Diaz v. Salinas CA2/5

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Filed 3/24/25 Diaz v. Salinas CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

GREG ALAN DIAZ, B332599

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV00426)

MICHAEL SALINAS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Grace White and Grace White for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Messina & Hankin and Theodore M. Hankin for
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Greg Diaz (plaintiff) sued defendants Michael
Salinas and Tina Salinas (defendants) because he believed they
wrongfully held title to real property as security for a loan that
he repaid in full. Plaintiff later failed to comply with a trial court
discovery order, and the court imposed issue and evidentiary
sanctions deeming it established that what he claimed were loan
payments were instead rent payments. Largely on the basis of
these sanctions, the trial court subsequently granted summary
judgment for defendants. We consider whether the grant of
summary judgment was proper when plaintiff has not, in this
court, challenged the propriety of the discovery sanctions.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed suit in January 2021. As summarized by the
trial court,1 plaintiff’s complaint alleged causes of action to quiet
title to real property, to cancel a deed, for specific performance,
for damages for breach of an oral contract, for damages for fraud
and deceit, and for restitution based on violations of the Unfair
Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). Plaintiff
contended he transferred title to his home in Reseda to
defendants in 2018 and defendants thereafter paid outstanding
property taxes and utility bills. Plaintiff alleged these payments

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Plaintiff did not include the complaint in the appellate
record. Although this omission alone might be a basis for
affirmance (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502 [“Appealed judgments and orders
are presumed correct, and error must be affirmatively shown”]),
plaintiff does not dispute the trial court’s description of the
complaint. So we proceed on the understanding the trial court’s
description is accurate.

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constituted a loan and defendants agreed to transfer title back to
him when he repaid the loan amount, which he has now done.
In July 2022, defendants moved to compel the production of
certain documents. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion or appear
at the hearing. The trial court ordered plaintiff to produce all
responsive documents within 20 days and pay $1,260 in expenses
associated with bringing the motion.
That deadline passed with no response from plaintiff.
Defendants then moved for terminating sanctions or, in the
alternative, for an order deeming certain facts established. Their
position in the litigation was that they never agreed to give title
to the real property back to plaintiff; instead, they agreed to let
him continue living in the home rent-free until he was “back on
[his] feet,” at which point he would pay rent. They accordingly
sought to preclude plaintiff from presenting evidence that he
lacked capacity to convey the real property to defendants, that he
paid property taxes between 2012 and 2018, or that payments he
made to defendants were anything other than “rent payments for
the hiring of real property[.]”
The trial court granted the requested issue and evidentiary
sanctions, which precluded plaintiff from presenting evidence on
those issues (and others). Specifically, the court deemed it
established that: (1) at all relevant times, plaintiff had the
capacity and understanding to convey title to the subject property
to defendants, (2) plaintiff paid no property taxes on the subject
property between December 2012 and September 2018, and (3)
“[a]ll payments [p]laintiff has made to [d]efendant[ ] Michael
Salinas[ ] between September 2018 and the present constitute
rent payments for the hiring of real property.”

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After the court imposed these issue sanctions, defendants
moved for summary judgment. They argued the trial court’s
issue and evidentiary sanctions left no triable issue of material
fact as to whether plaintiff had capacity to transfer title to the
property to defendants or whether he repaid the purported loan.
Plaintiff, represented by counsel, filed an opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. The opposition is not easily
intelligible, but the dominant theme is that there remains a
triable issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff made loan
payments to defendants.
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants.
The court reasoned that “all of [p]laintiff’s claims, whether
arising out of contract and/or fraud, are premised upon [his]
repayment of the loan . . . and/or the payment of the tax lien on
the [p]roperty” and the discovery sanctions foreclosed any “triable
issue of material fact as to an essential element of [p]laintiff’s
claims as alleged in the [c]omplaint.” The trial court rejected
plaintiff’s “suggestion that there is a triable issue of material fact
as to whether [he] is entitled to restitution under a theory of
unjust enrichment” for “the same reasons” and because it
sustained defendants’ hearsay objection to plaintiff’s evidence of
the Reseda home’s fair market value.

II. DISCUSSION
“‘Even when our review on appeal “is de novo, it is limited
to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in
[the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.] . . . .”’ [Citation.]”
(Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 467, 554-555.) None of the issues plaintiff raises on
appeal addresses the trial court’s reasons for granting summary

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judgment. As we proceed to explain, plaintiff does not contest (or,
charitably, does not adequately contest) the discovery sanctions;
his argument that he repaid a loan from defendants is foreclosed
by the unchallenged sanctions order; and he misunderstands the
concept of unjust enrichment in arguing his transaction with
defendants was one-sided.
Plaintiff’s briefs in this court do not argue the trial court
erred in imposing the issue and evidentiary sanctions it did. The
closest plaintiff comes is a statement that the trial court “did not
make any determination that [he] had or had not mental
capacity . . . during discovery” so there should be a trial at which
plaintiff is permitted “to present evidence of his mental capacity
other than when he entered into the contract in question.” That
is insufficient to place the correctness of the trial court’s
sanctions ruling before us as an issue requiring review. (See,
e.g., Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.)
Plaintiff does argue “he was made to execute the [q]uit
[c]laim [d]eed in [defendants’] name . . . in return for a
loan . . . that has been repaid.” But this is fatally undermined by
the trial court’s unchallenged issue sanction that deemed it
established plaintiff paid rent, rather than repaying a purported
loan. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subds. (b)-(c) [authorizing trial
court to impose sanctions “ordering that designated facts shall be
taken as established in the action” and “prohibiting any party
engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing
designated matters in evidence”].)
Plaintiff also argues “[i]t would be an unconscionable case
of unjust enrichment for [defendants] to receive a property now
from a US Veteran worth $697,000.00 when they made a loan to
plaintiff for it of $33,000 for which they received a $44,000.00

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repayment.” This argument suffers from multiple problems. As
we have already explained, the unchallenged sanctions order
precludes the argument that plaintiff’s payments to defendants
were anything other than rent payments. More fundamentally,
plaintiff uses the phrase “unjust enrichment” in a colloquial sense
that is entirely divorced from his claims in this action. In the
absence of a triable issue as to whether plaintiff performed under
the alleged loan agreement, plaintiff has not articulated a theory
under which defendants have some quasi-restitutionary
obligation to reconvey title to the Reseda property or return the
money he paid them. (See generally Hartford Casualty Insurance
Co. v. J.R. Marketing, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 988, 999
[“Restitution is not mandated merely because one person has
realized a gain at another’s expense. Rather, the obligation
arises when the enrichment obtained lacks any adequate legal
basis and thus ‘cannot conscientiously be retained’”].)
Plaintiff’s opening brief also includes an inscrutable
discussion of a cause of action for money had and received. His
complaint, however, did not include a cause of action for money
had and received. Moreover, even if it had, the unchallenged
discovery sanctions once again preclude the argument that
plaintiff’s payments to defendants were anything other than valid
rent payments.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded costs
on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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