CourtListener 10373732•Cong v. Tsao CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 4/7/25 Cong v. Tsao CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CHUNPING CONG, B330541
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KC068926)
v.
JASON TSAO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Salvatore Sirna, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Office of Carlos A. Lloreda, Jr., and Carlos A.
Lloreda, Jr., for Defendant and Appellant.
Tiedt & Hurd, John E. Tiedt and Matthew Ferris for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and appellant Jason Tsao appeals from a
judgment entered pursuant to the terms of a settlement under
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.1 Tsao contends the trial
court erred in entering judgment because the parties’ oral
stipulation to settle did not result in a valid and binding
agreement. We affirm the trial court’s entry of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, plaintiff and respondent Chunping Cong and her
husband came to California from China on temporary visas to
open a marble and granite business. They formed a California
corporation, C&L Marble Products, Inc. Cong was the sole
shareholder and director. Cong purchased real property in
Pomona in the company’s name (the Pomona property).
In 2000, Cong and her husband returned to China,
intending to stay for one to two months. They hired Tsao, Cong’s
husband’s cousin, to manage the business while they were away.
In December 2000, Cong planned to return to California, but her
visa application was denied because she had overstayed her
previous visa. Cong has been unable to travel to the United
States since she left in 2000.
According to Cong, between 2001 and 2013, Tsao assured
Cong and her husband that their business was in safe hands.
However, in 2016, Cong discovered that in August 2001, Tsao
changed the name of C&L Marble Products to Kingstone Marble,
Inc. In 2002, Tsao transferred the Pomona property and all other
company assets to himself and dissolved the company. Cong
claims Tsao took these actions without her knowledge or consent.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2
In 2016, Cong filed a complaint against Tsao asserting
causes of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion,
and unjust enrichment, and seeking declaratory relief, an
accounting, and a constructive trust. Tsao filed a cross-complaint
against Cong, her husband, and her children, alleging that Cong
and her husband failed to pay back money they borrowed from
Tsao to keep C&L Marble Products solvent, and claiming they
never compensated him for managing the company. In 2020, the
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court
granted Cong’s motion and denied Tsao’s motion.2
The court bifurcated the trial on Cong’s claims. In the first
phase, the trial court addressed Tsao’s statute of limitations
defense, concluding that the statute of limitations barred Cong’s
claims as to all but one company asset, the Pomona property. In
the second phase, the court held a bench trial to determine
liability and damages.
On July 1, 2022, Tsao testified. Cong’s counsel questioned
him about corporate bylaws he signed establishing him as: the
sole director, president, secretary, and chief financial officer of
C&L Marble Products; the sole person authorized to contract on
behalf of the company; and the holder of 10,000 shares of stock.
When asked if any document reflected the transfer of the shares
from Cong to Tsao, Tsao testified that Cong had signed corporate
meeting minutes transferring her company stock to him. He
asserted these minutes showed Cong had agreed to make Tsao
president of the company and allowed Tsao to transfer the
2 This court dismissed Tsao’s appeal from the order on the
summary judgment motions because no appealable judgment or
order had been entered. (Tsao v. Cong, et al. (Aug. 17, 2021,
B312067).)
3
Pomona property from C&L Marble Products to himself.
According to Tsao, Cong signed the minutes in China. Tsao
testified he did not have the signed minutes in his possession
because about a year or two after the lawsuit was filed, he had
given the “corporate minute book” containing the document to his
prior attorney, who had not returned it. Tsao testified he had no
photocopies or electronic copies of the document and was unsure
if his former attorney still had it. He did not recall whether he
had returned to the attorney’s office to determine whether the
attorney had the minutes.
Cong’s counsel asked Tsao why, when asked to confirm at
his deposition in July 2019 that there was no “corporate minute
book” or “any documents of any nature establishing that [he was]
president of the company,” Tsao responded affirmatively without
mentioning that there was a corporate minute book in the
possession of his former attorney. Tsao testified that he did not
tell counsel about the corporate minute book because, at the time
of his deposition, Tsao had “misplaced it.”
Before breaking for lunch on July 1, 2022, the court told
Tsao’s counsel, Carlos Lloreda, Jr., “Maybe you can try to
negotiate and settle this case over the lunch hour. I’m directly
speaking to you, Mr. Lloreda. Maybe you can initiate something
with [Cong’s counsel] about resolving this case.”
