Harvey v. Rebennack CA1/2

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Filed 3/25/25 Harvey v. Rebennack CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JAMES TED HARVEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170441
v.
ANDREW REBENNACK et al., (San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. CGC23610011)
Defendants and Appellants.

After his residential tenancy was terminated by means of an owner
move-in eviction, James Ted Harvey sued Andrew Rebennack, Kathy
Maionchi, Daniel Maionchi, Clark Maionchi, and Dominic Maionchi
(defendants) alleging five causes of action including violations of the San
Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance (Rent Ordinance).
Defendants filed a motion to strike four of the causes of action under the anti-
SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc, § 425.16).1
The trial court denied defendants’ motion at the first step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis based on its conclusion that defendants failed to meet their
burden to show that the challenged claims arose from protected activity.

1 “ ‘SLAPP’ is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public

participation.’ ” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 381, fn. 1 (Baral).)
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

1
Defendants now appeal, arguing that because Harvey’s claims arose from
their protected activity in serving him with an eviction notice, the trial court
erred in denying their motion. They argue that the trial court should have
moved to the second step of the analysis and, in view of the evidence that the
parties presented, determined that Harvey could not establish a probability
of prevailing on his claims. Like the trial court, we conclude that defendants
fail to show that Harvey’s claims arise from protected conduct; accordingly,
we will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Harvey’s Complaint
In December 2023, Harvey filed the operative first amended complaint
for declaratory relief and damages, alleging that after he had lived for 10
years in a rent-controlled apartment in a residential building in San
Francisco, his “tenancy was terminated pursuant to an owner move in
eviction.”2 According to the complaint, defendants represented that

2 The Rent Ordinance authorizes a landlord to “recover possession [of a

rental unit] in good faith, without ulterior reasons and with honest intent” for
the landlord’s use or occupancy as his or her principal residence for at least
36 continuous months. (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9, subd. (a)(8)(i).) As relevant
here, a “landlord” is “an owner of record of at least 25 percent interest in the
property.” (Id., subd. (a)(8)(iii).) A “landlord may not recover possession . . .
if a comparable unit owned by the landlord is already vacant and is available,
or if such a unit becomes vacant and available before the recovery of
possession,” in which case the notice to vacate must be rescinded and any
action to recover possession must be dismissed. (Id., subd. (a)(8)(iv).) And, “if
a non-comparable unit becomes available before the recovery of possession,”
that unit must be offered to the tenant. (Ibid.) The Rent Ordinance provides
that it is evidence of a lack of good faith for a landlord to time the service of a
notice to vacate or the filing of an action to recover possession “so as to avoid
moving into a comparable unit, or to avoid offering a tenant a replacement
unit.” (Ibid.)

2
Rebennack, Kathy Maionchi, Daniel Maionchi, and Clark Maionchi each
owned a 25 percent share of the property. Defendant Rebennack represented
that there were no other apartments available to be offered to Harvey; that
his “dominant motive for the eviction was to make [Harvey’s apartment] his
principal place of residence and that he was acting in good faith, without
ulterior reasons and with honest intent.” In April 2023, Harvey vacated his
apartment in reliance on defendants’ representations.
Harvey alleged five causes of action against the defendants; we discuss
only the first, second, fourth, and fifth, which were the subject of plaintiffs’
anti-SLAPP motion.
The first cause of action sought declaratory relief to determine whether
there were non-disclosed owners of the property (including Dominick
Maionchi); whether Rebennack was a “sham owner”; whether comparable
and non-comparable apartments were available when his tenancy was
terminated; whether defendants acted in good faith; whether defendants
timed his eviction “knowing that other apartment were available or . . . were
going to be available prior to when [Harvey] vacated the property”; whether
the Maionchi defendants “aided and abetted the termination of [Harvey’s]
tenancy; and whether there was a conspiracy between the defendants.
The second cause of action alleged negligence arising from defendants’
breaching their duty to exercise reasonable care in owning and operating the
building. Among other things, Harvey alleged that defendants violated their
duty not to interfere with his quiet enjoyment of the premises by failing to
maintain the property “in a reasonable and code compliant manner” and by
conspiring to displace him from his unit; violated the laws and rules
governing the termination of his tenancy and recovery of his unit by forming
a partnership and conspiracy to terminate his tenancy; and violated their

