Logan v. ADP CA2/3

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Testo completo

Filed 4/18/25 Logan v. ADP CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

PAULINE LOGAN, B325259

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV11313)
v.

ADP, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

OLIVIA MCCABE, B325441

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV33037)
v.

ADP, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Armen Tamzarian,
and Georgina T. Rizk, Judges. Affirmed.
Employee Justice Legal Group, Kaveh S. Elihu, and
Samuel J. Moorhead for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Jackson Lewis, Connie L. Chen, and Dylan B. Carp for
Defendant and Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

These combined appeals are from two separate actions
alleging disability discrimination against ADP, Inc. (ADP), a
company that provided human resources support to plaintiffs
Olivia McCabe’s (McCabe) and Pauline Logan’s (Logan) former
employer. In brief, both plaintiffs allege they were terminated
while on medical leave in violation of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code,1 § 12940 et seq.). Plaintiffs
sued their former employer and ADP, and the trial courts
sustained ADP’s demurrers without leave to amend, concluding
that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that ADP (1) was an
agent of plaintiffs’ employer, or (2) aided and abetted the
employer’s alleged FEHA violations.
We affirm. As we discuss, plaintiffs failed to state claims
for agent liability because they did not allege ADP “carried out”
the FEHA-regulated activities that gave rise to this action, and
they failed to state claims for aider-abettor liability because they
did not allege ADP knowingly encouraged plaintiffs’ employer to

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Government Code.

2
violate FEHA. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
sustaining ADP’s demurrers without leave to amend.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The McCabe action (B325441).
A. McCabe’s complaint.
McCabe filed the present action in August 2020, and filed
the operative third amended complaint (TAC) in August 2022
against Vandana Madkan, M.D. and Madkan Dermatology, P.C.
(doing business as Mosaic Dermatology) (collectively, Madkan)
and ADP. The TAC alleged as follows:
Madkan is a medical practice specializing in medical and
surgical dermatology. ADP is a Delaware corporation that
provided Madkan with human resources support.
Madkan hired McCabe as a medical assistant/phlebotomist
in July 2018. In December 2018, McCabe’s physician placed her
on medical leave “due to psychological symptoms that Plaintiff
was experiencing as a result of her pre-existing psychiatric
disorders.” Madkan told ADP about McCabe’s medical leave
request and asked how to address it. ADP responded that
Madkan could terminate McCabe once her accrued sick leave was
exhausted. Subsequently, Madkan told ADP that McCabe had
not agreed to return to work despite having no accrued paid time

2 The court previously deferred ruling on the following
motions, which we now deny: (1) McCabe’s request for judicial
notice (filed May 6, 2024) in appeal no. B325441; (2) ADP’s
request for judicial notice (filed October 4, 2024) in appeal
no. B325441; (3) ADP’s motion to strike (filed October 4, 2024) in
appeal no. B325441; and (4) Logan’s request for judicial notice
(filed May 17, 2024) in appeal no. B325259.

3
off left, and ADP advised Madkan to tell McCabe that she needed
to return to work by December 13, 2018 or face termination for
job abandonment. Madkan did so. McCabe did not return to
work, and Madkan asked ADP how to proceed with the
termination. ADP advised that Madkan should tell McCabe she
had exhausted all of her paid time off, and because she did not
qualify for a leave of absence, her absence was unexcused. ADP
attached a pre-written termination letter to the email. Madkan
made minor edits to the termination letter and sent it to McCabe.
McCabe was terminated the same day.
McCabe alleged that ADP “advised, substantially
encouraged, and aided and abetted . . . in the termination of
[McCabe],” which “was completed with the express agreement
and consent of ADP.” Further, “ADP’s advice and assistance was
critical in [McCabe’s] termination” because “[i]f ADP had advised
[Madkan] not to terminate [McCabe], they would not have done
so.”
McCabe asserted that her termination gave rise to causes
of action against Madkan and ADP for disability discrimination,
retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation,
failure to reasonably accommodate, and failure to engage in a
good faith interactive process, all in violation of FEHA (first
through fifth causes of action), as well as for declaratory relief
and wrongful termination (sixth and seventh causes of action).3

3 McCabe also asserted additional causes of action against
Madkan for violations of the Labor Code and the Business and
Professions Code. Those causes of action are not relevant to this
appeal.