The court reconvened two hours later. Lloreda informed
the court the parties had reached “a full settlement of the
entirety of the actions comprising this lawsuit,” and stated the
settlement was “to be supervised by the court under
[section] 664.” The court asked, “Are you going to write it out or
put it on the record here today?” Lloreda responded, “Put it on
the record.” The transcript reflects the following exchange:
4
“The court: Let’s start over so everything is
captured on the record. To my understanding, there
is a settlement, Mr. Lloreda; is that correct?
“Mr. Lloreda: Yes. There is a full settlement of
the entirety of the actions comprising this lawsuit
and case number.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“The court: . . . Obviously, it’s going to be
written out, and what you would do is just stipulate
to [section] 664.6.
“[Cong’s counsel]: Correct.
“Mr. Lloreda: With the terms to be in a mutual
general relation [sic]. We’ll also specify the file [sic]
of dismissal with prejudice as to the cross-complaint.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“The court: . . . So who wants to recite the
terms of the settlement. And if you can slowly recite
those so that [Cong’s son] can translate those terms
to his mom in Mandarin. Go ahead, Mr. Lloreda.
“Mr. Lloreda: The parties do herein agree to
settle all claims comprising the instant complaint
and the cross-complaint comprising this lawsuit, this
case number, and the terms will be that Defendant
Tsao will pay to Plaintiff the sum of $270,000 on or
before November 1st, 2022. $270,000—I’m sorry.
$273,000 on or before November 1st. Of course each
party bears their own attorney fees and costs. The
$270,000 will be paid on or before November 1st
pursuant to a mutual general release that both
parties will execute. . . .
5
[¶] . . . [¶]
“Mr. Lloreda: The parties have agreed that this
settlement shall not be confidential. It will not be
confidential. The parties will release each other from
all claims, as well as Defendant releasing any claims
they would have furtherances [sic] of the subject of
property located on Mission Boulevard here in
Pomona, and it will be, of course, a supervised
settlement pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 664 and --
“The court: Mr. Lloreda, before we go forward,
say that term again with regards to the property.
What happens to the property?
“Mr. Lloreda: The defendants will sign a
release of them releasing all their claims—or the
plaintiffs—pardon me. The plaintiffs will be signing
a release as to all claims they may have in the subject
property.”
Cong’s son translated the terms into Mandarin for Cong,
who was participating remotely by telephone. The court then
asked Cong if she agreed to those terms; she responded she did.
The court then asked, “And, Mr. Tsao, you agree; correct?” Tsao
responded, “Yes.” The court instructed the parties to
memorialize the terms in writing and execute mutual release
agreements. The court scheduled an Order to Show Cause Re:
Dismissal for November 2022.
A week later, Cong’s counsel sent a draft of a written
settlement and release agreement to Tsao. Tsao requested to
extend the deadline to pay the settlement by one month, to which
Cong agreed. Lloreda then sent Cong’s counsel a revised draft of
the written agreement in which he added terms not mentioned in
6
open court or, according to Cong’s counsel, discussed during
settlement negotiations, including a term allowing Tsao to sue
Cong’s husband in China. After further discussion, the parties
reached a final written agreement. However, Cong’s counsel did
not receive a fully executed agreement from Tsao. Instead, Tsao’s
counsel informed him that Tsao “would be rescinding the
settlement based on the discovery of new evidence.”
In August 2022, Tsao filed a motion to rescind the
settlement agreement. According to Tsao, while he was cleaning
out the Pomona property in preparation to sell it to pay the
settlement, he found a copy of the corporate meeting minutes,
signed by Cong, establishing Tsao as company president and
transferring all company stock to him. Tsao argued the
settlement agreement should be rescinded because the
“misplacement” of the signed meeting minutes was a “mistake of
fact.” He contended that absent the mistake, he would never
have agreed to the settlement because the minutes proved his
defense.
Tsao attached the minutes to his declaration supporting
the motion. The two-page document ostensibly memorializes a
July 12, 2001 meeting between Cong and Tsao, as directors and
shareholders of C&L Marble Products, at the corporation’s
“principal office.”3 On the first page, the minutes reflect that
Tsao was elected president, chief financial officer, and secretary
of C&L Marble Products. They further state “[t]hat the
undersigned member(s) of the Corporation, have agreed to
transfer their entire ownership interests and stocks to Jason
Tsao effective immediately.” On the second page, the minutes
3 The by-laws established that the Pomona property served
as the “principal office location” of the company.
