People v. Latanzio CA2/5

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Filed 4/9/25 P. v. Latanzio CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B330241

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA081803)
v.

ANTHONY LATANZIO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Emily Cole, Judge. Affirmed.

Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Xiomara Costello and Shezad H.
Thakor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Anthony Latanzio (defendant) stands convicted of several
crimes arising from the molestation of his girlfriend’s young
daughter. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in
excluding evidence that the girlfriend had been molested as a
child; (2) the standard jury instruction regarding child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome is incorrect; and (3) his attorney
was constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to the
prosecutor’s closing argument. Because these arguments lack
merit, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family unit
Defendant started dating his girlfriend in 2019, at a time
when the girlfriend’s daughter, Jane Doe, was only five years old.
Although defendant had his own residence, he spent a lot of time
with the girlfriend and Jane Doe at their apartment.
B. Molestation of Jane Doe
Between 2019 and July 16, 2021, defendant repeatedly
engaged in sex acts with Jane Doe. As Jane Doe consistently
recounted to a forensic interviewer, during her preliminary
hearing testimony, and during her trial testimony:
— Defendant, while once carrying Jane Doe into the
apartment as she pretended to be asleep, pushed his finger into
her vagina through her clothes.
— Defendant on more than one occasion inserted his
bare finger into Jane Doe’s vagina, on more than one occasion

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placed his mouth directly on her vagina, and on one occasion
forced Jane Doe’s mouth onto his penis while he watched
television.
— Defendant on one occasion inserted his penis into
Jane Doe’s vagina.
— On July 16, 2021, defendant inserted his bare finger
into Jane Doe’s vagina and also placed his mouth on her vagina.
Amidst these incidents, defendant warned Jane Doe that if she
told anyone about what he had done, he would break her pinky
finger.
On July 16, 2021, the girlfriend returned to the apartment
after running errands, and noticed defendant standing near Jane
Doe in the bathroom. The girlfriend noticed something was “off”
and thought defendant had a “guilty demeanor to him.” The
girlfriend took Jane Doe aside and asked her what had happened,
and Jane Doe hesitantly reported that defendant had hurt her
and pointed to her private parts when asked “where.” The
girlfriend immediately left the apartment with Jane Doe, but
defendant followed them in his car until the girlfriend drove to
the local sheriff’s station. A forensic nurse examined Jane Doe,
and noticed that her underwear was bloody and that she had
multiple abrasions around her vagina consistent with physical
trauma.
Defendant’s DNA was found on Jane Doe’s vaginal area,
and Jane Doe’s DNA was found under defendant’s fingernails, on
his hand, and on his penis.
II. Procedural Background
The People charged defendant with four separate counts
aligning with the four separate categories of conduct described
above—namely, (1) committing a lewd act upon a child 14 years