4
B. ADP’s demurrer.
ADP demurred to the TAC. ADP asserted it could not be
liable to McCabe as her employer because it did not have any
control over the details of her work. Further, McCabe failed to
allege facts sufficient to sustain a claim for aiding and abetting
because she did not allege that ADP acted consciously to violate
her rights. ADP asserted: “[McCabe] does not allege that ADP
. . . knew that Madkan’s decision to terminate [McCabe’s]
employment was allegedly unlawful. The fact that [ADP]
provided advice on the termination, as specifically alleged in the
TAC, suggests that the opposite is true, as ADP stood to gain
nothing by purposefully providing allegedly unlawful advice.
Further, the requirement for aiding and abetting is that the
accused party actually knew that the acting party was
committing an unlawful act—not that it should have known.
Here, [McCabe] fails to allege any facts to demonstrate that ADP
had ‘actual knowledge of the primary wrong,’ and therefore, her
aiding and abetting theory fails . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . At best,
[Madkan] has alleged that ADP gave advice that may have run
afoul of the FEHA, but not that ADP knowingly did so. What is
missing from [McCabe’s] allegations is any semblance of a
concerted plan to intentionally violate the FEHA. Further, this
failure cannot be cured by amendment without violating the
sham pleading rule. [¶] Quite simply, what [McCabe] is alleging
is that ADP allegedly gave Madkan wrong advice, which caused
Madkan to unlawfully terminate [McCabe’s] employment. There
is no assertion that ADP’s purpose or intent was to act
unlawfully, or that it had any knowledge that the termination
was allegedly unlawful. Accordingly, [McCabe’s] aiding and
abetting theory for her FEHA claims fails as a matter of law.”

5
McCabe opposed the demurrer. McCabe contended that
ADP need not have been McCabe’s employer to be liable under
FEHA, and McCabe had sufficiently pled that ADP aided and
abetted Madkan’s unlawful discrimination against her. While
McCabe conceded that “[t]here is an intent element in aiding and
abetting liability,” she asserted that the intent element could be
satisfied by evidence that a defendant “ ‘had actual knowledge of
the specific primary wrong the defendant substantially
assisted.’ ” In the present case, the TAC alleged that ADP was
aware that Madkan’s conduct violated the law and intentionally
participated in that conduct.
The trial court sustained the demurrer, finding that
McCabe failed to allege sufficient facts to show that ADP
employed McCabe within the meaning of FEHA or was liable for
aiding and abetting a FEHA violation. With regard to the aiding
and abetting claim, the court explained: “Based on [McCabe’s]
allegations, ADP did not and could not know that [Madkan’s]
conduct violated FEHA or constituted any other ‘specific primary
wrong.’ [Citation.] [McCabe] alleges ADP’s employee advised
Madkan to inform [McCabe] ‘that she had exhausted all paid
time off, did not qualify for a leave of absence . . . and that her
absence was therefore unexcused.’ [Citation.] Unexcused
absences are a facially legitimate reason to terminate an
employee. Doing so would only be wrong or illegal if [McCabe]
truly was entitled to be absent. Whether [McCabe] qualified for a
leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation—and, if so,
whether that accommodation constituted an undue hardship on
her employer—is a fact-intensive inquiry. ADP did not know at
the time whether firing plaintiff violated FEHA or any other law.

6
Encouraging and assisting [Madkan] to fire her therefore does
not constitute aiding and abetting a FEHA violation.”
The court also sustained the demurrer as to the
nonstatutory claims, finding that McCabe’s cause of action for
declaratory relief “relies on plaintiff’s other claims against ADP
. . . and therefore fails along with the others,” and the cause of
action for wrongful termination failed because it could not be
brought against someone who was not McCabe’s employer.
Finally, the court denied leave to amend, concluding that
McCabe failed to show a reasonable possibility of curing her
complaint’s defects. It explained: “[McCabe] has already
amended the complaint three times. In her opposition, [McCabe]
proposes adding generic allegations that ADP knew its actions
and [Madkan’s] actions violated FEHA. [Citation.] Those would
constitute conclusory allegations that ADP knew something
unknowable at the time. [McCabe] also proposes amending the
complaint to allege [Madkan] hired ADP in reliance on ADP’s
representations that it was an expert on California employment
law. [Citation.] Allegations about ADP’s representations to and
relationship with [Madkan] would not cure the complaint’s
defects.”
The court entered a judgment of dismissal on November 17,
2022, from which McCabe timely appealed.
II. The Logan action (B325259).
A. Logan’s complaint.
Logan filed an action against Madkan in March 2021, and
filed her operative second amended complaint (SAC) against
Madkan and ADP in August 2022. The SAC alleged as follows:

7
Madkan hired Logan as a medical assistant in July 2017.
In April 2019, Logan told Madkan and ADP that she was
scheduled for a major gynecological surgery in early May and
would be out of work through the end of the month. ADP advised
Madkan that Logan’s requested medical leave would exceed her
accrued paid time off and that Logan should be terminated when
her paid time off was exhausted. On about May 9, 2019, while
Logan was on medical leave, Madkan “on the advice and at the
instruction of ADP, attempted to coerce [Logan] into resigning.”
Logan did not resign, and the same day, “under the explicit
instruction and advice of ADP,” Madkan terminated Logan.
Logan believed she was terminated “due to her disabilities and/or
perceived disabilities, engagement in protected activities, medical
condition, medical leave and sex-gender.”
Logan alleged that Madkan and ADP “acted in concert with
one another to commit the wrongful acts alleged herein, and
aided, abetted, incited, compelled, and/or coerced one another in
the wrongful acts alleged herein, and/or attempted to do so,
including pursuant to Government Code §12940(i).” She further
alleged that Madkan and ADP “formed and executed a conspiracy
or common plan pursuant to which they would commit the
unlawful acts alleged herein, with all such acts alleged herein
done as part of and pursuant to said conspiracy, intended to
cause and actually causing Plaintiff harm.”
Logan thus asserted that her termination gave rise to
causes of action against Madkan and ADP for discrimination,
retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation,
failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and failure to

8
engage in a good faith interactive process, all in violation of
FEHA (first through fifth causes of action).4
B. ADP’s demurrer.
ADP demurred to Logan’s SAC. ADP asserted that it could
be liable to Logan under FEHA only if it was either Logan’s
employer or as an aider and abettor. Logan’s SAC did not (and
could not) allege that ADP employed Logan—i.e., that it had
control of any of the details of her employment. The SAC also did
not allege facts sufficient to establish that ADP aided and abetted
Madkan’s alleged unlawful acts. Specifically, the SAC did not
allege that ADP knew that Madkan’s decision to terminate Logan
was unlawful or that ADP provided substantial encouragement to
Madkan to commit known wrongs.
Logan opposed the demurrer. She contended that the SAC
pled that Madkan and ADP jointly employed Logan or,
alternatively, that ADP knowingly acted with Madkan to violate
Logan’s rights under FEHA. Logan also urged that if the court
sustained ADP’s demurrer, she should be permitted to file an
amended complaint.
The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
First, the court found there were no specific factual allegations in

4 Logan also asserted additional causes of action against
Madkan under the California Family Rights Act and the Labor
Code (sixth through sixteenth causes of action). Separately,
Madkan filed a cross-complaint alleging comparative and
equitable indemnity against ADP, to which the trial court
sustained ADP’s demurrer without leave to amend. Neither
Logan’s causes of action against Madkan nor Madkan’s cross-
complaint against ADP are relevant to this appeal.

9
the SAC suggesting that ADP “exercised such control over
Plaintiff’s employment nor any allegations that Plaintiff’s work
fell within ADP’s regular industry to support the allegations that
Defendant ADP was Plaintiff’s ‘employer’ or ‘joint employer.’ ”
Second, the court said ADP could be liable for aiding and abetting
Madkan’s alleged unlawful employment practices only if
“(1) [Madkan] subjected Plaintiff to unlawful employment
practices under FEHA, (2) ADP knew that [Madkan’s] conduct
violated FEHA, and (3) ADP gave [Madkan] ‘substantial
assistance or encouragement’ to act in violation of FEHA.” The
SAC failed to allege that ADP aided and abetted Madkan’s
alleged unlawful acts because the complaint’s allegations were
too conclusory to support claims that ADP knew that Madkan’s
conduct violated FEHA and substantially assisted in or
encouraged that conduct. Finally, the court denied leave to
amend because Logan had not adequately stated in her
opposition what additional facts she could allege to correct the
defects identified.
The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal in October
2022, from which Logan timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by sustaining
ADP’s demurrers without leave to amend because the complaints
adequately alleged, or could be amended to allege, that (1) ADP
was Madkan’s agent, and (2) ADP aided and abetted Madkan’s
wrongful conduct. For the reasons that follow, we find no error.
I. Standard of review.
“ ‘ “On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order
sustaining a demurrer, the standard of review is de novo: we

