CourtListener 10367939•People v. Vaughan CA3
Testo completo
Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Vaughan CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Calaveras)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101096
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21F8263)
v.
JAY VAUGHAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Jay Vaughan guilty of forcible sexual penetration. The
trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of six years.
On appeal, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing
argument by stating there was no “presumption of consent,” thereby relieving the
prosecution of the burden of proving the victim’s lack of consent and defendant’s lack of
belief in consent. Defendant further contends that if these claims were forfeited on
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appeal by his trial counsel’s failure to object, this omission constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. We conclude defendant forfeited the claim but he did not receive
ineffective assistance. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2021, D.F.1, a 19-year-old biological female transitioning to a male,
was staying in a house in Calaveras County with C.C. Defendant lived in a trailer on the
property. On January 28, 2021, D.F. got the mail from the mailbox, which included mail
for defendant. D.F. brought the mail to defendant in his trailer. Defendant and D.F.
struck up a conversation, which turned to the subject of D.F.’s gender identity.
Defendant asked D.F. about his sexual preferences and sexual history. When
defendant asked D.F. if he knew about any good sex toys, D.F. told defendant about a
website. Defendant asked D.F. to show him the website and indicated D.F. should use
defendant’s phone charging on the bed. D.F. sat on the bed and picked up the phone.
D.F. showed the website to defendant, who came over and sat next to him on the bed.
D.F. moved an inch away from defendant on the bed. Defendant moved an inch closer.
Defendant offered to buy D.F. anything he wanted on the website. Defendant started
talking about his sexual preferences.
Defendant complimented D.F.’s hands, touched his hands, and then started to put
D.F.’s hand on defendant’s crotch. D.F. pulled his hand away. Defendant put his hand on
D.F.’s thigh; D.F. tried to push it off. Defendant spit on his fingers and put his hand down
D.F.’s pants inside his boxer shorts and on top of his vagina. Defendant inserted his
fingers in D.F.’s vagina. Defendant told D.F. to lay back. Defendant put an elbow on
D.F.’s chest and leaned his weight on the elbow, forcing D.F. to lay back. Defendant
moved his fingers in D.F.’s vagina. Defendant asked D.F. if it felt good. D.F. said he
1 We refer to the victim by his initials, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(4).
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could not feel much “down there.” Defendant then became “rougher and harder.” D.F.
never told defendant to stop. Defendant continued for 10 to 20 minutes. Defendant took
his hand out of D.F.’s pants and again offered to buy him a sex toy.
D.F. went back to the house and told C.C. what had happened. C.C. said D.F.
could do nothing or call the police. D.F. chose to call the police and C.C. dialed 911 for
him. A police officer responding to the 911 call gathered D.F.’s clothes as evidence and
took a DNA swab from D.F.
The next day the police officer interviewed defendant about D.F.’s report.
Defendant said nothing happened; he and D.F. had just talked. When the officer returned
later with a search warrant for defendant’s DNA, defendant said D.F. had pulled his own
pants down and “ ‘reached over and . . . got ahold of [defendant].’ ”
A combination of D.F.’s and defendant’s DNA was found in D.F.’s boxer shorts.
When the officer told defendant his DNA was in D.F.’s underwear, defendant said that
D.F. had taken off his underwear and sat on defendant’s bed.
C.C. testified for the defense at trial. She testified that, on January 28, 2021, D.F.
said he wanted to deliver defendant’s mail. D.F. was gone for 10 to 15 minutes. When
D.F. returned to the house, D.F. said that defendant had done something to him, and C.C.
responded that she did not believe D.F. D.F. then went to bed. D.F. never called the
police and the police never came.
Defendant testified at trial. Defendant testified that when D.F. came to his trailer
on January 28, 2021, defendant had just gotten out of the shower. Defendant covered
himself with a towel. D.F. sat down next to defendant, touching him. D.F. told defendant
he was transitioning to become a male. D.F. took defendant’s phone and showed him sex
toys. D.F. stood up, pulled down his pants, and grasped defendant’s penis. Defendant
told D.F. to leave. D.F. started talking about doing other sexual things. Defendant heard
C.C. calling for D.F. and again told him to leave.