3
old or younger (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)),1 (2) oral copulation or
sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7,
subd. (b)), (3) sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years
old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)), and (4) oral copulation or
sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7,
subd. (b)).
The matter proceeded to trial in February and March 2023.
At trial, defendant testified and flatly denied committing
any of the charged acts. Defendant claimed that he and the
girlfriend had a bad fight just before July 16, 2021. Defendant’s
ex-wife and a childhood friend testified that defendant had been
in the presence of children without sexually molesting them.
Defendant called two expert witnesses, one who opined that DNA
is easily transferable, and another who opined that child
witnesses are easily suggestible.
A jury found defendant guilty of all charges.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 61 years to life in
prison. Specifically, the court imposed a base term of 25 years to
life on the sexual intercourse count; two consecutive 15-year
terms, one for each of the two oral copulation or sexual
penetration counts; and a consecutive six-year sentence on the
lewd conduct count.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Exclusion of Evidence That the Girlfriend Was a
Victim of Molestation as a Child
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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him to question the girlfriend about whether she had been
molested as a child. According to defendant, this evidence was
relevant to “impeach” the girlfriend and Jane Doe because the
girlfriend’s prior victimization (1) “would explain why [she] would
overreact when she saw [defendant] and Doe standing by the
bathroom” on July 16, 2021, and (2) would demonstrate that the
girlfriend “coached” Jane Doe to testify falsely.
A. Pertinent facts
Prior to trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to exclude any
evidence that the girlfriend had been molested as a child. After
confirming that there was no evidence that the girlfriend ever
told Jane Doe about her victimization, the trial court excluded
evidence of the girlfriend’s victimization on two grounds. First,
the court ruled that the evidence was not relevant. The court
explained that defendant could question the girlfriend “about
suggestibility[ and] planting ideas in [Jane Doe’s] head” and
could “even suggest that [the girlfriend] was paranoid,” but ruled
that the girlfriend’s reasons for trying to suggest testimony, to
plant ideas, or for being paranoid were not relevant: “The
suggestability [itself] is relevant,” the court summed up, but the
reason why the girlfriend would try to suggest testimony or was
paranoid was not. Second, the court ruled that even “if there is
any relevance whatsoever, it is so tangential and does not
outweigh the prejudicial value” under Evidence Code section 352.
B. Analysis
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) “[A] trial court
has broad discretion to exclude [relevant] evidence ‘if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability

5
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.’” (People v. Peoples (2016)
62 Cal.4th 718, 757, quoting Evid. Code, § 352.) We review a
trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337 [relevance]; People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 584 [discretionary exclusion of
unduly prejudicial evidence].)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
evidence that the girlfriend had been the victim of sexual
molestation as a child. To be sure, and as the trial court noted,
whether the girlfriend coached Jane Doe to lie and whether the
girlfriend overreacted might be relevant to impeach Jane Doe’s
testimony and to impeach the girlfriend’s testimony, respectively.
For these purposes, what matters are the facts of whether the
girlfriend was suggesting what Jane Doe should say and whether
the girlfriend overreacted. But why the girlfriend would be
particularly knowledgeable about molestation and why she
overreacted—which is what the girlfriend’s prior victimization
was proffered to show—has, at best, marginal relevance. (Accord,
People v. Adames (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 198, 208-209 [evidence of
alleged molestation of victim’s mother as a child properly
excluded because it “would have created confusion regarding the
real issue, i.e. did [the defendant] molest [the victim]”].) When
weighed against the danger of embarrassing and harassing the
girlfriend as well as distracting the jury with the fact of the
girlfriend’s childhood molestation, the court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that these dangers substantially
outweighed that minimal probative value under Evidence Code
section 352. (Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (a) [“[t]he court shall . . .

6
protect the witness from undue harassment and
embarrassment”].) Because the exclusion of this evidence was
appropriate under the Evidence Code, its exclusion also did not
violate defendant’s right to present a defense or right of
confrontation. (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440
[“[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not
impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a
defense”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 817 [“trial
judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is
concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’[s] safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant”].)
Defendant resists this conclusion with three arguments.
First, defendant argues that he would not have inquired about
the details of the girlfriend’s prior victimization. Keeping the
inquiry at a more general level, however, does not make the
evidence any more relevant or ameliorate the prejudice arising
from its admission. Second, he argues that the girlfriend’s prior
victimization clouded her perception. For support, defendant
cites the testimony of his expert that the “experiences and . . .
perception” of the persons who question a child victim “can come
to influence the child’s statement” about the crime “[t]o the
extent that those get communicated to the child.” But neither
this testimony nor any other evidence supports defendant’s
assertion that being molested in the past affects one’s perception
of events the witness is relaying. Indeed, the passage defendant
cites supports the trial court’s ruling insofar as the expert opined
that a questioner’s prior experience can influence a child victim
to fabricate “[t]o the extent [those experiences] get communicated

