People v. Bolanos CA5

CourtListener 10362756Calctapp24 mar 2025

Testo completo

Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Bolanos CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F082970
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MCR063072)
v.

CARLOS ALFONSO BOLANOS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Mitchell C.
Rigby, Judge.
Jean M. Marinovich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell and Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorneys General,
Eric L. Christoffersen, Kenneth N. Sokoler, and Ross K. Naughton, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Carlos Alfonso Bolanos was 22 years old when he committed various sex crimes
for which he was sentenced to serve, inter alia, multiple life in prison without parole and
multiple life in prison with parole terms. These sentences were based on the One Strike
law (Pen. Code,1 § 667.61). On an unrelated occasion, he stole a car and was convicted
for its theft.
In a prior appeal, we addressed numerous contentions, primarily relating to the
sentence imposed and parole eligibility. Bolanos petitioned for review in the California
Supreme Court. The petition was granted and deferred pending resolution in three
separate cases. After those cases were resolved, the Supreme Court transferred the matter
back to this court, “with directions to vacate [our] decision and reconsider the cause in
light of In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706 [(Vaquera)].”
We have reconsidered the cause. We will issue substantially the same opinion,
except that we apply Vaquera and its principles to reach the same conclusion in part II.,
post. In all other respects, the prior opinion will stand.
OVERVIEW
In sum, Bolanos makes several claims, mostly related to sentencing. Primarily, he
suggests the youthful offender parole scheme—which excludes people sentenced under
the One Strike law, and people sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as
adults—violates equal protection. (See § 3051, subd. (h).) The People dispute any equal
protection violation.
Second, Bolanos complains the court erred in pronouncing one of the life in prison
with parole terms. The People concede, but the parties diverge on the appropriate
remedy. Their disagreement centers on due process and notice.
Third, Bolanos contends the trial court should have stayed some of the One Strike
sentences pursuant to section 654, which generally prohibits multiple punishment for a
single act. The People disagree.
We find against Bolanos on these three issues. We also address his remaining
contentions—which we further detail below. Ultimately, we will reverse the car theft

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
conviction for insufficient evidence, direct the court to stay certain other sentences, and
remand for resentencing. The judgment, including the life without parole terms, is
otherwise affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Charges
The Madera County District Attorney charged Bolanos with numerous crimes and
special allegations. The following crimes were charged: forcible rape (§ 261,
subd. (a)(2); Counts 1 & 2), forcible oral copulation of a minor (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(C);
Count 3), aggravated kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 4), forcible oral copulation
(§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); Count 5), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); Count 6), false
imprisonment (§ 236; Count 7), vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Count 8),
and grand theft automobile (§ 484/487, subd. (d)(1); Count 9). The charges included the
following special allegations: aggravated kidnapping in Counts 1, 2, and 3 (§ 667.61,
subds. (l) & (d)(2)), aggravated kidnapping in Counts 1, 2, and 3 (§ 667.61, subds. (a) &
(d)(2)), kidnapping in Counts 1, 2, and 3 (§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (e)(1)), kidnapping in
Count 5 (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)(1)),2 and multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (a) &
(e)(4)).
Trial Evidence
There are three victims in this case. We will summarize the evidence relative to
each victim in the order presented at trial. In each incident, Bolanos used his “girlfriend”
or a fake Facebook3 profile to contact the victim. The fake profile was named “Maritza
Martinez” and depicted a “Mexican” “teenage girl ….”4

2 The basis for this special allegation is subject to some debate and discussed
further below.
3 Facebook is a “social media service provider[] ….” (Facebook, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1245, 1248.)
4 Victim one provided the Maritza Martinez description at the trial.

