seeks to seal the record of the
restraining order proceedings out of concern that future potential
employers will conduct background checks and discover “publicly
available records that would contain falsehoods about Rayant’s
character.” He argues, “This harm can only be addressed through
22
a sealing of records, which would permit Rayant to no longer
have a fear that a potential public employer would find court
records that contain false information about him and then decline
to provide him with an opportunity to explain the situation based
upon the contents of the public filings.” Rayant also cites the
harm of continued enhanced screenings by airport authorities.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that Rayant did not meet his burden under rule 2.550. 8
Assuming arguendo Rayant has demonstrated an
overriding interest in his reputation and future job prospects, a
question on which we express no opinion, he has not shown “[a]
substantial probability” that interest “will be prejudiced if the
record is not sealed.” (Rule 2.550(d)(3).) “Substantial
probability” is a higher standard than “reasonable likelihood,” the
latter of which “has been construed to mean something less than
‘ “ ‘more probable than not’ ” ’ yet greater than something that is
‘ “[m]erely ‘possible.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Alvarez v. Superior Court
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 642, 653 & fn. 4.)9
Accepting that having an active restraining order on one’s
record could negatively impact a background check, the trial
court already has mitigated that prejudice by terminating the
restraining order. Rayant does not argue the terminated
8 The trial court also found Rayant’s motion to seal
untimely, a conclusion Rayant disputes. It is not necessary for us
to reach this issue given our conclusion, on the merits, that
substantial evidence supports the denial of the motion.
9 We have found no cases, and Rayant has not cited any,
articulating the “substantial probability” standard in the public
access context other than to state it is more rigorous than a
“reasonable likelihood.”
23
restraining order will prejudice him—rather, he argues he could
be prejudiced by Marino’s unfounded accusations against him,
which an employer might discover during a background check
and “decline to provide [Rayant] with an opportunity to explain.”
Although we recognize a prejudice assessment in the
context of a sealing motion “ ‘by its nature calls for speculation’ ”
(Jackson, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025), Rayant offers no
evidence demonstrating a “substantial probability” that an
employer would disqualify him based on the allegations in
Marino’s restraining order request, despite the subsequent
termination of the restraining order. Rayant’s declaration
stating he never heard back about a government job for which he
applied falls short of establishing prejudice from the restraining
order proceedings, when there could be other reasons unrelated
to the restraining order for why Rayant did not get the job. The
lack of an evidentiary showing from Rayant supports the trial
court’s finding Rayant did not meet his burden to show prejudice.
As for Rayant’s evidence of additional screening at the
airport, he offers no argument other than criticizing the trial
court for “g[iving] no weight to Rayant’s fears of harm” in
“dealings with US immigration authorities.” He does not argue,
nor can we conclude, the interest in avoiding additional airport
screening overrides the public’s right of access to court records.
Further, Rayant offers no evidence that airport authorities would
discontinue the alleged enhanced screening if the record were
sealed.
At oral argument, Rayant’s counsel represented that after
briefing was complete in this appeal, Rayant was turned down for
several other positions requiring background checks. We express
no opinion whether, as a procedural matter, Rayant can file a
24
new motion to seal or strike based on that new evidence, nor do
we express an opinion how the trial court should rule on such a
motion.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to seal is affirmed. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
25
Filed 4/18/25
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
LAWRENCE MARINO, B337874
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STRO06089)
v.
CERTIFICATION AND
MARK ALON RAYANT, ORDER FOR PUBLICATION
Defendant and Appellant. [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed March 24,
2025, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For
good cause it now appears that the opinion should be published in
the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
There is no change in the judgment.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
____________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.
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