People v. Henley CA2/2

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Filed 4/8/25 P. v. Henley CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B336268

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA066656)
v.

JONATHAN DAVID HENLEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Darrell S. Mavis, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Charles Carbone and Charles Carbone for
Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
Defendant and appellant Jonathan David Henley appeals
from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).1 Because
defendant is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
A. The shooting
“On August 9, 2006, at 7:00 p.m., Arthur Spicer (Spicer)
was on the north side of Cherry Avenue, between Ivy and
California Avenues, in the City of Monrovia, when he saw a light
gray or blue car driving down Cherry Avenue. The car drove
across the center of the street, slowed down and stopped next to
him. From 10 feet away, the passenger pointed a small, black,
possibly .22-caliber gun at him. Spicer dropped to the ground
and heard two gunshots. He then saw the car drive up the street
at approximately five miles per hour, heard two more gunshots
and saw a man fall down near the corner of Cherry and
California Avenues.
“At that time, Robert Graves, Jr., (Graves) was washing his
car outside his residence at the corner of Cherry and California

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no substantive change. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its
new numbering.
2 We provide these facts, drawn from our nonpublished
opinion in defendant’s direct appeal from his conviction, for
context only.

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Avenues. . . . He saw a silver car, with tinted back windows, . . .
drive next to him, with the front passenger side nearest him,
with its window down. He did not hear any gunshots before he
saw the car, but ‘there was [sic] people down the street, [he]
wasn’t really paying attention.’
“The passenger asked Graves, ‘What’s up, homie?’ When
Graves turned to see who was talking to him, the car was two
feet away and a gun was sticking out of its window. Graves could
see the driver and a front passenger, but did not see their faces or
recognize the passenger’s voice. A shot was fired, hitting Graves
in the face. He fell to the ground and heard two more shots.
“Sharmaine Currie (Currie), who lived on Cherry Avenue,
midway between Ivy and California Avenues, was outside of her
home when she heard approximately 10 shots. When she first
looked down Cherry Avenue in the direction of the shots, she saw
Spicer near Ivy Avenue and a gray or silver Stratus or Intrepid
moving down Cherry Avenue towards California Avenue,
‘significantly slower’ than normal traffic on this street. Spicer
was running around, yelling, ‘They’re shooting.’ As the car
passed her, Currie could not see the occupants’ faces, but saw
that there was a front passenger and a ‘big’ driver, who had little
hair or was bald. Both men were Hispanic. Currie told police
that she heard a ‘pop’ near Spicer, then several shots at the
corner of Cherry and California Avenues.
“Omar Gutierrez, who lived on California Avenue, just
South of Cherry Avenue, was inside about to leave, when he
heard three or four gunshots. He went outside, saw a gray or
silver Intrepid, with tinted windows, driving fast down California
Avenue from Cherry Avenue. He could not see the occupants.

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“As a result of the shooting, Graves suffered a bullet wound
to his head, requiring surgery of his right eye and placement of a
prosthetic piece in his left eye. He lost his vision in his left eye
and had blurry vision in his right eye.” (People v. Henley
(June 22, 2010, B215829) [nonpub. opn.], fn. omitted (Henley).)
B. The investigation
“Detective Robert Manuel, the investigating officer,
received information that a gray Dodge Intrepid with tinted
windows was involved in the shooting. He located a car meeting
that description parked in front of [defendant]’s residence in
Azusa, registered to [defendant]. . . . [¶] Detective Manuel
searched the car and found a box of .22-caliber bullets in the
front, center console and a .22-caliber revolver under the driver’s
seat. No ballistics evidence was recovered at the scene.” (Henley,
supra, B215829.)
C. Interview of defendant
“Detective Manuel interviewed [defendant] several times,
once in a video-recorded interview at the police station. . . .
[Defendant] admitted owning the car found in front of his
residence. He said that on the day of the shootings, he left work
and went to Certified Market to buy some beer. There, he met ‘a
guy,’ Robert, whom he had not ‘seen in a while.’ Robert was with
Robert’s cousin, Jesse, whom [defendant] was ‘sure [he] was from
somewhere’ because of his baggy clothing and white T-shirt.
“Robert asked [defendant] to drive him and Jesse to Duarte
Road. On the way, they drove down Cherry Avenue ‘at a regular
pace.’ Robert was in the front seat, and Jesse was in the back.
Jesse rolled down his window, fired a gun at a Black man
washing his car and said, ‘Fuck that fool. . . .’ This surprised
[defendant], who did not know what to do, so he took off as fast as

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he could. He dropped Robert and Jesse off at a liquor store on
Duarte Road and then went home. [Defendant] denied . . .
shooting anyone . . . . At one point in the interview, [defendant]
asked how much jail time he would do, and, at another time,
asked, ‘So what’s my best deal right now?’” (Henley, supra,
B215829.)
II. Procedural History
A. Conviction and sentencing
In 2008, a jury found defendant guilty of the attempted
murder of Graves (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1), assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and aggravated mayhem
(§ 205; count 7). The jury found true a gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) as to all three counts. As to count 1, the
jury found true the allegation that the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. As to counts 1 and 7, the
jury found true the allegation that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and
(e)(1).
The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a term of life
plus 25 years to life in state prison.
B. Direct appeal
On direct appeal, we reversed the true findings on the gang
enhancement but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (Henley,
supra, B215829.)
C. Resentencing
On remand, appellant was resentenced to a prison term of
life with the possibility of parole.

