People v. Plant CA2/1

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Filed 4/2/25 P. v. Plant CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B332968

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA095782)
v.

AMARANTHA PLANT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Martin L. Herscovitz, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Deepti Vaadyala,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Amarantha Plant fraudulently used another’s driver’s
license and social security number to obtain financing and
purchase a car from a dealership. The prosecution presented
evidence at trial that Plant maintained possession of that driver’s
license and presented it to law enforcement as her own months
later when she was pulled over in the stolen car. She was
convicted of three offenses, (1) possession of personal identifying
information with intent to defraud (identity theft), after a prior
identity theft conviction (Pen. Code,1 § 530.5, subd. (c)(2)),
(2) false personation of another in connection with a written
instrument (§ 529, subd. (a)(2)), and (3) grand theft of an
automobile (§ 487, subd. (d)(1)). The trial court sentenced her to
two years in county jail for the grand theft, plus a consecutive
term of eight months for the identity theft with a prior. Pursuant
to section 654, the court stayed the sentence for the false
personation offense.
Plant contends the trial court violated section 654 when it
imposed multiple punishments for the identity theft and the
grand theft. She argues the two offenses arose from an
indivisible course of conduct with a single objective—to obtain the
vehicle by false pretenses—and the court should have stayed the
punishment for the identity theft. We reject this contention,
concluding the court did not err in imposing multiple
punishments based on facts presented at trial showing Plant
continued to use the victim’s personal identifying information
(the driver’s license) months after she committed the grand theft.
Plant also contends, the Attorney General concedes, and we
agree that she is entitled to additional presentence custody

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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credit. We modify the judgment accordingly and as so modified
affirm.

BACKGROUND
The information filed against Plant alleged that the three
charged offenses described above occurred on or about January
31, 2021. The information also alleged that Plant had three prior
identity theft convictions under section 530.5.

A. Evidence Presented at Trial
Sometime in fall 2020, Christine Villegas, the identity theft
victim, renewed her driver’s license online. By early December
2020, she had not received the new driver’s license in the mail
and wondered why it was late. In January 2021, she expected to
receive her 2020 form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement by mail, but
she did not receive that either.
In February 2021, Bank of America sent Villegas a loan
document related to the purchase of a preowned Dodge
Challenger from a Nissan dealership located on Van Nuys
Boulevard in Sherman Oaks. She contacted the dealership to
report that she had not purchased the car. As reflected in the
retail installment sale contract executed on January 31, 2021, the
price of the car was $28,900, and the repayment obligation
required 72 monthly payments of $589.26. Villegas confirmed
during her trial testimony that the driver’s license and social
security numbers listed on the sale contract were hers but the
signatures were not. After speaking with Villegas in February

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2021, the manager of the Nissan dealership filed a police report
regarding the vehicle theft.2
On March 25, 2021, Laguna Beach Police Department
Corporal Thomas McGuire initiated a traffic stop of a Dodge
Challenger. At trial, he identified Plant as the driver of the car.
He asked her for her driver’s license, and she provided one with
Christine Villegas’s name, photo, and other identifying
information on it. Next, he asked Plant for the vehicle’s
registration and proof of insurance, which she was unable to
produce. When other officers arrived, he asked her to exit the
car, and she was detained.
During an exchange between Corporal McGuire and Plant
recorded on another officer’s body worn camera,3 McGuire called
Plant “Christine,” and Plant responded to that name. McGuire
explained that he pulled her over because of an issue with the
car’s license plate. He asked her questions to ascertain if she was
the lawful owner of the car. She told him she had purchased the
car from “Anytime Auto” on Van Nuys Boulevard for $28,000, and
she was required to make 72 monthly payments of $699. She
insisted she had paperwork for the car but represented that it

2 Ali Chahin, the manager, was at the Nissan dealership on

January 31, 2021, and briefly interacted with the woman who
purchased the Dodge Challenger in Villegas’s name. The woman
wore a mask. At trial, Chahin provided a general description of
the woman, and the prosecutor argued the description was
consistent with Plant. Villegas testified that she was not
acquainted with Plant.
3 The prosecution introduced, and the trial court admitted

into evidence, audio/video recordings from the officer’s body worn
camera and written transcripts of the recordings. The transcripts
are included in the record before us.

