Lee v. Lee CA4/3

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Testo completo

Filed 4/16/25 Lee v. Lee CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JACK LEE, Individually and as
Cotrustee, etc.,
G063374
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No.
v. 30-2020-01146084)

CHENG-CHIE LEE, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Ebrahim Baytieh, Judge. Affirmed.
Murtaugh Treglia Stern & Deily and Devin E. Murtaugh for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Appellant herein, Cheng-Chie Lee, who goes by the nickname
“Jeff,” contests findings made after a bench trial on competing petitions filed
by himself and his older brother regarding assets in their parents’ trust.
Jeff’s1 petition sought to invalidate a trust document which disinherited him.
His brother, Jack, responded with a petition seeking to invalidate a contract
by which their parents were to pay a loan secured by a home the parents had
gifted to Jeff.
The trial court determined that both brothers had unduly
influenced their elderly parents into signing documents that benefitted them,
and therefore granted both petitions. Jeff appeals the decision as to Jack
because he contends the trial court failed to consider or dispose of Jeff’s
affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, laches, and lack of standing.
We conclude the trial court’s findings of fact and its statement of
decision indicate it considered these defenses and properly determined they
lacked merit. We therefore affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
Ju-Long and Sue May Lee (hereinafter collectively, the Lees)
moved to the United States from Taiwan in 1974 with their four children:
Susan, Jack, James, and Jeff, the youngest. The Lees were fluent in
Taiwanese, Mandarin, and Japanese, but not English. They therefore relied
heavily on their children to assist them in conducting financial business. As

1 We refer to individual Lee family members in this opinion by

their first names only for purposes of clarity.
2 Because Jeff does not substantively challenge the trial court’s

factual findings, we derive the majority of the facts from the revised final
statement of decision and judgment entered by the court herein on October
18, 2023.

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they grew older, the four children began alternating staying one week each
with the couple to assist them with their needs. After Susan began
experiencing health issues, she dropped out of the arrangement, and the
three brothers assumed weekly shifts staying with their parents.
The Lees accumulated substantial assets in Taiwan and in the
United States over their lifetimes. The couple, especially Sue May, became
interested in real estate investing after they immigrated to this country, and
Jeff helped her in this pursuit.
The Lees hoped to leave their estate to their children in equal
shares. In 1992, they executed a living trust for this purpose. The couple
transferred into the trust a house they had purchased in Rancho Santa Fe in
1989 (hereinafter, the Rancho property).
Around 2004, Jeff was going through divorce proceedings and he
moved into the Rancho property. He paid his parents $10,000 per month in
rent, but they were simultaneously depositing the money in an overseas bank
account they had established.
In 2007, the Lees obtained a $1 million residential mortgage loan
secured by the Rancho property. The proceeds of the loan were used to fund
construction of Ju-Long and Sue May’s dream home in Newport Coast, which
the parties refer to as “Skyridge.” Jeff claims he was heavily involved in the
construction at Skyridge.
Once Jeff’s divorce was finalized in 2011, the Lees gave Jeff the
Rancho property outright rather than transfer the money in the overseas
account back to him. However, Jeff testified, his parents told him they would
continue to be responsible for paying the Skyridge loan.
Jeff had an agreement drafted, the “repayment agreement,”
whereby his parents agreed that Jeff was receiving the Rancho property free

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and clear of the loan. Jeff testified that he was in possession of the original
document, and a copy of it was entered into evidence.
The document states that it was “made as of March 16, 2011,”
and is signed by Ju-Long, Sue May, and Jeff. The stated consideration for the
Lees’ promise was that Jeff would “allow[] the Real Property to continue to be
used as collateral for the Loan, so that the Loan [would] not have to be
prepaid” by them. The document further stated that if the deed of trust was
not released from the Rancho property on or before the Lees’ deaths, the loan
obligation was to be imposed on their living trust, and was to be paid as an
estate obligation prior to any distributions to beneficiaries.
Despite the purported March 16, 2011 effective date of the
agreement, the trial court found Jeff had taken “steps consistent with him
being responsible for the repayment of the Loan.” The trial court noted Jeff
had never told his siblings about the existence of the written repayment
agreement. It further noted the evidence showed Jeff was trying to secure his
own financing to pay off the Skyridge loan. Indeed, the court observed that
Jeff communicated with a mortgage loan specialist on March 21, 2011–five
days after the agreement’s effective date–to say he would secure financing to
pay off the majority of the loan once title had transferred to him. Susan’s
testimony corroborates this; she testified Jeff continually agreed to assume
the loan, but whenever the siblings decided on an arrangement for him to do
so, he would reject the proposal.
The repayment agreement bears a notary stamp dated January
3, 2012, almost a year after the agreement’s effective date. At trial, Jeff
testified that he drove his parents to a Wells Fargo Bank to sign both the
repayment agreement and an amendment to the Lees’ living trust before a
notary public. The trust amendment stated that Jeff’s share of the trust