3.
Victim One: Counts 1 through 4 (forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, kidnapping)
Victim one agreed to meet Maritza Martinez for a job. At the last minute, victim
one was told Bolanos would meet her instead and he indeed showed up in a van. Victim
one entered, believing she would help sell fruit. Bolanos drove her down the street and
then forced her to perform oral sex. He then drove her to a second location, raped her,
took her back to the first location, and then raped her again. To accomplish the acts,
Bolanos verbally threatened the victim with a weapon.5
Victim Two: Counts 5 through 7 (forcible oral copulation, criminal threats, false
imprisonment)
Victim two agreed to meet her friend at the friend’s home, a trailer.6 Her friend
was in a relationship with Bolanos. When victim two arrived at the trailer, she hesitated
to enter and remained outside until Bolanos approached and “told [her] go in” because
her friend “was in there.” After she complied by entering, Bolanos told her her friend
was not home. Victim two tried to leave but Bolanos blocked the door, held a knife to
her “stomach,” threatened to “stab her,” and forced her to perform oral sex.
Victim Three: Counts 8 and 9 (vehicle theft, grand theft automobile)
Victim three agreed to sell her car to Maritza Martinez. At the last minute, victim
three was told Bolanos would meet her instead. Bolanos showed up, test drove the car,
and then victim three signed over the “pink slip ….” After signing over the “pink slip,”
Bolanos handed victim three fake money concealed in an envelope. Victim three exited
the car, ultimately realized the money was fake, and Bolanos drove off the with car.

5 Bolanos did not display a weapon during the threats.

6 Victim two and her friend—Bolanos’s girlfriend—communicated through
Facebook. Bolanos “kicked” his girlfriend “out” after she invited victim two to visit. The
girlfriend testified she invited her friend over at Bolanos’s request and complied
“[b]ecause he was going to hit [her] if [she] didn’t [do] it.” She also helped him use the
Maritza Martinez profile to arrange the meeting with victim three.

4.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found Bolanos guilty on each charged crime. The jury found the
aggravated kidnapping special allegations to Count 1 not true (§ 667.61, subds. (l) &
(d)(2) and (a) & (d)(2)). It also found the kidnapping special allegation to Count 5 not
true (§ 667.61, subd. (b) & (e)(1)). The remaining special allegations were found true.
The court sentenced Bolanos to serve life without parole on Counts 2 and 3,
25 years to life on Counts 1 and 5, seven years to life on Count 4,7 and four years, four
months on Counts 6 through 9. Only the Count 9 term was stayed.
DISCUSSION
This appeal presents numerous issues. We address the issues in the following
order.
First, is Bolanos eligible for youthful offender parole (§ 3051)? Two, did the court
properly impose a 25-year-to-life sentence on Count 5? Three, should the court have
stayed two of the terms imposed on Counts 1, 2, and 3? Four, did the court fail to stay
the seven-year-to-life sentence on Count 4? Five, did the evidence insufficiently prove
vehicle theft (Count 8)? Six, did the court err in its grand-theft-automobile jury
instructions (Count 9)? Seven, should the court have stayed two of the terms imposed for
Counts 5, 6, and 7?
The People concede several issues. The People agree the court wrongly imposed a
25-year-to-life sentence on Count 5 but dispute the remedy, agree the court failed to stay
the sentence on Count 4, agree the evidence failed to prove vehicle theft (Count 8), agree
the court’s grand-theft-automobile instructions were erroneous but disclaim prejudice,
and assert the court should have stayed the sentence on Counts 6 and 7.
The People disagree the youthful offender parole scheme violates equal protection.
They also believe the court appropriately sentenced Bolanos on Counts 1, 2, and 3.

