CourtListener 10378251•People v. Zuccolillo CA3
Testo completo
Filed 4/11/25 P. v. Zuccolillo CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099761
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 20CF01824)
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY ZUCCOLILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Michael Anthony Zuccolillo participated in a series of sexually explicit
text messages with a fictitious minor. The text messages were initiated by one of
defendant’s business associates, who invented the persona of a foreign-born 16-year old
as part of a scheme to incriminate defendant to exact revenge for a deal gone wrong. The
business associate brought the messages to the attention of the Butte County Sheriff’s
Department, which commenced an investigation. Members of the sheriff’s department
exchanged more messages with defendant, including sexually charged ones, using the
1
persona of the same fictitious 16 year old. They also sent suggestive photographs of the
purported minor.
Defendant was arrested and charged with sending harmful matter to a minor (Pen.
Code, § 288.2, subd. (a)(2)),1 contacting a minor with the intent to commit a sexual
offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a)), and arranging a meeting with a minor for lewd purposes (§
288.4, subd. (a)(1)). A jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for two years with
various terms and conditions, including the requirement that he register as a sex offender.
Defendant appeals. He argues: (1) the sheriff’s department engaged in outrageous
government conduct by continuing an investigation conceived by a private citizen (his
business associate); (2) the trial court should have suppressed evidence obtained pursuant
to several search warrants; (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding his
business associate’s motives and criminal history; (4) the trial court violated his
confrontation rights by admitting the text messages; and (5) the trial court violated his
rights to due process and equal protection by requiring him to register as a sex offender.
None of these arguments has merit. Accordingly, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Sheriff’s detective (now Sergeant) Jason Miller was a member of the Internet
Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force, which investigates and prosecutes crimes
involving the online sexual exploitation of children. Miller met A. Halgren at the
sheriff’s office on February 24, 2020. Halgren gave Miller two cell phones. He also
gave Miller permission to search the phones.
Miller examined the phones and found text messages to defendant from someone
named “Mai.” “Mai” described herself as a 32-year-old Chinese gymnast, living in
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Sacramento. “Mai” and defendant exchanged text messages and photographs over
several days. During the course of these communications, “Mai” told defendant she had
a younger sister, “Kai.” “Mai” introduced “Kai” to defendant by text.
A. Defendant’s Communications with “Kai”
Defendant received an initial text message from “Kai” on February 11, 2020. An
exchange of messages ensued. The tone of the messages became increasingly suggestive,
and soon covered such topics as defendant’s vasectomy, “Kai’s” virginity, and the
possibility of the two having sex. Defendant and “Kai” also discussed their ages. “Kai”
revealed that she was 16 years old, and defendant replied that he was 41.
Defendant was concerned about “Kai’s” age. He wrote: “I might have an issue
with you being under 18. It’s a crime in America.” “Kai” assured defendant: “I will
have fun because it will feel good in my mouth,” and “I am Chinese, and it is not bad for
me.” Despite defendant’s reservations, he continued to exchange sexually explicit
messages with “Kai.” He also exchanged nude photographs with her. Things continued
in this manner for a week or so.
On February 19, 2020, defendant wrote “Kai” that he would be passing through
Sacramento that night and could get together if she was interested. The meeting was not
to be, but “Kai” encouraged defendant to visit soon. The sexually charged and explicit
back and forth continued. Around this time, “Kai” started using another phone.
On the afternoon of February 24, 2020, defendant texted “Kai” that he planned to
be in Sacramento that night. After an hour or so, defendant, hearing nothing, sent
another text message, this time just a question mark. A little less than an hour later, he
wrote: “I’m finishing up. If I don’t hear anything soon, I’m just going to turn back.” A
forensic analysis of call detail records from defendant’s phone would later suggest that he
left his home in Butte County around the same time, then drove towards Sacramento as
far as Oroville, and then turned around and drove back. By then, of course, Halgren had
turned “Kai’s” phones over to the sheriff’s department.