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Defendant testified he told a police officer nothing happened because he did not
want to get D.F. in trouble. Defendant later changed his story because defendant believed
he was now in trouble. Defendant denied putting his hands on D.F. or touching him in an
inappropriate way.
In rebuttal, the People introduced a 911 call log reporting D.F.’s statement that
defendant touched him and identifying C.C. as the reporting party. A police officer who
later interviewed C.C. reported she said that defendant told her nothing happened; D.F.
had sat on defendant’s lap and he told D.F. to get off.
An information charged defendant with forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code,
§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)).2 The matter was tried by a jury in February 2024. The jury
found defendant guilty of the charge. The trial court sentenced defendant to the middle
term of six years.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when, in closing
argument, he stated that there was no “presumption of consent.” Defendant
acknowledges that trial counsel’s failure to object to the claimed misconduct, as here, will
forfeit the issue on appeal. If the claim was forfeited, defendant contends counsel’s
failure to object gives rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude
defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claim was forfeited. And defendant’s ineffective
assistance claim fails because there was a conceivable tactical reason for counsel’s
omission and defendant cannot show prejudice.
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of forcible sexual
penetration with CALCRIM No. 1045, as follows: “The defendant is charged with
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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sexual penetration by force in violation of . . . [s]ection 289. To prove the defendant is
guilty of this crime, the [P]eople must prove that, [one], the defendant committed an act
of sexual penetration with another person. [Two], the penetration was accomplished by
using a foreign object. [Three], the person did not consent to the act, and [four], the
defendant accomplished the act by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury to another person.”
CALCRIM No. 1045 includes two paragraphs addressing consent: (1) “In order to
consent, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act,” and
(2) “The defendant is not guilty of forcible sexual penetration if [he] actually and
reasonably believed that the other person consented to the act. The People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and
reasonably believe that the other person consented. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.”
In his initial closing, the prosecutor argued: “Now, there is an element in here of
consent. If the defendant believed that this act was consensual, then you have to find him
not guilty, but I submit to you that if we start looking at just the macro picture, is there
going to be a presumption of consent when—and we have different ages on the jury, so is
there a presumption of consent with someone your grandchild’s age? No one would say
yes. Is there a presumption of consent with someone of your grandfather or your
grandmother’s age? Absolutely not.”
Defendant argues that “[t]hese comments crossed the line into being legally
incorrect.” Defendant reasons that the presumption of innocence extends to every
element of the crime that the People must prove including the lack of an actual and
reasonable belief in consent. Defendant argues, jurors could understand the prosecutor’s
arguments to mean the presumption of innocence did not extend to lack of consent or
belief in consent. Thus, defendant maintains the prosecutor’s comments lessened the
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People’s burden of proof to prove absence of consent or belief in consent beyond a
reasonable doubt.
“Though it is improper for a prosecutor to misstate the law [citation], such
misstatements ‘are generally curable by an admonition from the court.’ [Citation.] Thus,
‘ “ ‘[a]s a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial
misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an
assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the
impropriety.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Henderson (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 533, 548; see also People
v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 454; People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1035.)
Here, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s “presumption of consent”
comments on the grounds that the prosecutor misstated the law or lowered the People’s
burden of proof and did not request an admonition to cure the alleged harm. Thus,
defendant forfeited the claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (People v. Johnsen (2021)
10 Cal.5th 1116, 1164-1165 (Johnsen).)
As defendant points out, “[a] defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to
alleged prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that counsel’s inaction violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Lopez
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.)
“To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, [the defendant] ‘must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’
[Citations.] On direct appeal, a finding of deficient performance is warranted where
‘(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one,
or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 1165.) “ ‘[W]here counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions
do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal
unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.’ ” (Ibid.)
