People v. Merrigan CA3

CourtListener 10378204Calctapp14 apr 2025

Testo completo

Filed 4/14/25 P. v. Merrigan CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101095

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 94F02354)

v.

PATRICK MERRIGAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Patrick Merrigan appeals from his April 2024 resentencing for
kidnapping with intent to commit robbery, carjacking, and robbery. He argues the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss all but one of his prior strike convictions.
He also contends the matter should be remanded for resentencing because the trial court’s
oral pronouncement of sentence differs from the abstract of judgment. We will order the
abstract of judgment corrected and affirm the judgment.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 1994, the 69-year-old victim was putting on her seatbelt in her vehicle
after shopping at a hardware store, when defendant forced his way into her car and turned
the ignition on. Fearing she was being kidnapped, the victim turned the ignition off, and
defendant struck the victim in the face. Defendant restarted the car. The victim tried to
pull the keys out of the ignition, and defendant struck her in the face again. The victim
honked the horn, and defendant jerked the victim’s hand off the horn, breaking her hand.
He backed the car out of the parking space. The victim grabbed the steering wheel and
turned the car left, causing it to crash into a tree. Defendant took the victim’s purse and
fled. A hardware store employee captured and detained defendant. Investigating officers
noted that the victim had abrasions and contusions to her face, including a blackened left
eye.
A jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping with an intent to rob (Pen. Code,
§ 209, subd. (b); count one),1 carjacking (§ 215; count two), and robbery (§ 211; count
three). The jury further found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim (§ 12022.7) and committed the offenses against a person 65 years of age or older
(§ 667.9). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found defendant was convicted of
residential burglary (§ 459) in September 1978 and August 1979, and robbery in
December 1985 (§ 211). The jury also found defendant served two prior prison terms
within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an indeterminate term of 27
years to life on count two, 25 years to life each on counts one and three (stayed under
section 654), and a consecutive determinate term on count two of 22 years consisting of
three years for personal infliction of great bodily injury, one year for an offense against

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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an elderly victim,2 three five-year sentences for prior serious felony convictions (§ 667,
subd. (a)), and two one-year sentences for prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation subsequently
notified the trial court that defendant was eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.
In April 2024, the trial court held a full resentencing hearing.
At the hearing, the prosecution asked the court to strike the two, one-year prior
prison term enhancements and resentence defendant to 46 years to life in prison. In
support of its argument against dismissing defendant’s prior strikes under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), the prosecution argued the
facts of the current crime involved great violence and a vulnerable victim. The
prosecution acknowledged that in the last decade defendant’s rule violations in prison
consisted of urine tests positive for drugs.
Defense counsel agreed with the prosecution that defendant fell within the spirit of
the three strikes law in 1994 but said “a lot has changed since then.” Defendant’s many
theft-related offenses were due to the heroin addiction defendant developed after he was
discharged from the army in 1972. He lived with addiction until 2015 when he was
incarcerated and “things took a turn for the better.” Since 2015, he had been sober for 10
years and had not had any rule violations. Defendant had participated in 150 hours of
Narcotics Anonymous courses provided by a veterans group. Defendant had also
participated in an anger management class through the veterans’ group and completed a

2 The minute order and abstract of judgment from the original sentence show a two-year
term for the elderly victim enhancement. At the resentencing hearing, counsel for the
parties agreed that the section 667.9 enhancement should have been one year and the trial
court deferred. Section 667.9, subdivision (a) provides that “[a] person who commits one
or more crimes . . . against a person who is 65 years of age or older . . . shall receive a
one-year enhancement for each violation.” Although the jury made a finding under
section 667.9 for each crime, the trial court imposed the enhancement only for carjacking.

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reentry program. Defendant’s wife had arranged residential rehabilitation program for
him if released.
Defense counsel asked the court to strike two of the prior strikes and sentence
defendant to a determinative sentence of 24 or 29 years. Counsel characterized the 1978,
1979, and 1985 prior strikes as theft-related convictions that occurred in a period of
“abhorrent behavior” for defendant that continued into the 1990’s. That period had
diminished during incarceration through defendant’s rehabilitative efforts. Defense
counsel argued that defendant now fell outside the spirit of the three strikes law. Counsel
also asked the court to use its discretion under section 1385 to dismiss the enhancements.
The trial court asked for more detail about defendant’s rehabilitative efforts.
Defense counsel acknowledged that these efforts occurred “towards the older end of the
spectrum” but argued they were effective as shown by the absence of rule violations,
including for positive drug tests and inmate-manufactured alcohol. Defense counsel also
suggested this change was due to maturity. Lastly, counsel pointed out that defendant
was 71 years old and prison had affected his health dramatically. Defendant had COPD,
pleuritic chest pains, hypertension, hepatitis B and C, cerebral vascular disease, and
cataracts. He was in a wheelchair or walked with a cane. Any danger he posed to the
community was completely diminished by his rehabilitative efforts and his debilitating
chronic health issues.
In pronouncing sentence, the trial court detailed the underlying facts and
circumstances of defendant’s current crime, which the court found “problematic.” In
terms of his record, the court observed that last strike, the 1985 robbery conviction, was
committed relatively close in time to the current crime in 1994, which defendant
committed while he was on parole. In mitigation, the court noted that defendant was
“now 73” and did not use a weapon in carjacking the victim. The court acknowledged
that “there’s a lot to take into consideration.”

