People v. Hernandez CA2/6

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Filed 4/16/25 P. v. Hernandez CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B328163
(Super. Ct. No. 2022015660)
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Ventura County)

v.

JUVENAL HERNANDEZ,

Defendants and Appellant.

Juvenal Hernandez challenges his conviction and
sentencing for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in
violation of Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1)1 (count
one), and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person in
violation of section 30305, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). We will
affirm.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the

Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was a probationer subject to searches and
prohibited from possessing firearms under § 29800, subdivision
(a)(1) and ammunition under § 30305, subdivision (a)(1). He
became a prohibited person on December 10, 2020. On June 24,
2022, Deputy Sheriff Cameron Simpkins and three probation
officers arrived at appellant’s home to conduct a search.
Appellant did not have prior notice. Deputy Simpkins was the
only officer wearing a bodycam, and it was functioning properly.
He turned it on when he arrived at the house. A parole officer
knocked on the door as Deputy Simpkins observed appellant on
his cell phone in the backyard. Deputy Simpkins ordered
appellant inside. After two or three minutes, appellant’s
grandmother answered the door.
The officers asked appellant, his brother, and his
grandmother to step outside and wait on the front porch. One
parole officer searched appellant’s person while the other officers
and Deputy Simpkins conducted a protective sweep of the home.
Deputy Simpkins’s turned his bodycam off while he and two other
officers searched the house.
Officers found paperwork relating to appellant’s probation
in a back bedroom and determined he had “access and control” in
that room. While searching the bed area, Deputy Simpkins found
a black tote bag under the mattress. Inside was a .22 caliber
revolver bearing serial number Z71603, a magazine holder, three
magazines, boxes of 9-millimeter and .22 caliber ammunition,
gloves, and various firearm parts.
No other officers personally witnessed Deputy Simpkins
find the bag. When he found it, he turned his bodycam back on to
“depict accurately” where it was found. In the video, Deputy

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Simpkins is seen picking up the mattress and placing the black
bag underneath. The items were seized, booked into evidence,
and appellant was arrested.
The Automated Firearm System (AFS) is California’s
electronic repository for firearm records. It is maintained by the
California Department of Justice. Firearms records in AFS are
based on entries made by authorized law enforcement agents and
firearms dealers and may be subject to human error. If a firearm
has been relinquished, reported lost or stolen, or transferred, it
will be reported in AFS. If a firearm is confiscated by police, it is
entered into evidence as a “crime gun” but there is no paperwork
regarding relinquishment.
When a probation officer finds a probationer has not
relinquished a firearm, they remind the probationer to relinquish
and complete required paperwork. In a probation report, “found
to be in possession of . . .” is standard verbiage meaning firearms
are found to be registered under the person’s name, not
necessarily in their physical possession.
A diligent search of AFS revealed a .22 caliber firearm
bearing serial number Z71603 was purchased by appellant on
August 15, 2019. AFS has no other recorded history for the
firearm until it was seized and entered into evidence as a crime
gun by Deputy Simpkins on June 24, 2022. Probation reports
indicated appellant was found to be in possession of a firearm
with serial number Z71603 on three dates in 2021. No
paperwork was submitted to show the firearm had been
relinquished, reported lost or stolen, or transferred to another
owner.
Appellant was charged with possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) (count one),

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and possession of ammunition by a felon in violation of section
30305, subdivision (a)(1) (count two). The information alleged he
had prior felony convictions in 2020 for violations of § 32
[accessory after the fact]; Vehicle Code, § 2800.2, subdivision (a)
[evading the police while reckless driving]), and in 2021 for again
violating Vehicle Code, § 2800.2, subdivision (a). A jury found
appellant guilty on both counts. Appellant waived arraignment
for pronouncement of judgment and sentence and the court
imposed concurrent high terms on both counts, for an aggregate
term of three years in state prison.
DISCUSSION
Sufficient evidence supports the conviction
Appellant contends evidence he possessed a firearm must
be rejected as inherently improbable or physically impossible
because the prosecution offered “no evidence to explain why the
gun would not have been seized at the time of [appellant’s]
arrest” in 2020. Without citing the record, he claims an August
2, 2021 report showed the firearm was in the possession of the
Ventura County Sheriff’, implying it is impossible for him to have
possessed it in June 2022. His claims are an attempt to reargue
evidence.
Our role in determining whether sufficient evidence
supports a conviction is limited. We review the entire record in a
light most favorable to the prosecution and conclude whether
sufficient evidence would lead any rational trier of fact to find
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739.) We “‘“must presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]”’” (Id., at
p. 739) Conflicting evidence or testimony we might reasonably

