People v. Patterson CA2/5

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Filed 4/11/25 P. v. Patterson CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B336894

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA040726)
v.

TRYNUN PATTERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen M. Vasil, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, David E. Madeo, and
Stefanie Yee Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Trynun Patterson appeals from an order
denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.6. Defendant contends there was insufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the prosecution
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he could still be convicted
of felony murder as a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Conviction

1. Factual Background2

Defendant and codefendants Ike Carstarphen, Kenny
Buckner, and Darryl Clayton jointly planned to rob a music and
jewelry store in Long Beach. Carstarphen’s brother, Jermaine
Parrot, visited the store and reported to the others that three
employees worked there.

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section
1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
clarity, we will refer to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

2 We grant defendant’s request for judicial notice of the
reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts from Court of Appeal case No.
B143582, and this court’s nonpublished opinion in People v.
Patterson (Sept. 25, 2001, B143582).

2
At around 12:00 p.m. on May 3, 1999, defendant,
Carstarphen, Buckner, Clayton, and Parrot met behind Parrot’s
apartment building and discussed how to rob the store. The plan
was for Carstarphen, Buckner, and Clayton to enter first, then
for defendant to count to ten, enter the store, and close the door.
Defendant drove Carstarphen, Buckner, and Clayton to the
store. Defendant, Buckner, and Carstarphen were each armed
with a handgun.3 Carstarphen, Buckner, and Clayton entered
the store first. A mail carrier then entered the store. After the
mail carrier left, defendant entered and closed the door behind
him. Jenny Kim, a store employee who worked in the music side
of the store, told defendant to leave the door open, but defendant
refused.
Buckner and Carstarphen pointed guns at Gary Kim, who
was working in the jewelry side of the store. Buckner ordered
Gary to the floor; and Gary complied. After Gary laid on the
floor, defendant observed Carstarphen drag him to the back by
his ankles. Defendant pulled out a gun and ordered Jenny to lie
down. Clayton pulled Jenny over a counter to the back of the
store. The codefendants told defendant to start taking items, and
he began to put jewelry into a bag.
As he loaded jewelry into his bag, defendant observed
Carstarphen kick Gary and heard Gary moan in pain. Jenny
testified that the beating continued for between five to ten
minutes. Defendant heard a gunshot. Carstarphen had shot
Gary in the head. Defendant said, “Let’s go,” and ran out the
door. The robbers fled and traveled together to Parrot’s

3 Defendant initially told police that Clayton was also armed
with a handgun. But he later stated that Clayton was not armed.

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apartment, where they poured the jewelry on the table and, in
defendant’s words, “proceeded to select pieces.”
Police pulled over defendant and Buckner as they were
traveling in defendant’s car the following day. The police found
the gun that defendant had used in the robbery in the trunk of
the car.

2. Trial, Sentence, and Direct Appeal

On July 15, 1999, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
charged defendant, Buckner, and Carstarphen by information
with: the murder of Gary Kim (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), with a
special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed
while defendant was engaged in a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17));
second degree robbery of Gary Kim (§ 211; count 2); second
degree robbery of Jenny Kim (§ 211; count 3); and conspiracy to
commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 6). For counts 1
through 3, the information also alleged that defendant personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)).
On June 27, 2000, following trial, a jury convicted
defendant of the charged counts and found the robbery special
circumstance and personal use allegations to be true.4
On July 27, 2000, the trial court sentenced defendant to life
without the possibility of parole for count 1, plus four years for
the personal use firearm enhancement. The court also imposed
concurrent terms of seven years each for counts 2 and 3,

4 For counts 1 through 3, the jury also found true the
allegation that a principal personally used a firearm. (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1).)

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consisting of three years plus four years for the firearm
enhancements, and a concurrent term of three years for count 6.
On September 25, 2001, a panel of this court affirmed the
conviction, with directions for the trial court to amend the
abstract of judgment to reflect that the sentences for counts 2 and
6 were stayed pursuant to section 654. (People v. Patterson,
supra, B143582.)

B. Resentencing Petition

On January 17, 2019, defendant filed a section 1172.6
petition. On June 8, 2021, the trial court denied the petition,
finding defendant had not made a prima facie showing that he
was entitled to relief. On June 21, 2022, we reversed and
remanded with directions for the trial court to issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Patterson
(June 21, 2022, B313045 [nonpub. opn.].)
At the February 21, 2024, evidentiary hearing, the parties
elected to proceed on the record of the conviction. After
considering the trial record and the briefing and argument of
counsel, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the
prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The court noted that defendant was
armed when he went to the store, closed the door behind him and
thereby prevented the victims from leaving, was aware of and
witnessed Carstarphen assaulting Gary, and fled immediately
after the shot was fired. Defendant timely appealed.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6 and Felony Murder

