People v. Blaney CA4/1

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Filed 4/3/25 P. v. Blaney CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083910

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD146542)

RANDY SCOTT BLANEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa A. Mandel, Seth M. Friedman, and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2000, a San Diego jury found Randy Scott Blaney guilty of the first
degree murder of Christopher Englebrecht and the attempted murder of E.S.
In 2023, after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(hereafter, Senate Bill 1437), Blaney petitioned to have his convictions

vacated and to be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial
court summarily denied the petition at the prima facie stage, reasoning the
record of conviction precluded relief as a matter of law. We agree. Therefore,
we affirm the denial order.
II
BACKGROUND

A. The Shooting and Trial2
On July 14, 1999, Blaney and Englebrecht decided to rob E.S., a
pedestrian they encountered near the U.S.–Mexico border. Englebrecht
pointed a gun at E.S. and demanded his money, but E.S. fought back and
took the gun. Blaney fired two shots at E.S. with his own gun. E.S. returned
fire and fatally struck Englebrecht.
On October 31, 2000, a jury found Blaney guilty of the first degree
murder of Englebrecht (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); the attempted murder of
E.S. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2); assault with a semiautomatic firearm
(§ 245, subd. (b); count 3); conspiracy to commit a crime (§ 182, subd. (a)(1);
count 4); attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664; count 5); possession of a firearm by

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 This summary of facts is intended for background purposes only and
does not factor into our analysis of the trial court’s summary denial order.
2
a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 6); and the unlawful driving of a
vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 7).
The jury found true a special circumstance allegation that Blaney
committed the murder while engaged in the attempted commission of a
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). It returned true findings on allegations that
he intentionally and personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the
murder, attempted murder, and attempted robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).
Further, it returned true findings on allegations that he personally used a
firearm in the commission of the murder, attempted murder, assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, conspiracy, and attempted robbery (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)(1)), and that he was armed with a firearm when he unlawfully drove
a vehicle (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Blaney admitted a prison prior allegation
(former § 667.5, subd. (b)), and the trial court sentenced him to prison for life
without the possibility of parole, plus 20 years.
On direct appeal, our court struck a restitution fine, but otherwise
affirmed the judgment of conviction. (People v. Blaney (July 29, 2002,
D037113) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Senate Bill 1437
In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437, which went into effect
January 1, 2019. The Legislature approved the bill for the expressed purpose
of ensuring more equitable sentencing for “offenders in accordance with their
involvement in homicides.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b).) As the bill’s
uncodified findings and declarations explain, “It is a bedrock principle of the
law and of equity that a person should be punished for his or her actions
according to his or her own level of individual culpability.” (Id., § 1(d).)
“Senate Bill 1437 altered the substantive law of murder in two areas.
First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the application of the felony-

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murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e) to the Penal Code. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) Under that provision, ‘A participant in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs is
liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was
the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd. (e).)” (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).)
“Second, Senate Bill 1437 imposed a new requirement that, except in
cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) ‘Malice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’
(Ibid.) One effect of this requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as
an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
[Citation.] ‘[U]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an
accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or abetted
(i.e., the target offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct
perpetrator that was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime the
accomplice aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense).” (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 449.) Thus, under state law as it existed prior to the enactment
of Senate Bill 1437, “a defendant who aided and abetted an intended [crime]
could be liable for murder, if the murder was the natural and probable
consequence of the intended [crime]. [Citation.] The defendant need not

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have intended the murder or even subjectively appreciated the natural and
probable consequences of the intended crime.” (Ibid.)
“Senate Bill 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95, which created a
procedural mechanism ‘for those convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief’ where the two
substantive changes described above affect a defendant’s conviction.” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 775, which ensured “that persons who were convicted of attempted
murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural
probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those
persons convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 1(a).) “[F]ormer section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6 without
substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)” (Curiel, at p. 449.)
Under section 1172.6, a petitioner initiates the resentencing process by
filing a declaration averring that: (1) a charging document was filed against
the petitioner allowing the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, natural and probable consequences murder, murder under another
theory by which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine; (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial, or accepted a plea offer
in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder
or attempted murder; and (3) the petitioner could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of the statutory amendments that
were implemented by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(1)–(3), (b)(1).)
“When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary
declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the