7 See section 3046, subdivision (a)(1).

5.
We find the youthful offender parole scheme does not, on its face, violate equal
protection. We agree with the parties the court erred in pronouncing a 25-year-to-life
sentence on Count 5 but hold the remedy is to impose a 15-year-to-life sentence. Finally,
we also agree the court failed to stay the sentence on Counts 4, 6, and 7, the evidence was
insufficient to prove vehicle theft, and the court’s grand-theft-automobile jury
instructions were erroneous but harmless. We will remand the case with directions to
enter an acquittal on Count 8 and otherwise resentence Bolanos consistent with this
opinion.
I. The Youthful Offender Parole Scheme Does Not Violate Equal Protection
As pertinent, “[a] youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the Board of
Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who
was 25 years of age or younger … at the time of the controlling offense.” (§ 3051,
subd. (a)(1).) Youthful offender parole does not apply, however, “to cases in which
sentencing occurs pursuant to … [s]ection 667.61, or to cases in which an individual is
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that
was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.” (§ 3051, subd. (h).) Both
exclusions apply in this case.
Bolanos claims “[e]qual protection principals [sic] require the provisions of
section 3051 be extended to him.” “[T]he requirement of equal protection ensures that
the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification.”
(People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman).)
“Where, as here, a statute involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right,
it need only meet minimum equal protection standards, and survive ‘rational basis
review.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) Bolanos suggests “[n]o rational
basis supports exclusion of first-time youthful offenders convicted of LWOP under the
One Strike law when youthful offenders convicted of murder are eligible.” He does not
otherwise address the LWOP-as-an-adult exclusion.

6.
The People do not agree Bolanos’s exclusion from youthful offender parole
violates equal protection. They instead contend “there could be a rational basis for the
disparate treatment.” The People focus on the One Strike exclusion and do not address
the LWOP exclusion.
The California Supreme Court resolved these claims after the parties submitted
their briefs. Bolanos is not entitled to relief and is ineligible for parole under both
exclusions. (People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 136-137 [youthful parole
exclusion for “One Strike offenders” does not violate equal protection]; People v. Hardin
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 839 [LWOP exclusion from youthful parole does not violate equal
protection on its face].)8
II. A One Strike Sentence On Count 5 Is Authorized
Depending on the circumstances pled and proven, the One Strike law mandates
imprisonment for 15 years to life, 25 years to life, or LWOP. (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (b),
(j), (l), and (m).) At issue in this case are section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (b).
Section 667.61, subdivision (a) states: “Except as provided in subdivision (j), (l),
or (m), a person who is convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one or
more of the circumstances specified in subdivision (d) or under two or more of the
circumstances specified in subdivision (e) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for 25 years to life.” Section 667.61, subdivision (b) states: “Except as provided in
subdivision (a), (j), (l), or (m), a person who is convicted of an offense specified in

8 Bolanos did not raise equal protection in the trial court, nor did he attempt to
raise an as-applied argument in this court. We accordingly do not address or foreclose an
as-applied challenge.
“An as applied challenge … seek[s] relief from a specific application of a facially
valid statute ….” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 (Tobe).)
“When a criminal defendant claims that a facially valid statute … has been applied in a
constitutionally impermissible manner to the defendant, the court evaluates the propriety
of the application on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to relieve the defendant
of the sanction.” (Ibid.)

7.
subdivision (c) under one of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e) shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 15 years to life.” The difference
between the two subdivisions is the quantity and quality of circumstances proven.
Here, relative to Count 5, the People charged two special allegations. The first
special allegation, reproduced in full below, charged a kidnapping circumstance pursuant
to section 667.61, subdivision (e)(1) and referenced both subdivisions (a) and (b). The
second special allegation, reproduced in full below, charged a multiple victim
circumstance pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4) and referenced only
subdivision (a).
Because the jury found true only the multiple victim circumstance, a 25-year-to-
life sentence under section 667.61, subdivision (a) is unauthorized because that
subdivision requires two proven subdivision (e) circumstances.9 The trial court erred in
pronouncing a 25-year-to-life sentence. The question is: what is the remedy?
The People claim the trial court should pronounce sentence pursuant to
section 667.61, subdivision (b). Bolanos asserts no One Strike sentence is permitted
because the only circumstance found true referenced subdivision (a), which requires two
proven circumstances. Based on the record in this case, we agree with The People.
A. Additional Background
The Count 5 special allegations—as charged by the People and reproduced in
full—follow:
“SPECIAL ALLEGATION 1
PC667.61(b)/(c)/(e)(1): Aggravating Circumstances

IT IS FURTHER ALLEGED As to Count 5 within the
meaning of State of California Penal Code
Sections 667.61(a), (c)(7) and (e)(1), as to CARLOS
ALFONSO BOLANOS, that the following circumstances

9 For clarity, only one section 667.61, subdivision (d) circumstance is necessary to
prove to invoke the One Strike law. But that subdivision is not at issue here.

