CourtListener 10372361•Truglio v. Chutter CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 4/3/25 Truglio v. Chutter CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
NANCY TRUGLIO, B326254
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV06718)
v.
CHUTTER INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Reversed and
remanded in part; affirmed in part.
Lewitt, Hackman, Shapiro, Marshall & Harlan, and Jessica
W. Rosen, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ellis George, Eric M. George, and David J. Carroll, for
Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________
Plaintiff Nancy Truglio appeals from summary judgment
entered in favor of Sonja Perencevic and Chutter, Inc. (Chutter)
(collectively, defendants) on plaintiff’s complaint to invalidate an
amendment to a commercial lease agreement entered into by her
late father, Ralph Truglio (Ralph), with lessee Chutter. Plaintiff
contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding some
of her evidence and denying her discovery motions. She further
argues there are triable issues of material fact regarding whether
the lease amendment provided for future rent increases. She
thus asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
as to her causes of action for financial elder abuse, rescission,
unconscionability, and declaratory relief.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s
discovery motions. As to summary judgment, we conclude there
are triable issues of material fact as to whether the parties
agreed to future rent increases. Because this contract term is
critical to evaluating plaintiff’s claims for elder financial abuse,
rescission, unconscionability, and declaratory relief, we reverse
the summary judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Chutter’s Lease Agreement and Extensions
Effective January 1, 1964, Chutter, through its then-owner,
Dan Tana, leased a commercial restaurant space from Domenico
and Teresa Boggio and opened Dan Tana’s restaurant (the
restaurant). In the 1970s, the Boggios transferred the property
to Ralph’s aunt, who in turn passed it to Ralph, who held it
through his family’s trust. Ralph began signing amendments to
the lease in 1986. In 2009, Dan Tana sold Chutter to defendant
Perencevic.
2
The initial 1964 lease was for a term of five years, with an
option to extend for an additional five years. The lease provided
that in addition to paying rent, Chutter would be responsible for
maintaining the premises and making repairs as needed; making
any alterations required by law; paying utilities, real estate
taxes, and assessments on the property; and maintaining fire and
liability insurance. The original lease was amended numerous
times, and subsequent amendments provided options for
successive five-year extensions of the original lease term.
The most recent amendment not in dispute was executed in
October 2010. That amendment extended the lease until the end
of 2023 and set the monthly rent at $7,000 in 2010, increasing to
$8,000 from 2013 to 2018, and $9,000 from 2018 to 2023. It also
granted two additional five-year options, raising the rent to
$11,000 per month from 2023 to 2028 and $13,000 per month
from 2028 to 2033.
In 2017, Perencevic began considering making renovations
to the restaurant, including significant upgrades to the kitchen.
These renovations were partly prompted by a recommendation
from West Hollywood’s Health Department that the kitchen’s
electrical systems be physically separated from the plumbing,
necessitating the relocation of sinks and the walk-in freezer, as
well as the rerouting of gas and water lines. Additional planned
upgrades included expanding the kitchen and updating
equipment such as the walk-in refrigerator and freezer, stoves,
fryer, and sinks. Perencevic estimated the work would cost at
least $200,000, but possibly as much as $500,000.
Considering the cost of the remodel, Perencevic contacted
Ralph in October 2017 to propose extending the lease beyond
2033. At the time, Ralph was 95 years old. Ralph asked
3
Perencevic to prepare a lease extension, which she did. In
October 2017, Perencevic, accompanied by her office manager and
Dan Tana, met Ralph over lunch at the restaurant. During that
one-hour lunch, in the presence of the office manager and Dan
Tana, Perencevic and Ralph signed the 2017 Amendment, which
was furnished by Perencevic.