7
required modification of the corporate by-laws to show Tsao
“owns One Hundred Percent of the corporation’s stocks,
transferring hereby the full ownership interest in the
corporation” to him. Below, the document bears the handwritten
signature of “Ping Cong.”
Tsao retained a Certified Questioned Document Examiner
to determine the authenticity of Cong’s signature on the minutes.
Tsao submitted her report in support of the motion to rescind.
She examined the signature on the minutes and compared it to
Cong’s signature on other documents. The examiner concluded
there was “a strong probability the Chun Ping Cong of the known
signatures did sign the questioned corporate meeting minutes”
and it was “more likely than not” that she signed the minutes.
Cong opposed the motion. She contended the signed
minutes document was not newly discovered because Tsao had
produced the first page in discovery in 2019. She further argued
the purported minutes were “false and misleading.” She asserted
she did not meet with Tsao on July 12, 2001, and could not have
because she was in China at the time and could not return to the
United States due to problems with her visa. She denied signing
or otherwise approving the document. Alternatively, Cong
contended that Tsao’s “misplacement” of the document was not a
mistake of fact because his inability to find it was due to his
neglect.
In August 2022, Cong filed a motion to enforce the
settlement under section 664.6. Cong asked the court to enforce
the settlement on the terms to which the parties orally stipulated
before the court. In opposition, Tsao argued the newly discovered
minutes revealed that Cong’s case was “premised upon a lie.” He
also reasserted his arguments from the motion to rescind.
8
In January 2023, the court held a hearing on both motions.
The court denied Tsao’s motion to rescind and granted Cong’s
motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The court found
that when they orally stipulated to the settlement, both parties
were represented by counsel and were “fully aware of the risks
and benefits of entering into such an agreement.” The court
further reasoned that at the time of the settlement, the “lost”
minutes were not available and, “had the matter proceeded to
trial, this document that Mr. Tsao later found would not have
been presented at trial.” In the court’s written order, the court
concluded Tsao failed to establish grounds for rescission because
his belief that the signed minutes were lost was not “ ‘the kind of
mistake which renders a contract voidable . . . .’ ” The court
found Tsao had known “that the document could still exist and
assumed the risk that the document could turn up at a later
date” when he entered into the settlement agreement.
In February 2023, Cong filed a motion to enter judgment
since Tsao continued to refuse to pay the settlement amount.
Tsao opposed the motion. Although the court had already
determined the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable,
Tsao asserted additional arguments challenging the validity of
the agreement. Tsao contended the settlement agreement was
unconscionable because Cong lied when she denied transferring
her assets to Tsao; the agreement was voidable because it was
based on the parties’ mutual, mistaken assumption that the
signed meeting minutes could not be found; the court failed to
“explicitly define” all settlement terms; the court failed to confirm
Tsao’s understanding of the terms of the agreement or the
finality of the agreement; and the court afforded Tsao insufficient
time to understand the settlement terms before he agreed to
9
them.
The court rejected Tsao’s arguments, ruling: “Because the
court has already found a valid settlement agreement exists,
Tsao does not have any legal ground to refuse to make the agreed
upon payments.” The court entered judgment in favor of Cong in
the amount of $273,000 with interest. Tsao timely appealed from
the judgment.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Tsao again challenges the validity of the
settlement agreement. Tsao asserts the parties had no meeting
of the minds with respect to the confidentiality and release terms;
Cong’s fraudulent misrepresentation that she did not sign the
minutes transferring her ownership interests voided the parties’
agreement; and the trial court failed to properly supervise the
oral stipulation to settle under section 664.6. Tsao forfeited the
first two arguments by failing to raise them in the trial court. We
reject the third argument and conclude substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s finding that the parties entered into a
valid, binding settlement agreement. We also deem forfeited the
arguments Tsao raised only in his reply brief on appeal.
I. Tsao’s Arguments Challenging the Validity of the
Parties’ Oral Agreement Fail
A. Applicable legal principles
Section 664.6, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part: “If
parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the
parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the
court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon
motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the
settlement.” The Legislature enacted section 664.6 to establish
“a summary, expedited procedure to enforce settlement
10
agreements when certain requirements that decrease the
likelihood of misunderstandings are met.” (Levy v. Superior
Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 585.)
In ruling on a motion to enter judgment under
section 664.6, “the trial court acts as a trier of fact. It must
determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding
settlement.” (Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th
1530, 1533 (Kohn).) “[A] trial court’s factual findings concerning
whether a settlement agreement explicitly defined the material
terms, and whether the parties expressly acknowledged their
understanding of and agreement to be bound by those material
terms, are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Eagle Fire &
Water Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
448, 470.)