8.
apply: the defendant kidnapped the victim of the present
offense in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5

SPECIAL ALLEGATION 2
PENAL CODE SECTION 667.61(a)/(c)/(e)(4):
Aggravating Circumstances

IT IS FURTHER ALLEGED, as to Counts 1 through 3 and
Count 5, within the meaning of State of California Penal
Code Sections 667.61(a), (c)(1), (c)(7) and (e)(4), as to
CARLOS ALFONSO BOLANOS, that the following
circumstances apply: the defendant has been convicted in the
present case or cases of committing an offense specified in
subdivision (c) against more than one victim.”
As noted, the jury found Special Allegation 2 true, and Special Allegation 1 not true.
Prior to trial, counsel for Bolanos filed a motion to dismiss. !(CT 84)! Counsel
listed the charges and allegations in the motion, explicitly acknowledging Bolanos faced
“15 Years to Life” under Count 5 due to the “667.61(e)(4)” allegation. !(CT 86-87)!
Minute orders throughout the case indicate the parties attempted to negotiate a
plea. According to these orders, the People “offer[ed] 50 to Life,” and Bolanos
“counter[ed]” with “35 to life.” !(CT 72)! After the People rejected the counter offer
!(CT 97)!, a jury trial was “confirmed,” !(CT 97)! and it began approximately one month
later. !(CT 98, 112)! The record indicates no other settlement discussion.
B. Analysis
“A defendant has a due process right to fair notice of any sentencing allegation
that, if proven, will increase the punishment for a crime. [Citations.] In the sentencing
enhancement context, the touchstone of fair notice is whether the accusatory pleading
enables the defense to predict the sentence the defendant faces if convicted. To enable a
defendant to make this prediction, an accusatory pleading must provide the defendant
with fair notice of the factual basis on which the prosecution is seeking an increased
punishment and of ‘the potential sentence.’ ” (Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 717.)
“[A]n accusatory pleading that fails to inform the defendant that the prosecution is

9.
pursuing a particular sentencing enhancement in connection with a specific count does
not allow the defendant to predict the potential sentence[.]” (Id. at pp. 717-718.)
“[T]o satisfy due process, an accusatory pleading must inform the defendant that
the prosecution is relying on specific facts to support imposition of a particular One
Strike sentence.” (Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 719.) “[D]ue process does not
require ‘rigid code pleading or the incantation of magic words.’ [Citation.] An
accusatory pleading need not specify the number of the pertinent sentencing statute, so
long as it otherwise clearly notifies the accused of the factual basis on which it is seeking
a longer sentence and the information necessary to calculate sentencing exposure.” (Id.
at pp. 719-720.)
“If a One Strike allegation describes the specific factual circumstance based on
which the prosecution seeks One Strike sentencing and cites to section 667.61, the
allegation does not necessarily need to specify the sentence (i.e., ‘15 years to life,’ ‘25
years to life,’ or ‘life without the possibility of parole’) or cite to the specific subdivision
of section 667.61 that provides the applicable enhanced penalty.” (Vaquera, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 720.) “Similarly, a One Strike allegation need not specify the factual
basis of the sentence the prosecution is seeking if the allegation’s text otherwise makes
clear that the prosecution intends to rely on the facts alleged in connection with the
underlying count to seek imposition of a specific One Strike sentence on that count. To
satisfy due process, it is sufficient for an accusatory pleading to provide the defendant
fair notice of the particular One Strike sentence the prosecution is seeking and of which
facts it intends to prove to support that sentence.” (Ibid.)
Based on the above principles we recognize the pleading is not perfect. We
nonetheless find it adequate and fair. The singular defect is that the pleading combines
section 667.61, subdivision (a) and (e) with only one circumstance. A section 667.61,
subdivision (a) sentence only applies if “one or more of the circumstances specified in