The 2017 Amendment is a single-page, four-paragraph
document. The first two paragraphs extended the lease to
December 8, 2063, and provided that the amendment would bind
the parties’ successors. The third paragraph stated that “the
Lease and all Amendments thereto shall remain in full force and
effect, and in the event of a conflict between the Lease and the
Amendments thereto and this Amendment, this Amendment
shall govern.” The fourth and final paragraph contained a
merger clause, stating: “This Amendment contains all of the
agreements of the parties hereto with respect to the matters
contained herein, and no prior agreement, arrangement or
understanding pertaining to any such matters shall be effective
for any purpose. Nothing in this Amendment shall be deemed to
waive or modify any provisions of the Lease except as expressly
stated herein.” The 2017 Amendment varied from the parties’
prior practice in that it provided for a single 30-year extension,
rather than a series of options for five-year extensions. Most
significantly, the document failed to address rent increases
during the extended lease period.
In March 2018, Ralph suffered a heart attack. He was
hospitalized and later moved to a rehabilitation facility. In April
2018, Ralph transferred control of the family trust, the lessor of
the restaurant, to his daughter, plaintiff Truglio. Ralph died in
January 2019. When plaintiff could not locate the lease among
4
Ralph’s possessions, she requested and received a copy of the
lease documents from Chutter. Plaintiff provided the lease
documents to her attorney, who was alarmed by the 2017
Amendment’s lack of a rent increase provision.
In October 2020, plaintiff’s attorney wrote to Perencevic’s
counsel, threatening litigation unless the parties met to
“seriously discuss and work on a resolution of . . . issues” relating
to the 2017 Amendment. The following month, the parties and
their counsel met. Plaintiff’s attorney brought a draft complaint
and threatened to file suit unless Chutter agreed to either
rescind the 2017 Amendment or pay “fair market” rent after
2033. Chutter refused to do either.
The Lawsuit
On February 19, 2021, plaintiff filed this action against
Chutter and Perencevic. As relevant here, her complaint alleged
four causes of action: (1) financial elder abuse in violation of
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30, subdivision (b);
(2) rescission of the 2017 Amendment based on fraud, duress,
undue influence or menace; (3) unconscionability; and
(4) declaratory relief to the effect that the 2017 Amendment is
void.1 Each cause of action had a common factual predicate—
namely, that the 2017 Amendment did not contain a provision for
increasing rent.
During discovery, plaintiff propounded “Interrogatory
No. 50.1,” which asked defendants to identify all the documents
that are part of the agreement at issue in the case, i.e. the lease
and any modifications to it. Subparts (b) and (e) of the
1 Plaintiff concedes that her fifth and final cause of action for
declaratory relief related to withholding rent is no longer at
issue, so we do not address it.
5
interrogatory respectively prompted defendants to “state each
part of the agreement not in writing” and “state each
modification not in writing.” In their October 2021 verified
response to Interrogatory No. 50.1, defendants identified
“October 2017 Amendment to the Lease (Plaintiffs’ Complaint
Exhibit B)” as the agreement at issue in the case. In response to
subparts (b) and (e), defendants responded “none,” meaning that
all of the agreement and any modifications to it were in writing.
However, seven months later, Perencevic testified at her
deposition that she and Ralph orally agreed to increase the
monthly rent by $2,000 every five years. According to Perencevic,
who provided the only testimony on this issue, Ralph suggested
that the lease extend through 2063 and that rent increases follow
the same pattern as agreed upon in the 2010 lease extension—a
$2,000 increase every five years.2
During discovery, plaintiff also sought information relating
to Chutter’s gross income, sales revenues, and profits from
operating the restaurant. Defendants objected that the requests
were overbroad, burdensome, and not relevant. Eventually,
plaintiff moved to compel responses, and defendants opposed the
motions, arguing the discovery requests improperly sought
information about Chutter’s financial condition in violation of
Civil Code section 3295.3 The court denied plaintiff’s motions,
2 We note the 2010 Amendment’s rent increases did not
follow straightforward $2,000 increments. The 2010 agreement
increased monthly rent in $1,000 increments in 2013 and 2018,
and in $2,000 increments in 2023 and 2028.
