People v. Farley CA4/1

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Testo completo

Filed 4/14/25 P. v. Farley CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083515

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD229026)

CRAIG FARLEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael T. Smyth, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In 2010, Craig Farley and Pierre Terry went to the home of Jonathan
Pleasant, a marijuana dealer Farley knew. Neighbors heard wrestling
sounds and yelling followed by a loud boom from Pleasant’s apartment, saw
Farley and Terry run out, and ran in to discover Pleasant with a fatal
shotgun wound. A jury convicted Farley of, among other counts, first degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) committed while engaged in a
robbery and a burglary (§ 190.2(a)(17)) for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (§ 186.22(b)(1)). The jury further found Farley committed the offenses
while acting as a principal, although it found not true allegations Farley
personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.53(b), (c) & (d), 12022.5(a)). Farley then
admitted a strike prior. The court sentenced him to life in prison without the
possibility of parole, plus a consecutive determinate sentence of 25 years to
life, on count 1, and stayed the sentences on the remaining counts. On direct
appeal, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Farley (Nov. 14, 2014, D062857)
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 2020, Farley filed a form petition for resentencing under now
section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95). Counsel filed a second petition in
2021. Following an evidentiary hearing, the resentencing court ruled Farley
could still be found liable for felony murder and second degree implied malice
murder but not for first degree express malice murder.
Farley appeals, arguing the record does not contain sufficient evidence
to support the court’s finding that the prosecution met its burden of proving
him guilty of felony murder and second degree implied malice murder beyond
a reasonable doubt. Considering the relevant factors set forth in People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, we
disagree and affirm the order as to felony murder. As a result, we need not
reach Farley’s alternate argument.

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I.
A.
Pleasant sold marijuana from his apartment. He usually had four to
five big bags of marijuana in his backpack or a safe. Pleasant sometimes had
large amounts of cash, which he would put in his wallet, in a safe, or on a
closet shelf. He would take large amounts of money out and count it or make
change in front of friends, neighbors, and customers.
Pleasant also had a handgun he generally kept near him when selling
marijuana.
B.
On June 28, 2010, Pleasant spent the evening at home with his
girlfriend. At one point, someone called him and came over. According to
Pleasant’s girlfriend, once the visitor arrived, Pleasant looked outside and
unlocked the metal security door without hesitation to allow Farley to enter.
Her impression was that Pleasant and Farley had a friendly relationship and
had known each other for a while. A neighbor recalled seeing Farley in the
apartment complex four or five times before.
Pleasant showed Farley more than one bag of marijuana and told him
the price. Farley checked his pockets and shoes, said “hold on,” and left.
Before long, he returned and said he had left his money at home. They
talked and smoked marijuana before Farley left.
C.
The next morning, Pleasant’s neighbor Mark visited Pleasant. Mark
described the apartment as “clean.” Someone called, and Mark heard
Pleasant say, “hurry up and come.”
Before his girlfriend left, Pleasant told her he planned to wait for his
friend Corey as well as Farley, who was going to return.

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When Corey arrived, Mark decided to leave, and Pleasant locked the
security door behind him and closed the interior wooden door. Corey made a
purchase and headed for the door. As Pleasant opened the wooden door,
Corey heard him say, “I was waiting for you” to two men standing outside the
security door.
As the first man stepped in, he said, “This is my brother and he’s cool,”
pointing to the man behind him. Corey described them both as Black and
described the man in front as being about six feet tall and wearing black
name-brand athletic shoes. At trial, the prosecutor showed Corey a
photograph of Farley’s shoes, and Corey said they were similar in color,
brand, and style to the ones he saw on the first man to enter Pleasant’s
apartment. The man had a backpack strapped to his chest, which he reached
into as he came in. Corey did not look at the second man other than to notice
he had lighter skin. He said they walked past him into the room, and he left.
Not long after, a neighbor heard wrestling sounds, yelling, and “a lot of
banging” coming from Pleasant’s apartment followed by “a loud boom.” She
waited “a few minutes” and then walked to her screen door, at which point
she heard Pleasant yelling “help” and saw two men run by her and down the
stairs. She said one wore a baseball hat and one carried a backpack. She
estimated their heights at about 5’6” or 5’7”.
Another neighbor also heard wrestling followed by a gunshot. After
looking out the door and then notifying her sister in the other room, she and
her sister ran to Pleasant’s apartment, which she described as “trashed.”
Mark’s sister, who was in her car in the alley outside, called him and
said she had seen two men run out of the apartment and thought someone
had been robbed. She later told police the first male who came down the