10.
subdivision (d) or … two or more of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e)” is, or
are, proven. (Emphasis added.)
At bottom, specific to Count 5, the information invoked the One Strike law, a 25-
year-to-life sentence, a 15-year-to-life sentence, a kidnapping circumstance, and a
multiple victim circumstance. A multiple victim circumstance combined with Count 5,
i.e., forcible oral copulation, carries a 15-year-to-life sentence under section 667.61,
subdivision (b). These pleading-facts sufficiently apprised Bolanos of a potential One
Strike sentence.
To find otherwise, we would need to conclude the People exercised discretion to
charge a legal impossibility—a One Strike sentence invoking one 667.61, subdivision (e)
circumstance under subdivision (a). Such a conclusion defies logic. It is true “a
prosecutor has the discretion to charge any provision of the One Strike law supported by
the facts or, indeed, to elect not to invoke the One Strike law at all; nothing requires the
prosecutor to charge the One Strike provision that carries the longest sentence.”
(Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 724.) The pleading in this case, however, clearly
alleged the One Strike law and all applicable factual circumstances. No reasonable
reading leads to a conclusion the prosecutor intentionally charged a legal impossibility,
especially where the information otherwise sought LWOP terms on other counts.
The best evidence for our conclusion is the fact Bolanos’s counsel actually
understood the Count 5 multiple victim circumstance carried a 15-year-to-life sentence.
!(CT 86-87)! We need not analyze any further.
We conclude our analysis by noting the California Supreme Court in Vaquera
acknowledged the possibility a pleading error is “subject to a prejudice analysis[.]”
(Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 726.) There, the Court repeatedly emphasized “the
purpose of a statutory pleading requirement is ‘to give sufficient notice to permit the
defense to make informed decisions about the case, including whether to plead guilty,
how to allocate investigatory resources, and what strategy to deploy at trial.’ ” (Ibid.)

11.
Bolanos makes no attempt to demonstrate prejudice, nor could he. The People
offered to settle the case, Bolanos impliedly rejected the offer, made a counteroffer, and
then swiftly proceeded to trial when the People rejected the counteroffer. There is no
reason to believe the information—relative to Count 5—impacted any strategic decision
in the case. More importantly, Bolanos faced LWOP sentences on other counts. It makes
no sense to believe Bolanos forwent resolving or defending against the LWOP charges
and instead would have chosen to resolve his case or defend against it differently had
Count 5—a parole eligible charge—been pleaded in a clearer manner. In other words,
there is no conceivable rationale Bolanos’s strategy was impacted by the Count 5
pleading language.
In sum, the One Strike law and all circumstances at issue in this case were pled.
Bolanos had the opportunity to defend against the factual allegations. He faced LWOP
sentences on other counts. The People rejected his counteroffer to settle the case. His
attorney knew the Count 5 charge and multiple victim circumstance carried a 15-year-to-
life sentence. There is no conceivable error or prejudice on this record. On remand, the
trial court shall impose a 15-year-to-life sentence on Count 5 pursuant to section 667.61,
subdivision (b).
III. The Sentences On Counts 1 Through 3 Are Proper
The court pronounced consecutive One-Strike-law sentences for each sex-crime
conviction committed against victim one, as charged in Counts 1, 2, and 3. Bolanos
contends, because each sentence was “based on the same act of kidnapping” and
“[s]ection 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the same act,” the court could apply “the
One Strike law only to one count.”
The People argue, because “section 654 does not preclude multiple punishment for
the substantive crimes,” it “does not preclude punishment for attached enhancements ….”
We hold the sentences at issue here do not violate section 654.