3 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Civil Code.
6
finding that plaintiff sought financial information without first
seeking leave from the court pursuant to section 3295. The court
also concluded that, contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the
requested information was not relevant to plaintiff’s
unconscionability cause of action.
Motion for Summary Judgment
In June 2022, defendants filed their motion for summary
judgment. Based on Perencevic’s testimony, defendants asserted
that “despite the lack of a written rent provision in the 2017
Amendment, the signatories had agreed that the rent for 2033–
2063 would increase by $2,000/month every five years, continuing
the same rent increase set by the last two options of the 2010
Amendment which covers 2023 to 2033.” Defendants argued that
plaintiff could not prove financial elder abuse because defendants
acted in good faith when they orally agreed to the rent increases
and since Ralph was competent when he entered into the
amendment. Defendants produced evidence that at the time he
signed the 2017 Amendment, Ralph was still driving, he
continued to own and manage the rental property, and his health
records did not indicate that he had cognitive impairments.
Defendants asserted the 2017 Amendment was neither unfair nor
unconscionable because Chutter was making a major financial
investment by improving the restaurant, which justified
extending the lease term, and because the lease amendment
provided for monthly rent increases of $2,000 every five years
during the extension.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the 2017
Amendment did not provide for rent increases after 2033 (the end
of the final rent increase period established by the 2010
Amendment). Plaintiff contended rent increases were not
7
included in the 2017 Amendment and Perencevic’s prior
statements contradicted her current claim of $2,000 monthly rent
increases every five years. Plaintiff attached a declaration from
Zane Averbach, an attorney who appeared with and on behalf of
plaintiff during the 2020 meeting with Perencevic to discuss the
2017 Amendment. In that declaration, Averbach asserted that at
the 2020 meeting, “Perencevic insisted the Lease amendment
provided for no rent increase” and that she claimed to have told
Ralph “there should be no rent increase because she would have
substantial expense to refurbish the restaurant.” Plaintiff also
furnished a copy of defendants’ October 2021 response to
interrogatories, in which defendants attested that all
modifications to the lease agreement were in writing.
Plaintiff pointed out that it was not until Perencevic’s May
2022 deposition that she claimed there was an oral agreement
regarding the rent increases. Plaintiff further argued that
Perencevic’s version of events was not credible because it would
require the parties to honor an unwritten rent increase set to
begin 17 years in the future and last 30 years thereafter, to 2063,
a timeline that far exceeded the life expectancies of all parties
involved: Ralph (then age 95 when he signed the amendment),
plaintiff (then age 65), and Perencevic (then age 68).
Plaintiff also argued that Ralph lacked capacity when he
entered into the amendment, Perencevic exerted undue influence
over Ralph, and defendants harmed Ralph through the
transaction. The opposition was supported by declarations of real
estate professional John Gebhardt and psychiatrist Sarah
Mourra, M.D. Gebhardt opined that the 2017 Amendment was in
effect an encumbrance on title to the restaurant property and
that its terms were so unfairly slanted in Chutter’s favor that he
8
could discern no business justification for Ralph’s agreement to it.
Mourra opined that “[t]he facts [in] this case strongly suggest”
Ralph lacked the capacity to understand and agree to the 2017
Amendment. She attested that firsthand accounts from Ralph’s
friends and Ralph’s medical records showed that Ralph “exhibited
conditions consistent with suffering significant memory issues
and mental decline consistent with dementia.”