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B. The Sheriff ’s Department Assumes the Role of “Kai”
Sheriff’s Detective Mary Barker began texting defendant as “Kai” on February 25,
2020, using yet another phone. Defendant told “Kai” he was frustrated the meeting had
not happened the day before. Nevertheless, he soon resumed sending sexually explicit
text messages and photographs. He also asked that “Kai” send more photographs.
Sergeant Miller conducted a Google images search for photographs of young Asian
women similar in appearance to the woman (or women) shown in the photographs
previously sent by Halgren as “Kai.” He found several such images on an adult porn site.
Detective Barker sent the photographs to defendant, posing as “Kai.”
C. The Search Warrants
The sheriff’s department obtained two search warrants for cell phone records: one
for phones associated with defendant and Halgren for the period from January 1, 2020,
through February 25, 2020, (the first warrant) and one for defendant’s phone for the
period from February 25, 2020, through March 1, 2020, (the second warrant). The
sheriff’s department later obtained a third search warrant for defendant’s home, vehicles,
and person. Detective Miller personally served the third warrant on defendant,
simultaneously delivering copies of the first and second warrants. He seized and
subsequently searched defendant’s phone.2
D. Charges and Jury Trial
Defendant was arrested and charged by first amended information with sending
harmful matter to a minor (§ 288.2, subd. (a)(2)), contacting a minor with the intent to
commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a)), and arranging a meeting with a minor for
lewd purposes (§ 288.4, subd. (a)(1)).
2 Defendant would later move to suppress the search warrants pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment and the Electronic Communications and Privacy Act of 2016 (§ 1546 et seq.)
(ECPA). (§§ 1538.5, 1546.4, subd. (a).) The trial court denied the motion.
4
The matter was tried to a jury in August 2023. Sergeant Miller testified for the
prosecution. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He said he never believed he was
texting with a 16-year-old girl—or even a 32-year-old gymnast. Instead, defendant
thought he was texting with his wife or one of several friends. It was not unusual for
defendant to exchange sexually charged messages with these people, and the messages
often involved role-playing. However, defendant never thought he was sending sexually
charged messages to a 16 year old and does not have any sexual interest in minors.
E. Verdict and Sentence
The jury deliberated for two days and found defendant guilty as charged.
Defendant appeared for sentencing in October 2023. The trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for two years and
ordered him to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290. This appeal timely
followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Outrageous Government Conduct
Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the sheriff’s department engaged
in unconstitutional “outrageous government conduct” by violating operational and
investigative standards set by the ICAC Task Force (hereinafter, ICAC standards). The
argument fails.
1. Additional Background
Sergeant Miller testified on direct examination about the circumstances giving rise
to the sheriff’s department’s investigation, which began with the meeting with Halgren.
Defendant’s trial counsel organized part of his cross-examination around the ICAC
standards. He elicited testimony that the ICAC standards—which do not appear to have
been made part of our record—require that only sworn law enforcement personnel
conduct investigations, and Halgren was not part of law enforcement. He also elicited
testimony that the ICAC standards place restrictions on transmitting visual depictions of
5
persons or purported persons, including that the person be “ ‘an investigative personnel
person,’ ” over the age of 18, who consents to the use of the depiction. Miller
acknowledged that Halgren transmitted images of Asian women that may or may not
have been over the age of 18, and Detective Barker transmitted images obtained from an
adult website. On redirect, Miller clarified that the ICAC standards are merely guidelines
and are not mandatory.
Defense counsel alluded to the ICAC standards in closing argument, noting they
are designed to guide law enforcement personnel in conducting “real investigations,” and
do not contemplate vigilante undertakings by private citizens. However, defense counsel
did not argue the sheriff’s department engaged in “outrageous government conduct.”
More importantly, our record does not contain anything indicating defendant ever moved
to dismiss for outrageous conduct.
2. Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has held that a trial court may dismiss a criminal
case based on outrageous government conduct, defined broadly as “conduct that shocks
the conscience.” (Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 172.) Our high court has
“left open the possibility that we might accept the outrageous conduct defense,” but has
not formally adopted it. (People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1224.) Nevertheless,
courts of appeal have concluded that the defense may apply where the police manufacture
a crime, engage in criminal activity, or act solely out of the desire to convict the
defendant. (People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1144; see also People v.
Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934, 1005-1006.) For outrageous government conduct to
lead to a finding that conviction would violate the defendant’s right to due process, the
conduct must be “ ‘ “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal
sense of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 418, fn. 17.)
Some courts have held that rulings on motions to dismiss for outrageous conduct
should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Velasco-Palacios (2015) 235
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Cal.App.4th 439, 445-446; People v. Shrier (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 400, 418.) Others
have reasoned that the analysis is a mixed question of law and fact. (People v. Uribe
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-858.) Under the latter approach, the appellate court
first assesses the facts to determine whether misconduct occurred. (Ibid.) “This factual
determination is clearly one that is subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Id. at p.
858.) The court then applies the law to the established facts de novo to determine
whether the conduct constitutes outrageous conduct in the constitutional sense. (Ibid.)
We need not resolve this split of authority, because we conclude the issue has been
forfeited.
“To preserve a misconduct claim for review on appeal, a defendant must make a
timely objection.” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 612; see People v. Gamache
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 370-371.) Here, though defense counsel referred to possible
violations of the ICAC standards at various points, he did not argue the sheriff’s
department engaged in outrageous conduct and does not appear to have moved to dismiss
on that ground. Thus, the trial court was never called upon to decide whether the
sheriff’s department engaged in any misconduct at all, let alone conduct “ ‘ “so grossly
shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice.” ’ ” (People v.
Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 418, fn. 17.) The claim is therefore forfeited. (People v.
Low (2010) 49 Cal.4th 372, 393, fn. 11 [due process challenge based on claim of
outrageous government conduct forfeited where not raised at trial].)
B. Search Warrants
Defendant next challenges the validity of the search warrants. He argues the first
and second warrants were overbroad within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and
section 1546.1, subdivision (d)(2) of the ECPA and failed to comply with the notice
7
requirements mandated by section 1546.1, subdivision (a) of the ECPA.3 We will address
these contentions momentarily.
1. Additional Background
The sheriff’s department obtained several search warrants over the course of the
investigation, three (or maybe only two) of which are relevant here.4 The first warrant
(21-SW-00479) was issued and executed on service providers for phones associated with
defendant and Halgren on February 25, 2020. The first warrant sought phone records for
defendant’s and Halgren’s phones for the period from January 1, 2020, through February
25, 2020.
The second warrant (21-SW-00494) was issued and executed on defendant’s cell
phone provider on March 10, 2020. The second warrant sought defendant’s phone
records for the period from February 25, 2020, through March 1, 2020.
The third warrant (BSW-20-144) was issued and executed on defendant on April
9, 2020. The third warrant authorized searches of defendant’s residence, vehicles, and
person for electronic data processing and storage devices and images or videos of minors
under the age of 18. Detective Miller personally served the third warrant on defendant on
April 9, 2020. He simultaneously gave defendant copies of the first and second warrants.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from Halgren’s phones and each
of the search warrants pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and the ECPA. (§§ 1538.5,
1546.4, subd. (a).) As relevant here, defendant argued the sheriff’s department needed a
warrant to search Halgren’s phones, as Halgren was not the intended recipient of
defendant’s messages. Turning to the search warrants, defendant argued the first and
3 As we will elaborate, defendant’s opening brief touches on other arguments, but these
arguments are not clearly set out in a heading or supported by reasoned legal argument,
and therefore, we will treat them as forfeited.
4 A fourth search warrant was issued but never executed.
8
second warrants were overbroad and failed to comply with the ECPA’s notice
requirements. Defendant argued the sheriff’s department exceeded the scope of the third
warrant by downloading the contents of his phone without obtaining a separate warrant
describing the items to be searched on the phone. The prosecution opposed the motion.