12.
As relevant, section 654 states “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different
ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but
in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
Section 654 “ensure[s] that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his
culpability.” (People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 341 (Correa).) It “does not bar
multiple punishment simply because numerous sex offenses are rapidly committed
against a victim with the ‘sole’ aim of achieving sexual gratification.” (People v.
Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 325.) “ ‘A person who commits separate, factually
distinct, crimes, even with only one ultimate intent and objective, is more culpable than
the person who commits only one crime in pursuit of the same intent and objective.’ ”
(Correa, supra, at p. 341.) These principles are controlling.
“ ‘[T]he One Strike law is an alternative sentencing scheme ….’ ” (People v.
Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 534.) “ ‘[I]t applies only to certain felony sex
offenses.’ ” (Ibid.)
In this case, Bolanos committed three discrete One Strike crimes while
substantially moving the victim between each crime,10 impliedly ignoring multiple

10 For this reason, it does not matter—as Bolanos argues—kidnapping is a
continuous crime. (See People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 233.) Here, Bolanos
committed three distinct One Strike crimes against victim one.
To suggest an exception for One Strike crimes based on a kidnapping
circumstance would permit a single prison term for a person who succeeds in kidnapping
and secreting a victim for a lengthy time period, while otherwise committing innumerable
sex crimes. Such an interpretation would reward the most culpable individuals and we
reject it because the One Strike law’s purpose is “to increase the penalties imposed on
defendants who commit certain sexual offenses under specified circumstances.”
(People v. Betts (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 294, 299; cf. People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th
269, 354-355 [prior law permitted “ ‘a single … sentence … for a sequence of sexual
assaults by [a] defendant against one victim that occurred during an uninterrupted time
frame and in a single occasion.’ ”].)

13.
opportunities to abandon his criminal endeavor.11 There is no reason to believe section
654 should apply in this circumstance, and we find it does not.
In any event, section 667.61, subdivision (h) states “[n]otwithstanding any other
law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence
be suspended for, a person who is subject to punishment under” the One Strike law. The
First District Court of Appeal recently held this subdivision means section 654 does not
apply to the One Strike law. (People v. Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669, 688-690
(Caparaz).) We agree. The Count 1, 2, and 3 sentences will remain.
IV. The Trial Court Must Stay the Sentence On Count 4
The jury found Bolanos guilty of kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)) as charged in
Count 4. The jury used the same act—kidnapping—to find true the One Strike
allegations charged in Counts 1, 2, and 3.
The court imposed a consecutive sentence for Count 4. Bolanos contends the
sentence is prohibited by law. The People agree. The parties are correct.
As relevant, section 667.61 states:

“If only the minimum number of circumstances specified in
subdivision (d) or (e) that are required for the punishment
provided in subdivision (a), (b), (j), (l), or (m) to apply have
been pled and proved, that circumstance or those
circumstances shall be used as the basis for imposing the term
provided in subdivision (a), (b), (j), (l), or (m) whichever is
greater, rather than being used to impose the punishment
authorized under any other law ….” (§ 667.61, subd. (f).)

11 Section 667.61, subdivision (i) mandates consecutive sentences for “crimes
involv[ing] … the same victim on separate occasions ….” A separate occasion is defined
by reference to section 667.6, subdivision (d), which in part requires “consider[ation of]
whether, between the commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to reflect upon the defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed
sexually assaultive behavior.” Bolanos certainly had opportunities to reflect.

14.
Likewise, section 209, subdivision (d) states “a person may not be punished under
[section 209,] subdivision (b) and [s]ection 667.61 for the same act that constitutes a
violation of both subdivision (b) and [s]ection 667.61.”
There is neither dispute nor doubt the trial court’s sentence violated these sections.
On remand, when the court again pronounces judgment, it must stay the sentence on
Count 4.
V. The Evidence Failed To Prove Vehicle Theft (Count 8)
The jury convicted Bolanos for violating Vehicle Code section 10851,
subdivision (a). As pertinent, to prove the violation, the People had to prove Bolanos
took the car “without the consent of the owner ….” (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a);
People v. Bullard (2020) 9 Cal.5th 94, 102.) Bolanos now claims he took the vehicle at
issue with the owner’s consent.
The People concede. We accept the concession.
Here, Bolanos took the vehicle with the owner’s consent, albeit in a fraudulent
manner. But, “ ‘ “unless there is statutory language to the contrary, whenever lack of
consent is a necessary element of a crime, the fact that consent is obtained through
misrepresentation will not supply the essential element of nonconsent.” ’ ” (People v.
Stuedemann (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1, 7; People v. Donell (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 613,
617 [taking a vehicle with “ ‘fraudulently induced consent is consent nonetheless’ ”].)
Because Bolanos had the owner’s consent, the conviction for taking a vehicle
without the owner’s consent is insufficiently proven and cannot stand. He is entitled to
an acquittal on Count 8. (See People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1129-1130
[double jeopardy clauses bar retrial if reversal is based on insufficient evidence].)
VI. The Grand Theft Automobile Conviction Is Affirmed
In Count 9, the jury found Bolanos guilty of “grand theft auto,” a violation of
section 484/487(d)(1) ….” Bolanos claims “the conviction must be reversed” because it
was “based on the theory of larceny, which requires a showing that the property was