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stairs had a backpack strapped to his front, gloves, and darker skin. She
estimated them as 5’7” or 5’9” in height.
Mark rushed out of his apartment, saw Pleasant’s door was open, and
ran inside to find Pleasant slumped over with two neighbors providing first
aid. Pleasant screamed, “Oh, God, they shot me.” Mark used a towel to put
pressure on the gunshot wound until a police officer took over. Pleasant was
pronounced dead at the scene.
D.
Medical examiners explained Pleasant’s wound indicated he had been
shot with a shotgun at close range and died from the resulting blood loss.
Pleasant also had a laceration on his head consistent with being struck with
a hand- or shotgun that caused a subarachnoid hemorrhage.
A responding officer observed Pleasant’s apartment looked like a
struggle or fight had occurred based on the overturned furniture. Officers
found handcuffs, the slide of a semi-automatic handgun, and Pleasant’s open
and empty safe. Investigators also located a black baseball hat containing
Terry’s DNA. DNA evidence taken from the gun slide and Pleasant’s
fingernail scrapings also matched Terry, and his fingerprints were found on
artwork in the living room. Farley’s DNA was on a roll of duct tape.
Cell phone records placed Farley near the crime scene and
demonstrated he was in communication with Terry before and after
Pleasant’s killing. Calls were made from Farley’s cell phone to Pleasant’s cell
phone the evening of June 28. That same night, nine calls were placed from
Farley’s phone to Terry’s. The first call from Farley’s phone to Terry’s phone
originated from a cell phone tower on Pleasant’s apartment building.
The next morning, Farley called Terry and then exchanged several calls
with Pleasant. After the incident with Pleasant, Farley and Terry exchanged

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numerous text messages. Shortly after, a request was made to Farley’s cell
phone provider for a new phone number. Cell phone records for the new
number showed Farley leaving California the next morning and traveling to
Louisiana.
Louisiana deputies detained Farley. He was then transported back to
San Diego.
A laptop computer found in Farley’s Louisiana hotel room revealed
internet searches for “El Cajon Boulevard shooting” and related topics,
searches on the San Diego County Sheriff’s website for arrest warrants for
himself, and a search of “who’s in jail” for Terry.
II.
On appeal, Farley contends the record does not contain sufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding that he could still, under the amended
murder statutes, be found guilty of felony murder and second degree implied
malice murder. We disagree.
A.
Senate Bill 1437 was enacted to “‘ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)”
(People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.) It implemented this goal
by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which
defines the degrees of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2 & 3.)
Under the new legislation, a petitioner who makes a prima facie
showing he or she could not presently be convicted of murder under the
amendments to the murder laws is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
(§ 1172.6(c), (d)(1).) At the hearing, the prosecution bears the burden “to

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prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder”
under the amended laws. (§ 1172.6(d)(3).) “[T]he superior court acts as an
independent fact finder and determines whether the People have met their
burden in proving the defendant guilty of murder.” (People v. Henley (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1016.) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to
the conviction, shall be vacated.” (§ 1172.6(d)(3).)
B.
To demonstrate that a nonkiller was a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless disregard for human life, the
prosecution must show that the defendant “knowingly engaged in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death.” (Banks, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801
[cleaned up].) “The defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed, demonstrating
reckless indifference to the significant risk of death his or her actions create.”
(Ibid.) But, “participation in an armed robbery, without more, does not
involve engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.”
(Id. at p. 805 [cleaned up].)
Banks compiled the following list of factors to be considered in
determining whether a participant’s role should be considered “major”:
(1) The defendant’s role in planning the crime that led to one or more
deaths;
(2) The defendant’s role in supplying or using lethal weapons;
(3) The defendant’s awareness of “particular dangers posed by the nature
of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants”;

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(4) Whether the defendant was present at the scene of the killing and in a
position to facilitate or prevent the murder; and,
(5) The defendant’s actions after lethal force was used.
(Banks, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) No one factor is necessary or alone sufficient.
(Ibid.)
Because there was no evidence the defendant in Banks—the getaway
driver in an armed robbery that resulted in a shooting death—saw or heard
the shooting or could have prevented it, the court determined he was not a
major participant. (Banks, 61 Cal.4th at p. 805.) Likewise, because the
direct perpetrator’s killing of a security guard “was apparently a spontaneous
response to armed resistance from the victim,” there was no evidence he
knew his own actions would involve a grave risk of death. (Id. at p. 807.)
Accordingly, the court concluded the defendant was not recklessly indifferent
to human life. (Ibid.)
The next year, our high court returned to this issue, endorsed the
Banks factors, and sought to further define “reckless indifference to human
life.” (Clark, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.) To assess whether a defendant exhibited
reckless indifference, the court offered the following factors:
(1) the defendant’s “knowledge of weapons, and use and number of
weapons”;
(2) the defendant’s “physical presence at the crime and opportunities to
restrain the crime and/or aid the victim”;
(3) the “duration of the felony”;
(4) the “defendant’s knowledge of cohort’s likelihood of killing”; and
(5) the “defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the violence during
the felony.”