The trial court held a hearing, at which Detective Miller testified. Following the
hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court began with evidence obtained
from Halgren’s phones. Relying on People v. Pride (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 133, 140
(Pride), the trial court found defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his communications with Halgren. The trial court then considered the search warrants,
finding each warrant was supported by probable cause and each was sufficiently
particular. As for the ECPA’s notice requirements, the trial court agreed with defendant
that the sheriff’s department failed to give notice of the first and second warrants but
concluded the purpose of the statute was nevertheless met and suppression was not
warranted.
2. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and
provides, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.“ (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) “A search is presumptively reasonable, and
thus in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, if supported by a warrant describing
with particularity the thing or the place to be searched.” (People v. Meza (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 520, 534 (Meza).)
Courts consider “three main factors” in determining the validity of a warrant: (1)
probable cause, (2) particularity, and (3) overbreadth. (Meza, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p.
535.) Probable cause will be found where there is “ ‘ “a substantial basis for concluding
a fair probability exist[s] that a search would uncover wrongdoing.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
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“ ‘Particularity is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought,’ ”
and overbreadth addresses whether “ ‘the scope of the warrant [is] limited by the
probable cause on which the warrant is based.’ ” (Ibid.) Defendant concedes each of the
executed warrants was supported by probable cause. Therefore, we need only address
particularity and overbreadth, at least so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned.
But we also have statutory requirements to consider. As relevant here, the ECPA
now requires that any warrant to compel production of electronic communications
information or electronic device information from a service provider must “describe with
particularity the information to be seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable,
the time periods covered, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services
covered, and the types of information sought.” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).)5 The ECPA also
requires that law enforcement provide notice of the warrant to the target
“contemporaneously with the execution of a warrant.” (§ 1546.2, subd. (a)(1).)
A person whose electronic information has been obtained or retained in violation
of the ECPA “may move to suppress” pursuant to section 1538.5. (§1546.4, subd. (a).)
The same standard of review applies. (Ibid.) Thus, we defer to the trial court’s factual
findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. (DiMaggio v.
Superior Court (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 875, 889.) We exercise our independent
5 Defendant argues without citation to authority that the ECPA requires greater
particularity than the Fourth Amendment. We are not so sure. True, the ECPA calls for
particularized descriptions of enumerated categories of information, such as the “time
periods covered, the target individuals or accounts.” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).) But the
statute only requires such descriptions “as appropriate and reasonable.” (Ibid.) “Thus,
not every warrant for electronic information must describe the information it seeks in
terms of each of the four categories of information listed in the statute.” (Price v.
Superior Court of Riverside County (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 13, 53.) Regardless,
defendant fails to support the argument with legal authority or analysis, and we decline to
consider the issue further. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1107, fn. 37.)
10
judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was
reasonable. (Ibid.)
3. Analysis
Determining the nature of defendant’s challenge to the search warrants is easier
said than done. Defendant’s opening brief purports to challenge all three executed
warrants as overbroad or insufficiently particular, but he makes no real effort to
distinguish between them. Instead, he indiscriminately asserts all search warrants were
overbroad as to time, or overbroad as to types of records sought, or both. He likewise
suggests none of the warrants complied with the ECPA’s notice requirements, despite
their obvious differences. Defendant paints with too broad a brush.
“ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with
some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146.) “Mere
suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract
principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review.” (Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) An appellant must “convince us, by developing his arguments,
stating the law, and calling out relevant portions of the record, that the trial court
committed reversible error,” and the failure to do so justifies us in rejecting the
appellant’s arguments on this basis alone. (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 893, 910.)