10
exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint
states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citation.] First, we
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a
whole and its parts in their context. Next, we treat the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. Then we
determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. [Citations.] [¶] We do not, however,
assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of
law. [Citation.]” (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439–440.)
“ ‘When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend,
“ ‘ “we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court
has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of
proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.”
[Citation.]’ ” (State of California ex rel. Bowen v. Bank of America
Corp. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 225, 239.)’ (State of California ex
rel. McCann v. Bank of America, N.A. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
897, 906 (McCann).)” (People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery
Radiology Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 532–533.)
The plaintiff may make this showing in the first instance to the
appellate court. (Summerfield v. City of Inglewood (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 983, 992; Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 316, 322.)
II. ADP’s liability as Madkan’s agent.
Plaintiffs do not contend that their complaints adequately
alleged that ADP was liable as Madkan’s business agent, but
they urge they could allege agency liability if given the
opportunity to amend. We disagree.

11
A. Agent liability under FEHA.
FEHA provides that it is an unlawful employment practice
for “an employer” to discharge a person based on, among other
things, a physical disability. (§ 12940, subd. (a).) “Employer”
“includes any person regularly employing five or more persons, or
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly . . . .” (§ 12926, subd. (d), italics added.)
Our Supreme Court recently discussed the scope of agent
liability under FEHA in Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical
Group (2023) 15 Cal.5th 268 (Raines). There, the plaintiffs
alleged that they received offers of employment conditioned on
successful completion of preemployment medical screenings
conducted by defendant U.S. Healthworks (USHW). (Id. at
p. 274.) As part of the screenings, USHW required applicants to
answer questions about their medical histories that had no
bearing on their ability to perform job-related functions. (Ibid.)
The plaintiffs sued USHW and others, alleging violations of
FEHA and other torts. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’
complaints against USHW, concluding that USHW was not the
plaintiffs’ employer within the meaning of FEHA. (Id. at
pp. 274–275.) The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit
asked the California Supreme Court to clarify the meaning of
“employer” under FEHA. (Id. at pp. 273, 275.)
The Supreme Court concluded that FEHA does not impose
liability on all agents, but in appropriate circumstances can
impose liability on the “business-entity agents of employers”—
i.e., on “business entities acting as independent contractors.”
(Raines, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 276, 277, 279.) The court did
not identify “the specific scenarios in which a business-entity
agent will be subject to liability under the FEHA,” but it held “as

12
a necessary minimum” that business-entity agents can be directly
liable under FEHA only if they “carr[y] out FEHA-regulated
activities on behalf of an employer.” (Id. at p. 288, italics added.)
In other words, the court explained, “a business-entity agent’s
obligation to comply with FEHA and its consequent liability for
FEHA violations results from the entity’s own engagement in
FEHA-regulated activities on the employer’s behalf.” (Id. at
p. 290, italics added.)
B. Logan’s and McCabe’s complaints do not state
claims for agent liability under FEHA.
Plaintiffs do not contend their operative complaints allege
that ADP is liable for FEHA violations as Madkan’s business-
entity agent within the meaning of Raines, but they suggest they
could amend their complaints to so allege. Specifically, plaintiffs
urge they could allege that (1) ADP “had agreed ‘to guide
[Madkan] through the termination of employees, including
advising on the applicable federal, state and local employment
laws,’ ” (2) ADP “ ‘represented that it was knowledgeable
regarding the commercially accepted human resource practices
for terminating employees and was knowledgeable regarding
applicable federal, state and local employment laws,’ ”
(3) Madkan “ ‘relied on ADP’s advice and instruction regarding
. . . termination,’ ” and (4) Madkan “acted solely and exclusively
on the basis of the advice and instruction of ADP, which they
followed systematically and without exception.” Plaintiffs assert
these allegations state a claim for agent liability under Raines
because they suggest Madkan “effectively and de facto ced[ed]
[its] authority and discretion to ADP . . . [and] allowed ADP to
exercise administrative functions traditionally exercised by an

