CourtListener 10376136•People v. Medel CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 4/10/25 P. v. Medel CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B334656
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA160903)
v.
CARLOS ESEQUIEL MEDEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra A. Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Carlos Esequiel Medel (defendant) stands convicted of
several crimes associated with a high-speed flight from law
enforcement. On appeal, he raises one issue of instructional error
and one sentencing error. We need not decide whether there is
any instructional error because any such error is harmless; we
accordingly affirm defendant’s conviction. However, we agree
there was a sentencing error and order the trial court to modify
the judgment to stay one of the counts.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
In mid-January 2023, South Gate Police Department
Officer Georgina Vargas activated her lights and siren to induce
a white Ford van to pull over. Officer Vargas saw defendant
driving the van. The van had been stolen four weeks earlier.
Defendant slowed down and appeared to be pulling the van
over.
After Officer Vargas pulled up behind the van, defendant
punched the accelerator and took off at high speed. Officer
Vargas gave chase, with lights flashing and sirens blaring.
Defendant blew through 11 stop signs and drove at speeds well in
excess of the speed limit. In light of defendant’s dangerous
driving, Officer Vargas broke off her pursuit, but not before
transmitting the van’s rear license plate number.
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Just minutes later, South Gate Police Department Officer
Victoria Lopez saw a white van with its lights off roll to a stop in
an alleyway close to where Officer Vargas ended her pursuit.
From inside her patrol car, Officer Lopez watched defendant
stand at the rear of the van and try to bend its license plate.
When Officer Lopez got out of the car, defendant ran off.
He sprinted to a nearby mechanic’s shop and tried to get into its
office. However, Jesus Manzaneda was sleeping in the shop’s
office and, after a struggle, pushed defendant away from the
shop’s door.
Defendant then ran to a Lincoln Navigator SUV and locked
himself inside.
By that time, the police had formed a perimeter around the
area and summoned an air unit. Officers in the air unit called
out to defendant to surrender. South Gate Police Department
Officer Gilberto Varela identified himself and ordered defendant
to come out of the SUV. Defendant refused. The officers then
shattered the SUV’s windshield. Officer Varela again ordered
defendant to come out of the SUV, and warned him that a K-9
would come after him, and bite him, if he did not obey.
Defendant refused. Officer Varela dispatched the K-9, who
entered the SUV and grabbed hold of defendant’s arm, but
defendant still refused commands to exit the vehicle so that the
officers could release the K-9’s bite. Defendant punched at the
dog and tried to choke the dog.
The officers were then able to place defendant in handcuffs.
II. Procedural Background
In the operative amended information, the People charged
defendant with (1) fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle
while driving recklessly, as a felony (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), (2)
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recklessly driving on a highway (id., § 23103, subd. (a)), (3)
driving or taking a vehicle without consent (id., § 10851, subd.
(a)), (4) battery of Manzaneda (Pen. Code, § 242), and (5)
resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer for obstructing
Officer Varela (id., § 148, subd. (a)(1)). The People further
alleged that defendant’s 2021 first degree burglary conviction
constituted a “strike” within our Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code,
§§ 667, subd. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
The jury convicted defendant of all counts, and defendant
admitted his prior strike conviction.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a four-year prison
sentence. The court imposed a four-year sentence on the felony
fleeing charge, calculated as a mid-term sentence of two years,
doubled due to the prior strike. The court imposed a 90-day
sentence for the reckless driving count, 364 days for the driving
or taking a vehicle count, six months for the battery count, and
364 days for the resisting arrest count; all of these other
sentences ran concurrently to one another and to the felony
sentence.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Instructional Error
Defendant argues that his conviction for resisting arrest
must be vacated because the jury instructions were confusing and
thereby eliminated one of the mens rea requirements for that
offense. We evaluate jury instructions de novo. (People v. Simon
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 133.)
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A. Pertinent facts
The trial court instructed the jury on the crime of resisting
arrest using the standard CALCRIM No. 2656 instruction. In
pertinent part, the jury was instructed:
“the People must prove that:
1. Gilberto Varela was a peace officer
lawfully performing or attempting to perform his
duties as a peace officer;
2. The defendant willfully resisted,
obstructed, or delayed Gilberto Valera in the
performance or attempted performance of those
duties;
AND
3. When the defendant acted, he knew, or
reasonably should have known, that Gilberto Varela
was a peace officer performing or attempting to
perform his duties.
Someone commits an act willfully when he or she
does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that
he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else,
or gain any advantage.”
(Italics omitted.)
The court also instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 252,
which sorted the various crimes charged into those “requir[ing]
general criminal intent” and those “requir[ing] a specific intent or
mental state.” The court listed “resisting arrest” as a general
intent crime. With regard to general intent crimes, the court
went on to instruct that:
“For you to find a person guilty of these [general
intent] crimes, that person must not only commit the
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prohibited act or fail to do the required act, but must
do so with wrongful intent. A person acts with
wrongful intent when he or she intentionally does a
prohibited act or fails to do a required act; however, it
is not required that he or she intend to break the law.
The act required is explained in the instruction for
that crime.”
