In re M.H. CA5

CourtListener 10373714Calctapp7 apr 2025

Testo completo

Filed 4/7/25 In re M.H. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re M.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF F088943
SOCIAL SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 23CEJ300116-2,
Plaintiff and Respondent, 23CEJ300116-3, 23CEJ300116-4)

v.
OPINION
M.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Mary Dolas,
Judge.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Lisa R. Flores, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Smith, J.
Appellant M.H. is the father of M.H., Jr. (five years old),1 A.H. (three years old),
and R.H. (two years old), who are the subjects of this dependency matter. Father
challenges an order issued by the juvenile court after a combined hearing considering his
Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 388 petition, and a section 366.26 permanency
plan for the three children. The court order denied father’s section 388 petition,
concluded adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for each child, and terminated
parental rights.3 We affirm the order.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
Detention
A juvenile dependency petition was filed on April 27, 2023, alleging mother failed
to protect her four children. Father was named as the alleged father of three of the
four children listed in the petition. The petition contained allegations that mother’s home
was unsanitary, she had a substance abuse problem, and that she had exposed her children
to her mother’s methamphetamine use.
Following a detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie case had
been made that the children qualified as dependents under section 300, and that allowing
the children to remain in their mother’s home was contrary to their welfare. While father
was present at the detention hearing, he was not granted visitation rights because he was
designated only as an “alleged” father in the petition.

1 These are the ages of the children at the time of the November 6, 2024, order
entered in this case.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3 The mother, whose parental rights were also terminated, is not part of this appeal.
Also, a fourth child listed in the dependency petition, who was alleged to have a different
father, is not part of this appeal.

2.
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
A jurisdiction and disposition hearing was held on June 5, 2023, at which time the
court found true the allegations mother had not protected her children, and the children
should be declared dependents under section 300, subdivision (b). Father was denied
reunification services because of his designation as an “alleged” father. Father was
present at the hearing and filed a waiver of rights submitting the matter on the report
created by the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department).
Six-Month Review Hearing
Prior to this hearing, father submitted a request for blood or DNA testing to
determine whether he was the biological father of M.H., Jr., A.H., and R.H (collectively,
the children). The juvenile court entered an order for paternity testing on December 4,
2023, and continued the hearing.
At the six-month review hearing held on January 22, 2024, which father attended,
the juvenile court noted paternity testing was still pending, possibly due to a problem
with the minute order granting the request for DNA testing. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court determined the children would remain dependents and family
reunification services for mother would be terminated.4 The court also set a date for a
section 366.26 hearing.
On February 9, 2024, paternity tests revealed father was the biological parent of
all three children. Father was granted twice weekly visits with the children in February
2024. However, father’s status was not formally elevated from “alleged” to “biological”
father by the court until May 20, 2024.

4 When the children were removed from mother’s home in April 2023, two of the
children were under the age of three, and therefore, subject to section 361.5,
subdivision (a)(1)(B), stating reunification services could be limited to a period of
six months, but no more than 12 months.

3.
Section 366.26 Hearing and Section 388 Petition
According to a report prepared by the department and submitted to the juvenile
court considering the permanent plan for the children, father was consistently
participating in the visits he had been provided. Because the social worker assigned to
the case was not available to observe the visits before this report was prepared, the
original report does not provide any information about the quality of those visits. Instead,
in an addendum report submitted to the court on November 6, 2024, the social worker
provided information about three visits she observed between father and the children, all
in June 2024. This summary of the visits included information showing father made
efforts to interact with all three children in appropriate ways. At one point it is also
noted, “[u]pon completing the supervised visits, it is observed that [father] does care
about his children, however it is not sufficient to reunify.”
For a variety of reasons, the contested section 366.26 hearing did not occur until
October 30, 2024. A section 388 petition filed by father was also considered at this
hearing. This petition, which was filed on October 9, 2024, asked the court to modify its
prior court order from June 5, 2023, denying father reunification services. Father
attached various documents to his section 388 petition and provided information about
his attachment to the children, information about when they resided with him, and other
milestones he had with his children.
In his testimony in support of the petition, father described how he was not
initially provided visits with the children because he was not named on their birth
certificates. Once DNA testing was completed and he could prove he was their biological
parent, father was able to visit with the children. Father stated that he continued with
these visits until they were stopped for an unknown reason. Father also described how he
had enrolled in parenting classes on his own but could not complete the classes because
time devoted to those classes along with the visits with the children could jeopardize his