4
was at home. The vehicle identification number of the Dodge
Challenger Plant was driving on March 25, 2021, as recorded by
McGuire during the traffic stop, matched the vehicle
identification number of the Dodge Challenger purchased in
Villegas’s name on January 31, 2021.
At some point during their exchange, Corporal McGuire
became aware that Plant was not the person shown in the photo
on the driver’s license she had provided. She conceded the
driver’s license was not hers but could not explain why she had
given it to him. During the course of the stop, officers did not
find a driver’s license in Plant’s name, but they recovered a
second driver’s license in a different woman’s name.4

B. Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found Plant guilty of possession of personal
identifying information with intent to defraud (identity theft;
count 1), false personation for a written instrument (the
paperwork executed in Villegas’s name to obtain the car; count 2),
and grand theft of an automobile (count 3). Plant waived her
right to a jury trial on the priors and admitted three prior
identify theft (§ 530.5) convictions.5

4 In the defense case, Plant presented evidence and argued

that she was working on the day the Dodge Challenger was
purchased in Villegas’s name. Plant’s unsuccessful alibi defense
is not relevant to the contentions she raises on appeal, and we
need not discuss it further.
5 Plant was charged in count 1 with possession of personal

identifying information with intent to defraud after a prior
section 530.5 conviction, a violation of section 530.5, subdivision
(c)(2).

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At the sentencing hearing, the parties and the trial court
discussed whether the sentence on any of the counts should be
stayed under section 654. The prosecutor urged the court to
impose multiple punishments for the identity theft conviction in
count 1 and the false personation conviction in count 2, arguing
the two offenses were temporally distinct because Plant had an
opportunity to reflect upon her actions between the time she took
possession of Villegas’s personal identifying information and the
time she used that information at the dealership.
The defense argued multiple punishments were precluded
by section 654 because Plant’s “objective intent was clear and
singular, the taking of a car in another’s name.” The defense also
argued there was no evidence presented at trial indicating when
Plant took possession of Villegas’s personal identifying
information, so it was not possible to determine if Plant had an
opportunity “to contemplate the different uses [of the
information] or not using it” before she committed the false
personation and grand theft offenses.
The trial court concluded multiple punishments on count 1
(identity theft) and count 3 (grand theft) would not violate section
654, based on the duration of Plant’s possession of Villegas’s
driver’s license. The court noted that Plant fraudulently obtained
the car with Villegas’s driver’s license on January 31, 2021, and
around two months later when she was detained at the traffic
stop, she still possessed Villegas’s driver’s license (which she
presented to the police officer as her own).6 The court found the

6 The court also stated its understanding that Plant’s

possession of Villegas’s personal identifying information
“spanned over four months,” from sometime in November 2020
until the March 25, 2021 traffic stop, and that she had obtained

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continued possession created a new risk of harm, that Plant
would use the driver’s license again with intent to defraud. The
court also noted there were three victims of Plant’s fraud:
Villegas, the Nissan dealership, and Bank of America.
The court sentenced Plant to the middle term of two years
for the grand theft, plus a consecutive term of eight months (one-
third the middle term) for the identity theft, to be served in
county jail. The court selected the middle term of two years for
the false personation offense and stayed the punishment
pursuant to section 654. In consultation with defense counsel,
the court awarded Plant 32 days of presentence custody credit, 16
days of actual credit and 16 days of conduct credit.

DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Imposing
Multiple Punishments
Plant contends the trial court violated section 654 when it
imposed multiple punishments for count 1 (identity theft) and
count 3 (grand theft). She argues the court should have stayed
the punishment on count 1 because “the possession of personal
identifying information with intent to defraud was part of the
same continuous course of conduct with the single objective of
successfully committing grand theft by false pretense.”

the information a couple months before she used it on January
31, 2021 at the dealership. As the defense pointed out, however,
there was no evidence presented at trial indicating when or how
Plant obtained Villegas’s information. We cannot infer from the
record before us that Plant obtained the driver’s license at the
time it went missing from Villegas’s mailbox, rather than at some
later time (e.g., immediately before she entered the dealership).

