CourtListener 10364806•People v. Muro CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 3/26/25 P. v. Muro CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B338661
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA035502)
v.
MARIO CARLOS MURO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, John Lonergan, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Penal Code section 30511 requires that certain incarcerated
juvenile and youth offenders be given a youth offender parole
hearing. Juveniles and youths who are eligible for such a hearing
may move for a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63
Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to develop a record for an eventual youth
offender parole hearing.
A jury convicted Mario Carlos Muro of two counts of first
degree murder and found true a multiple-murder special-
circumstance allegation, and a court sentenced him to life
without parole. Muro committed the murders when he was 18
years old. Muro moved for a Franklin hearing, but the trial court
denied the motion because Muro, based on his age when he
committed his crimes and his life without parole sentence, was
ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.
Muro appeals, contending that section 3051 violates equal
protection because it excludes youth offenders like him who were
sentenced to life without parole for an offense committed after
the age of 17. He also contends that his sentence violates federal
and state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment. Our California Supreme Court rejected Muro’s
equal protection contention in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th
834 (Hardin). And courts have rejected the argument that a life
without parole sentence for a youth offender is cruel and unusual
punishment under the federal and state constitutions. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s order.
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
BACKGROUND
On March 24, 1996, Muro fired multiple shots into a van
stopped at a red light, killing Richard Lopez and Michael
Mahome.2 After shooting them, Muro got into a car he had just
bought from his brother-in-law. Israel Magana was driving the
car, and additional passengers were in the car. Muro confessed
to being the shooter, because he did not think it right that an
innocent man be accused.
In 1998, a jury convicted Muro of two counts of murder and
found true a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation.
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) On January 20, 1999, a
court sentenced Muro to two terms of life without parole.
In 2023, Muro petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and
requested a Franklin hearing. On April 19, 2024, the trial court
denied Muro’s petition, finding him ineligible for a Franklin
hearing as a matter of law.3
2
The facts are from this division’s opinion affirming an order
denying a petition Muro had filed under section 1172.6 for
resentencing, People v. Muro (May 13, 2021, B307128) [nonpub.
opn.]. We take judicial notice of that opinion. (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (a).)
3
Although Muro raised the Franklin issue in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, the trial court impliedly treated it as a
motion under section 1203.01, which provides that a trial court
may collect information about a defendant postjudgment to
submit to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. A
motion brought under that section is appealable. (See In re Cook
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446–447.)
3
DISCUSSION
I. Equal protection
Muro was 18 years old when he participated in the murders
for which he was sentenced to life without parole; therefore, he
was ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section
3051, subdivision (h), and not entitled to a Franklin hearing. He
nonetheless argues that section 3051 violates equal protection by
treating youth offenders sentenced to life without parole for
special circumstance murder differently from youth offenders
serving parole-eligible life sentences for other crimes. As we now
explain, our California Supreme Court rejected his argument in
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834.
Over the past two decades, courts have recognized that
juveniles (persons under 18) are constitutionally different from
adults for sentencing purposes because of juveniles’ diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform. (See generally
Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471.) Accordingly, the
Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing the death penalty on
juveniles (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551), life without
parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses (Graham v.
Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48), mandatory life without parole for
juveniles (Miller, at p. 489), de facto life without parole for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders (People v. Caballero (2012) 55
Cal.4th 262), and a sentence of 50 years to life for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders (People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349,
356).
In light of the judicial recognition of juveniles’ lessened
culpability and greater prospects for reform, our Legislature
enacted section 3051. Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole
Hearings to conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” at specified
4
times during the youth’s incarceration. Generally, persons who
were younger than 26 years old when they committed their
controlling offense are eligible for a youth offender parole hearing
if they were sentenced to a determinate term or a life term with
the possibility of parole. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) Persons sentenced to
life without parole are entitled to a hearing if they were younger
than 18 years old when they committed the controlling offense.
(§ 3051, subd. (b)(4).) However, persons sentenced to life without
parole who committed their controlling offense when they were
18 or older are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.4
(§ 3051, subd. (h).) Further, persons who are eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing must have a sufficient opportunity to
make a record of information relevant to that eventual hearing.
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Thus, only persons
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051
are in turn eligible for a Franklin hearing.
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834, considered whether section
3051 violates equal protection by excluding youths sentenced to
life without parole for a crime committed when they were 18 or
older from a youth offender parole hearing. Hardin, at page 850,
first held that when “plaintiffs challenge laws drawing
distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on
the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal
protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether
the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in
4
Similarly, persons sentenced under the Three Strikes or
One Strike laws and offenders who, after attaining 26 years of
age, commit an additional crime for which malice aforethought is
an element are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.
(§ 3051, subd. (h).)
5
question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review,” which is rational basis review.
Under rational basis review, courts “consider whether the
challenged classification ultimately bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4
Cal.5th 277, 289.)