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work. Father noted when he visited the children they were excited when the visits
started, and sad when the visits ended. Father also testified the children called him “dad.”
During the section 366.26 portion of the hearing, social worker Angela Rascon
Valles testified on behalf of the department. Valles testified that the visits coordinated
through the department stopped in September 2024 because father had missed
three consecutive visits. Valles was aware, however, that father visited the children
one to two weeks before the hearing, which was arranged by the caregiver. However,
while Valles testified the visits were generally good, and the children were happy to see
him because they knew he would play with them, she believed the relationship was more
of a friendship even though they called him “dad.”
After the parties were each given the opportunity to present arguments, the
juvenile court took the matter under submission in light of the “complexity that has to be
addressed.” On November 6, 2024, the court started by addressing the section 388
petitions brought by both mother and father.5 The court first noted that even though
reunification services were never provided to father given his earlier status as an
“alleged” father, the court was required “to shift [its] focus to the needs of the children
and their need for permanency and stability.” The court further noted father had the
“burden to present credible and substantial evidence of changed circumstances that would
warrant further reunification services,” and that statutory time periods governing how
long reunification services could be provided must be considered.
The juvenile court then went through the history of the case, noting that while
proceedings had begun in May 2023, father had not requested the blood or DNA testing
necessary to change his status from “alleged” to “biological” father until December 2023,
and that the documentation necessary to make that change was not submitted to the court
until May 2024. The court ultimately issued the following ruling:

5 Again, our focus is on the petition brought by father.

5.
“[I]n reviewing the testimony and information in the Department’s
report and considering cases that have addressed the issue of changed
circumstances versus changing circumstances, the Court finds at this time,
in regards to father’s [petition], that he did not submit sufficient evidence to
show a changed circumstance, nor … was there any evidence in regards to
[whether] he meets the criteria, as a biological father, to receive
reunification services and/or meets the criteria to permit ordering him
reunification services when the statutory time period has expired. So the
Court at this point, based on the insufficient evidence being provided to
support the request, will deny [father’s] request to order six months of
family reunification services, in that he’s not met his burden of showing a
changed circumstances that would warrant a finding that it would be in the
children’s best interest.”
Turning to the section 366.26 permanency plan, the court found the evidence clearly
showed the children were each adoptable and that adoption was the appropriate
permanent plan. The court then terminated father’s parental rights.
Father filed a notice appealing this decision on November 13, 2024.
DISCUSSION
The focus of father’s appeal is the denial of the section 388 petition he submitted
requesting reunification services. However, a review of the notice of appeal initiating
this matter reveals an appeal of the order terminating father’s parental rights was the only
order specifically challenged. The box on the second page of the notice of appeal
indicating an order involving a section 388 petition is also being appealed is not checked.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3), “[a] notice of appeal must
be liberally construed, and is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order
being appealed.” Because the notice of appeal filed in this case lists the order from
November 6, 2024, denying father’s section 388 petition, out of an abundance of caution,
we conclude father has preserved his right to appeal that order. (See In re Madison W.
(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1450–1451.) We take this approach as father’s position in
this appeal focuses on the argument that the denial of reunification services led to the

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termination of his parental rights. No additional arguments are raised with respect to the
termination of father’s parental rights.
I. The Section 388 Petition
A. Standard of Review

“A juvenile court dependency order may be changed, modified, or
set aside at any time. (§ 385.) A parent may petition the court for such a
modification on grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.
(§ 388, subd. (a).) The parent, however, must also show that the proposed
change would promote the best interests of the child. (§ 388,
subd. (a)(2) .…)” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 525.)
Even with this ability to seek modification, the child’s best interests are not to
delay permanency and stability in order to reward a parent for “hard work and efforts to
reunify.” (In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) Therefore, “[i]f the court cannot
safely return a dependent child to a parent’s custody within statutory time limits, the court
must set a hearing under section 366.26.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630.)
With respect to a section 388 petition, the change in circumstances necessary to
support the petition must be material. (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120.) The
juvenile court may deny the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing if it believes
a prima facie showing has not been made. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181,
188–189.) A petition does not meet the prima facie standard unless facts alleged in the
petition are supported by relevant evidence, and support a favorable decision on the
petition. (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 127.)
The goal is to show changed, not changing, circumstances. (In re Casey D. (1999)
70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47, disapproved by In re Caden C., supra, 68 Cal.5th 614, specifically
on the compelling nature of the parent-benefit exception found in § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
“The change of circumstances or new evidence ‘ “must be of such significant nature that
it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order.’ ” (In re
Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) Therefore, when “determining whether a