In replying to plaintiff’s opposition, defendants objected to
Gebhardt’s and Mourra’s declarations as speculative, opining on
matters not properly subject to expert opinion, and not based on
the declarant’s specialized knowledge, skill, experience, or
training. Defendants also provided a declaration of Stephen
Mihaly, an attorney who represented Chutter at the November
2020 meeting. In his declaration, Mihaly disputed Averbach’s
description of Perencevic’s statements regarding any future rent
increases during the extension period. Mihaly attested: “At no
time during the meeting did Ms. Perencevic take the position
that there would be zero rent increases for the new lease term of
2033–2063. Ms. Perencevic stated that the rent increase was
based on the previous amendment.” In response to Averbach’s
demands that defendants either cancel the extension period or
change the terms of the 2017 Amendment to set rent at the fair
market value, “Perencevic explained that rent at fair market
value was not what was agreed upon by her and [Ralph].”
According to Mihaly, Perencevic “explained that fair market
value did not make sense, because the building was old and the
maintenance costs were already high” and “that she was in the
process of making renovations to the kitchen, which would also
be very costly, and that the refurbishment would increase the
value of the property.”
9
On September 15, 2022, the court heard oral argument
from the parties and asked whether the 2017 Amendment was
ambiguous. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that, in light of plaintiff’s
evidence, a jury could disbelieve Perencevic’s testimony that she
and Ralph agreed to $2,000 monthly rent increases every five
years. When plaintiff pointed out that Perencevic had taken the
position at the 2020 meeting that the 2017 Amendment did not
provide for rent increases, the court suggested those statements
were inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1152 because
they were made during settlement negotiations. The court
ordered additional briefing on the ambiguity issue.
In their supplemental brief, defendants argued that
because the 2017 Amendment stated the previous lease and all
agreements thereto would remain in force and effect, it continued
the parties’ preexisting practice based on the 2010 Amendment of
increasing monthly rent by $2,000 every five years. Defendants
argued that plaintiff advanced no extrinsic evidence to resolve
the ambiguity regarding rent increases and the court therefore
could rely on Perencevic’s testimony. Defendants also filed
supplemental evidentiary objections to plaintiff’s evidence,
arguing Perencevic’s statements at the 2020 meeting were
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1152.
In her supplemental brief, the plaintiff argued that the
2017 Amendment’s silence on rent left several possible
interpretations of what the agreement required in terms of rent:
no rent at all; no increase beyond the last option ending in 2033;
or a $2,000 monthly increase every five years as claimed by
Perencevic. Plaintiff argued that Perencevic’s testimony to an
oral agreement regarding the rent was contradicted by
(1) defendants’ verified answer to Interrogatory No. 50.1;
10
(2) Perencevic’s statement at the 2020 meeting with plaintiff that
she and Ralph had agreed in November 2017 that there would be
no rent increases; (3) the 2017 Amendment’s failure to mention or
reference an oral agreement; (4) the absence of contemporaneous
documents evidencing an oral agreement; (5) Perencevic’s total
silence about an oral agreement until her 2022 deposition; and
(6) real estate expert Gebhardt’s statement that omission of the
rent term was unusual.
On October 17, 2022, the trial court granted the summary
judgment motion. The court sustained defendants’ objections to
attorney Averbach’s declaration about Perencevic’s statements at
the 2020 meeting, and to the majority of Gebhardt’s and Mourra’s
declarations.
The court concluded that “the 2017 [A]mendment merely
extends the terms of the lease, is silent on rent between 2033 and
2063, and directs the parties back to the lease and prior
amendments for all other terms. The 2010 amendment sets the
rent up to 2033, but is silent on the issue of rent between 2033
and 2063. Therefore, the amendment at issue is ambiguous on
the issue whether the rent is frozen at $13,000, until 2063, or
whether the rent increases $2,000 per month during each five-
year period.”
The court then explained that it was required to consider
extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. The court found that
Perencevic’s testimony that “ ‘Mr. Truglio said, he will have
increase in the rent every five years for $2,000 like it was
before’ ” was “corroborated by the pattern of rent increases
referenced in the amendment of 2010, which increased the rent
$2,000 per month during the third option period (December 31,
2023, to December 31, 2028) and $2,000 per month during the
11
fourth option period (December 31, 2028, to December 31, 2033).”
