CourtListener 10379856•People v. Caseres CA2/6
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Filed 4/16/25 P. v. Caseres CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335703
(Super. Ct. No. NA094572
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
JOSEPH CASERES,
Defendant and Appellant.
Joseph Caseres appeals the trial court’s judgment following
a resentencing hearing to strike a now-invalid prior prison term
enhancement. (Pen. Code, §§ 1172.75, 667.5, subd. (b).)1 We
affirm.
This appeal concerns Caseres’s conviction of second degree
robbery with a finding of personal firearm use and discharge, as
well as prior felony strike conviction and prison term findings.
Caseres received a sentence of 36 years’ imprisonment, which
1All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
stated otherwise.
included one year for a prior prison term enhancement. At a
section 1172.75 resentencing, the trial court struck the one-year
prison term enhancement, but otherwise reimposed the same
sentence. Caseres now complains that the court erred by
reimposing the upper-term sentence for robbery without a finding
that the aggravating upper-term factor was true beyond a
reasonable doubt. (§§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)-(4), 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
For several reasons, we reject this contention. (People v.
Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 466-467.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 31, 2012, Caseres took a chain necklace,
watch, and earrings from Ramiro Suarez. Caseres fired a firearm
near Suarez’s ankle, grazing it. Suarez’s sister saw the robbery
and shooting; she and Suarez recognized and identified Caseres.
Prior to trial, Suarez informed a police detective that he had been
threatened and would not cooperate in the prosecution. At trial,
Suarez testified that he was intoxicated during the crimes and
unable to identify the robber.
A jury convicted Caseres of second degree robbery and
found that he personally used and discharged a firearm during
commission of the crime. (§§ 211, 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c).) In
a separate proceeding, Caseres admitted that he had served two
prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b), and been convicted of a serious felony and strike
conviction. (§§ 667, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds.
(a)-(d).) The prior prison terms were served for a 2004 conviction
for making criminal threats, and a 2009 conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon.
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Original Sentencing (2014)
On January 7, 2014, the trial court imposed a second-strike
sentence of 36 years’ imprisonment. The sentence consisted of an
upper term of five years for the robbery (then doubled), five years
for the serious felony conviction, 20 years for the firearm
enhancement, and one year for the prior prison term that
concerned unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The court
imposed various fines and fees and awarded Caseres 377 days of
custody credit.
Caseres appealed and we affirmed. (People v. Caseres (Feb.
19, 2015, B254288) [nonpub. opn].)
Section 1172.75 Resentencing (2023)
In 2022, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
identified Caseres as an inmate who may be entitled to section
1172.75 resentencing. On October 30, 2023, the trial court held a
resentencing hearing. In a sentencing memorandum, his
attorney requested a 13-year sentence, proposing that the court
strike the prior serious felony and strike conviction findings, the
firearm enhancement, and the one-year prior prison term
enhancement. The court declined to strike the serious felony and
strike conviction findings or the firearm enhancement. It struck
the one-year prison term enhancement (based upon unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon) and otherwise reimposed the
same sentence. The trial judge stated this reason for reimposing
the upper term: “High term is warranted because the defendant
had previously served a prison term and [this] is an aggravating
factor under California Rules of Court [rule] 4.421(b)(3).” The
court reimposed various fines and fees and awarded Caseres
4,505 days of custody credit.
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Caseres appeals and contends that the trial court erred by
imposing the upper-term because the aggravating factor was not
found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the factfinder.
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that any prison
term enhancement imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b), except that imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense, is legally invalid.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (c) requires the trial court to recall
an applicable sentence and resentence the defendant.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1) mandates the trial court
to impose “a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed . . .
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” At
resentencing, the court “shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(Id., subd. (d)(2).) The court may also consider post-conviction
factors, including the defendant’s disciplinary record, his
rehabilitation, and his age and physical condition affecting any
risk for future violence, among other factors. (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
“Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court
may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless
there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
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Caseres has forfeited his resentencing argument. The trial
court provided him an opportunity for full resentencing and
argument for application of discretionary and ameliorative
changes in sentencing laws. (People v. Carter (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 960, 972 [“a defendant eligible for removal of a
prison prior under section 1172.75 must be provided an
opportunity for full resentencing to argue for further relief under
any other ameliorative changes in law that reduce sentences”].)
Caseres did not object that the court was precluded from
reimposing the upper term without the factual findings pursuant
to section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1)–(3). (People v. Brannon-
Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 466-467 [defendant
forfeited claim pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b) by not
raising it at resentencing hearing]; People v. Tilley (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 772, 778 [forfeiture where defendant did not seek the
lower term, object to the imposition of the middle term, or argue
that he suffered from mental illness].)
Forfeiture aside, there is a split of authority whether a trial
court resentencing a defendant pursuant to section 1172.75 must
find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt before
imposing the upper term. People v. Brannon-Thompson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th 455, 458, does not require aggravating factors to
be found true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was
previously imposed. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4) [“Unless the court
originally imposed the upper term . . . .”].) People v. Gonzalez
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 329, interpreted section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
every case due to Sixth Amendment concerns. We find Brannon-
Thompson’s interpretation based upon plain language of the
statute persuasive. Here, the court previously imposed the upper
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term at the original sentencing, and by the plain language of
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) could do so again without a
reasonable doubt finding.
Moreover, at the original sentencing hearing, Caseres
admitted that he served two prior prison terms as described in
the felony information. The prosecutor described the priors by
referring to the information, to the case number, brief title of the
crime, and the conviction date. Caseres responded that he
“admit[ted]” the prison prior that the prosecutor described as
pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), “a violation of [former]
section 12021[(a)(1)], commonly known as felony possession of a
firearm.” His attorney then stipulated to a factual basis for the
admissions and the court determined that “the admissions have
been made knowingly, intelligently, understandingly, expressly,
and explicitly. There’s a factual basis pursuant to the admission
of the defendant.” Caseres’s admissions satisfied any burden of
proof requirement of sections 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) and
1170, subdivision (b)(2).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J. BALTODANO, J.
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Tomson T. Ong, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
S.R. Balash, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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