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(Clark, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-621, capitalization omitted.) The requirements
of being a major participant and having reckless indifference to human life
“‘significantly overlap . . . , for the greater the defendant’s participation in the
felony murder, the more likely [the defendant] acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’” (Id. at pp. 614-615.)
C.
We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s factual findings at a
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. (Henley, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 1017.)
Under this lens, we review the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to decide if the prosecution introduced sufficient evidence—
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value—to support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) We will affirm unless sufficient
substantial evidence would not support the verdict under any hypothesis.
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) We must accept any logical
inferences the trier of fact might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence. (Ibid.)
D.
Here, the court issued a written decision in which, as relevant, it found
beyond a reasonable doubt Farley (1) was a major participant in the
underlying felonies of robbery and burglary of an inhabited dwelling who
(2) acted with reckless indifference to human life. Accordingly, it concluded
he was guilty of felony murder under amended law.
1.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion Farley was a
major participant in the underlying felonies.
First, as to Farley’s role in planning, the court concluded it was
“significant, likely the most significant, role in planning the robbery.” Farley

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counters this conclusion is speculation. We conclude, however, it was
reasonable for the court to infer Farley played a major role in the planning.
“An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably
be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in
the action.” (Evid. Code, § 600(b).) A reasonable inference may not be based
on speculation, conjecture, or guess work. (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th
353, 360.) An appellate court must accept logical inferences drawn from the
circumstantial evidence. (See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
There is no evidence Terry knew Pleasant or that he was a marijuana
dealer. Farley, on the other hand, had visited Pleasant before. Pleasant’s
girlfriend testified that when Farley came over the night before the murder,
Pleasant recognized him, immediately unlocked the door, and smoked
marijuana with him.
Several witnesses testified no other buyer had ever come without
money before; thus, it was logical for the court to infer Farley’s nighttime
visit was a ruse to gather information. This inference is supported by the cell
phone records, which show Farley called Terry repeatedly during and after
his visit with Pleasant the night before the murder.
Due to the nighttime visit, Farley learned what marijuana Pleasant
had in the apartment. After leaving the apartment and before returning the
next morning, Farley called Terry, which could justifiably support the
inference he called to discuss the plan. Although Farley argues he had no
need to “case” the place because he already knew Pleasant was a dealer who
likely had marijuana and cash, that he went late in the evening and returned
the next morning supports the inference he was investigating Pleasant’s
current supply.

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Farley also arranged the meeting with Pleasant the next day and
vouched for Terry. He then entered the apartment with a backpack likely
containing the murder weapon, tape, and handcuffs. From these facts, the
court could logically deduce Farley had a significant role in planning the
robbery. Given the totality of these circumstances, the court appropriately
found this factor weighed in favor of finding Farley was a major participant.
Second, as to his role in supplying or using lethal weapons, Farley
argues the court’s conclusion that he was carrying the handgun, and thus had
a role in supplying weapons, was speculation and not substantial evidence.
Notably, the court did not specify Farley carried the handgun. It found it
reasonable to infer he carried one of the two weapons in his backpack. We
agree.
Farley’s fingerprints were not on the handgun slide left behind, and the
jury determined he did not personally use a firearm. But Farley entered with
a backpack strapped to his chest and Corey did not mention seeing either
man with a shotgun, so it was reasonable for the court to infer Farley was
aware of and carried the shotgun in his backpack. As the jury apparently
concluded Terry was the shooter, the court could logically deduce Farley
supplied Terry with the murder weapon. (See Evid. Code, § 600(b).) The
absence of Farley’s fingerprints on the handgun slide does not undermine this
inference given the testimony about the suspect wearing the backpack and
fitting Farley’s description wearing gloves. Accordingly, this factor weighs in
favor of a major participant finding.
Third, as to awareness of the dangers posed by the nature of the crime,
Farley argues the fact he had duct tape and handcuffs suggests he did not
intend violence but rather planned to restrain Pleasant. We find this
argument untenable given Pleasant was over six feet tall and almost