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petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.’ ” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong), quoting
§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The prima facie inquiry is a “limited” one. (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) “ ‘ “[T]he court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Unless the parties waive a resentencing hearing and
stipulate the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought, the court must then
schedule an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction, recall the sentence, and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
At the prima facie review stage, “a petitioner’s allegations should be
accepted as true, and the court should not make credibility determinations or
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972; see Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 720 [“factfinding [is] prohibited at the prima facie stage”].)
“ ‘However, if the record [of conviction], including the court’s own documents,
“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the
court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, at p. 971.) In other words, a court should deny a
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, without issuing an order to
show cause, “if the record of conviction conclusively establishes that the

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petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” (People v. Gaillard

(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211.)3
C. The Resentencing Petitions
In 2019, Blaney filed a petition to have his murder conviction vacated
and to be resentenced under former section 1170.95. The trial court denied
the petition at the prima facie stage and our court affirmed the denial order.
(People v. Blaney (July 29, 2021, D077935) [nonpub. opn.].) We determined
the record of conviction showed Blaney was found guilty of provocative act
murder as the provocateur—i.e., the jury necessarily found Blaney did an
unlawful act likely to cause a police officer or victim to respond with deadly
force, which caused the death of another, and he personally acted with
malice. (Ibid.) Thus, we reasoned, the record of conviction conclusively
showed Blaney could be found guilty of murder under current law. (Ibid.)

In 2023, Blaney filed a second petition for resentencing.4 Once more,
the trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. The court found
Blaney ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury found him
guilty of murder as the “direct perpetrator under the provocative act murder
theory.” Further, although the parties focused much of their attention on
Blaney’s request to vacate his murder conviction, the court also denied the
petition insofar as it sought vacatur of the attempted murder conviction.
Blaney filed a timely notice of appeal from the summary denial order.

3 In general, the record of conviction includes the charging documents,
the plea form or verdict forms, the jury instructions, and the parties’ closing
arguments. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1247, fn. 3;
People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.)

4 The People do not argue on appeal that Blaney is procedurally barred
or collaterally estopped from filing a successive petition for resentencing.
Therefore, we express no opinion on these issues.
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III
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Correctly Declined to Vacate the Murder Conviction
Blaney claims we must reverse the order denying the petition to vacate
his murder conviction because the record of conviction does not conclusively
prove he remains guilty of murder under sections 188 and 189, as amended
by Senate Bill 1437. In particular, he argues the jury may have found him
guilty of murder by imputing malice to him based solely on his participation
in a crime, which is not permissible under current law. For reasons we shall
explain, we reject Blaney’s assertion that the jury might have found him
guilty of murder by imputing malice to him.
It is undisputed by the parties—and the record of conviction confirms—
that Blaney was found guilty of Englebrecht’s murder under the provocative
act doctrine. “ ‘A provocative act murder case necessarily involves at least
three people—in our case, the perpetrator of the underlying offense, an
accomplice, and a victim of their crime. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A variation
on the law of transferred intent, the provocative act doctrine holds the
perpetrator of a violent crime vicariously liable for the killing of an
accomplice by a third party, usually the intended victim or a police officer.”
(People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654 (Gonzalez), superseded in part
by statute as explained in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868–869.)
“ ‘In such a case, the killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a
felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice
committed with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 655.)
A murder conviction under the provocative act doctrine, as it is
understood today, “requires proof that the defendant personally harbored the
mental state of malice, and either the defendant or an accomplice