We do not believe any of defendant’s search warrant arguments are adequately
supported or developed, and we would be justified in deeming them all forfeited. (Bishop
v. The Bishop’s School, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 910.) Nevertheless, we will exercise
11
our discretion to briefly address defendant’s primary arguments to the extent we can
discern them.6
a. Overbreadth and Particularity
Defendant suggests all the search warrants were overbroad or insufficiently
particular in one way or another. He suggests the first warrant was overbroad in seeking
phone records for an eight-week period from January 1, 2020, to February 25, 2020,
when he only communicated with Halgren as “Kai” for a three-week period, from
February 5, 2020, through February 25, 2020. He suggests the second warrant was
overbroad in seeking phone records reflecting communications with persons other than
the sheriff’s department posing as “Kai.” And he suggests the third warrant—or possibly
all the warrants—were insufficiently particular in using the phrase “any and all” to
describe categories of records to be seized. We need not reach any of defendant’s
overbreadth or particularity arguments, because they are all aimed “at categories of
potential evidence which were not used at trial.” (People v. Ulloa (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 1000, 1006-1007 (Ulloa).)
“Even when a warrant is overbroad in part, evidence will not be suppressed if it
was seized pursuant to a portion of the warrant which was not.” (People v. Holmsen
6 We decline to consider two other issues suggested by the opening brief. First, we
decline to consider defendant’s suggestion that the trial court’s reliance on Pride was
misplaced. Pride was only relevant to the question whether defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his communications with Halgren. (See Pride, supra, 31
Cal.App.5th at p. 140.) And that question was only relevant to the admission of evidence
obtained from the warrantless search of Halgren’s phones, which defendant does not
purport to challenge. Thus, we have no occasion to consider whether defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in communications captured on Halgren’s phones, or
whether Pride supports the trial court’s determination that he did not.
Second, we decline to consider defendant’s suggestion that the Fourth Amendment or the
ECPA required the sheriff’s department to obtain another search warrant to search devices
seized pursuant to the third warrant. Defendant offers no legal analysis or authority for
this proposition, and we decline to develop the argument for him.
12
(1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048, italics omitted; see also People v. Camarella (1991)
54 Cal.3d 592, 607, fn. 7.) And where evidence was seized under “some provision of the
warrant [that] was overbroad,” there is no resulting error unless that same evidence was
introduced at trial. (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1043; Ulloa, supra, 101
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1005-1006.)
Ulloa illustrates the point. There, the defendant was charged with multiple acts of
oral copulation and sodomy against a minor neighbor. (Ulloa, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1003.) Police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s home and any computers
for evidence of the exploitation of children, including videos or photographs depicting
actual or simulated sexual acts. (Id. at p. 1004.) The officer’s supporting affidavit
indicated that defendant had been communicating with the minor through an instant
messaging service. (Id. at pp. 1004 1006.) Police seized the defendant’s computer and
found the instant messages, along with photographs that may or may not have depicted
actual or simulated sex acts, but do not appear to have involved the minor. (Id. at p.
1005.) At trial, the prosecution introduced the messages, but not the photographs. (Id. at
p. 1006.) A jury found the defendant guilty of one count of oral copulation with a person
under 18. (Id. at p. 1003.)
The defendant appealed, arguing the search warrant was constitutionally
overbroad in seeking photographs and videos. (Ulloa, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p.
1004.) The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s overbreadth argument, stating:
“None of the photographs seized were introduced against him at trial. Thus, even if the
descriptions of items [sought by the warrant] were overbroad, the photographs seized
pursuant to those descriptions were not used, and there was no resulting trial error.” (Id.
at pp. 1005-1006.) So too here.
Take the first warrant. Defendant concedes the first warrant authorized the search
of his phone records for the three weeks in which he actively communicated with “Kai”
and “Mai,” from February 5, 2020, through February 25, 2020. But he says the warrant
13
went too far in authorizing the phone records search for the four preceding weeks, from
January 1, 2020, through February 4, 2020. He thus claims the seizure of phone records
for the period from January 1, 2020, through February 4, 2020, was beyond the
permissible scope of the first warrant and should have been suppressed. Defendant’s
argument is ultimately academic, as he does not identify any evidence from that earlier
period that was admitted at trial. “Accordingly, even if we assume some provision of the
warrant was overbroad, defendant has not shown that any evidence should have been
suppressed.” (People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1043-1044.)
