CourtListener 10373675•Vanrooy v. Jacobes-Downing-Hughes CA3
Testo completo
Filed 4/7/25 Vanrooy v. Jacobes-Downing-Hughes CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sutter)
----
DELACY VANROOY, C100312
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CVCS20-
0000150)
v.
JACOBES-DOWNING-HUGHES, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Delacy Vanrooy (plaintiff) challenges an order dismissing her complaint
against defendant Jacobes-Downing-Hughes, Inc. (defendant) for failure to serve process
within the mandated three-year period (Code Civ. Proc.,§§ 583.210, 583.250).1 On
appeal, plaintiff contends her delay in serving the complaint should have been excused, or
that defendant should have been estopped from seeking dismissal, because defendant’s
authorized agent for service of process intentionally evaded service during a five-week
1 Undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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period in which service was attempted. Plaintiff alternatively argues—for the first time
on appeal—that the trial court erred in denying her requests for an order authorizing her
to serve defendant by publication or through the Secretary of State. Finally, plaintiff
argues the trial court erred in dismissing the action “with prejudice” and in awarding
costs to defendant as the prevailing party in a California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) action.
We find no error in the trial court’s decision to dismiss the action for failing to
serve the complaint within three years. The court could reasonably conclude that
regardless of any difficulties encountered in attempting to serve defendant’s registered
agent in the months after the complaint was filed, it did not excuse her lack of diligence
in effectuating service or estop the defendant from seeking dismissal. We decline to
reach plaintiff’s argument about service by publication or substitute service, finding
plaintiff forfeited it by failing to raise it below. We agree, however, that the trial court
erred by dismissing the action with prejudice and awarding costs to the defendant as the
prevailing party in a FEHA action. Thus, we will modify the order of dismissal to correct
these errors and affirm the order as modified.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant by filing a FEHA complaint for
discrimination, sexual harassment, and related claims. Plaintiff filed the underlying
complaint on January 22, 2020, but did not serve it on defendant until August 14, 2023,
more than three and one-half years after the action was filed.
In September 2023, defendant (by special appearance) moved to dismiss the
complaint for untimely service (§§ 583.210, 583.250). Plaintiff opposed, arguing that
defendant should be estopped from seeking dismissal, or that the untimely service should
be excused, because defendant’s authorized agent for service of process was not
“ ‘amenable to service.’ ” In support of her opposition, plaintiff relied on a “declaration”
from two process servers summarizing (in table format) multiple attempts to personally
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serve defendant, at the residential address of its agent for service of process, during a
five-week period in September—October 2020. Plaintiff presented no evidence of
further attempts to serve defendant between October 2020 and the date when service was
completed in August 2023.
The trial court granted the motion. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the
failed attempts to serve defendant showed service was impossible, impracticable, or
futile, noting there were other methods of service available to plaintiff. Further, even if
the court were to exclude the five-week period during which service supposedly was
“impossible,” plaintiff still failed to serve defendant within the mandatory three-year
period. Because service was not timely, the court dismissed the case with prejudice and
awarded costs to defendant as the prevailing party. Plaintiff timely appealed the order of
dismissal.
DISCUSSION
“Section 583.210, subdivision (a), provides that a summons and complaint ‘shall’
be served upon a defendant within three years after the action is commenced. Section
583.250, in turn, provides that the action ‘shall’ be dismissed if service is not made within
the statutorily prescribed time and that the foregoing requirements ‘are mandatory and are
not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.’ ”
(Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 748 (Watts).)
Section 583.240 delineates several circumstances that operate to toll the three-year
period. (Watts, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 748.) This includes where service was
“impossible, impracticable, or futile due to causes beyond the plaintiff’s control.”
(§ 583.240, subd. (d).) The burden is on the plaintiff to show an excuse for the delay in
service, and the exceptions codified in section 583.240, subdivision (d) are strictly
construed against the plaintiff. (State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JP Morgan Chase &
Co. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121; Shipley v. Sugita (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 320,
326.)
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Whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence is a relevant factor in evaluating
whether service was impossible, impracticable, or futile, but proof of reasonable
diligence does not itself excuse untimely service. (Torrey Hills Community Coalition v.
City of San Diego (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 429, 436-437; Bishop v. Silva (1991)
234 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1321-1322; Dale v. ITT Life Ins. Corp. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d
495, 503, fn. 9.) For section 583.240, subdivision (d), to apply, the plaintiff must show
that service was impossible, impracticable, or futile due to “a cause beyond the plaintiff’s
control.” (§ 583.240, subd. (d).) Service is ordinarily within the plaintiff’s control.
(Bishop, at p. 1322.)