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intentionally committed a provocative act that proximately caused an
unlawful killing. [Citations.] A provocative act is one that goes beyond what
is necessary to accomplish an underlying crime and is dangerous to human
life because it is highly probable to provoke a deadly response. [Citations.]
Although the doctrine has often been invoked in cases where the defendant
initiates or participates in a gun battle [citation], it is not limited to this
factual scenario. [Citations.] Malice will be implied if the defendant commits
a provocative act knowing that this conduct endangers human life and acts
with conscious disregard of the danger.” (Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 655; see People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 603 [“With respect to
the mental element of provocative act murder, a defendant cannot be
vicariously liable; he must personally possess the requisite mental state of
malice aforethought when he either causes the death through his provocative
act or aids and abets in the underlying crime the provocateur who causes the
death.”], italics omitted.)
Because the provocative act doctrine requires proof that the defendant
personally harbored malice, several courts have concluded that petitioners
who were convicted of provocative act murder were categorically ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6. (People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
1164, 1173 (Flores) [denying resentencing petition because, at the time of
petitioner’s conviction, “a provocative act murder conviction required the
defendant personally harbor malice, whether it was the defendant or an
accomplice who committed the provocative act that caused the death”]; People
v. Antonelli (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 712, 721 (Antonelli), review granted
Oct. 18, 2023, S281599 [denying resentencing petition because petitioner
“was convicted pursuant to the provocative act murder doctrine, which
requires that the defendant personally harbor malice”]; People v. Lee (2020)

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49 Cal.App.5th 254, 265 [“Because [petitioner] was convicted of provocative
act murder, the jury necessarily found he acted with malice aforethought.”],
review granted Nov. 23, 2021, S262459.)
However, in People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164 (Lee), our
colleagues in the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that, prior to
People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653 (Concha), there was—at the very
least—some uncertainty in the case law about whether non-provocateur
accomplices were required to personally harbor malice to be found guilty of
provocative act murder. The Lee court analyzed the Supreme Court’s pre-

Concha provocative act doctrine precedent.5 Based on this historical
analysis, the court determined a non-provocateur accomplice seemingly could
be found guilty of provocative act murder, prior to Concha, “based on the
malicious and provocative acts of his confederates, without a showing that
the defendant himself harbored malice.” (Lee, at p. 1178; see id. at p. 1177
[“[P]rovocative act murder … require[d] proof of malice aforethought, … [but]
it was sufficient that only the provocateur him-or herself—the perpetrator
who initiate[d] the gun battle, for example—act[ed] with that mental
state.”].)
According to the Lee court, Concha was the first Supreme Court case
that “discussed provocative act murder in terms of the individual mental
states of multiple surviving accomplices.” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1180.) In Concha, the Supreme Court “observed that, ‘[w]hile joint
participants involved in proximately causing a murder “ ‘are tied to a “single

5 The Lee court discussed the Supreme Court’s decisions in People v.
Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690,
Taylor v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578, People v. Taylor (1974) 12
Cal.3d 686, People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, and People v. Caldwell
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, and numerous Court of Appeal decisions pertaining to
the provocative act doctrine. (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1175–1180.)
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and common actus reus,” “the individual mentes reae or levels of guilt of the
joint participants are permitted to float free and are not tied to each other in
any way. If their mentes reae are different, their independent levels of guilt
... will necessarily be different as well.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Concha, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 662.) Therefore, the Concha court explained, “ ‘[t]he
defendant or an accomplice must proximately cause an unlawful death, and
the defendant must personally act with malice’ ” for the defendant to be found
guilty of provocative act murder. (Lee, at p. 1181, italics added.)
Based on its conclusion that pre-Concha “case law imposed culpability
on all perpetrators of the underlying crime so long as the provocateur acted
with malice,” the Lee court held that a pre-Concha provocative act murder
conviction does not categorically preclude relief under section 1172.6 where
the record of conviction leaves open the possibility the petitioner might have
been convicted as a non-provocateur accomplice. (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1182–1185.) Appellate courts are now divided on this issue. (Compare
Antonelli, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 720–721 [pre-Concha provocative act
murder conviction precluded resentencing] with Lee, at pp. 1175–1181
[petitioners with pre-Concha provocative act murder convictions may be
entitled to resentencing]; see also Flores, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173,
fn. 4 [disagreeing with Lee’s conclusion that Concha was the first Supreme
Court case to impose a personal malice requirement for non-provocateur
accomplices].) The issue is also pending review before the Supreme Court.
(Antonelli, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 712, review granted.)
Blaney urges us to reverse the summary denial order based on the Lee
court’s analysis of the historical precedent. However, we need not decide
whether Lee was correctly decided or wade into the split of appellate
authority because Lee involved a petitioner whose record of conviction left