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parent has made a prima facie showing under section 388, we may consider the entire
factual and procedural history of the case.” (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701,
711.)
A juvenile court’s decision to either grant or deny a petition to modify a previous
order involves the exercise of discretion, which will not be overturned absent a clear
abuse of that discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 (Stephanie M.).)

“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority
to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (Stephanie M.,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.)
Therefore, “[w]e will not disturb the court’s determination unless the court has exceeded
the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
determination.” (In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 871, 881.)
B. Application
In his section 388 petition, father asked the juvenile court to provide him
reunification services, which he had been denied in the past. Addressing the question of
what had changed since he was denied these services in June 2023, father stated the court
would not elevate his status from “alleged” to “presumed” father of the children in
December 2023. Father was later declared the “biological” father of all three children in
May 2024.
During his testimony to the juvenile court, father described his efforts to obtain
visits with his children, which did not occur until the DNA tests showed he was their
biological father in February 2024. At this point, the department finally allowed visits to
occur. Father’s testimony also addressed missed visits with the children due to his work
obligations. When asked about how this would change in the future, father stated if
reunification services were provided and the children could be placed in his home, he
could rely on his family, if necessary, to care for the children while he was at work.

8.
However, no evidence was provided to the court establishing family members were
actually available to take on the role of caregiver when father was not able to be with his
children because of work obligations.
The juvenile court first addressed father’s section 388 petition and concluded he
failed to provide sufficient evidence of changed circumstances or evidence supporting the
need to receive reunification services beyond the allowable statutory time period. After
father’s section 388 petition was denied, the court moved on to address the permanent
plan for the children. The court then found the children were adoptable, and further,
exceptions for parental and/or sibling benefits had not been shown to apply to prevent the
choice of adoption as the permanent plan.
A review of the “entire factual and procedural record” of this case (In re Daniel F.,
supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 711) supports the conclusion the juvenile court did not exceed
“the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
determination,” when denying the section 388 petition. (See In re Katelynn Y., supra,
209 Cal.App.4th at p. 881.) Sadly, father failed to move with enough speed to establish
his biological connection to the children during a period of time when reunification
services could have had more impact on the permanent plan eventually adopted by the
court. When father submitted his request for reunification services, the focus had already
shifted to the needs of the children for “ ‘permanency and stability .…’ ” (Stephanie M.,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) While the complete record provides evidence of father’s
efforts to be part of his children’s lives, it also provides evidence of missed visits and
some uncertainty surrounding his ability to provide financially for his children. The facts
support the court’s conclusion that father’s circumstances were changing rather than
changed and would not prevent the court from implementing a permanent plan, especially
in light of statutory timelines that had already expired. (See In re Mickel O., supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.)

9.
We address an issue raised by father in his reply brief. Father repeats an argument
raised in his opening brief that “section 388 does not require that circumstances be
completely changed,” and that the juvenile court was too cavalier when highlighting the
facts showing father’s circumstances were only changing and not changed. However,
case law is consistent in the requirement that a parent must show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that a change in circumstances existed and that this change served the best
interests of the children. (See § 388, subds. (a)(2), (c), (d); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.570(h)(1); In re M.V. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1056–1057.) The fact
circumstances might change or are changing for the better, “does not promote stability for
the child or the child’s best interests. [Citation.] ‘ “[C]hildhood does not wait for the
parent to become adequate.” ’ ” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.)
Based on our review of the juvenile court’s ruling on the section 388 petition, we
cannot conclude the court abused its discretion. The decision was within the “bounds of
reason” while contemplating the best interests of all three children. (See Stephanie M.,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying father’s section 388 petition and terminating his parental rights
is affirmed.

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