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1. The two offenses at issue
Plant was convicted of identity theft under section 530.5,
subdivision (c)(2), which applies to “[e]very person who, with
intent to defraud, acquires or retains possession of the personal
identifying information . . . of another person, and who has
previously been convicted of a violation of this section . . . .” As
the trial court instructed the jury, “A person intends to defraud if
he or she intends to deceive another person in order to cause a
loss of something of value, or to cause damage to a legal,
financial, or property right. [¶] Personal identifying information
means driver’s license or an equivalent form of identification.”
(CALCRIM No. 2041, italics omitted.)
Plant was convicted of grand theft of an automobile under a
theory of false pretenses. The trial court instructed the jury that
the elements of the crime are: “1. The defendant knowingly and
intentionally deceived an automobile owner or the owner’s agent
by false or fraudulent representation or pretense; [¶] 2. The
defendant did so intending to persuade the owner or the owner’s
agent to let the defendant take possession and ownership of the
automobile; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The owner or the owner’s agent let
the defendant take possession and ownership of the automobile
because the owner or the owner’s agent relied on the
representation or pretense.” (CALCRIM No. 1804.)
2. Section 654 and standard of review
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part, “An
act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.” Thus, “If a single action or
course of conduct by a defendant violates multiple laws, ‘the

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distinct crimes may be charged in separate counts and may result
in multiple verdicts of guilt, [but] the trial court may impose
sentence for only one offense’ ” and must stay the sentence for the
others. (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673; People v.
Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591-592.)
Section 654’s purpose is to ensure a defendant is punished
in a manner commensurate with culpability. (People v. Harrison
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335; People v. Gaynor (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
794, 800.) To that end, it “precludes multiple punishments for a
single act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Hester
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) Whether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible depends on the intent and objective of the
actor. (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354.) If a
“defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he [or
she] may be punished for each statutory violation committed in
pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared
common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of
conduct.’ ” (Harrison, at p. 335.) Multiple punishments are also
permissible where a course of criminal conduct is divisible in time
and “ ‘the offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to
afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or
her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating
the violation of public security or policy already undertaken’ ”
and creating a “ ‘new risk of harm.’ ” (Gaynor, at pp. 800, 804;
People v. Peyton (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1080 [multiple
punishments for receiving stolen property and identity theft did
not violate section 654 where the defendant “took possession of
[a] stolen ATM card and had the opportunity for reflection. He
formed a new criminal intent before he used the victim’s personal

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identification number to withdraw money from the ATM” around
two hours later].)7
“The question of whether section 654 is factually applicable
to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law
gives the trial court broad latitude in making this
determination.” (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1092, 1113 (DeVaughn).) Generally, “a trial court may base its
decision under section 654 on any of the facts that are in evidence
at trial,” even those that may not have been the basis for the
jury’s verdicts. (People v. McCoy (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1333,
1340 (McCoy), italics omitted.) We review the trial court’s
express or implied findings regarding the defendant’s intent and
objective under the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737.) To that end,
we “review the trial court’s determination in the light most
favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every

7 There is a “multiple victim” exception to section 654,

which applies where a defendant “commits an act of violence with
the intent to harm more than one person or by a means likely to
cause harm to several persons.” (People v. Solis (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 1002, 1023.) “Where, however, the offenses arising
out of the same transaction are not crimes of violence but involve
crimes against property interests of several persons, [the
California Supreme Court] has recognized that only single
punishment is permissible.” (People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368,
378.) In imposing multiple punishments on Plant, the trial court
noted there were multiple victims of her crimes: Villegas, the
Nissan dealership, and Bank of America. We need not address
this issue further because we uphold the trial court’s decision to
impose multiple punishments on other grounds explained below.