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D. Section 1172.6 petition
In August 2022, defendant, who was represented by
counsel, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. The People opposed the petition, arguing that
defendant was ineligible for relief because he was convicted based
on a theory of being a direct aider and abettor and that no jury
instructions were given, nor theory presented, on felony murder
or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s section 1172.6
petition in December 2023. After entertaining oral argument, the
court denied the petition, concluding that defendant had not
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. The court
explained that it was “denying [the petition] for all of the reasons
that [we]re stated in the People’s response[.]”
E. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed from the order denying his
section 1172.6 petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Law
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to
“eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[] and limit[] the scope
of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The bill also added what is now
section 1172.6 to provide a procedural mechanism for defendants
who could no longer be convicted of murder because of the
changes made to sections 188 and 189 to petition for retroactive
relief. (Lewis, supra, at p. 959.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) subsequently “expanded the class of defendants

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entitled to relief to those convicted of attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [Citations.]”
(People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.)
In order to obtain resentencing relief, a defendant convicted
of attempted murder must allege that (1) an information was
filed against him allowing the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)); (2) he was
convicted of attempted murder (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)); and (3) he
could not now be convicted “because of changes to [s]ection 188 or
189 made effective January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).
Upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing, the trial court must conduct a prima facie analysis
to determine the defendant’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b)(3) & (c); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708;
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 960.) “[T]he prima facie
inquiry . . . is limited. . . . ‘“[T]he court takes [a] [defendant]’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the [defendant] would be entitled to relief if
his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must
issue an order to show cause”’” and set the matter of an
evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, at p. 971.)
In making this assessment, the trial court may consider the
defendant’s record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–971.) “The record of conviction will necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.) However, “the court should not
make credibility determinations or engage in ‘factfinding

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involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 974.)
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section
1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545 (Coley); see also People v. Muhammad
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 276 (Muhammad), review granted
Feb. 19, 2025, S288860 [“The trial court’s denial of a resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage ‘“is a purely legal
conclusion[]”’”].)
III. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial
court properly denied defendant’s section 1172.6 petition. As
described above, a successful prima facie case for section 1172.6
relief requires a defendant to aver, inter alia, that he could no
longer be convicted “because of” the 2019 statutory changes.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Defendant cannot satisfy this
requirement here because the record of conviction conclusively
establishes that he was convicted of attempted murder under a
theory of direct aiding and abetting, a theory unaffected by the
2019 changes to sections 188 and 189. (See Coley, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [“Direct aiding and abetting remains a
valid theory of attempted murder”].)
“[W]ith respect to attempted murder, section 1172.6 affords
relief only to a person convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [Citation.]” (Muhammad, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 276.) Here, however, the jury that
convicted defendant was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or any other theory allowing

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malice to be imputed on defendant.3 Rather, the jury was
instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401 on direct aiding and
abetting principles. CALCRIM No. 401 informed the jury that, as
an aider and abettor, defendant had to “kn[o]w that the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime” and had to “intend[] to
aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime.” The jury
was also instructed with CALCRIM No. 600, which explained
that to prove defendant’s guilt for attempted murder, the People
were required to prove that “defendant intended to kill” the
victim.
The jury thus could not and did not convict defendant of
attempted murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, rendering defendant ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (Coley, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548; see also People v. Cortes (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [a petitioner is ineligible for § 1172.6
relief as a matter of law if the jury instructions show that jurors
were not instructed on any theory of murder liability that allowed
malice to be imputed].)
Defendant resists this conclusion with what boils down to
two arguments. Neither has merit.
First, defendant relies primarily on People v. Powell (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) and People v. Langi (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi) to argue that the jury instructions
permitted the jury to impute onto him the actual perpetrator’s
murderous intent. Both cases are inapposite. Powell, a direct
appeal from a murder conviction, concluded that the standard

3 Nor was the jury instructed on felony murder, as
“California has no crime of attempted felony murder.
[Citations.]” (People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1071, fn. 4.)

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aiding and abetting instructions “were not tailored” to fit the
theory of implied malice murder. (Powell, supra, at p. 714.)
Relying on Powell, Langi held that the summary denial of a
section 1172.6 petition should be reversed where the record
showed that a defendant was convicted as an aider and abettor of
implied malice murder using the standard jury instructions.
(Langi, supra, at pp. 982–984.)
The reasoning found in Powell and Langi simply does not
apply here, where defendant was convicted of attempted murder,
not implied malice murder. “[A]ttempted murder requires a
specific intent to kill” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176,
190), and defendant’s jury was so instructed with CALCRIM
No. 600. (Cf. Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 547 [Langi
inapplicable where the defendant was convicted of express, not
implied, malice murder].)
Second, defendant contends that substantial evidence does
not support a finding that he harbored malice or an intent to kill.
This argument is improper because “[t]he mere filing of a
section 117[2.6] petition does not afford the petitioner a new
opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings. To the contrary,
‘[n]othing in the language of section 117[2.6] suggests it was
intended to provide redress for allegedly erroneous prior
factfinding. . . . The purpose of section 117[2.6] is to give
defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with
respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a do-
over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
We thus reject any claim challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying defendant’s convictions.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

________________________, J.
RICHARDSON

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