7
to the child”—but here, the girlfriend’s victimization was never
communicated to Jane Doe. Third, defendant argues that the
prosecutor exploited the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence of
the girlfriend’s molestation because, in closing argument, the
prosecutor argued that the girlfriend, upon seeing defendant and
Jane Doe on July 16, 2021, “just freaks out . . . . Why would she
just freak out because they’re both standing by the bathroom?
That doesn’t make any sense.” Defendant takes this passage out
of context: This passage was in the course of the prosecutor
explaining why defendant’s testimony was not reasonable when
defendant claimed that the girlfriend’s reaction was based solely
on where he and Jane Doe were standing when the girlfriend got
home; the prosecutor explained that the girlfriend had a basis for
“freak[ing] out”—namely, that she could “tell when something’s
off, when someone’s trying to hide something.”2

2 In full, this portion of the closing argument reads as
follows:
“Now, how reasonable is the defendant’s
testimony? His testimony essentially is that he never
touched [Jane Doe]. How reasonable is it, when you
consider [the girlfriend’s] actions, her reactions, when
she got home?
So she comes home. She sees the defendant
close to the bathroom in the hallway, and she sees
[Jane Doe] close to the bathroom, and she just freaks
out. This is someone she’s dated for two years, who
she’s left home alone with [Jane Doe] before, who –
again, she – they seem to have a good relationship.
Why would she just freak out because they’re both
standing by the bathroom? That doesn’t make any
sense.

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II. Propriety of Standard Instruction on Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in giving the
standard instruction explaining how a jury may properly consider
expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
(CSAAS) because that instruction improperly “advised the jurors
that they may consider the CSAAS testimony in evaluating the
complaining witness’s veracity.” We review instructional errors
de novo. (People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900.)
Expert testimony on CSAAS is admissible if (1) the
testimony is “tailored to address the specific myth[s] or
misconception[s] suggested by the evidence” in terms of how
children react to sexual abuse, and (2) the jury is instructed that
“the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to
determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.”

Clearly, she gets home and she sees a look on
his face and on [Jane Doe’s] face that let[s] her know
something’s not right. We all have partners in our
lives or friends, probably even interacted with
children if you don’t have children of your own, you
can tell when something’s off, when someone’s trying
to hide something. [The girlfriend] had just got
home, on her way back home, when all of this is going
on, when [Jane Doe’s] changing her underwear, and
the defendant gave her underwear to change into
when [Jane Doe] noticed she was she was bleeding.
When you catch someone when something’s
going on, they have something to their face. There’s
an energy that you can feel. Why would [the
girlfriend] just overreact just by seeing them
standing there?”

9
(People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 188; People v.
Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 391-394; People v. McAlpin
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301 (McAlpin).) Here, the People called
an expert witness who testified that, contrary to expectations,
children often wait months or years to report sexual abuse, and
often give inconsistent accounts that lack specifics; the expert
further testified that she had not interviewed Jane Doe and had
not reviewed the record in this case. The trial court also
instructed the jury with the standard jury instruction, CALCRIM
No. 1193, as follows:
“You have heard testimony from [the expert]
regarding child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome.
[The expert’s] testimony about child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that
the defendant committed any of the crimes charged
against him.
You may consider the evidence only in deciding
whether or not [Jane Doe]’s conduct was not
inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has
been molested, and in evaluating the believability of
her testimony.”
The trial court did not err in giving the standard CALCRIM
No. 1193 instruction in this case. Earlier in the case, defendant
had questioned Jane Doe’s veracity partly on the basis of her
delayed disclosure of the abuse by defendant and partly on the
basis of her inability to remember exact details and dates. Thus,
there was an evidentiary basis for the instruction. Further, the
standard CALCRIM No. 1193 instruction has been uniformly
upheld as valid. (People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494,