“Consistent with the venerable substantial evidence
standard of review, and with our policy favoring settlements, we
resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable
inferences to support the trial court’s finding that these parties
entered into an enforceable settlement agreement and its order
enforcing that agreement.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.)
B. Tsao forfeited his contention that no settlement
agreement was formed because there was no
meeting of the minds
Tsao first contends that the parties had no meeting of the
minds regarding the general release and waiver of
confidentiality. Because Tsao did not raise this theory below, it is
forfeited.
“ ‘As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court
cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties
11
must adhere to the theory (or theories) on which their cases were
tried. This rule is based on fairness—it would be unfair, both to
the trial court and the opposing litigants, to permit a change of
theory on appeal . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Nellie Gail Ranch Owners
Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 997 (Nellie Gail).)
“ ‘Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds
that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and
the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider. . . . Bait
and switch on appeal not only subjects the parties to avoidable
expense, but also wreaks havoc on a judicial system too burdened
to retry cases on theories that could have been raised earlier.’
[Citation.]” (Brandwein v. Butler (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1485,
1519 (Brandwein).)
Even if Tsao had not forfeited the argument, the trial court
correctly concluded that the parties mutually assented to the
confidentiality and mutual general release terms at the time they
entered into the oral stipulation. Tsao’s counsel read into the
record the terms that the parties “agreed that this settlement
shall not be confidential” and “will release each other from all
claims . . . .” Cong and Tsao gave their unequivocal assent to the
terms. Although the parties indicated they intended to reduce
the agreement to writing, there is no evidence to suggest the
parties did not intend the oral stipulation to be binding unless
and until a formal written agreement was executed.
(Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1430
[“nothing tentative” about binding effect of oral agreement where
attorneys read the settlement in the record and ensured each
party agreed, even absent written agreement].) The parties’ post-
agreement disputes have no bearing on the enforceability of the
parties’ oral agreement to the settlement terms before the court.
12
(Id. at p. 1431 [“If difficulties or unresolvable conflicts arise in
drafting the written agreement, the oral settlement remains
binding and enforceable under section 664.6.”]; Kohn, supra, 23
Cal.App.4th at p. 1534 [oral agreement binding where “all that
remained to be done was a reduction of the agreement to a
writing”].)
Accordingly, we find no merit to Tsao’s contention that no
contract was formed.
C. Tsao forfeited his argument that the settlement
was voided by Cong’s purported fraud
Tsao asserts a second theory not raised below, namely, that
Cong fraudulently misrepresented that she did not sign the 2001
minutes to induce his agreement to settle. He contends Cong lied
to “induce” him to pay money and he was “forced to rely” on her
misrepresentation because he could not find the signed minutes
to support his defense. As we understand his argument, he
appears to assert Cong’s alleged fraud voided the settlement
agreement.
Tsao did not contend below that the settlement agreement
was invalid or subject to rescission due to fraud. He instead
“assert[ed] throughout the entire lawsuit that Plaintiff had
signed all ownership interest in and control of” the company to
him, but that he had mistakenly believed the document
corroborating his claim was irretrievably lost. Tsao contended
Cong lied about not signing the minutes in his opposition to
Cong’s motion to enforce the settlement. But he made no specific
argument based on fraudulent misrepresentation, instead urging
the trial court to deny Cong’s motion to enforce the settlement “so
that justice may prevail.” Consequently, neither the trial court
nor Cong had any opportunity to address Tsao’s argument that
13
rescission was warranted because Cong made fraudulent
misrepresentations he justifiably relied on in deciding to settle.
Tsao has therefore forfeited these arguments on appeal. (Nellie
Gail, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 997; Brandwein, supra, 218
Cal.App.4th at p. 1519.)
D. The trial court adequately supervised the
parties’ oral stipulation to settle
Finally, Tsao contends that the parties’ oral stipulation to
settle on July 1, 2022, did not create a binding agreement
because the trial court’s supervision of the stipulation was
deficient. Specifically, Tsao contends that during the July 1,
2022 afternoon session, the trial court participated for only 15
minutes, failed to ensure the parties understood the terms and
the consequences of the settlement, and failed to clarify
ambiguities in the parties’ terms. This argument fails on the
merits.