13
employer and to control some of an employer’s traditional rights,
such as firing employees.”
We conclude that plaintiffs’ proposed amendments are not
sufficient to state a claim for agent liability under Raines.
Notably, plaintiffs do not contend they could truthfully allege
that ADP carried out (or had the authority to carry out) the acts
on which their FEHA claims are premised—that is, plaintiffs do
not suggest that they could allege ADP had the authority to
engage in the interactive process with, reasonably accommodate,
or hire and fire Madkan’s employees, or that ADP terminated
their employment. Instead, plaintiffs appear to suggest that a
third party carries out FEHA-regulated activities on behalf of an
employer within the meaning of Raines if the third-party advises
an employer on FEHA compliance, and the employer acts on that
advice.5 But nothing in Raines so suggests. To the contrary,
Raines explained that “a business-entity agent’s obligation to
comply with FEHA and its consequent liability for FEHA
violations results from the entity’s own engagement in FEHA-
regulated activities on the employer’s behalf.” (Raines, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 290, italics added.) And, in each of the federal
cases on which Raines relied, the employer’s agent was alleged to
have “act[ed] on behalf of” an employer or “exercised ‘ “control of
some of the employer’s traditional rights,” ’ ” such as by
establishing a pay plan, formulating minimum standards for jobs,
and promoting or demoting employees. (Id. at pp. 285, 287,

5 The sole case plaintiffs cite for this proposition, Mikhail v.
Aeroseal, LLC (E.D. Pa., May 4, 2016, No. CV 15-1505) 2016 WL
2346747, interpreted Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and
Collection Law, not FEHA. Mikhail thus is not relevant to our
analysis.

14
italics added.) In other words, in Raines and the federal cases it
cited, the alleged agents “carrie[d] out FEHA-regulated activities
on behalf of an employer,” and the alleged liability arose from the
manner in which those activities were carried out. (Id. at p. 288,
italics added.)
In contrast to Raines, plaintiffs allege that ADP advised
Madkan on FEHA compliance, but that Madkan—not ADP—
made and implemented the decision to terminate plaintiffs.
Specifically, Logan’s SAC alleges that Madkan “rejected [Logan’s]
medical note and warned her that she faced termination if she
requested accommodations,” “attempted to coerce [Logan] into
resigning,” and “terminated [Logan].” Similarly, McCabe’s TAC
alleges that “[McCabe’s] psychologist received multiple phone
calls from Madkan,’ ” McCabe “received multiple emails from
[Madkan’s medical assistant] instructing [McCabe] to return to
work,” and “Madkan . . . sent . . . [McCabe] [a] letter inform[ing]
[McCabe] that she was being terminated due to a failure to
return to work.” (Italics added.) While ADP allegedly advised
and instructed Madkan on each of these steps, plaintiffs have not
alleged and do not suggest they could allege that ADP “carrie[d]
out” the events that gave rise to this action. (See Raines, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 288.) Accordingly, neither plaintiff has
established that she has (or can) state a claim against ADP as an
agent of Madkan for violations of FEHA.6

6 Plaintiffs suggest we should not decide whether they can
state claims against ADP as an agent of Madkan because they
have “not yet attempted to plead [their] causes of action based on
[ ] new facts and new legal theory,” and thus “any discussion of
[plaintiffs’] legal theory and cause of action ‘would constitute an
advisory opinion.’ ” Not so. As stated above, on an appeal from a

15
III. ADP’s liability for aiding and abetting.
Plaintiffs next contend that if given an opportunity to
amend their complaints, they could state claims against ADP for
aider and abettor liability under FEHA. For the reasons that
follow, plaintiffs’ claims lack merit.
A. Aider and abettor liability under FEHA.
FEHA prohibits “any person” from aiding or abetting
workplace discrimination. (§ 12940, subd. (i) [unlawful to “aid,
abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts
forbidden by” FEHA].) Thus, “individuals and entities who are
not the plaintiff’s employer may be liable under FEHA for aiding
and abetting the employer’s violation of FEHA.” (Smith v. BP
Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 145–146 (Smith);
Alch v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 339, 389 (Alch).)

judgment dismissing a complaint after a successful demurrer, if
the existing complaint does not state a claim, it is the plaintiff’s
burden to show “ ‘in what manner [she] can amend [her]
complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect
of [her] pleading.’ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335,
349.)” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43; see also Schifando v. City of Los Angeles
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 [“[t]he plaintiff has the burden of
proving that an amendment would cure the defect”].) Only if a
plaintiff does so can a reviewing court conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend. (Salazar
v. Target Corp. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 571, 577; Cantu v.
Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 890.)
Determining whether plaintiffs have demonstrated their ability
to state a cause of action if allowed the opportunity to replead
thus is not an improper advisory opinion—it is, instead, an
essential aspect of our appellate review.