The court concluded that plaintiff failed to “present admissible
extrinsic evidence to dispute this account.” Specifically, the court
stated “Plaintiff attempts to rely on statements Perencevic
allegedly made during settlement discussions (which, according
to [her former attorney] Mihaly’s declaration, she did not actually
make). As discussed, these statements are inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 1152. Second, Plaintiff attempts to rely on
the declaration of John Gebhardt. This does not provide extrinsic
evidence concerning the parties’ mutual intention. Third,
Plaintiff relies on Defendants’ response to Form Interrogatory
#50.1 . . . . This does not call into question Perencevic’s account
because she testified that she believed this issue was governed by
the 2010 (written) amendment. . . . A discovery response must be
clear and unequivocal to constitute an admission. [Citation.]
Defendants’ response is not.”
The court found that plaintiff had failed to produce
evidence raising a triable issue of material fact regarding any
cause of action. The court entered judgment in defendants’ favor,
and plaintiff appealed.
DISCUSSION
Among other arguments, plaintiff contends that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment because triable issues
of material fact exist regarding whether the 2017 Amendment
provided for rent increases. As explained below, we agree that
conflicting extrinsic evidence created a factual dispute on this
issue. Because the rent term of the 2017 Amendment is critical
to deciding plaintiff’s claims for financial elder abuse, rescission,
unconscionability, and declaratory relief, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment. Since we reverse and remand, we
12
also address plaintiff’s argument that the court erred in denying
her discovery motions and conclude there was no abuse of
discretion.
I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
“Summary judgment is designed to cut through the parties’
pleadings to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is
necessary to resolve the dispute.” (Carver v. Volkswagen Group
of America, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 864, 876.) A motion for
summary judgment shall be granted “if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “[T]he party moving for
summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make
a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of
material fact; if [the moving party] carries [the] burden of
production, . . . the opposing party is then subjected to a burden
of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the
existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “On appeal from the
granting of a motion for summary judgment, we examine the
record de novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Miller v.
Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460.)
II. Conflicting Extrinsic Evidence Raises a Question of
Fact About the Rent Ambiguity in the 2017
Amendment
At issue on appeal are plaintiff’s causes of action for
financial elder abuse, rescission, unconscionability, and
declaratory relief. The factual predicate for each of these causes
13
of action is that defendants wrongfully procured Ralph’s
agreement to a 46-year lease extension that did not include a
provision for rent increases between 2033 and 2063. Plaintiff’s
financial elder abuse and recission causes of action stated:
“Defendants knew or should have known that obtaining [Ralph]’s
signature on the 2017 Amendment, which purports to extend the
term of the lease for the Premises until December 8, 2063—that
is an additional 46 years with no rent adjustment for the 30 years
from 2033 to 2063—was likely to be harmful to [Ralph] and his
interest in the Premises.” Plaintiff’s unconscionability cause of
action alleged, “[t]he unconscionability includes but is not limited
to each of: (i) duration, (ii) lack of a rent increase, and
(iii) duration without rent increase.” Plaintiff’s declaratory relief
cause of action incorporated these factual allegations and
asserted the contract had no legal force or effect because it was
unconscionable.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment argued that
each of these causes of action failed because the 2017
Amendment included an oral agreement that monthly rent would
increase by $2,000 every five years. In support, they relied on
Perencevic’s deposition testimony, which they contended was
undisputed. Specifically, defendants asserted that plaintiff
cannot prove financial elder abuse since there was no “wrongful
use,” “intent to defraud,” or “undue influence” because the
amendment was equitable and not harmful to Ralph as it
included rent increases. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30,
subd. (a)(l) [financial elder abuse occurs when a person/entity
obtains elder’s property for a wrongful use, with intent to
defraud, or by undue influence].) Defendants contended that
plaintiff could not obtain rescission because the oral agreement
14
regarding rent increases showed Ralph did not make a mistake of
fact or law and that his consent was not obtained by duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence. (See § 1689, subd. (b) [a party
may rescind if consent given by mistake, or obtained through
duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence].) They further argued
there was no procedural unconscionability because Ralph
dictated that the rent provision be oral, and no substantive
unconscionability existed since the parties orally agreed the rent
would increase by $2,000 every five years—the highest rate
agreed upon to date. Lastly, they asserted that plaintiff’s
declaratory relief claim incorporated the allegations of the three
preceding claims for elder abuse, rescission, and
unconscionability, and thus failed for the same reasons.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that, to the extent the 2017
Amendment is ambiguous, triable issues of material fact exist as
to whether the parties agreed to rent increases. She asserts the
extrinsic evidence was in conflict in part because (1) the written
agreement did not include a rent term and (2) defendants’
response to Interrogatory No. 50.1 indicated that the 2017
Amendment was the sole contract at issue in the case and that
the entire agreement and all modifications thereto were in
writing.