11
open the possibility that he might have been convicted of provocative act
murder as a non-provocateur accomplice, whereas Blaney was
incontrovertibly found guilty of murder as the provocateur. And the caselaw
has always imposed a requirement that the provocateur act with malice for a
provocative act murder conviction. (Flores, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172
[“the law has always required a defendant who committed a provocative act
personally harbor malice and [it] still does”]; Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1182 [before Concha, “the case law imposed culpability on all perpetrators
of the underlying crime so long as the provocateur acted with malice”], italics
added; see also People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 583 [“a central
inquiry in determining a defendant’s criminal liability for a killing committed
by a resisting victim is whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently
provocative of lethal resistance to support a finding of implied malice”].)
Blaney does not dispute the Attorney General’s assertion that he was
found guilty of murder in his capacity as the provocateur. Nonetheless, we
observe for the sake of completeness that the record of conviction irrefutably
supports the Attorney General’s position on this issue. During closing
arguments, the prosecution presented a single theory of murder liability—

12
that Blaney was guilty of murder as the provocateur.6 Thereafter, the jury
was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.12 (“Murder—Killer Other Than
Perpetrator of Underlying Crime—Provocative Act Doctrine”), which
expressly stated the jury could find Blaney guilty of murder only if it found
he “committed an intentional provocative act.” By contrast, the jury was not
instructed with CALJIC No. 8.13 (“Liability for Murder by Participant in
Provocative Act Murder”), which might otherwise have allowed the jury to
find Blaney guilty of murder as a non-provocateur accomplice.
Blaney’s record of conviction therefore conclusively demonstrates that
the jury found him guilty of provocative act murder as the provocateur,
rather than a non-provocateur accomplice. The caselaw has always imposed
a requirement that a provocateur act with malice, either express or implied,
under the provocative act doctrine. (See Flores, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1172; Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1182.) Thus, the jury’s verdict
precludes Blaney from establishing that he “could not presently be convicted
of murder … because of changes to Section 188 or 189” implemented by
Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)), and the trial court properly denied
Blaney’s petition to vacate his conviction for the murder of Englebrecht.

6 During closing statements, the prosecutor stated, “The doctrine of law
under which we’re proceeding is provocative murder. He’s not the killer. The
bullet from his gun did not kill the dead person. His action of shooting
caused someone to shoot back, killing someone. That’s provocative act
murder. [¶] … [T]he theory of provocative [act] murder is just common sense.
If you do an act that causes someone else to respond with deadly force and
somebody gets killed and you are wrong in doing that first provocative act,
you should be guilty – held accountable, responsible for the person who winds
up dead because it’s your fault. That’s why Randy Blaney said to the officer,
to the detective, ‘I killed Chris.’ Because he knew he was responsible for
Chris’s death because of his actions. [¶] ... [¶] … The bottom line in this case
is this: Randy Blaney and his partner tried to rob [E.S.] During that
attempted robbery, Blaney fired two shots at [E.S.] That’s a provocative act.”
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B. The Trial Court Correctly Declined to Vacate the Attempted Murder
Conviction
Blaney does not argue that the trial court erred by summarily denying
his petition to vacate his conviction for the attempted murder of E.S. He
therefore has waived any challenge to the trial court’s denial of relief as to
the attempted murder conviction. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983,
1029 [“ ‘ “[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of
authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the
court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.” ’ ”].)
Even if Blaney had challenged the denial of relief as to the attempted
murder conviction, we discern no error in the trial court’s ruling.
Section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548; see People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865
[a “petition [is] properly denied as to [an] attempted murder conviction … if
the record affirmatively demonstrates the jury did not rely on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine”].) Here, the jury could not have
convicted Blaney of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine because the jury was never instructed on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. Because Blaney was not found guilty of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the
trial court properly denied the petition for resentencing insofar as it sought to
vacate the attempted murder conviction. (Coley, at p. 548 [summary denial of
petition to vacate attempted murder conviction proper because jury was not
instructed on natural and probable consequences doctrine]; People v. Cortes
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [“the jury was not instructed on any theory of
liability for murder or attempted murder that required that malice be
imputed to [petitioner]. He is therefore ineligible for resentencing”].)

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IV
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.

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