We review an order granting a section 583.250 motion to dismiss for abuse of
discretion. (State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., supra,
58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1120-1121.) Under that standard, the trial court’s findings of fact
are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and
its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious. (Id. at
p. 1121.)
Here, plaintiff argues that her delay in serving the complaint should have been
excused because the evidence compels a finding that service was impossible. We
disagree. Plaintiff’s evidence did not show it was impossible to serve defendant within
the three-year period. At best, it showed plaintiff was unable to personally serve
defendant’s registered agent during a five-week period in September—October 2020. Yet
even if we exclude the five-week period in which personal service on the registered agent
was (ostensibly) “impossible,” plaintiff still failed to complete service within the three-
year deadline. (Crane v. Dolihite (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 772, 791-792; Graf v. Gaslight
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 291, 298, overruled on other grounds in Watts, supra, 10 Cal.4th
at p. 758; see Maginn v. City of Glendale (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108; see also
Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1100-1101.)
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Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have tolled the statutory period from the
date she first attempted service until the date service was completed. However, plaintiff
has not cited any authority to support this argument, and we find the argument to be
without merit. The governing statutes afforded plaintiff a variety of other means by
which she could have attempted to serve defendant, including by delivery to the business
office, by mail (with an acknowledgment of receipt), by substitute service on the
Secretary of State, or by publication. (Watts, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 748; §§ 415.10-
415.95, 416.10-416.50; Corp. Code, §§ 1701, 1702.) Despite this, plaintiff made no
attempts to serve defendant in any manner between October 2020 and the date service
was completed in August 2023. Accordingly, there is nothing to support plaintiff’s claim
that it was impossible to serve defendant for the entire three-year period; she did not try.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the excuse of
impossibility, impracticability or futility under the circumstances of this case.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that defendant should have been barred from seeking
dismissal based on equitable estoppel. Under this implied exception to section 583.210, a
defendant may be barred from seeking dismissal if the defendant’s statements or conduct
caused the plaintiff reasonably to forebear from effecting service within the mandatory
three-year period. (Brookview Condominium Owners’ Assn. v. Heltzer Enterprises-
Brookview (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 502, 510; Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp. (1986)
177 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1221; § 583.140.)
We conclude plaintiff’s estoppel argument fails for the same reason as her
impossibility claim. Even if we accepted that defendant’s registered agent intentionally
avoided service, there is no evidence to compel a finding that such conduct reasonably
caused plaintiff to forebear from completing service within the time requirements of
section 583.210. The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the delay in
service was due to plaintiff’s own lack of diligence. Thus, the court did not err in
rejecting estoppel. (Brookview Condominium Owners’ Assn. v. Heltzer Enterprises-
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Brookview, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 512; Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., supra,
177 Cal.App.3d at p. 1222; see also Inversiones Papaluchi S.A.S. v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1063 [the law disfavors estoppels where the
party raising estoppel was represented by an attorney].)
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by failing to approve her
“requests”—raised only by way of case management conference statements—to permit
service by publication or on the Secretary of State. Defendant responds, and we agree,
that this argument is forfeited as plaintiff failed to raise it below. (Honig v. San Francisco
Planning Dept. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 520, 530; Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc.
v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226.) “Appellate courts are
loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an
opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.” (JRS
Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178.)
Plaintiff’s opposition did not argue that the trial court should have granted permission for
service by publication or through the Secretary of State. Accordingly, the argument is
forfeited on appeal.
Plaintiff’s final argument is that the trial court erred by dismissing her action “with
prejudice” and by awarding costs to defendant as the prevailing party. We agree with
both points. First, section 581 makes clear that a dismissal under section 583.250 is
required to be “without prejudice.” (§ 581, subds. (b)(4) & (g); Franklin Capital Corp. v.
Wilson (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 187, 214-215; see Inversiones Papaluchi S.A.S. v.
Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069.) The trial court had no authority to
enter a dismissal with prejudice. (Franklin Capital Corp., at p. 215.)
Second, Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(6) provides that in civil
actions brought under FEHA, “a prevailing defendant shall not be awarded fees and costs
unless the court finds the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when
brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” This provision is
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“ ‘an express exception to [section 1032, subdivision (b)] and . . . therefore governs cost
awards in FEHA cases.’ ” (Moreno v. Bassi (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 244, 260; Williams v.
Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 115.) On this record, we see
no basis for a finding that plaintiff’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Nor
do we see any basis for apportioning costs between FEHA and non-FEHA causes of
action. (Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1058-1060.)
Accordingly, we conclude section 12965 controls and prohibits the award of costs to
defendant as the prevailing party.
DISPOSITION
The order and judgment of dismissal is modified to a dismissal “without
prejudice” and to delete the award of costs to defendant as the prevailing party. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278 (a)(3), (5).)
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Mauro, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Boulware Eurie, J.
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