Evaluating whether there is an ambiguity “involves ‘a two-
step process: “First the court provisionally receives (without
actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the parties’
intentions to determine ‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the language is
‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged by a party. If
in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is
‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic
evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting
15
the contract. [Citation.]” (Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th
1159, 1165.) The trial court’s determination of whether an
ambiguity exists is a question of law, subject to independent
review on appeal. (Ibid.) The trial court’s resolution of an
ambiguity is also a question of law if no parol evidence is
admitted or if the parol evidence is not in conflict. However,
where the parol evidence is in conflict, the trial court’s resolution
of that conflict is a question of fact . . . . [Citation.] Furthermore,
“[w]hen two equally plausible interpretations of the language of a
contract may be made . . . parol evidence is admissible to aid in
interpreting the agreement, thereby presenting a question of fact
which precludes summary judgment if the evidence is
contradictory.” (Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Tecrim Corp.
(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 149, 158.)’ ” (Wolf v. Superior Court (2004)
114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1351, italics added.)
We therefore begin with the written 2017 Amendment,
which was silent as to rent. The 2017 Amendment’s third
paragraph stated that “the Lease and all Amendments thereto
shall remain in full force and effect, and in the event of a conflict
between the Lease and the Amendments thereto and this
Amendment, this Amendment shall govern.” The reference to the
continued force of the prior lease and amendments could suggest
that, absent an express modification, existing terms—including
the previously established pattern of rent increases—would
remain operative, as defendants have suggested. It also could be
interpreted to mean that rent increases would continue only as
previously expressly specified, with the last scheduled increase
16
occurring in 2033 under the terms of the 2010 Amendment, after
which no further increases would apply.4
In addition, the 2017 Amendment’s fourth paragraph
contained a merger clause that supports plaintiff’s position that
there was no provision for rent increases. The fourth paragraph
stated: “This Amendment contains all of the agreements of the
parties hereto with respect to the matters contained herein, and
no prior agreement, arrangement or understanding pertaining to
any such matters shall be effective for any purpose. Nothing in
this Amendment shall be deemed to waive or modify any
provisions of the Lease except as expressly stated herein.” As the
2017 Amendment did not prescribe any rent increases for the
extension period, the merger clause appears to render ineffective
any oral agreement regarding increases. In light of the foregoing,
we conclude that the 2017 Amendment’s silence about rent and
conflicting provisions created an ambiguity regarding rent
increases.
We therefore turn to the parties’ extrinsic evidence.
Defendants presented Perencevic’s deposition testimony that she
4 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the
previous amendments had a similar provision, which stated the
lease and previous amendments are “ratified and confirmed and
remain[ ] in full force and effect.” Nonetheless, the parties
continued to negotiate amendments with rent increases at the
end of the term identified in each amendment, indicating that the
parties did not treat the mere reaffirmation of the lease and
amendments as a guarantee that prior rent terms would
automatically carry forward.