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question will not permit us to reverse. (People v. Hovarter (2008)
44 Cal.4th 983, 1016.)
Determining whether evidence is trustworthy, a witness is
credible, or facts are true or false, lies solely in the trial court or
jury’s purview. (People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1016.)
We will not reject witness testimony believed by a factfinder
unless it is physically impossible or its falseness is clear without
making any inferences or deductions. (People v. Mayberry (1975)
15 Cal.3d 143, 150.) Evidence is inherently improbable when it is
“‘unbelievable per se . . . ,’ such that ‘the things testified to would
not seem possible.’” (People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721,
725.) Evidence is not physically impossible or inherently
improbable because it is contradicted or inconsistent. (People v.
Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 124-125.)
Trial evidence showed a firearm bearing serial number
Z71603 was registered to appellant in August 2019. He became a
prohibited person on December 10, 2020. A firearm is in a
probationer’s possession if it is registered to them. Probation
reports written in February, July, and August 2021 report the
firearm was registered to appellant. No paperwork was
submitted to show it had been relinquished, reported lost or
stolen, or transferred to another owner. Three probation officers
and Deputy Simpkins testified a firearm bearing serial number
Z71603 was found during the June 24, 2022 search in a room
appellant had access to and control of. AFS has no other
recorded history for the firearm until it was seized and entered
into evidence as a crime gun by Deputy Simpkins on June 24,
2022.
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution (People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 739), it is

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neither physically impossible nor so apparently false or
outlandish for a rational jury to believe the firearm was not
seized in 2020, nor relinquished by appellant, and thus remained
in his possession to be found in his home during a 2022 parole
search. (People v. Ennis, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 731; see
also People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 150.) “We reject
[appellant’s] attempt to reargue the evidence on appeal and
reiterate that ‘it is not a proper appellate function to reassess the
credibility of the witnesses.’” (People v. Thompson, supra, 49
Cal.4th at p. 125.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports appellant’s
conviction. Since a conviction supported by substantial evidence
does not violate due process rights under either the state or
federal constitution, we need not address his constitutional
claims. (People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1018-1019.)
Sentencing Under Section 1170
During oral argument, the parties conceded appellant had
been released from custody and both sides raised the issue of
mootness for the first time. We requested supplemental briefing
regarding whether appellant’s release mooted his sentencing
claim. After considering that briefing we conclude the claim is
moot.
“‘[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no
practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective
relief.’” (People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.)
Consequently, “‘“[w]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of
a lower court, and without any fault of the [opposing party], an
event occurs which renders it impossible for [the] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of [defendant], to grant him any
effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal

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judgment, but will dismiss the appeal”’ as moot.” (People v.
DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645 (DeLeon).) Where a defendant
has completed a sentence, their claims of error as to that
sentence are moot “because a reviewing court’s resolution of the
issues could offer no relief regarding the time he spent in custody
. . . .” (Ibid.) An exception to mootness has been recognized
where a defendant “continues to suffer a besmirched name and
the stigma of criminality.” (People v. Delong (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 482, 492.)
A defendant must demonstrate “sufficiently concrete
consequences to avoid a finding of mootness.” (DeLeon, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 646, fn. 2.) Speculative consequences do not
“support the conclusion that a legally sufficient controversy
exists.” (Ibid.) “[C]omplaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to
sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect
on the . . . legal status that is capable of being redressed by a
favorable court decision.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277.)
Even though appellant is now free from custody and
supervision, he asserts his claim of sentencing error is not moot
because a public stigma of increased criminality remains part of
his permanent record due to the improper imposition of an upper
term sentence. But he has not provided relevant authority to
support this claim, or demonstrated how his completed sentence
will result in ongoing adverse collateral consequences such as
would prevent his appeal from being moot. ““‘[T]he moral stigma
of a judgment which no longer affects legal rights does not
present a case or controversy for appellate review.”’” (People v.
Armas (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 350, 357, italics omitted.)
Appellant was released from state prison to postrelease
community supervision (“PRCS”) on January 23, 2024. PRCS

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was terminated on January 22, 2025. This appeal was fully
briefed on June 11, 2024, nearly six months after appellant’s
release from prison and just seven months before PRCS was
terminated. The appeal was argued and submitted on March 13,
2025, two months after PRCS terminated. Even if we were to
remand, and even if the trial court resentenced to a lower term,
“resolution of the issues could offer no relief regarding the time
he spent in custody . . . .” (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 645.)
Not only would a conclusion in his favor have no practical
effect or provide him with effective relief (People v. Rish, supra,
163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380), but a low term sentence will not
change the fact appellant’s criminal convictions remain a
permanent part of his record. Remand and resentencing will not
clear his record or remove the stigma of criminality. The issue is
moot and we decline appellant’s invitation to consider the merits.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Honorable David Worley, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Melanie Dorian, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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