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“We have said that ‘the decision . . . whether to object to comments made by the
prosecutor in closing argument is a highly tactical one.’ ” (Ibid.)
We can conceive of a tactical reason for defense counsel to remain silent. The
prosecutor’s comments—that D.F. was not presumed to consent because of the age
difference—were brief and not especially persuasive. It was undisputed that D.F. showed
defendant a sex toy website while sitting on his bed, notwithstanding the age difference.
In fact it was this evidence of consent that defense counsel highlighted in closing. (See
People v. Castillo (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 119, 126 [victim’s testimony “demonstrated
equivocal conduct which could have led defendant to believe that consent existed where
in fact there was none”].)
Defense counsel argued: “We know that [D.F.] and [defendant] were sitting
closely on the bed. We know this. They both testified to this. That’s not a fact in
dispute. We also know that they were looking at a sex toy website, a sex toy website
sitting on a bed close together looking at a sex toy website.”
Defense counsel continued: “Now, ask yourself, what would, in this case, a man
in a situation like that think sitting on a bunk, as [defendant] calls it, a bed, with a
biological female sitting next to you only inches away sharing a cellphone and looking at
a sex toy website? What would a man think in that position? Would they be thinking that
this is a no coming from the female? No. There is absolutely nothing in that scenario,
two people sitting on a bed, a male, a biological female looking at a porn sex toy website
that says no. All that says is consent [has] to be there.”
Viewed through the lens of trial tactics, the prosecutor’s argument for lack of
consent based on age difference, in his initial closing argument, gave defense counsel an
opportunity to make an argument to the jury in her closing that defendant’s belief in
consent was reasonable based on D.F.’s actions.
Moreover, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim also fails because he cannot
show prejudice because of counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s comments. A
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defendant “bears the burden of showing prejudice, that is, a ‘reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676 (Centeno), quoting
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.)
The day before the prosecutor’s closing argument the trial court instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 220: “The defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent.
This presumption requires that the [P]eople prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the [P]eople must prove something, I mean they
must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.” CALCRIM No. 1045 instructed the jury that
the People must prove lack of consent and, specifically “[t]he [P]eople have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably
believe that the other person consented. If the [P]eople have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty.”3 Thus, the general instruction on presumption of
innocence and the People’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was further
reinforced by a specific instruction on the elements of the charged crime that emphasized
the People’s burden to prove lack of belief of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
“ ‘When argument runs counter to instructions given a jury, we will ordinarily
conclude that the jury followed the latter and disregarded the former, for “[w]e presume
that jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the
prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.” ’ ”
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 676; see People v. Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63,
75 [“We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions, rather than any conflicting
comment by counsel, in reaching a verdict”].)
3 Jurors were given copies of the instructions to bring into the jury room during
deliberations.
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To the extent that the prosecutor’s comments suggested that the presumption of
innocence did not extend to consent or it was not the People’s burden to prove consent or
lack of belief in consent beyond a reasonable doubt, that argument ran counter to the trial
court’s instructions. The jury was expressly instructed that “[i]f you believe that the
attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my
instructions.”
Moreover, after the prosecutor presented his opening argument, the prosecutor
advised the trial court that one reasonable doubt instruction may not have been given.
The trial court stated its belief that the instruction had been given, but in abundance of
caution again instructed the jury on reasonable doubt that defendant having been charged
with a crime was not evidence that the charge was true. Before giving this instruction,
the court advised the jury that “[a] question came up whether I gave you the instruction
on reasonable doubt” and asked jurors if it had in fact given this instruction previously.
Jurors responded affirmatively. Thus, the critical significance of instructions on
reasonable doubt were in the forefront of the minds of the jurors during closing
arguments.
Under these circumstances, it is not probable that defendant would have received a
more favorable verdict had defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s comments
referencing “presumption of consent.”
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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
EARL, P. J.
/S/
DUARTE, J.
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