16
Because FEHA does not define aiding and abetting, courts
have applied the term’s common law definition. (Alch, supra,
122 Cal.App.4th at p. 389, fn. 48; Fiol v. Doellstedt (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1325 (Fiol); Smith, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at
p. 146.) Under that definition, a “ ‘[l]iability may . . . be imposed
on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if
the person [1] knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and [2] gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other to so act.’ ” (Fiol, at pp. 1325–1326; see also Alch, at p. 389,
fn. 48 [quoting Fiol].)7 Applied in the FEHA context, therefore, a
third party defendant may be liable for aiding and abetting an
employer’s violation of FEHA “if the [third party defendant] knew
the employer’s conduct violated FEHA and gave ‘substantial
assistance or encouragement to the [employer] to so act. . . .’ ”
(Alch, at p. 389, italics added; see also Smith, at p. 146.)
Applying this standard, the court in Smith, supra,
64 Cal.App.5th 138, considered whether a plaintiff stated a cause
of action against third parties under FEHA for aiding and
abetting harassment and discrimination by the plaintiff’s
employer. The court found the complaint did not properly allege
aider and abettor liability because “[n]owhere in the FAC does
[the employee] allege that [the third parties] knew of [the

7 Under the common law, aider and abettor liability may also
be imposed on one who “gives substantial assistance to the other
in accomplishing a tortious result and the person’s own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.” (Alch, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 389, fn. 48; Fiol,
supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1325–1326.) Plaintiffs do not allege
that ADP had an independent duty to them under FEHA, and
thus we do not address this issue.

17
employer’s] alleged harassment and discrimination against [the
employee]. [Citation.] Nor does [the employee] allege that [the
third parties] knew [the employer’s] conduct violated FEHA or
that [they] gave [the employer] substantial assistance or
encouragement to [the employer’s] alleged violations of FEHA.”
(Id. at p. 146.)
In contrast, in Alch, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pages 389 to
390, the Court of Appeal found that a group of television writers
had adequately alleged aider and abettor liability against
defendant talent agencies because the plaintiffs’ complaints
“clearly allege the agencies knew the employers were engaged in
systemic discrimination on the basis of age, and gave ‘substantial
assistance or encouragement’ to the employers by virtue of their
own referral practices, screening out older writers in favor of
younger ones.”
B. Plaintiffs’ complaints did not state claims for
aider and abettor liability under FEHA.
Plaintiffs do not suggest they have alleged that ADP
encouraged Madkan to act in ways ADP knew violated FEHA,
but they urge that is not the proper test in the present case.
They contend that Smith and Alch involved intentional torts, and
thus those cases do not apply because disability discrimination is
not an intentional tort. Instead, plaintiffs suggest, disability
discrimination is a tort of negligence, and thus ADP can be liable
for aiding or abetting Madkan’s alleged disability discrimination

18
if it encouraged Madkan to take acts it “knew or should have
known” violated FEHA. (Italics added.)8
Plaintiffs’ argument lacks merit. As an initial matter,
plaintiffs erroneously assert that disability discrimination is not
an intentional tort. The case they cite for this proposition does
not support it; rather, it holds that “where . . . an employee is
found to be able to safely perform the essential duties of the job, a
plaintiff alleging disability discrimination can establish the
requisite employer intent to discriminate by proving (1) the
employer knew that plaintiff had a physical condition that
limited a major life activity, or perceived him to have such a
condition, and (2) the plaintiff’s actual or perceived physical
condition was a substantial motivating reason for the defendant’s
decision to subject the plaintiff to an adverse employment action.”
(Wallace v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 109, 129
(Wallace).) Manifestly, a cause of action for which an intent to
discriminate is “requisite” is an intentional tort. (See Bailey v.