3
duty to fix certain enumerated problems with the unit, including lack of heat
and ceiling leaks.
The fourth cause of action alleged that defendants violated Rent
Ordinance section 37.10B, subdivision (a), which lists various acts that
constitute tenant harassment if done in bad faith. Harvey alleged that
defendants violated several provisions of that subdivision by disturbing his
quiet enjoyment in bad faith, by failing to address substandard conditions
and then wrongfully terminating his tenancy in violation of the applicable
rules “and for financial gain,” and by failing to fix the previously enumerated
problems with the unit.
The fifth cause of action alleged that defendants violated Rent
Ordinance section 37.9, subdivision (a)(8), which sets forth the conditions for
an owner move-in eviction, by taking “steps to circumvent the Rent
Ordinance’s requirements” by evicting Harvey when they had comparable
and non-comparable apartments and not offering them to him; by conspiring
to have him evicted; and by concealing facts, including facts about ownership
of the unit, motive, and availability of other apartments.
B. Anti-SLAPP Motion
Defendants responded to Harvey’s complaint with an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike the first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action, arguing
that they arose from Rebennack serving Harvey with an owner move-in
eviction notice and filing a copy of the notice with the San Francisco Rent
Board.3 They argued that Rebennack’s actions were protected activities
because they were undertaken pursuant to the Rent Ordinance requirements

3 On appeal, defendants state that their anti-SLAPP motion was not

directed toward Harvey’s habitability claims, which we note are included in
the challenged second and fourth causes of action.

4
for owner move-in evictions “and in conjunction with proceeding with an
unlawful detainer action.” Defendants further argued that Harvey could not
produce any evidence to support his claims.
Defendants supported the motion with a declaration in which
Rebennack stated that he, Kathy Maionchi, Daniel Maionchi, and Clark
Maionchi became owners of Harvey’s unit in January 2023; that the same
month he had caused a 60-day notice of termination of tenancy, or “owner
move-in notice,” to be served on Harvey; that the notice included the
information required by law, including “the ownership structure” of Harvey’s
unit; and that he made no representations to Harvey regarding the
circumstances of the owner move-in eviction apart from the owner move-in
notice. Rebennack filed an unlawful detainer action against Harvey in March
2023 “based on owner move-in eviction”; Harvey did not contest the unlawful
detainer action; Harvey moved out of the unit in April; and the unlawful
detainer action was subsequently dismissed without prejudice. Rebennack
declared that he moved into the unit before July 1, 2023 and that since then
he had made the unit his principal residence.
In opposition, Harvey argued that defendants failed to “identify any
allegation in the complaint of liability based on protected activity.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Harvey argued that he was not seeking relief based
on service of the eviction notice; instead, he sought relief based on allegations
that defendants fraudulently invoked the Rent Ordinance to evict him from
his rent-controlled apartment. He further argued that his claims had the
requisite minimal merit, as shown by the declarations of Harvey and his
attorney that were submitted with the opposition. And he argued that the
trial court did not need to consider the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to

5
Harvey’s first cause of action, seeking declaratory relief, which Harvey had
dismissed pursuant to defendants’ demurrers.4
After a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the motion on
the ground that defendants failed to show that the challenged causes of
action arose from protected activity under section 425.16. Defendants timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
As our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he anti-SLAPP statute is
‘designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the
exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.
[Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion to strike a
claim “arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).)’ ” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1008-
1009 (Bonni).)
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First,
‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant
has engaged.’ (Park [v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017)] 2 Cal. 5th [1057,] 1061 [(Park)].) Second, for each claim that does

4 Defendants filed demurrers to Harvey’s complaint on the same day

they filed their anti-SLAPP motion; in response to the demurrers, Harvey
dismissed his first cause of action. On appeal, defendants do not discuss
Harvey’s first cause of action in their arguments on the first step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis, and we do not discuss it further.