Defendant’s challenge to the second and third warrants fail for much the same
reason. Defendant argues the second warrant was overbroad in seeking evidence of
communications with persons other than the sheriff’s department posing as “Kai.” He
argues the third warrant was overbroad in seeking “any and all” phone records in various
categories. However, he does not identify any evidence seized pursuant to the
purportedly overbroad provisions of the warrants that was admitted at trial. Thus, even
assuming the second and third warrants were overbroad as to subject matter, defendant
has again failed to show that any evidence should have suppressed. (People v. Carpenter,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1043-1044; Ulloa, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1005-1006.)
Defendant’s challenge to the scope of the search warrants fails.
b. Notice
Defendant next argues suppression was required because the sheriff’s department
failed to give contemporaneous notice of the first and second warrants pursuant to section
1546.2, subdivision (a)(1) of the ECPA. The People concede the violation of the ECPA’s
notice requirements, but argue suppression was not warranted. The People have the
better argument.
California appellate courts have applied a three-part inquiry determining whether
an ECPA violation warrants suppression. (Price v. Superior Court of Riverside County,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 61; People v. Campos (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1297
14
(Campos).) Adapted from People v. Jackson (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129 (Jackson), a
wiretap case, the “Jackson framework” asks: “(1) Has defendant established a violation
of [the ECPA]? (2) If so, was the violated provision intended to play a central role in the
statutory scheme? And (3) if so, was the purpose of the provision achieved in spite of the
error?” (Campos, supra, at p. 1297, citing Jackson, supra, at p. 149.) The trial court
answered each of these questions in the affirmative.
With respect to the last Jackson inquiry, the trial court found defendant received
notice of the first and second warrants on April 9, 2020, when Detective Miller personally
served the third warrant on him. The trial court further found that the court would been
likely to have granted applications to delay notification of the first and second warrants,
had such applications been made. (See § 1546.2, subd. (b)(1)-(2).) That being so, the
trial court found the purpose of the notice requirement had been achieved, despite the
delayed notification. We agree with the trial court.
Defendant received notice of the first and second warrants on April 9, 2020, more
than three years before trial began. “And since law enforcement’s efforts to obtain
defendant’s electronic information were eventually made known to him before trial
began, we cannot say the violations defeated [the ECPA’s] purpose.” (Campos, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 1298 [notice violation was harmless error where defendant received
notice before trial began].) Consequently, suppression was not warranted under the
Jackson framework.
C. Halgren’s Motives
Defendant argues the trial court erred in granting a prosecution motion to limit
Halgren’s testimony. He argues the trial court’s ruling deprived him of an opportunity to
attack the credibility of the investigation and violated his right to due process and to
present a defense. Defendant’s argument fails.
15
1. Additional Background
The prosecution filed a pretrial motion to limit Halgren’s testimony. The
prosecution anticipated Halgren would be asked about his reasons for communicating
with defendant as “Kai,” and would say he was angry with defendant because he felt he’d
been wronged in a real estate deal. The prosecution argued Halgren’s feelings about
defendant and the real estate deal were irrelevant (Evid. Code, § 350), and the probative
value of such evidence would be outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, and wasting time (Evid. Code, § 352). Defendant opposed the
motion, arguing Halgren initiated the investigation, and “[i]t’s always the right of the
defense to attack the manner in which an investigation occurred and how the
investigation was pursued.”