17
and Ralph orally agreed to increase monthly rent by $2,000 every
five years.5
However, plaintiff proffered expressly contradictory
evidence. Specifically, plaintiff produced defendants’ response to
“Interrogatory No. 50.1,” served seven months before Perencevic’s
deposition. In their response, defendants represented that the
2017 Amendment was the sole contract at issue in the case and
that the entire agreement, and all modifications, were in writing.
This statement directly contradicts Perencevic’s testimony about
an oral agreement with Ralph. Perencevic’s failure to mention an
oral agreement until her 2022 deposition, despite this dispute
beginning in early 2020, further bolsters plaintiff’s theory that
the alleged oral agreement is a fabrication.
Only in their supplemental briefing did defendants first
argue that the 2017 Amendment’s provision stating that the
previous lease and agreements remained in force and effect
encompassed an agreement on regular rent increases. Yet,
5 On appeal, defendants contend that they never argued
there was an oral agreement, but rather “that the rent increases
were incorporated in the 2017 Amendment.” Defendants
mischaracterize the record. In their motion for summary
judgment, defendants argued, “despite the lack of a written rent
provision in the 2017 Amendment, the signatories had agreed
that the rent for 2033–2063 would increase by $2,000/month
every five years, continuing the same rent increase set by the last
two options of the 2010 Amendment which covers 2023 to 2033.”
They based this argument entirely on Perencevic’s testimony that
she and Ralph agreed on the phone to $2,000 monthly rent
increases every five years and that Ralph told her she need not
write it into the contract. In moving for summary judgment,
defendants never posited the theory that the rent increase
provision was incorporated in the 2017 Amendment.
18
portions of Perencevic’s deposition testimony also contradicted
this interpretation of the written agreement. Perencevic
expressly testified that Ralph said she did not “have to write
anything” about rent because they would increase the rent as
they had in prior amendments. According to Perencevic, she
asked, “what do you want us to put in this amendment?” In
addition to saying no writing was necessary, Ralph responded,
“[Y]ou can put whatever you want. It can be . . . put the year
2063, but you don’t have to worry about the rent because it’s
going to be the same like it was in every amendment until today.”
This was consistent with defendants’ original position, which was
that the parties had an oral agreement or understanding about
rent increases, not that they would include an express written
provision incorporating a prior practice into the 2017
Amendment.
Defendants’ conflicting accounts of the parties’ agreement
created a triable issue of material fact, precluding summary
judgment. (WYDA Associates v. Merner (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
1702, 1713 [“Because the parol evidence is contradictory, a
factual question arises that should not be resolved on summary
judgment.”].) We further note that a jury could reject the
extrinsic evidence completely and conclude that the parties did
not reach any agreement beyond what was set out in the written
agreement. (See, e.g., Day v. Rosenthal (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d
1125, 1153 [finder of fact entitled to disbelieve plaintiff’s
uncontradicted testimony where the plaintiff “was pressing his
claim against a dead person, . . . the purported agreement was
oral, . . . it was being presented by the person who stood to gain
19
the most by its establishment and that there were no witnesses to
the actual oral agreement”].)6
At oral argument before this court, defendants argued that
they were entitled to summary judgment even if there is a factual
dispute regarding the rent increases. For example, they asserted
that plaintiff cannot establish financial elder abuse because there
is no evidence that Perencevic should have perceived Ralph had
any cognitive deficits since he was still driving and managing the
restaurant property. However, proving Ralph was impaired,
although helpful to plaintiff’s case, is unnecessary. To establish
elder abuse, plaintiff need only show that defendants knew or
should have known that the bargain was unfair and likely
harmful to the elderly adult. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30,
subd. (b) [wrongful use].)