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The trial court modified defendant’s sentence for carjacking from 27 years to life
to 25 years to life. The court explained that “[h]ad [defendant] completed more
rehabilitation, this sentence might be different. But I do believe that the interest of justice
does support modification of [the] sentence.” Turning to the other counts, the court said:
“So Count One, the kidnapping, that is stayed and will remain stayed as well as Count
Two.”3
Regarding the enhancements versus strikes, the trial court noted “it is a different
analysis of whether [defendant] still, by clear and convincing evidence, poses a risk to
public safety.” The court concluded that defendant did not due to his age. The court
stayed the great bodily injury and elderly victim enhancements, as well as the prison
priors, and dismissed the five-year serious felony enhancements.
The resulting total sentence was 25 years to life in prison.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Striking the Prior Strike
Defendant claims in refusing to strike his prior strikes the trial court erred in two
ways: (1) by not exercising informed discretion, in light of the court’s comments at
sentencing that defendant argues indicated the court did not know it had discretion to
dismiss defendant’s strikes; and (2) by considering that defendant’s last strike in 1985
was relatively close in time to the current offense committed in 1994--a factor defendant
argues is not relevant when the resentencing occurs 30 years later. We see no abuse of
discretion.

3 As we will discuss, the trial court misspoke when it referred to “Count Two” as stayed,
which led to an error in the abstract of judgment.

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The law in this area is well developed; a trial court must decide whether to strike a
prior strike by considering factors that are intrinsic to the three strikes law’s sentencing
scheme. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) These factors include: (1) the
nature and circumstances of the current conviction; (2) the nature and circumstances of
the prior strike convictions; and (3) the defendant’s “background, character, and
prospects.” (Ibid.) If the defendant falls outside the spirit of the three strikes law, the
court may, in furtherance of justice, treat the defendant “as though he [or she] had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Ibid.; see
also Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530; § 1385, subd. (a).)
We review a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) On review, the denial of a Romero
motion is strongly presumed to be a proper exercise of discretion, and the court is
presumed to have considered all relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record
to the contrary. (Id. at p. 378; People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) In light
of the presumption, the trial court abuses its discretion in failing to strike a prior
conviction only in limited circumstances, such as “where the trial court was not ‘aware
of its discretion to dismiss’ [citation], or where the court considered impermissible
factors in declining to dismiss [citation].” (Carmony, at p. 378.) A defendant bears the
burden of providing sufficient evidence to support his Romero motion. (People v. Lee
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129.)
Defendant argues the trial court “did not expressly grant or deny [defendant’s]
Romero motion, and the trial court’s comments indicate that the court may not have
understood the scope of its discretion.” Defendant focuses on the court’s comment: “On
the three strikes law, the Court has the discretion to either take the upper term and times it
by three, and this looks like what the sentencing judge did of 27 to life. But if the Court
was to impose a midterm or low term, then it is no longer bound to the 27 years to life but
then can choose the 25 to life instead.”

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Defendant’s attempt to seize upon these remarks in isolation is unavailing. It is
clear the trial court denied defendant’s Romero request but determined to modify the
sentence to reduce the original indeterminate sentence from 27 years to 25 years to life.
The court was simply explaining how the three strikes law could be applied to do so.
To accept defendant’s argument that the trial court did not know it had discretion
to strike defendant’s prior convictions would require us to ignore: (1) the parties’ briefs
stating that the trial court had discretion to strike defendant’s prior convictions under
Romero; (2) the court’s statement at the outset of the hearing that it had read the briefs;
(3) the prosecution’s argument that the court should not exercise its discretion under
Romero; and (4) defense counsel’s argument that the court should exercise its discretion
to dismiss two of defendant’s prior convictions. We find it implausible that the court was
unaware of the arguments of counsel.
Moreover, the trial court’s remarks themselves establish that the court understood
the scope of its discretion and exercised it. The court discussed factors relevant to
whether defendant fell outside the three strikes scheme, including the nature and
circumstances of the current crime and prior strike convictions and defendant’s prospects
given his advanced age and efforts at rehabilitation. The court detailed the “problematic”
facts of the current crime and then identified defendant’s prior convictions for burglary in
1978 and 1979 and robbery in 1985. The court observed that the 1985 conviction and the
current conviction in 1994 were “relatively close in time,” the remoteness of a prior
conviction being a factor considered for striking the conviction. (People v. Vasquez
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390 (Vasquez) [“a prior conviction may be stricken if it is
remote in time”]; accord People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813.)
Regarding defendant’s prospects, the court said it might have dismissed defendant’s prior
convictions had he “completed more rehabilitation.”
After declining to strike defendant’s prior convictions, the trial court contrasted the
legal standard governing that decision with its decision to stay or dismiss enhancements:

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“I think it is a different analysis on whether [defendant] falls outside the scope of the
three strikes law, I think [it is] a different analysis of whether he still, by clear and
convincing evidence, poses a risk to public safety.” The court proceeded to dismiss or
stay all the enhancements based on defendant’s age. In sum, after applying Romero
factors, the trial court correctly contrasted the Romero standard with the standard under
section 1385 to dismiss enhancements, to explain why it did not grant defendant’s request
to dismiss two of his prior convictions, while granting his request to stay or dismiss the
enhancements. We find no abuse of discretion.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court’s observation that the 1985 strike was
relatively close in time to his current 1994 carjacking crime was “neither (1) supported by
the record nor (2) a permissible factor to consider.” We disagree.
On the first point, defendant argues it was not true the 1985 strike was relatively
close in time to 1994, noting that section 1385 provides that a trial court in considering
whether to dismiss an enhancement should afford great weight to the fact the
enhancement “is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(H).) Defendant acknowledges that subdivision (c) of section 1385 does not apply
to the three strikes law. (See People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243-244;
People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 410-411, review granted May 29, 2024,
S283924.) Defendant omits, however, that the strike convictions courts have dismissed
as remote were considerably older than nine years. (See People v. Avila (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1141 [“Avila’s prior strikes were from 1990 and 1992, so they were
28 and 26 years old, respectively, when he committed the current offenses in 2018”];
People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1248 [prior offenses deemed remote were
17 to 20 years old]; In re Saldana (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 620, 624 [dismissal of burglary

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conviction 16 years old].) The trial court’s observation that the 1985 and 1994 robberies
were relatively close in time was not unreasonable.4
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in considering the time between 1985
robbery and the current robbery offense in 1994, maintaining that the relevant
consideration is that the 1985 strike conviction occurred almost 40 years ago. Ignoring
his 1994 robbery conviction, defendant declares “[t]here is nothing in the record to
indicate that [defendant] has committed any offense in the last 40 years and much less a
serious or violent felony.” In any event, we disagree that the time period between
defendant’s 1985 conviction and his resentencing in 2024 renders the 1985 conviction
remote for purposes of Romero. Defendant has been incarcerated in state prison since
1994, that is, for 30 of the 40 years. A prior conviction is not considered remote when the
defendant “ ‘was incarcerated a substantial part of the intervening time and thus had little
or no opportunity to commit’ additional crimes.'” (Vasquez, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p.
390; accord People v. Beasley, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 501-502.)
We conclude the trial court did not fail to exercise informed discretion or consider
an impermissible factor in declining to dismiss defendant’s prior convictions.
II
Correcting the Abstract of Judgment
The trial court resentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count two for
carjacking: “On the carjacking, the Court is going to modify the sentence from 27 years

4 Without citing supporting authority, defendant states: “Nor is it determinative that the
trial judge found that [defendant] was still on parole when he committed the controlling
offense because that was a separate factor.” To the contrary, it is “highly significant” that
a defendant was still on parole at the time of the current offenses. (Vasquez, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 390; see also People v. Beasley (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 495, pp. 501-
502 [defendant’s third strike offense was not remote, because “he had been in prison for
most of the past 23 years,” and “[h]e was still on parole when he committed the instant
offense”].)

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to life 25 years to life.” The court, however, immediately preceded this statement with
the following: “So on Count One, the kidnapping, that is stayed and will remain stayed
as well as Count Two.” But, at the outset of the resentencing hearing, the trial court
reviewed the original abstract of judgment, noting “Count One, violation of Penal Code
section 209(b), kidnapping with the intent to commit robbery. That count was stayed. [¶]
Count Two, a carjacking. [¶] And then on Count Three, 211, robbery in the second
degree. That was likewise stayed.”
Reviewing the trial court’s statements as a whole, it is clear the court resentenced
defendant to 25 years to life for carjacking and maintained the stay originally imposed on
the sentences for kidnapping and robbery. But the abstract of judgment erroneously
reflects the sentence on count 2 for carjacking as stayed and a sentence of 25 years to life
in prison imposed on count three for second degree robbery.
Defendant asks us to remand the case to the trial court to clarify which counts
were stayed and also to consider whether to grant Romero relief and consider any new
post-conviction factors. This is unnecessary. “Where there is a discrepancy between the
oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the
oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) An
appellate court may order correction of an abstract of judgment that does not accurately
reflect the oral judgment of a sentencing court. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th
181, 185; People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 260-261.)
Accordingly, we will direct correction to the abstract of judgment to reflect that
defendant is sentenced to 25 years to life on count two for carjacking and the sentences
on counts one and three for kidnapping and robbery, respectively, remain stayed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of
judgment to reflect the sentence imposed on count two, carjacking, is 25 years to life in
prison and the sentences on count one for kidnapping with intent to commit robbery and

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on count three for second degree robbery are stayed. The trial court is further directed to
forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.

/s/
Duarte, J.

We concur:

/s/
Hull, Acting P. J.

/s/
Mauro, J.

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