The trial court ruled from the bench, stating: “So as it relates to Mr. Halgren and
his testimony, which is reflected in the People’s motion, we’ll take up Mr. Halgren if
called as a witness in a 402 hearing prior to that. And I will need to hear how his feelings
toward the defendant and how this real estate deal are relevant at that time prior to his
testimony. [¶] So I’m granting the motion as it relates to Mr. Halgren’s testimony that
counsel refrain from discussing his feelings towards the defendant and a harmful real
estate deal between he and the defendant until he testifies. [¶] Now, as to how the
investigation occurred, the manner in which the investigation occurred, I think I’m going
to have to take those issues up as they come. As far as if there’s hearsay testimony being
inquired about, I’ll have to hear and rule on those motions as they come along. [¶] So
I’ll defer ruling until those issues are presented.”
Halgren was not called as a witness by either side, and that was the end of the
matter.
2. Analysis
“A tentative pretrial evidentiary ruling, made without fully knowing what the trial
evidence would show, will not preserve the issue for appeal if the appellant could have,
16
but did not, renew the objection or offer of proof and press for a final ruling in the
changed context of the trial evidence itself. [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘Where the court rejects
evidence temporarily or withholds a decision as to its admissibility, the party desiring to
introduce the evidence should renew his offer, or call the court’s attention to the fact that
a definite decision is desired.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 133;
People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 735-736.)
Here, the trial court provisionally granted the motion in limine but made clear that
it would reconsider its ruling in light of Halgren’s testimony. Accordingly, it was defense
counsel’s obligation to renew his request that the evidence be admitted and press for a
final ruling after Halgren testified in order to preserve the issue for appeal. (People v.
Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 133.) None of these things happened. Halgren did not
testify, and defense counsel did not make a further offer of proof or press for a final
ruling in the changed context of the trial evidence. Consequently, the issue has been
forfeited. (People v. Ennis, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 735-736.)
D. Halgren’s Text Messages
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in admitting Halgren’s text messages.
He argues the text messages were testimonial hearsay, and their admission violated the
confrontation clause. The People respond that defendant forfeited his confrontation
clause challenges by failing to object in the trial court. We agree with the People.
Even claims based on the confrontation clause are forfeited on appeal if that
objection was not raised at trial. (See People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730.)
Defendant did not object to the text messages on confrontation clause grounds and
thereby forfeited the issue. But even if the argument had been preserved, it lacks merit.
It is well established that out-of-court statements, when offered to show the effect
on the hearer, are admissible as nonhearsay. (See People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th
774, 820-821 [a victim’s statement later communicated to the defendant that she was
afraid of the defendant was admissible to show, not that she was actually afraid, but the
17
statement’s effect on the defendant]; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 428-429
[testimony by defendant’s mother that she had been threatened was not hearsay because it
was not offered to prove the mother was actually threatened but for the purpose of
showing the effect on the defendant who had learned of the threats].) Here, Halgren’s
text messages were offered to show that defendant believed he was communicating with a
16-year-old girl who was interested in having a sexual relationship with him. They were
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; therefore, they were not testimonial
hearsay subject to the confrontation clause.
E. Equal Protection
Finally, defendant challenges the probation condition requiring lifetime sex
offender registration pursuant to section 290. He argues mandatory lifetime registration
violates his equal protection rights under the federal and state Constitutions, as section
290 imposes shorter registration periods for other sex offenses, without a rational basis
for doing so.7 We are not persuaded.
1. Standard of Review
Where no suspect class or fundamental right is in play, we analyze equal
protection claims with rational basis review. (People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
479, 487.) Defendant has the burden to show the classification he challenges fails this
“deferential standard.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 852.) We analyze his
claims de novo. (Briscoe, supra, at p. 487.)
“Rational basis review requires that the challenged classification bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. [Citation.] The logic does not need to be
persuasive or sensible—just rationale. [Citation.] It ‘need not have been “ever actually
7 Defendant’s argument heading refers to due process and equal protection, but the
argument focuses solely on equal protection. Accordingly, we consider any due process
claim abandoned.