“The Legislature enacted Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(Senate
Bill 1437)] ‘to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance
with their involvement in homicides.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 1(b).)” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448.) “Senate
Bill 1437 altered the substantive law of murder in two areas.
First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the application of the
felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). . . .
Under that provision, ‘A participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death
occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
[¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was
not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd. (e).)
[¶] . . . [¶]
“Senate Bill 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95
[renumbered as section 1172.6], which created a procedural
mechanism ‘for those convicted of felony murder . . . to seek relief’
where the . . . substantive changes described above affect a
defendant’s conviction. . . . [¶] Under section 1172.6, ‘A person
convicted of felony murder . . . may file a petition with the court
that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining

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counts . . . .’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at pp. 448–450.)
At a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, “the prosecution
bears the burden ‘to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under the law
as amended by Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)). In
addition to evidence admitted in the petitioner’s prior trial, both
‘[t]he prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or
additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.’ (Ibid.) ‘If
the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior
conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to
the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Wilson
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.)
“[A] trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is
reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under this
standard, we review the record ‘“‘in the light most favorable to
the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)

B. Reckless Indifference to Human Life

“Reckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death.’ [Citation.] Examples include ‘the person who
tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or
the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery,

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utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the
unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking
the victim’s property.’ [Citation.] Reckless indifference
‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing)
to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’
[Citation.]
“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”’
[Citations.] ‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of
death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish
reckless indifference to human life; ‘only knowingly creating a
“grave risk of death”’ satisfies the statutory requirement.
[Citation.] Notably, ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an
armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used’ is not
sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life.
[Citations.]
“We analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether [the defendant] acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Relevant factors include: Did the defendant use or
know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many

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weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically
present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to
restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of
the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the
victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her
confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal
force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks
of violence during the felony? [Citation.] ‘“[N]o one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.”’ [Citations.]” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667,
676–677, citing People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 617–623
(Clark).)5

C. Analysis

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that he
acted with reckless indifference to human life. We find
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
The Clark factors support finding that defendant acted
with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant knew that at
least three guns would be used in the robbery. He displayed one
of these guns as he ordered Jenny Kim to lie on the ground and
Carstarphen used another to inflict the fatal injury. Defendant
was not only present at the scene of the crime, but he actively
participated in subduing one of the two employees.
As to whether defendant had the opportunity to restrain
the crime or aid the victim, we conclude this factor weighs in
favor of finding reckless indifference. When Jenny Kim asked

5 Defendant does not dispute there was sufficient evidence
that he was a major participant in the robbery.

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defendant to keep the door open, defendant refused, which both
prevented detection of the robbery and impeded escape. Further,
he knew that Gary Kim had complied with orders to lie on the
floor and did not resist the robbers. Yet defendant did nothing to
stop Carstarphen when he dragged Gary by the ankles to the
rear of the store, beat him, and eventually shot him.
The duration of the interaction between the perpetrators
and the robbery victims as well as defendant’s knowledge of
Carstarphen’s propensity for violence support the trial court’s
finding. During the course of the robbery, defendant watched as
Carstarphen dragged Gary and beat him for five to ten minutes.
On this record, the trial court could reasonably conclude that
defendant was aware of his “confederate’s propensity for
violence.” (In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
Finally, defendant did nothing to minimize the risk of
violence during the robbery or aid the victim. Instead, defendant
exhorted his co-robbers to flee immediately after the shooting,
which they all did. On this record, substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
We are unpersuaded by defendant’s assertion that because
he was 19 years old at the time of his crimes, his youth and
immaturity undermine a finding that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (See, e.g., People v. Keel (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 546, 558–559 [finding youth a relevant consideration
of whether defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life].) As an initial matter, defendant forfeited this argument by
failing to assert below that his youth was a factor weighing
against a finding of guilt. (Cf. People v. Oliver (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 466, 488 [declining to find forfeiture because first

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case to expressly hold that defendant’s youth was relevant factor
was issued in August 2021, after denial of defendant’s
resentencing petition].) In any event, even considering
defendant’s age, the totality of the circumstances supports a
finding that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (See id. at pp. 489, 490, fn. omitted [“even if the trial court
was required to expressly consider [defendant’s] youth, any such
error in this regard is harmless”; finding “[defendant’s] actions
during this crime did not show ‘a transient rashness’ or ‘inability
to assess consequences.’ [Citation.] Nor do we perceive any
‘“impetuosity”’ or ‘“failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”’
[Citation.] Rather, [defendant], well aware of ‘“the particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime [and] weapon[] [to be]
used”’ [citation], made an intentional and volitional choice . . .”].)
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial
of defendant’s resentencing petition.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.

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