8 Although neither plaintiff made this contention in the trial
court, we reject ADP’s contention that plaintiffs therefore
forfeited it. “The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
appellate courts reviewing a general demurrer make a de novo
determination of whether the complaint alleges ‘facts sufficient to
state a cause of action under any possible legal theory.’ ”
(Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1244.) “Accordingly, the ‘any possible legal
theory’ standard encompasses a legal theory presented for the
first time in an opening appellant’s brief.” (Ibid.; see also
Simpson v. The Kroger Corp. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1367
[“We may consider new theories on appeal from the sustaining of
a demurrer”].)

19
San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 636
[“Intent is not an element of negligence”].)9
Moreover, even if disability discrimination were a tort of
negligence, plaintiffs still could not plead aider and abettor
liability merely by alleging that ADP encouraged conduct that it
“knew or should have known” violated FEHA. It is true, as
plaintiffs assert, that there are several cases that arguably
recognize liability for aiding and abetting negligent conduct. (See
Navarrete v. Meyer (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1290
(Navarrete) [for purposes of joint liability under a concert of
action theory, “it suffices that [the passenger] assist or encourage
[the driver’s] breach of a duty”]; see also Use Note to CACI
No. 3610 [“It appears that one may be liable as an aider and
abetter of a negligent act”].) But none of those authorities
suggest, as plaintiffs would have us do, that a defendant can be
liable for aiding or abetting in the absence of actual knowledge
that the act to which encouragement is given is tortious—or,
stated differently, that “it is legally possible for [plaintiffs] to
satisfy the scienter or knowledge element of [their] causes of
action for aiding and abetting against ADP by using a negligence
standard (i.e., [that] ADP knew or should have known that
[Madkan’s] conduct violated FEHA).” (Italics added.)

9 Plaintiffs are correct that Wallace held that “animus” is not
a necessary element of a disability discrimination case. (See
Wallace, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 [“California law does
not require an employee with an actual or perceived disability to
prove that the employer’s adverse employment action was
motivated by animosity or ill will against the employee”].) But
“animus” is not synonymous with “intent.”

20
In Navarrete, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at page 1286, for
example, the court explained that “[t]he concert of action theory
of group liability ‘may be used to impose liability on a person who
did not personally cause the harm to plaintiff, but whose
“ ‘[a]dvice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to
a tortfeasor[,] and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious[,]
it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as
participation or physical assistance.’ ” ’ ” (Italics added.)
Similarly, in Orser v. George (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 660, the court
held that a defendant who did not fire a bullet that killed a
decedent nonetheless could be liable to the decedent’s heirs if the
defendant “knew [the shooter’s] conduct constituted a breach of
duty owed [the decedent] and [gave the shooter] substantial
‘assistance or encouragement.’ ” (Italics added.) And, CACI
No. 3610 (Aiding and Abetting Tort) provides that an element of
the tort of aiding and abetting is that the defendant “knew that [a
tort] was [being/going to be] committed.” (Italics added.)
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that to state a claim
for aider and abettor liability under FEHA, plaintiffs must allege
that ADP encouraged Madkan to take actions ADP knew violated
FEHA. Neither plaintiff has done so; indeed, both plaintiffs
concede they have not adequately pled that ADP knowingly aided
and abetted Madkan’s alleged FEHA violations under the test
articulated in Smith and Alch. The trial court thus did not err in
sustaining ADP’s demurrer to the aider and abettor claim.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying leave to amend. In the trial court, plaintiffs did not
articulate any specific amendments that would cure the pleading
defects as to aider and abettor liability. Nor did plaintiffs do so
in their appellate briefs, merely asserting that they could allege

21
that ADP “was familiar with FEHA and its unique
characteristics, and a reasonable fact finder could readily infer
ADP knew that terminating an employee with a known disability
while on medical leave would most likely violate FEHA under the
circumstances.” This is insufficient. And, although plaintiffs
asserted at oral argument that they could allege that ADP knew
its advice to Madkan violated the law, this was insufficient to
establish an abuse of discretion. (New Plumbing Contractors,
Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1088,
1098 [although “the showing as to how the complaint may be
amended need not be made to the trial court and can be made for
the first time to the reviewing court,” an “argument[ ] raised for
the first time at oral argument[ ] is not adequate to justify [a]
finding the trial court abused its discretion. New issues cannot
generally be raised for the first time in oral argument”]; Daniels
v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150,
1185–1186 [same], overruled on other grounds in Sheen v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905.)

22
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Respondent ADP is awarded
its appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.

23

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