Likewise, for undue influence, Ralph’s vulnerability is
relevant; impairment is not required. (See Odorizzi v. Bloomfield
School Dist. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 130 [listing factors for
undue influence, including the victim’s vulnerability, the
influencer’s authority, the tactics used, and the equity of the
result].) These claims focus on whether defendants took
advantage of Ralph, and the existence of a rent increase provision
is critical in assessing whether defendants engaged in conduct
that supports the elements of these causes of action. Similarly,
in the motion for summary judgment, defendants’ arguments
regarding rescission and unconscionability hinge on Ralph
proposing an oral rent increase provision, making them
6 Since we are reversing due to the amendment’s ambiguity,
we do not reach plaintiff’s other arguments related to the
summary judgment motion.
20
inappropriate for summary judgment. (See § 1689, subd. (b)
[a party may rescind if consent given by mistake of fact, or
obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence];
Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn v. Pinnacle Market Development
(US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 246 [substantive
unconscionability “pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s
actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh
or one-sided” and procedural unconscionability involves the
fairness of circumstances of the contract’s formation].)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Denying Plaintiff’s Discovery Request for Financial
Information
Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred when it denied her
motions to compel discovery of financial information from
defendants. We review an order granting or denying a motion to
compel discovery for abuse of discretion. (John B. v. Superior
Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1186.) We afford trial courts wide
discretion to allow or prohibit discovery because “[a] circumspect
approach to appellate review of discovery orders ensures an
appropriate degree of trial court latitude in the exercise of that
discretion.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531,
540.)
The trial court denied plaintiff’s motions to compel for two
reasons. First, the court found that plaintiff’s discovery requests
violated section 3295, which prohibits pretrial discovery of a
defendant’s financial condition except on motion, supported by
affidavits “establish[ing] that there is a substantial probability
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim [for punitive damages]
pursuant to Section 3294.” (§§ 3295, subd. (c), 3294). Plaintiff
made no motion pursuant to section 3295, instead bringing a
21
motion to compel which did not reference section 3295.7 We
conclude the trial court did not err by placing the burden on
plaintiff to seek leave of court to discover Chutter’s financial
information. Section 3295 “makes it clear that a party desiring
discovery of a defendant’s financial information must bring a
motion in order to obtain such information. Then, the trial court
must determine whether the plaintiff has established a
‘substantial probability’ of prevailing on the claim for punitive
damages.” (I-CA Enterprises, Inc. v. Palram Americas, Inc.
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 257, 283.)
Second, the trial court found that Chutter’s income and
profits were not relevant to either procedural or substantive
unconscionability, as plaintiff asserted in her motions to compel.
Citing Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913,
926, plaintiff argues this was error and such financial
information is relevant to the unconscionability analysis since, in
evaluating a price term of a contract, courts “ ‘look to the basis
and justification for the price, including the price actually paid by
similarly situated consumers in a similar transaction,’ ” as well
as “ ‘the true value’ of the subject of the contract, product or
service.” We disagree.
“California’s discovery process allows for discovery of all
relevant material and is designed to eliminate the element of
surprise. [Citations.] ‘For discovery purposes, information is
relevant if it “might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the
case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement . . . .” ’ ”
(Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694,
7 Plaintiff has not furnished a reporter’s transcript of the
hearing on her motions to compel. Therefore our analysis is
based on plaintiff’s motion and the trial court’s minute order.
22
712, fn. 8; Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010 [defining relevant].) Here,
Chutter’s income and profit information had no bearing on
whether defendants procured the 2017 Amendment through
unfair means. The information could not assist plaintiff in
assessing procedural fairness for her unconscionability analysis.
Regarding substantive unconscionability, Chutter’s historical
financial information would not shed light on the property’s fair
rental price. As plaintiff’s own briefing points out in citing
Perdue, the fairness of the bargain would be assessed by looking
at the amount paid by similarly situated restaurateurs for a
similar space, or the true value of the lease.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff’s motions to compel.
23
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded in part as to the
court’s grant of summary judgment, and is affirmed in part as to
the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motions to compel. Plaintiff
Nancy Truglio is awarded her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
24
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