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fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”
(People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.)
3. Analysis
Plant argues she had a single intent and objective in
committing the identity theft and the grand theft: “to use
Villegas’[s] driver’s license to obtain the Dodge Challenger with
false pretense.” She likens this case to People v. Casica (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 320, where the Court of Appeal concluded the
trial court erred in imposing punishments for three counts of
forgery and three counts of commercial burglary (cashing forged
checks). The appellate court agreed with the defendant’s
argument that although she “committed the forgeries on separate
dates from the burglaries,” the trial court should have stayed the
sentence on the forgery counts under section 654 because she
“committed each count of forgery and burglary together, as a
single course of conduct, with the goal of obtaining money via the
forged checks.” (Id. at p. 324.) The Court of Appeal explained,
“There would be little point in forging the checks without cashing
them, and cashing the checks would be impossible without the
forgeries. Thus, it is logical to conclude that defendant only
harbored one intent—to obtain money from [the victim’s] account.
Speculation about any other intent harbored by defendant is just
that, speculation, and therefore not supported by substantial
evidence.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Curtin (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th
528, 532 [the People conceded that the defendant’s “sentence for
forgery should have been stayed under section 654, because the
forgery and burglary were part of the same indivisible
transaction, both committed for a single criminal objective, to
cash the check”].)

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Plant’s position might be well taken if the evidence
presented at her trial showed only that she took possession of the
driver’s license (at an unknown time, possibly immediately before
entering the dealership) and used it to obtain the Dodge
Challenger by false pretenses. But here there was more. Plant
did not discard the driver’s license after she obtained the car.
Instead, Plant maintained possession of Villegas’s driver’s
license, and around two months after the grand theft she used
the license again. This time, she presented it to a police officer as
her own during a traffic stop, potentially exposing Villegas to
further legal consequences. As the trial court found, Plant’s
continued possession and use of the driver’s license after the
grand theft created a new risk of harm to Villegas. Substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that Plant’s intent and
objective in possessing the driver’s license extended beyond
merely accomplishing the grand theft. Thus, we conclude the
court imposed punishment in a manner commensurate with
Plant’s culpability, consistent with the purpose of section 654.
Plant urges us to ignore the evidence of her use of the
driver’s license during the March 25, 2021 traffic stop in
determining whether the trial court erred in imposing multiple
punishments. She argues that the information filed against her
alleged all three offenses were committed on January 31, 2021
(the date she obtained the car from the dealership); the
prosecutor argued during closing argument that the three
offenses occurred on January 31, 2021; and “there was no
substantial evidence that the jury convicted [her] on count 1
based on the March 25 incident.” As we explained above,
however, “a trial court may base its decision under section 654 on
any of the facts that are in evidence at trial,” even those that may

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not have been the basis for the jury’s verdicts. (McCoy, supra,
208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1340, italics omitted.) In imposing multiple
punishments, the court here relied on Plant’s use of Villegas’s
driver’s license during the traffic stop, stating these “additional
facts . . . were proven, to [the court’s] satisfaction.” We agree
with the trial court that section 654 does not bar multiple
punishments based on these facts.

B. Presentence Custody Credit
Plant contends and the Attorney General agrees that she is
entitled to 49 days of presentence custody credit, rather than the
32 days the trial court awarded.
According to the probation report, Plant was arrested on
November 23, 2021, and released on her own recognizance on
December 8, 2021, which amounts to 16 days of actual credit.8
After the jury’s verdicts were read on August 2, 2023, she was
remanded to custody. She was sentenced on August 10, 2023, so
she is entitled to nine days of actual credit for that period as the
trial court correctly found. Thus, Plant’s actual custody credit is
25 days.
As the parties agree, to calculate Plant’s presentence
conduct credit, based on an odd number of days served (25), we
divide the actual custody credit by two (which equals 12.5), round
down to a whole number (12), and multiply by two (24). (See
People v. Whitaker (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1358-1362.)

8 At the sentencing hearing, however, defense counsel

incorrectly represented that Plant was released on November 29,
2021, and was entitled to seven days of actual credit for that
period.

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Thus, Plant is entitled to 49 days of presentence custody
credit, 25 days of actual credit plus 24 days of conduct credit.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect 25 days of actual credit
and 24 days of conduct credit, for a total of 49 days of presentence
custody credit. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The
clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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