11
300 pounds, whereas Farley and Terry were each smaller according to
witness’ estimates. Additionally, it was common knowledge Pleasant was
armed, as Corey said Pleasant always had the handgun with him in his
home—often on his lap or at his side. As Farley had been there previously, it
was reasonable for the court to conclude he knew taking Pleasant’s money
and marijuana would present significant danger because any attempt to
subdue Pleasant would have involved a significant struggle and the probable
threat Pleasant would defend himself with his firearm.
As in Clark, where the participants brought a gun to compel store
employees to submit to being handcuffed (Clark, 63 Cal.4th at p. 613), it is
reasonable to infer Farley and Terry anticipated a struggle and brought
firearms to facilitate restraining Pleasant. That at least one weapon was
loaded further belies the inference Farley intended to subdue Pleasant with
only tape and handcuffs. This factor thus favors concluding Farley was a
major participant.
Fourth, as to presence at the scene and ability to facilitate or prevent
the murder, the court correctly noted witness testimony from before and after
the killing, Farley’s DNA on the duct tape, and cell phone records place
Farley at the scene of the murder. Nonetheless, because the sequence of
events inside the apartment is unknown, the court recognized it could not say
Farley could have physically stopped the shooting in the moments before it
occurred. Farley agrees, pointing out that any effort he made to stop Terry
from shooting Pleasant likely would have resulted in Farley getting shot.
That may be true, but as the court pointed out, Farley could have
preemptively thwarted the murder by not bringing firearms into the
apartment or by ensuring they were unloaded. It also is reasonable to
presume Pleasant was pistol-whipped prior to being shot. If Terry inflicted

12
the blow, as the jury seemingly found, this would have provided Farley
insight into Terry’s violent nature, at which point he could have intervened.
Nonetheless, given the uncertainty, this factor is given neutral weight.
Fifth, as to Farley’s actions after lethal force was used, the United
States Supreme Court as well as our own high court have explained a
defendant’s actions after a fatal shooting may bear on the defendant’s mental
state. (See Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 151-152 and In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 679.) Farley contends his post-crime actions reveal
little about his state of mind and, if anything, an aborted call he made to 911
hours later should weigh in his favor. We disagree.
Pleasant’s neighbor testified the robbers did not flee immediately after
the “boom.” Although her time estimates varied, she said she was standing
by her door when she heard the boom and then went to sit on her couch for “a
few minutes” before returning to the door and observing the men run by.
Using a stopwatch in court, the prosecutor asked the neighbor to estimate the
time between the “boom” and seeing the fleeing men—the stopwatch reflected
26.6 seconds. Either way, there is no evidence Farley used the time to aid
Pleasant or call 911. Rather, because he did not immediately leave the
apartment, and given the evidence police did not find at the scene, it is
reasonable to infer he used the time to hide the weapons and collect money
and marijuana.
Besides, if Farley was shocked Terry shot Pleasant, he could have
stayed to render aid while only Terry fled. Instead, he exchanged several
text messages with Terry after Pleasant’s killing, fled the state, and changed
his phone number. On these facts, we find this factor tips the scale in favor
of finding Farley was a major participant.

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Weighing the factors, we conclude Farley’s significant involvement in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death could appropriately
be considered “major.” (Banks, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
2.
In addition, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding Farley
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
First, as to knowledge and use of weapons, for the reasons already
stated, it was reasonable to infer that Farley knew at the very least the
shotgun would be used. While our high court has repeatedly reiterated that
“any person who plans or participates in an armed robbery can be said to
anticipate that lethal violence might be used,” this “fact, without more, does
not establish reckless indifference to human life.” (Scoggins, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 682.) Yet Farley anticipating any use of a shotgun within the confines of a
small apartment arguably constitutes the “more” required to elevate the
situation to one involving a grave risk of death. And Farley would also have
become aware of the handgun, at the latest, when he observed Terry pistol-
whipping Pleasant. These facts weigh in favor of finding he acted with
reckless indifference.
Second, as to presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain the
killer or aid the victim, as previously discussed, evidence shows beyond a
reasonable doubt Farley was present at the scene and could have aided
Pleasant. Whether he had an opportunity to restrain Terry before the
shotgun blast is unclear, but testimony suggests a struggle lasted for several
minutes during which time he may have had a chance to intervene. This
factor weighs slightly in favor of Farley having the requisite mental state.
Third, as to the felony’s duration, evidence suggested the struggle in
the apartment lasted for several minutes, and the court opined this was a