10
503-504; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 175-176;
People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473-474; People v.
Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 219-220.)
Defendant makes what boils down to two arguments. First,
he urges that CSAAS evidence is not admissible to prove a child
sex victim’s credibility. He is wrong. The precedent establishes
that CSAAS evidence cannot be used to prove that the victim is
telling the truth, but can be used to show that their counter-
intuitive behavior is not inconsistent with telling the truth; in
other words, CSAAS evidence does appropriately bear on the
victim’s credibility in some respects. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d
at p. 1302.) Second, defendant urges us to reject this precedent.
Given that some of it comes from our Supreme Court, we cannot
do so. (Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1942) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455-456.) We agree with the lower court precedent in any event.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Not Objecting
to Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective because she did not object to a portion
of the prosecutor’s closing argument in which the prosecutor
impermissibly vouched for the credibility of Jane Doe.
A. Pertinent facts
During closing argument, the prosecutor addressed Jane
Doe’s credibility in the following passages:
“So [Jane Doe] has no reason to lie in this case.
There’s no reason for her to lie. From the outside
looking in, the defendant was nothing but nice to her,
right. He bought her gifts. He played games with
her. He bought her jewelry. He took her on trips.
He treated her like his own child. He never wanted

11
her to get left out. Why would she lie? Sounds like a
good relationship. Maybe you say, well, she didn’t
want to lie. Maybe [the girlfriend] told her to lie.
But that doesn’t really make any sense either.
...
As far as the prior consistent statements,
overall, [Jane Doe] was very consistent about the
abuse and the different ways th[at defendant] abused
her. How you can use this again ties back into,
because she was consistent in the past and she’s been
consistent here, she’s overall consistent, what she
says in court you should believe it. It’s believable
because she’s been consistent this whole time.”
Defendant did not object to either argument.
B. Analysis
Because a claim of prosecutorial error in closing argument
is preserved for appeal only if a defendant objects and seeks a
jury admonition (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839), and
because defendant neither objected to nor sought a jury
admonition with respect to the portions of the prosecutor’s closing
argument challenged on appeal, defendant has recast his
argument as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel—namely,
that his lawyer was ineffective for not objecting and seeking a
jury admonition. “To establish that counsel was constitutionally
ineffective, a criminal defendant must show that (1) counsel’s
performance was ‘deficient’ because it ‘“‘“‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional
norms’”’”’; and (2) but for that deficient performance, there is a
‘reasonable probability . . . the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.’” (People v. Washington (2017) 15

12
Cal.App.5th 19, 25, quoting People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181,
198.) Establishing ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal is particularly “difficult” because courts “presum[e] that
counsel’s actions” are reasonable and because the “record on
appeal may not explain why counsel chose to act as he or she
did.” (Mickel, at p. 198.) The decision not to make a meritless
objection is neither deficient performance nor prejudicial. (People
v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732.) We independently review
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Mayfield
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 199.)
Defendant’s counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for
not objecting to the prosecutor’s closing argument because such
an objection would have been meritless. “‘A prosecutor is
prohibited from vouching for the credibility of witnesses or
otherwise bolstering the veracity of their testimony by referring
to evidence outside the record.’ [Citation.] Similarly,
‘“[i]mpermissible ‘vouching’ may occur where the prosecutor
places the prestige of the government behind a witness through
personal assurance of the witness’s veracity or suggests that
information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s
testimony.”’ [Citation.] ‘However, so long as a prosecutor’s
assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of
prosecution witnesses are based on the “facts of [the] record and
the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any
purported personal knowledge or belief,” [the prosecutor’s]
comments cannot be characterized as improper vouching.’”
(People v. Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419, 446-447; People v.
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1330.) Here, the prosecutor’s
argument regarding Jane Doe’s credibility is based wholly on
evidence presented at trial—the gifts defendant bought Jane Doe,

13
the time he spent with her, and the consistency of Jane Doe’s
statements over time. At no point did the prosecutor suggest that
she was personally vouching for Jane Doe’s credibility or that the
prosecutor had information outside the record supporting Jane
Doe’s credibility.
IV. Cumulative Error
Defendant lastly argues that the foregoing errors at his
trial cumulatively warrant vacating his convictions. Because we
conclude that the trial court and defense counsel committed no
prejudicial error, there is no error to cumulate. (People v.
Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1064.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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