B. Analysis
Defendant does not dispute that the CALCRIM No. 2656
instruction listing the elements of the crime of resisting arrest
correctly states the law. (Accord, Yount v. City of Sacramento
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 894-895.) Instead, he argues that the
court’s classification of resisting arrest as a “general intent”
crime in CALCRIM No. 252 created a conflict—or, at a minimum,
confusion—over whether the knowledge-based element in the
CALCRIM 2656 instruction—namely, that the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the person he willfully
resisted was a peace officer in the performance of their duties—
continued to apply. To be sure, a defendant’s due process rights
are violated when an intent element of a crime is effectively
removed from the jury’s charge, and such removal can occur
when multiple instructions are conflicting or confusing. (People
v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1164-1165, superseded by
statute on other grounds as noted in People v. Brooks (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 932, 946, fn. 17; People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666,
673-674.) In assessing whether two instructions conflict or are
confusing, we must consider all instructions as a whole and ask
“‘“whether there is a ‘“reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged instruction[s] in a way”’”’” that they
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conflict or are confusing. (People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th
644, 655.)
We need not grapple with whether there was instructional
error because, even if we assume there was, that error was not
prejudicial.
Because the instructional error here did not infect the
jury’s examination of the reckless evasion count, we take as a
given that defendant was the person leading a marked police car
through a high-speed chase. The evidence overwhelmingly
established that, at the time defendant resisted Officer Varela’s
commands, he was surrounded by uniformed officers with an air
unit circling overhead. On this record, and because defendant
introduced no contrary evidence, the evidence overwhelmingly
establishes that defendant knew or should have known the
people he was resisting were peace officers engaged in the
performance of their duties. (Accord, People v. Canales (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1251 [error under CALCRIM No. 252
instruction harmless where “proof” of mental state at issue “was
overwhelming”].)
Defendant resists this conclusion with four arguments.
First, defendant asserts that there is a question of fact as to
whether he knew the police were after him because he was not
the person evading them in the van. The jury found to the
contrary, and this finding regarding defendant’s conduct is in no
way affected by the alleged instructional error regarding
defendant’s intent.
Second, defendant argues that the evidence is conflicting as
to whether he knew the police were lawfully engaged in their
duties (that is, that the police were not unlawfully engaged in the
use of excessive force). Textually, the showing defendant claims
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is absent may not be required at all: The knowledge requirement
for the crime of resisting arrest under Penal Code section 148
requires that the defendant know or reasonably should know the
person they are resisting is a peace officer in the performance of
their duties; it does not also require that the defendant
contemporaneously know the officer is lawfully performing those
duties. (In re A.L. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 (A.L.) [suggesting
no such knowledge requirement]; but see People v. Southard
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 424, 438-439 [suggesting there may be
prejudice due to such a requirement].) But even if we accept as a
practical matter that “[t]here may be no distinction between
performing a duty and lawfully performing a duty, since an
officer who is acting unlawfully cannot be said to be performing
his or her duty” (A.L., at p. 25), there was overwhelming evidence
in this case that defendant knew the people he was resisting were
officers attempting to arrest him in performing their duties and,
more to the point, no evidence to the contrary—no evidence that
defendant subjectively believed the officers were acting
unlawfully (by using excessive force), and no evidence from which
a reasonable jury could conclude that a reasonable person would
believe the officers were acting unlawfully (by using excessive
force).
Third, defendant argues that the evidence is conflicting as
to whether he was on drugs at the time, and thus could not
subjectively appreciate that the uniformed officers talking to him
were peace officers. However, our Supreme Court has held that
the knowledge requirement turns not only on what a defendant
knows about the status of the person he is resisting, but also
what they should have known. (People v. Montiel (1993) 5
Cal.4th 877, 916, overruled on other grounds, People v. Sanchez
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(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665; compare People v. Mackreth (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 317, 330-332 [adopting same rule as Montiel] with
A.L., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 22 [requiring actual
knowledge].) Because constructive knowledge suffices, and
because any reasonable person in defendant’s situation would
know the people he was resisting were peace officers, any error
regarding the knowledge instruction was harmless.
Fourth and lastly, defendant points to inconsistencies in
Officer Varela’s testimony, but that does not bear on the facts
relevant to showing what defendant knew or should have known
from defendant’s perspective.
II. Sentencing Error
Defendant contends that his 90-day sentence for reckless
driving must be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654
because it punishes the same act of driving that gave rise to the
felony fleeing charge. The People concede this was error, and we
agree.
Penal Code section 654 provides that “[a]n act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case
shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (Pen. Code, § 654, subd. (a).) Although this
statute on its face prohibits multiple punishments for the same
act, it “has also long been applied to cases where a ‘course of
conduct’ violates several statutes.” (People v. Kwok (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1236, 1252.)
The California Supreme Court established a two-step
inquiry for courts to determine whether a defendant may be
subject to multiple punishment. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2
Cal.5th 307, 311.) Courts must first consider whether “the
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different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’” (Ibid.,
quoting People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358.) A
defendant’s action is considered a single physical act if it
completes the actus reus for each criminal offense. (Corpening, at
p. 313.)
Here, the same physical act—defendant’s flight from
police—completed the actus reus of the crimes of fleeing a
pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly in
violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, and reckless driving in
violation of Vehicle Code section 23103, subdivision (a). Because
both crimes were committed by the same act, the court erred in
not staying the misdemeanor reckless driving offense under
Penal Code section 654.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified as follows: The 90-day sentence
for reckless driving in violation of Vehicle Code section 23103,
subdivision (a), is stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
prepare and forward an amended abstract of judgment reflecting
the modified sentence to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
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We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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