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very long struggle during which Farley failed to stop Terry from killing
Pleasant. As Clark explained, “[w]here a victim is held at gunpoint,
kidnapped, or otherwise restrained in the presence of perpetrators for
prolonged periods, ‘there is a greater window of opportunity for violence’ . . . ,
possibly culminating in murder.” (Clark, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.) We would not
characterize the encounter here as prolonged. Even so, it persisted long
enough for Pleasant to be struck in the head with a handgun and for
furniture in two rooms to be upended. It was long enough for Farley to leave
if he were appalled by the situation once it became violent. Instead, he
stayed without interceding. This evidence shows some degree of reckless
disregard for human life.
Fourth, as to Farley’s knowledge of Terry’s propensity to kill, the court
found “no evidence” Farley knew of “earlier violence, lethal or otherwise” by
Terry and concluded this factor did not weigh in favor of a reckless
indifference finding. The People concede this point. Aside from the red flags
raised once Pleasant was pistol-whipped, we agree this factor is not decisive.
Finally, Farley does not offer any evidence suggesting he attempted to
minimize the risks, and in any event such evidence would not necessarily
foreclose a reckless indifference finding. (See Clark, 63 Cal.4th at p. 622.)
Farley’s contributions to the planning and execution of this crime were
significant. Ultimately, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s denial of the resentencing petition as we must, and “after considering
those aspects of the present felony that provide insight into both the
magnitude of the objective risk of lethal violence and [the] defendant’s
subjective awareness of that risk” (Clark, 63 Cal.4th at p. 623), we conclude
sufficient evidence supports finding Farley knowingly planned and engaged
in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.

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3.
Lastly, we address Farley’s argument the court erred in failing to
consider his youth—21 years old at the time of the offense—when ruling on
his resentencing petition. The People did not respond to this argument. We
discern no reversible error.
Following developments in psychology and brain science showing
differences between juvenile and adult minds, California has begun
legislating with these differences in mind, and “several appellate courts have
addressed the relevance of a defendant’s youth when conducting an analysis
of major-participant and reckless-indifference findings.” (People v. Oliver
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 485-486.) “The hallmark features of youth include
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.
The background and mental and emotional development of a youthful
defendant must be duly considered in assessing his culpability. They are
more vulnerable or susceptible to outside pressures than adults.” (People v.
Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 991 [cleaned up].)
Farley does not direct us to evidence in the record showing his counsel
raised this issue below. Yet it is not certain forfeiture applies because the
evidentiary hearing occurred in October 2023, and at least one appellate
court determined as early as December 2022 that, “[i]n addition to the Banks
and Clark factors, a defendant’s youthful age must be considered.” (People v.
Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1088, fn. 7, italics added.)
We need not decide this issue, though, because even if the court erred
in not considering Farley’s youth, the error was harmless. Appellate courts
assessing prejudice in this area have applied the standard from People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, which asks whether it is reasonably
probable a result more favorable to Farley would have been reached absent

16
the failure to consider his youth. (E.g., People v. Jimenez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1007.)
“[T]he case law discussing the differences in brain development among
youthful offenders (in contrast to their adult counterparts) stress two areas of
divergence: (1) their relative impulsivity; and (2) their vulnerability to peer
pressure.” (Oliver, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) Farley does not point us to any
evidence in the record suggesting his criminal behavior was motivated by
either factor. Given the evidence Farley visited Pleasant the night before to
gather information about Pleasant’s stash of drugs and cash, spoke with
Terry repeatedly by phone, and likely concealed a shotgun in his backpack
before returning with Terry the next morning, this incident does not appear
to be an impulsive crime. The record also contains no evidence indicating
Farley looked up to Terry, who was younger than him, or otherwise felt peer
pressure to participate in the crimes. We further note Farley has not
identified any evidence regarding his upbringing or maturity level to support
finding lesser culpability for murder. (Cf. Jones, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1091,
1093 [remanding for consideration of youth where defendant offered report
asserting he had traumatic and violent upbringing, had mental health issues,
abused drugs, and was numbed to violence].)
It does not seem reasonably probable the court would have reached a
result more favorable to Farley had it considered his youth. We thus
conclude any error was harmless. Given our conclusion, it is unnecessary to
address the trial court’s additional finding that Farley could be found guilty
of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder.

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III.
We affirm.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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