Tsao argues that no valid agreement was formed because
the trial court failed to specifically ask the parties whether they
understood the material terms and binding nature of the
agreement. Tsao cites In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th
896 (Assemi) and Kohn, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, to argue that
this omission invalidated the oral stipulation. However, neither
case establishes this as a standard for adequate judicial
supervision of an oral stipulation under section 664.6.
In Assemi, our high court considered whether substantial
evidence supported a trial court’s determination that the parties
entered into a binding oral stipulation to settle a dissolution
proceeding. (Assemi, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 901–904, 911.) The
court held that trial courts making that determination “should
consider” whether the judge supervising the oral stipulation
14
“questioned the parties regarding their understanding” of
settlement terms and whether the parties “acknowledged their
understanding of and agreement to be bound.” (Id. at p. 911.)
Yet, the Assemi court did not hold that an oral stipulation to
settle is only binding or enforceable if the judge supervising the
stipulation asks formulaic questions to confirm a party’s
understanding of, or agreement to, the settlement terms.4
Instead, Assemi provided a nonexclusive list of factors to enable
the trial court to determine whether the parties entered into a
binding settlement.
Kohn is illustrative. The court in Kohn concluded there
was substantial evidence of a binding settlement under
section 664.6 where the trial court’s minutes stated a settlement
was reached at a mandatory settlement conference, a letter from
the respondent’s counsel the following day identified the terms
parties agreed to, and the appellant did not object that the terms
as stated by the respondent were inaccurate. (Kohn, supra, 23
4 At least one court has found that in amending section 664.6
in 2021, the Legislature intended to “ ‘eliminate[ ] the
requirement that parties themselves must personally sign or
orally stipulate to these settlements and instead allows counsel
for the parties to so stipulate on their behalf . . . .’ ” (Greisman v.
FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, 1325, quoting Sen.
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 2723 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 20, 2020, p. 5
and Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2723
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 4, 2020, pp. 5–6.) Tsao’s
assertion that the statute requires a trial court to confirm a
party’s personal understanding of settlement terms is
inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent to streamline
settlement by removing the direct client involvement
requirement under section 664.6. (Greisman, at p. 1325.)
15
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1534–1535.) The Kohn court found this was
substantial evidence supporting the trial court ruling that the
parties had entered into a valid and binding settlement. (Id. at
p. 1533.)
Similarly, here, regardless of whether the trial court rigidly
adhered to the considerations identified in Assemi, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding of a valid, binding
settlement agreement. The record reflects the parties reached a
settlement after a two-hour recess. Tsao’s counsel confirmed, on
the record and in Tsao’s presence, that the parties reached a “full
settlement” of all claims. Tsao’s counsel recited the material
terms on the record, including the settlement sum, the deadline
for payment, the execution of “a mutual general release,” and the
parties’ agreement to waive confidentiality. The court ensured
Cong had access to an accurate translation through her son. In
response to the court’s inquiries, both Cong and Tsao confirmed
their agreement to the settlement terms in open court. Neither
party asked for clarification about the terms or objected to any
terms as inaccurate.
Moreover, the record establishes that Tsao’s refusal to
execute a written settlement agreement was based on his
discovery of the second page of the corporate minutes bearing
Cong’s purported signature, and not because he misunderstood
the terms of the settlement agreement or believed no binding
agreement had been reached. Cong’s counsel was advised that
Tsao did not execute the written agreement because of the
“discovery of new evidence.” And Tsao initially moved to rescind
the agreement based solely on his discovery of the corporate
minutes. He did not challenge the validity of the oral stipulation
until after the trial court denied his motion to rescind. (See
16
Assemi, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 912 [affirming entry of judgment
where evidence showed party’s refusal to execute written
settlement after oral stipulation was not based on disagreement
with terms but “rested upon her belated misgivings about having
entered into the stipulation”].)
E. Tsao waived his remaining arguments raised
for the first time in his reply
In his reply brief, Tsao asserts several arguments that were
not raised or even mentioned in his opening brief. He contends
rescission was warranted because he made a mistake of fact; the
settlement is not enforceable because it is unconscionable; and
rescission was warranted because of the parties’ mutual mistake.
We decline to address these arguments. “ ‘Points raised for the
first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered,
because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an
opportunity to counter the argument.’ [Citation.]” (Reichardt v.
Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) Thus, “[c]ourts will
ordinarily treat the appellant’s failure to raise an issue in his or
her opening brief as a waiver of that challenge.” (Paulus v. Bob
Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685.) We deem
these arguments waived.
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover her costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
18
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