Hardin then turned to whether there was a rational basis
to exclude persons sentenced to life without parole for a crime
committed when they were 18 or older from a youth offender
parole hearing. The court found that while the Legislature’s
primary purpose in extending section 30515 to youth offenders
was to give them the opportunity to obtain release based on
growth and rehabilitation, the Legislature balanced this purpose
with other concerns about culpability and the appropriate
punishment for certain very serious crimes. (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 854.) In “designing section 3051, the Legislature
consciously drew lines that altered the parole component of
offenders’ sentences based not only on the age of the offender
(and thus the offender’s amenability to rehabilitation) but also on
the offense and sentence imposed. The lines the Legislature drew
necessarily reflect a set of legislative judgments about the nature
of punishment that is appropriate for the crime.” (Id. at p. 855.)
Hardin rejected the argument that there is no rational
basis to distinguish between youth offenders sentenced to life
without parole for special circumstance murder and youth
offenders sentenced either to functionally equivalent life without
5
As originally enacted, only juveniles were eligible for youth
offender parole hearings, but, over the years, the age of eligibility
has been raised to 22 and then to 25. (See generally Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 845–846.)
6
parole sentences or to indeterminate life terms for first degree
murder. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 858; cf. People v.
Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 [excluding defendants sentenced
under One Strike law from § 3051 relief does not violate equal
protection].) The court observed that “legions of decisions” hold
that “special circumstance murder is sufficiently serious and
morally culpable as to justify imposing the most severe sanctions
available under the law, up to and including death.” (Hardin, at
p. 859.) While the court did not “foreclose the possibility of other
challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special circumstances
statute based on a more robust record or a more focused as-
applied inquiry, Hardin has not carried his burden to
demonstrate that legislative reliance on the special circumstance
murder statute in section 3051, subdivision (h) is categorically
irrational.” (Id. at p. 862.) The court concluded that Hardin had
not shown that the “Legislature’s decision to expand youth
offender parole hearings to most young adult offenders, while
excluding Hardin and others similarly situated, violates equal
protection under a rational basis standard.” (Id. at p. 866.)
Muro acknowledges that Hardin rejected the same equal
protection argument he makes here, that treating youth
offenders sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance
murder differently from youth offenders serving parole-eligible
life sentences for other crimes violates equal protection.
Nonetheless, he raises the issue to exhaust his state court
remedies for federal review. However, we are bound by Hardin.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.)
7
II. Cruel and/or unusual punishment
Muro also contends that evolving standards of decency
have made his life without parole sentences cruel and/or unusual
punishment under the federal and state constitutions. (U.S.
Const. 8th Amend. [prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment];
Cal. Const., art. I, § 17 [prohibiting cruel or unusual
punishment].) Under current law, Muro’s sentence does not
violate federal or state prohibitions on cruel and/or unusual
punishment.
As an initial matter, the Attorney General asserts that
Muro forfeited this issue by failing to raise it below. Even if
Muro forfeited the issue, we exercise our discretion to address it.
(See People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720; People v. Em
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 971, fn. 5 [appellate court may reach
forfeited issue on record presented or in interest of judicial
economy].)
Under the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, punishment is cruel and unusual if it is so
disproportionate to the crime committed that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.
(People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358.) The Eighth
Amendment contains a narrow proportionality principle
applicable to noncapital sentences. (Ewing v. California (2003)
538 U.S. 11, 20.) However, the Eighth Amendment does not
require strict proportionality between crime and sentence, and it
forbids only extreme sentences grossly disproportionate to the
crime. (Ewing, at p. 23.)
California’s Constitution imposes a similar standard.
Punishment that is so disproportionate to the crime for which it
is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental
notions of human dignity may violate our state constitution. (In
8
re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424; see generally In re Palmer
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 973 [setting forth factors to determine
whether a sentence is excessive].)
As we have said, section 3051 has its genesis in federal
cases applying the Eighth Amendment to juveniles. That is,
Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 460 prohibited mandatory life
without parole terms for juveniles. It did not apply to young
adults like Muro who were 18 or older when they committed their
crime. (See People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 781–782.)
“If the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a sentence of death
for 21 year olds, then most assuredly, it does not prohibit the
lesser” life without parole sentence. (In re Williams (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 427, 439.)
Thus, our California Supreme Court and courts of appeal
have declined to extend Miller, as well as Graham and Roper, to
young adults 18 years of age or older. (See, e.g., People v. Flores
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429–430 [declining to extend Roper to 18-to-
20-year-olds]; People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191 [death
penalty for 18 year old with “intellectual shortcomings” does not
violate federal and state Constitutions]; People v. Gamache (2010)
48 Cal.4th 347, 407 [“lengthy confinement under a sentence of
death does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment” or
violate federal and state Constitutions]; In re Williams, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at pp. 437–438 [life without parole for 21-year old
offender not grossly disproportionate to his culpability]; see
People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482.)
A line has been drawn about at what age it is cruel and
unusual punishment to impose a life without parole sentence.
(People v. Argeta, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1482.) That line
currently stands at 17 years of age (i.e., those persons who are 17
and younger are considered juveniles). Muro was 18 years old
and not a juvenile when he committed the murders. Accordingly,
9
his life without parole sentences do not constitute cruel and/or
unusual punishment.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Mario Muro’s request for a Franklin
hearing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
ADAMS, J.
10
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