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estate should not be adjusted based on the Lees’ agreement to repay the loan
on the Rancho property. Jeff testified that he could not recall whether anyone
translated the documents to the Lees before they signed. He also could not
recall which attorney had drafted the repayment agreement.
On May 8, 2011, at a Mother’s Day family get-together, the Lees
informed their other children that they had transferred the Rancho property
to Jeff. The other three siblings were distressed by this news. From that point
on, the court found, Jack began what the court called “an unrelenting
campaign of pressure and influence to equalize what [Jack] saw as an unfair
gift to Jeff.” Sue May required mental health treatment for stress and
anxiety from the resulting family conflict.
In 2012, Jack and Susan brought their parents to attorney John
Chang, whose law firm represented Susan in connection with her estate
planning. Chang spoke Mandarin and so could communicate easily with the
Lees. The Lees told him they wanted to leave their estate equally to their
children, but they did not want to be responsible for the Skyridge loan. Chang
drafted and on December 11, 2012, the Lees executed an irrevocable trust
document which intentionally disinherited Jeff. The document named Susan
and Jack as cotrustees.
The Lees continued to keep the Skyridge loan current. In 2019, at
the age of 95, Ju-Long passed away. Sue May survives him, but at the time of
trial, she was around 95 years old herself, and could not testify. As of the
date of trial, Jeff remained living at the Rancho property.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2020, Jeff filed a petition to determine the validity of the
2012 irrevocable trust and to enforce the repayment agreement. Jack filed
objections to the petition as well as a counter petition seeking rescission of
the repayment agreement based on undue influence, amongst other things.3
Susan filed a joinder to Jack’s objection to Jeff’s petition.
Jeff filed his own objections to Jack’s petition. Among the
affirmative defenses Jeff asserted were the statute of limitations, laches, and
lack of standing. Jeff alleged that the Lees knew at least as of 2012 that they
had a cause of action for rescission against him and that there was a time
limit to bring that claim in court. Jeff also alleged that Jack lacked standing
to object to the repayment agreement on Sue May’s behalf, because she was
still alive. Jeff brought a motion for summary judgment based on the three-
year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338,
subdivision (d). In denying Jeff’s motion, the trial court stated he had failed
to show that his parents were aware, on or before April 26, 2018, that they
had been induced to sign the repayment agreement by fraud.
After a bench trial on Jeff and Jack’s competing petitions, the
trial court issued a statement of decision granting both petitions and
invalidating both the 2012 irrevocable trust and the repayment agreement.
The court found both Jeff and Jack had procured their respective documents
by unduly influencing their parents.4 As for Jeff’s affirmative defenses, the
court stated that it had “considered all such defenses and legal arguments,”

3 The operative petition by Jack is the second amended petition

filed August 19, 2022.
4 Jeff does not contest the court’s undue influence findings.

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and found that “based on the factual findings made by the court, and based
on the totality of all the evidence, none of these defenses and/or legal
arguments are persuasive or applicable to change the conclusions reached by
the court as detailed in this Statement of Decision.”
Jeff filed objections to the statement of decision, asking the court
to further detail its disposition of the affirmative defenses, but the court
declined.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, Jeff argues the trial court should have denied Jack’s
petition based on his affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, laches,
and lack of standing.
“Where the facts are undisputed, the effect or legal significance of
those facts is a question of law. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791,
799.) We review any questions of law de novo. (Id. at p. 801.) We review
findings of fact for substantial evidence. ‘“In general, in reviewing a judgment
based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, ‘any conflict in the
evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved
in support of the determination of the trial court decision. [Citations.]’
[Citation.] . . . “The court's statement of decision is sufficient if it fairly
discloses the court’s determination as to the ultimate facts and material
issues in the case.’”” (Gomez v. Smith (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1026–
1027.)