18
articulated” by lawmakers, nor be “empirically substantiated.” ’ [Citation.] The law will
be upheld as long as we can ‘ “ ‘speculat[e]’ any rational reason” ’ for the distinction it
draws. [Citation.] This means that ‘[t]o mount a successful rational basis challenge, a
party must “ ‘negative every conceivable basis’ ” that might support the disputed
statutory disparity.’ ” (People v. Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 487.)
2. Relevant Offenses and Sex Offender Registration Requirements
California law has long required persons convicted of certain sex crimes to register
as sex offenders. (People v. Mosley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1044, 1048.) “For many years,
California took a one-size-fits-all approach to sex offender registration: If registration
was required, registration was always for life.” (People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
184, 190.) Consistent with this approach, section 290 imposed automatic lifetime
registration for certain sex offense convictions. (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015)
60 Cal.4th 871, 876-877.) Effective January 2021, however, the Legislature amended
section 290 and established a three-tiered registry for adult sex offenders, requiring
registration for a minimum of 10 years (tier one), 20 years (tier two), or for life (tier
three), depending on the offense. (Legg v. Department of Justice (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
504, 509.)
Defendant was convicted of three sex offenses: sending harmful matter to a minor
(§ 288.2, subd. (a)(2)), contacting or communicating with a minor with intent to commit a
sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a)), and arranging a meeting with a minor with intent to
commit a sexual offense (§ 288.4(a)(1)). These are all tier three offenses requiring
lifetime registration. (§ 290, subd. (d)(3)(C)(x) - (xii).)
3. Analysis
Defendant argues lifetime registration for convictions under sections 288.2, 288.3
and 288.4 violates equal protection. This is so, defendant says, because violations of
sections 288.2, 288.3 and 288.4 are “less serious” than other offenses, for which lifetime
registration is not required. For example, defendant says rape with a foreign object (§
19
264.1), aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269), and sodomy (§ 286), where the
offenses are not serious or violent within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c) or
1192.7 subdivision (c), are all tier one offenses, requiring only a 10-year registration
period. Defendant’s argument fails.
For starters, rape with a foreign object and aggravated sexual assault of a child are
both tier three offenses, as the People accurately observe. (§ 290, subds. (d)(3)(M)
[requiring tier three registration for persons convicted of violating § 264.1] and
(d)(3)(C)(viii) [requiring tier three registration for persons convicted of violating § 269].)
Regardless, a plausible basis exists to mandate lifetime registration for persons who
violate sections 288.2, 288.3, and 288.4, while imposing a lesser registration period for
sodomy.
The Legislature could have reasonably believed offenders under sections 288.2,
288.3 or 288.4, pose a greater risk of recidivism than other sex offenders, such as section
286 offenders. The offenses proscribed by these statutes are all “luring” crimes, which
involve an adult planning and cultivating a relationship with a targeted minor, often by
means of electronic communications. (See People v. Hsu (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 976,
985 [§ 288.2]; People v. Keister (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 442, 452 [§ 288.3]; People v.
Yuksel (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 850, 854 [§ 288.4].) The Legislature could have
reasonably concluded that such offenses evince a predatory mindset, which goes beyond
the mindset required for offenses under section 286, which might be more impulsive.
(See, e.g., People v. Medelez (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 659, 663 [luring requires preparatory
communication].) The Legislature could have also concluded the planning associated
with such offenses betokens a higher risk of reoffending, such that lifetime registration
would be appropriate. Indeed, the Legislature, in enacting the tiered registry system,
relied on “ ‘decades of research’ ” which provided “ ‘a much better sense of who is at
high risk of reoffending and who is not.’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
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Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 384 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Sept. 8, 2017, p. 13.)
Thus, we conclude the disparate treatment of offenders under sections 288.2,
288.3, and 288.4 bears a rational relationship to the purpose of the tiered registry
system—focusing resources and attention on offenders at the highest risk to reoffend—
and to the purposes of those statutes, which were intended to address concerns about sex
offenders, including predatory adults using electronic communications to lure children for
sex. Defendant’s equal protection claims fail.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
EARL, P. J.
/S/
DUARTE, J.
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