CourtListener 10381235•P. v. Sullivan CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 4/18/25 P. v Sullivan CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B334734
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA138490)
v.
KARENGHA SULLIVAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke, II, Judge. Affirmed.
Susan Morrow Maxwell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David E. Madeo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 2016, Karengha Sullivan pled no contest to attempted
murder. Years later, Sullivan petitioned for resentencing under
Penal Code1 section 1172.6, which limited accomplice liability for
murder. Relying in part on the stipulated factual basis for
Sullivan’s plea, the trial court found that Sullivan was convicted
as a direct aider and abettor and, as such, ineligible for
resentencing. We agree and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
I. Sullivan’s plea to attempted murder
Based on a shooting in 2015, an amended felony complaint
charged Sullivan with conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd.
(a)(1)), two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)),
personal and principal gun use (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d),
(e)(1)), and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)). Four
codefendants were also charged with crimes arising from the
shooting.
In 2016, Sullivan pled no contest to one count of attempted
murder and admitted a gang allegation.2 At the plea hearing,
Sullivan admitted the following facts as a basis for his plea: On
March 7, 2015, Sullivan, Donald Wilson, Calvin Charles, and
Quintell Foster “discussed committing a retaliatory murder
against Athens Park Blood”; Wilson and Foster armed
themselves with firearms; Sullivan and Charles got into “a follow
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2
The trial court struck an allegation that the attempted
murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
2
car,” and Foster and Wilson got into a “lead car”; the two cars
drove together to Athens Park Territory; Sullivan and Charles
drove the car to distract any type of law enforcement or rival
gang members; shots were fired from Wilson and Foster’s car at
individuals in Athens Park territory (129th Street and San Pedro
in Los Angeles County); the two cars that went into Athens Park
territory attempted to flee after “completing [the] mission”; and
after trying to flee, a SUV “shot at [the] car injuring” Sullivan
and then shot at the car Foster was in, killing Foster but missing
Wilson.
Defense counsel joined in and the court accepted the plea
and the factual basis. The court then sentenced Sullivan to five
years for attempted murder and 10 years for the gang
enhancement on count 2.
II. Postconviction petition for resentencing
In 2022, Sullivan petitioned for resentencing under section
1172.6, and the trial court appointed counsel for him. The People
opposed the petition on the ground that the record of conviction
established that Sullivan was convicted as a direct aider and
abettor.
At the September 21, 2023 hearing on the petition, the trial
court found that the record of conviction, including the plea
transcript, established that Sullivan was convicted as a direct
aider and abettor. Accordingly, the trial court found that
Sullivan failed to make a prima facie showing for relief and
denied the petition.
3
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and standard of review
To the end of ensuring a person’s sentence is commensurate
with the person’s individual criminal culpability, Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) and
subsequent related legislation limited accomplice liability under
the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and eliminated
convictions for murder based on a theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis);
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) As amended
by Senate Bill No. 775, effective January 1, 2022, these
ameliorative changes to the law now expressly apply to
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine and voluntary manslaughter.
Senate Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3),
which provides that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a
crime shall act with malice aforethought” and malice “shall not
be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in
a crime.” Under section 188, subdivision (a)(3), an accomplice no
longer may be guilty of murder based on the mere determination
the accomplice aided and abetted a target crime, and murder was
a natural and probable consequence of that target crime. (See
generally People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 984.)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 189, subdivision (e), to
limit application of the felony-murder rule. Before the addition of
that section, the felony-murder doctrine had allowed accomplices
to be liable for murder “simply by participating in certain felonies
4
with the killer.” (People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158,
1164, review granted May 1, 2024, S284232.) But the doctrine as
now limited by section 189, subdivision (e), allows accomplices to
a felony to be held responsible for a cohort’s act of murder only if
the accomplice “with the intent to kill” aided and abetted “the
actual killer” in committing murder in the first degree or the
accomplice was a “major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (See also People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)
Senate Bill 1437 created a procedure, codified at section
1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former law to
be resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of those
crimes under the current law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A
defendant commences that procedure by filing a petition
containing a declaration that, among other things, the defendant
could not presently be convicted of murder under the current law.
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
At this prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true the
petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were
proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In determining
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, the
trial court may look at the record of conviction, including jury
instructions, verdicts and closing argument, to determine readily
ascertainable facts such as the crime of conviction. (People v.
Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56.) When the conviction
resulted from a plea, the record of conviction includes the plea
colloquy and the facts the defendant admitted as a factual basis
5
for the plea. (People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136; People
v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211–1212; People v.
Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1028.)
At the prima facie stage, the trial court does not engage in
fact finding that involves weighing evidence or exercising
discretion. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) If a petition
establishes a prima facie case for relief, the trial court must
appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to show cause, and
hold an evidentiary hearing at which the parties may offer new or
additional evidence and the trial court sits as an independent
factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the
defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory. (People v.
Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
But if at the prima facie stage the record of conviction
establishes that the petition is meritless, the trial court may
dismiss it. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) To deny a
petition at the prima facie stage, the record of conviction must
demonstrate the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) We review
the denial of a petition at the prima facie stage de novo. (Ibid.)
II. The record of conviction established Sullivan’s ineligibility
for resentencing
Sullivan agrees that his plea and stipulation to the factual
basis are part of the record of conviction, but he disagrees that he
admitted any facts precluding him from resentencing under
section 1172.6. As we now explain, the facts Sullivan stipulated
to establish he was convicted of attempted murder as a direct
aider and abettor.
Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
attempted murder liability after the passage of Senate Bill 1437.
6
(People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850; People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 548.) To establish liability under that theory, the
prosecution must establish that the “ ‘defendant aided or
encouraged the commission of the murder with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating its
commission.’ ” (Curiel, at p. 466.) “ ‘[T]o be guilty of attempted
murder as an aider and abettor, a person must give aid or
encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent
to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s
accomplishment of the intended killing—which means that the
person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor must
intend to kill.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054.)
Here, Sullivan admitted he and his accomplices “discussed
committing a retaliatory murder against Athens Park Blood.”
Two of Sullivan’s accomplices then armed themselves, the men
drove two cars into Athens Park territory, Sullivan’s car was
driven in a way to distract law enforcement and rival gang
members, and someone from Wilson and Foster’s car fired shots
at individuals within Athens Park territory. Sullivan’s admission
that he discussed committing murder established that he knew
the shooter’s intent to kill. His admission that he was in the
“follow car” to the “lead car” established that he shared a
murderous intent and engaged in indirect acts to encourage and
further the attempted murder. Therefore, Sullivan was convicted
of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor who had the
intent to kill.
We are unpersuaded by Sullivan’s argument that these
admissions fail to establish he agreed to commit murder. True,
7
Sullivan did not stipulate to those specific words. But there is no
other interpretation of Sullivan’s admissions. A discussion was
had about committing murder, men armed themselves, they all
drove into gang territory, and Sullivan’s accomplices shot at
people. That is direct aider and abettor liability for attempted
murder.
Sullivan, however, argues that the charging document
allowed him to be prosecuted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. That is, when murder (or, as here,
attempted murder) is charged generically, the prosecution is not
limited to pursing any particular theory and may proceed on any
theory of murder. (People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967,
977.) But the charging document is not particularly relevant
where, as here, Sullivan entered into a plea, stipulated to a
factual basis for the plea, and that factual basis established he
was convicted as a direct aider and abettor and not under any
now-invalid theory.
Sullivan also asserts that had he rejected the plea and
instead gone to trial, the prosecution could have proceeded under
a now-invalid theory that he agreed to participate in an assault
with a deadly weapon, the natural and probable consequence of
which was attempted murder. But that is not what happened.
Sullivan did not go to trial. He entered into a plea. Therefore,
we have no occasion to speculate about what might have
happened at a trial that never occurred. Were we required to do
so, then it would be the rare pleading petitioner who could not
establish a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief. But opening
up relief to almost all defendants who entered a plea is not what
section 1172.6 was designed to do. (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 715 [§ 1172.6 “does not open resentencing to every
8
previously convicted murder defendant”].) Rather, just “as a
defendant convicted following a jury trial cannot show eligibility
for relief under section 1172.6 by asserting there may have been
other evidence not adduced at trial that would have allowed the
jury to make findings inconsistent with current law, a defendant
convicted by plea cannot show eligibility for relief by asserting
the People could have prosecuted him based on invalid theories
when the record conclusively establishes that at the time of the
plea, the People were operating under only one theory of the
defendant’s guilt, and that theory is still valid under current
law.” (People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 277,
review granted Feb. 19, 2025, S288860.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Karengha Sullivan’s Penal Code section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J. ADAMS, J.
9
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