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II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED NONE OF APPELLANT’S AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES HAD ANY MERIT BASED ON ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS
Jeff’s central thesis is that the trial court’s factual findings as
provided in the final statement of decision were insufficient to resolve his
three main affirmative defenses. Indeed, he suggests that the trial court left
his affirmative defenses “unresolved.” But a careful reading of the statement
of decision shows clearly that the trial court did consider Jeff’s defenses. It
just rejected them. And the basis for its rejection is made manifest in its
discussion of the facts and law.
A. Statute of Limitations
Jeff’s statute of limitations argument is premised on the fact that
his parents consulted with a number of attorneys over the years who
reviewed the repayment agreement. Most notably, Jeff’s parents sought the
advice of an attorney in 2012 who wrote an opinion letter regarding their
agreements with Jeff. This attorney stated that, while he understood the
Lees did not wish to “pursue any legal remedies to challenge those
agreements,” he felt the agreements might be vulnerable to judicial attack if
they chose to do so. He cautioned that there were “time limits within which
any such actions must be filed, and although they vary, and again will
depend upon the facts, the most obvious time limit would be three years from
date of the transaction.” Assuming the Lees understood the content of this
letter, it is evidence that attorneys attempted to make them aware that they
had three years to file suit in order to invalidate the agreements.
But Jack asserted that the statute of limitations was tolled
because Jeff continually behaved in a way that was inconsistent with the
repayment agreement. Jack appears to have been arguing that Jeff was

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equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense
because his own conduct induced the Lees not to sue. “One aspect of equitable
estoppel is codified in Evidence Code section 623, which provides that
‘[w]henever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon
such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or
conduct, permitted to contradict it.’ (See DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix
Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 60.) . . . ‘“‘Where
the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it
cannot be availed of by him as a defense.’”’ [Citations.]” (Lantzy v. Centex
Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 384.)
The trial court found merit in this theory, stating: “The evidence
presented during the trial establishes that at different points in time Jeff
took steps consistent with him being responsible for the repayment of the
Loan.” This included hiding the agreement from his siblings and seeking his
own financing to pay off the loan. The trial court’s statement shows it felt
Jeff’s own conduct had induced his parents into thinking he would not be
enforcing the agreement and that he was therefore estopped to assert the
statute of limitations as a defense.
The trial court’s finding that Jeff exerted undue influence on his
parents to sign the repayment agreement also militates against allowing him
to use the statute of limitations as a shield in this action. “Just as the statute
of limitations does not run against an action based on fraud so long as the
fraud remains concealed, so ought the statute to be tolled even after the fraud
is discovered, for so long as the sheer economic duress or undue influence
embedded in the fraud continues to hold the victim in place.” (Wyatt v. Union

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Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 788, italics omitted.) Surely, this principle
would apply to the Lees based on the trial court’s factual findings.
B. Laches
“‘“The defense of laches requires unreasonable delay plus either
acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay.” [Citation.]’ (Johnson v. City of Loma
Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 68.).” (Drake v. Pinkham (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
400, 406.) The premise of Jeff’s laches defense is that the delay in rescinding
the repayment agreement resulted in the loss of witnesses, including his
father, and Sue May, who was very old by the time of trial.
However, like the statute of limitations, a defendant may be
estopped to assert laches as a defense where his conduct induces the plaintiff
to postpone efforts to rescind an agreement. (See Cooper v. Huntington (1918)
178 Cal. 160, 164.) And, like Jeff’s statute of limitations defense, this appears
to be the trial court’s conclusion.
C. Lack of Standing
Jeff argues that Jack may have had authority to act for Ju-Long’s
estate as a co-executor, but he lacked standing to rescind the repayment
agreement on Sue May’s behalf. He further argues that Jack lacked personal
standing to challenge the repayment agreement as a trust beneficiary
because any such standing would have been established under the Probate
Code, and Jeff claims Jack did not raise any claims under the Probate Code.
The record does not demonstrate that Jack ever claimed to have
standing on Sue May’s behalf; rather, his filings show Jack brought his
petition as co-executor of Ju-Long’s estate. “A party to a contract” can rescind
“[i]f the consent of the party rescinding, or of any party jointly contracting
with him, was . . . obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue

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influence, exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he
rescinds . . .” (Civ. Code, §1689, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) Here, Jack sued
on Ju-Long’s behalf to rescind the agreement because both he and Sue May’s
consent was obtained through undue influence. And the trial court agreed
that Jeff unduly influenced both of his parents.
The trial court properly concluded that none of Jeff’s affirmative
defenses barred Jack’s petition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Appellant to bear his own costs on
appeal.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

GOODING, J.

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