6
arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least
“minimal merit.” ’ (Ibid.)” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.)
In the first step of the analysis, courts determine “whether the
plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity. At this first step, courts are to
‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the
defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for
liability.’ (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.)” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
1009.) To determine whether challenged claims arise from protected activity
we consider the pleadings and “affidavits concerning the facts upon which
liability is based.” (Park at p. 1067.) “The defendant’s burden is to identify
what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are
protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni
at p. 1009.) Section 425.16, subdivision (e), identifies four categories of
protected activity. As relevant here, those categories include “any written or
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)
If the court finds that the defendant has met its burden with respect to
the first step of the analysis, the court proceeds to the second step, which
requires it to “determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82, 88 (Navellier).) In making this determination, the court’s “inquiry is
limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made
a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It
accepts the plaintiffs’ evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s
showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.

7
[Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ ” (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-395.)
We review an order granting or denying a motion to strike under
section 425.16 de novo. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)
B. Analysis
At the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the moving defendant
bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the
claims for relief supported by them.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
Even if a cause of action is “ ‘triggered’ by protected activity,” the cause of
action does not necessarily arise from protected activity: “the critical
consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s
protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 89.) We must “respect the distinction between activities that form the
basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity
or provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p.
1064.) A claim is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike “only if the
speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of.” (Id. at p.
1060.) “Thus, where a plaintiff’s claim is based upon ‘an action or decision’ of
the defendant, it is not enough that some protected activity by the defendant
precedes that action or decision, that some protected activity is the means of
communicating that action or decision, or that some protected activity
constitutes evidence of that action or decision. To fall under the anti-SLAPP
statute, the challenged action or decision itself must be protected activity.
(Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686,
700, citing Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1060-1061.) “If the core injury-
producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest
on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions

8
to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.”
(Hylton v. Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272.)
Defendants attempt to meet their burden at the first stage of the
analysis by contending that Harvey “has alleged wrongful endeavor/eviction
and ‘tenant harassment’ claims . . ., as well as negligence and breach of quiet
enjoyment claims, arising from the making of false statements to him
concerning motive, ownership, etc.”5 Defendants argue that the allegedly
false statements were made only in the eviction notice and the complaint in
their unlawful detainer action, and that the eviction notice and unlawful
detainer action “constitute the ‘endeavor’ to recover possession” and that
“without these writings there could be no alleged ‘fraud’ (because there would
be no representation, let alone a misrepresentation) and no alleged
‘endeavor.’ ” Defendants do not identify the specific portions of the complaint
they seek to strike or the elements of any of Harvey’s causes of action that
rest on protected activity; instead, they state in a conclusory fashion that
“Harvey cannot possibly state his fraudulent wrongful eviction claim without
pleading statements made in the [protected] [e]viction [n]otice and then
alleging that they were false.”
For his part, Harvey concedes that the service of the eviction notice and
the filing of an unlawful detainer action are protected activities. But he
argues that his claims are not based on the service of the eviction notice or on

5 Defendants appear to use the words “wrongful endeavor” and

“wrongful eviction” as shorthand for Harvey’s fifth cause of action, which
alleges violation of Rent Ordinance section 37.9. The phrases are derived
from the Rent Ordinance provision authorizing a tenant to “institute a civil
proceeding for injunctive relief [and] money damages” if “a landlord
wrongfully endeavors to recover possession or recovers possession of a rental
unit in violation of” Rent Ordinance section 37.9. (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9,
subd. (f), italics added.)

9
the filing of the unlawful detainer, which is not even mentioned in the
complaint, or on the making of false statements in the eviction notice; his
claims are instead based on defendants’ failure to comply with the
requirements of the Rent Ordinance for owner move-in evictions.
Harvey has the better argument. Defendants insist that Harvey’s case
is “based on the service of the [owner move-in] notice” and that his claim “is
simply that the [owner move-in notice] was allegedly served in bad faith (i.e.,
was somehow bogus).” But defendants’ insistence that Harvey’s claims are
based on the eviction notice does not make it so. And the mere facts that
Harvey’s complaint outlines the representations made in the eviction notice,
and alleges that defendants “misrepresented” who owned the property and
their motive for evicting him and concealed facts about the availability of
other apartments do not mean that Harvey’s claims arose from the eviction
notice for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. The claims that defendants
are challenging here are essentially claims that they violated the provisions
of the Rent Ordinance governing owner move-in evictions, and the issue in
this appeal is whether those Rent Ordinance claims are subject to the anti-
SLAPP statute.
We have examined the pertinent decisions on the application of the
anti-SLAPP law to landlord-tenant matters at length in Delois v. Barrett
Block Partners (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 940, 950-953 (Delois) and Moriarty v.
Laramar Management Corp. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 125, 136-139 (Moriarty).
We draw on our discussion in Delois and Moriarty here to provide a brief
summary of two important cases: Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 154 (Marlin) and Clark v. Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281
(Clark).

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In Marlin, tenants filed a declaratory relief action after their landlords
served notice that they intended to withdraw certain rental units from the
market under the Ellis Act (Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq.). (Marlin, supra, 154
Cal.App.4th at p. 157.) Plaintiffs alleged that a controversy existed in that
plaintiffs contended the landlords were not entitled to invoke or rely on the
Ellis Act, while the landlords contended that they were. (Ibid.) The
defendant landlords filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the complaint
arose from their protected acts of filing and serving the required Ellis Act
notices. (Id. at p. 158.) The trial court granted the motion, but the Court of
Appeal reversed, observing that “the critical question in a SLAPP motion ‘is
whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech
or petitioning activity.’ [¶] Defendants have fallen victim to the logical
fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc—because the notices preceded plaintiffs’
complaint the notices must have caused plaintiffs’ complaint. The filing and
service of the notices may have triggered plaintiffs’ complaint and the notices
may be evidence in support of plaintiffs’ complaint, but they were not the
cause of plaintiffs’ complaint. Clearly, the cause of plaintiffs’ complaint was
defendant’s allegedly wrongful reliance on the Ellis Act as their authority for
terminating plaintiffs’ tenancy. Terminating a tenancy or removing a
property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the
constitutional rights of petition or free speech.” (Id. at pp. 160-161, fns.
omitted.) “[T]he [plaintiffs’] suit is not based on the defendants’ filing and
serving of a notice required under the Ellis Act, it is based on the [plaintiffs’]
contention ‘defendants are not entitled to invoke or rely upon the Ellis Act to
evict plaintiffs from their home.” (Id. at pp. 161-162.)
In Clark, a landlord served and filed the requisite notices to evict a
tenant, allegedly to make the tenant’s unit available to the landlord’s

11
daughter, as permitted by the local rent ordinance. (Clark, supra, 170
Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) The tenant was evicted after the landlord prevailed
in an unlawful detainer action, and subsequently sued the landlord for fraud,
unlawful eviction, and unfair business practices. (Ibid.) The tenant alleged
that the landlord “made fraudulent misrepresentations in the unlawful
detainer action, and never meant for her daughter to reside in [the]
apartment.” (Id. at p. 1285.) Instead, the landlord allegedly kept the
apartment unoccupied in violation of the applicable rent ordinance and
performed renovations with the goal of renting the unit to a new tenant at a
higher rent. (Ibid.) The landlord filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that
the complaint arose from her privileged communications, including serving
the eviction notice. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion,
and the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the tenant’s complaint was
“not premised on [landlord’s] protected activities of initiating or prosecuting
the unlawful detainer action, but on her removal of the apartment from the
rental market and fraudulent eviction of [tenant] for the purpose of installing
a family member who never moved in.” (Id. at p. 1286.)
The Clark court found Marlin instructive, and concluded that the
reasoning in Marlin applied to the case before it: the tenant’s action in Clark
“is not based on [landlord’s] filing or service of the notices of intent to evict, it
is not based on anything [landlord] said in court or a public proceeding, and it
is not based on the fact that [landlord] prosecuted an unlawful detainer
action against her. The complaint is based on [landlord’s] allegedly unlawful
eviction, in that she fraudulently invoked the [rent ordinance] to evict
[tenant] from her rent-controlled apartment as a ruse to provide housing for
her daughter, but never installed her daughter in the apartment as required

12
by that ordinance, and also that she failed to pay Clark’s relocation fee.”
(Clark, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.)
Likewise here: Harvey’s suit is not based on the eviction notice; it is
based on his claim that defendants fraudulently invoked the owner move-in
eviction provision of the Rent Ordinance to evict Harvey from his rent
controlled apartment as a ruse to provide housing for a purported 25 percent
owner of the property, even though other apartments were available.
Defendants were “not sued for exercising constitutional rights. [They were]
sued to compel compliance with the provisions of the [Rent Ordinance].
[Harvey’s] suit was unquestionably ‘triggered by’ [defendants’] statements [in
the eviction notice]. But the suit is not based on those statements. It is
based on [Harvey’s] claim that [defendants] fraudulently invoked the [owner
move-in eviction provision of the Rent Ordinance] to effect [Harvey’s]
eviction.” (Clark, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1289-1290.)6
In arguing that the statements made in the eviction notice are subject
to the anti-SLAPP law, defendants rely on three cases: Birkner v. Lam
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275 (Birkner), Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467 (Feldman), and Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1169 (Wallace).
As we have previously explained in Delois, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at
pages 952-953, and Moriarty, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pages 137-138, the

6 Defendants argue that Clark is distinguishable from the case before

us because Clark “did not involve a claim that the landlord had
misrepresented the initial conditions that justified service of the notice in the
first place.” Defendants are incorrect. Clark states explicitly that the
plaintiff “claimed [the landlord] made fraudulent misrepresentations in the
unlawful detainer action and never meant for her daughter to reside in
Clark’s former apartment.” (Clark, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1285.)

13
court in Clark distinguished Birkner and Feldman, upon which the landlord
in Clark had relied. (Moriarty, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 137; Delois,
supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) We need not discuss Birkner and Feldman
in detail here. Suffice it to say that those two cases are of limited value in
supporting defendants’ position: “ ‘Birkner and Feldman have been criticized
for failing to recognize that the critical consideration is whether the claim is
based on defendant’s protected free speech of petitioning activity. The mere
fact that a claim may have been triggered by protected activity (such as
service of unlawful detainer papers) does not necessarily mean it arose from
that activity.’ ” (Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of
Oakland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 738, 747, fn. 6, quoting Weil & Brown, Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2019)
¶ 7:798; see also Ben-Shahar v. Pickart (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1052-
1053 [distinguishing Clark, Marlin, and “numerous cases [addressing] anti-
SLAPP motions that were not properly advanced in the context of a landlord-
tenant dispute” from Birkner and Feldman, in which “the eviction notices and
unlawful detainer actions were . . . the ‘sole basis for liability’ ”].) We
conclude that the service of the eviction notice on Harvey preceded or
triggered his suit, but was not the basis of the suit—the basis was his claim
that defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the Rent
Ordinance and therefore were not entitled to rely on the provisions permitted
owner move-in evictions.
The other case on which defendants primarily rely is Wallace, in which
a tenant’s cause of action for wrongful eviction alleged that the landlord’s
dominant motive in attempting to recover possession was not one of the
permissible grounds enumerated in the Rent Ordinance. (Wallace, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.) The Court of Appeal found that the cause of

14
action was based on protected activity, specifically, the service of an eviction
notice and the filing of an unlawful detainer action. (Id., at pp. 1182-1183.)
But we find Wallace unpersuasive: it relies on Birkner and Feldman, and
“dismisses Clark in conclusory fashion in a footnote.” (Moriarty, supra, 224
Cal.App.4th at p. 139.)
More persuasive is Ulkarim v. Westfield, LLC (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1266 (Ulkarim), in which a commercial tenant alleged that her landlord
breached an agreement by “ ‘giving unilateral notice of termination [of
tenancy] without cause and in bad faith for the purpose of transferring
Plaintiffs’ successful business to [a third party].’ ” (Id. at p. 1271.) The trial
court granted the landlord’s anti-SLAPP motion based on its conclusion that
the complaint was based on the protected activity of serving a notice of
termination. (Id. at p. 1272.) The tenant appealed, and the Court of Appeal
reversed. (Id. at p. 1270.) The Court of Appeal discussed in depth a host of
cases addressing terminations of tenancy, including Marlin and Clark, and
concluded that the complaint in Ulkarim was not based on the service of a
notice of termination or filing of an unlawful detainer complaint, but was
instead based on the landlord’s “decision to terminate or other conduct in
connection with the termination.” (Id. at pp. 1276-1281) The Court of Appeal
observed that it was “exceedingly difficult to reconcile” Birkner and Feldman
with the other cases it had discussed and “decline[d] to follow Birkner and
Feldman to the extent that those opinions suggest a rule contrary to our
conclusion.” (Id. at p. 1281.) In our case, as in Ulkarim, the plaintiff is
challenging “the underlying decision to terminate” his tenancy, not the
service of the eviction notice. (Ibid.)
Defendants argue for the first time on appeal that our Supreme Court’s
decision in Action Apartment Association, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007)

15
41 Cal.4th 1232 (Action Apartment) requires us to conclude at the first step of
the anti-SLAPP analysis that Harvey’s claims are based on protected activity
and also requires us to conclude that Harvey’s claims for damages are barred
by the litigation privilege. Action Apartment, which does not address the
anti-SLAPP law, was an action brought by landlords to challenge the City of
Santa Monica’s “Tenant Harassment” ordinance that prohibited a landlord
from “maliciously serving a notice of eviction or bringing any action to recover
possession of a rental unit without a reasonable factual or legal basis” and
provided for criminal and civil penalties for violation of the ordinance. (Id. at
pp. 1238-1239.) Action Apartment held that the challenged provision
“conflicts with, and is preempted by, the litigation privilege to the extent it
prohibits, criminalizes, and establishes civil penalties for eviction notices
where litigation is contemplated in good faith and under serious
consideration.” (Id. at p. 1252.)
Defendants’ arguments based on Action Apartment are not entirely
clear, but appear to be that when a tenancy has been terminated by means of
an eviction notice and an unlawful detainer action has been filed, the
litigation privilege attaches to the eviction notice and, by extension, the
protections of the anti-SLAPP statute also attach to the eviction notice.
Because Harvey’s challenge to the termination of his tenancy is, in
defendants’ view, “based on” allegedly false statements in the privileged
eviction notice, his challenge is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion and would
be barred by the litigation privilege. Defendants’ position is that Harvey
could not sue for damages based on a challenge to the eviction notice unless
he had defended against the unlawful detainer action and established in that
action that the eviction notice was in defendant’s words “bogus”—in which
case Harvey’s remedy would be to sue for malicious prosecution.

16
We decline to exercise our discretion to address defendants’ arguments
concerning Action Apartment, which were not raised below. (Newton v.
Clemons (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [appellate courts generally “ ‘ignore
arguments [and] authority . . . not presented and litigated in the trial
court’ ”].) But the arguments are not persuasive in any event. We reject
defendants’ contention that the causes of action in Harvey’s complaint at
issue in this appeal are challenges to the eviction notice. Like the court in
Ulkarim, we distinguish between “cause[s] of action based on the service of a
notice in connection with the termination of a tenancy or filing of an unlawful
detainer complaint” and causes of action like Harvey’s which are “based on
the decision to terminate or other conduct in connection with the
termination.” (Ulkarim, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276 [citing cases that
recognize the distinction, including Clark and Marlin].) We disagree with
defendants’ suggestion that this distinction is inconsistent with Action
Apartment, and we note that although Action Apartment was decided almost
18 years ago, and although it has been cited and discussed in some anti-
SLAPP cases, including Birkner and Feldman, defendants do not contend
that any case has adopted their analysis of its implications.
Because we conclude that defendants have not met their burden at the
first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we do not reach step two. There will be
time enough to address the merits when the case is remanded to the trial
court.
C. Request for Sanctions
In his respondent’s brief, Harvey requests an award of attorney fees as
a sanction on the ground that the appeal is frivolous. However, Harvey has
not filed a separate sanctions motion supported by a declaration as required
by California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a), (b). (See Cowan v. Krayzman

17
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907, 919 [“[s]anctions cannot be sought in the
respondent’s brief”].) The request for sanctions is denied. (See Bak v. MCL
Financial Group, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1118 [failure to comply with
procedure for requesting appellate sanctions is grounds to deny the request].)
DISPOSITION
The challenged order is affirmed. Harvey shall recover his costs on
appeal.

_________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

A170441, Harvey v. Rebennack et al.

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