15.
taken without the owner’s consent.” He adds that, “[a]lthough the evidence might have
supported a finding of theft by false pretenses, the jury was not instructed on that theory”
and a “conviction cannot be upheld based on a theory on which the jury was not
instructed.”
The People acknowledge “the jury was indeed instructed on the wrong theory of
theft.” They “disagree that any remedy is called for.”
We find the court erred in its jury instructions. However, for the following
reasons, the error is not prejudicial.
A. Additional Background
Relative to Count 9, the court instructed the jury as follows:

“The defendant is charged in Count 9 with grand theft.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that:

1. The defendant took possession of property owned by
someone else;

2. The defendant took the property without the owner’s
consent;

3. When the defendant took the property he intended to
deprive the owner of it permanently or to remove it from the
owner’s possession for so extended a period of time that the
owner would be deprived of a major portion of the value or
enjoyment of the property;

AND

4. The defendant moved the property, even a small distance,
and kept it for any period of time, however brief.” (See
CALCRIM No. 1800.)
The court did not instruct the jury with any other theft theory, including theft by false
pretenses. (See CALCRIM No. 1804.)

16.
B. Analysis
“The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements
of the charged offense.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824 (Merritt).) Failure
to do so is “very serious constitutional error because it threatens the right to a jury trial
that both the United States and California Constitutions guarantee.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Where the effect of the omission can be “quantitatively assessed” in the context
of the entire record (and does not otherwise qualify as structural error), the failure to
instruct on one or more elements is mere “ ‘trial error’ ” and thus amenable to harmless
error review.” (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 828.) “Certainly, the more elements that
are omitted, the less likely it is that the error is harmless, but so long as the error does not
vitiate all of the jury’s findings, it is amenable to harmless error analysis.” (Id. at p. 829.)
“An instructional error involving multiple elements, like an error involving a single
element, will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances, such as where each
element was undisputed, the defense was not prevented from contesting any of the
omitted elements, and overwhelming evidence supports the omitted element.” (People v.
Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 414.)
Not all of the jury’s findings are vitiated in this case.12 There was little doubt
Bolanos committed the theft—he conceded the crime and testified to its commission.13

12 For example, the jury did find Bolanos took another person’s property. Such a
finding is the baseline for all theft.
13 Bolanos testified he purchased the car with “fake money.” After his testimony
but before closing arguments, defense counsel informed the court, “I have had a chance
to talk to Mr. Bolanos about this, and we believe it to be strategically in our best
interest … to concede” Counts 8 and 9.
In closing argument, defense counsel stated, “Regarding … charges number 8 and
9, those are regarding the vehicle theft. My client admitted that, yes, he took the car. …
[T]he evidence is abundantly clear that it’s beyond a reasonable doubt that he did that.
And that’s the one for number 8 and 9, regarding the car theft, that’s an easy one to go
back – as a jury, the first thing you should probably, after you elect a foreperson is circle
guilty on those two charges.”

17.
“ ‘One situation in which instructional error removing an element of the crime
from the jury’s consideration has been deemed harmless is where the defendant concedes
or admits that element.’ ” (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 831.) Such is the case here—
Bolanos did not contest the crime and instead confessed to it in open court.
The remaining, omitted14 theft-by-false-pretense elements were “ ‘uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the
same absent the error[. T]he erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.’ ”
(Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 832.) We will affirm the Count 9 grand theft auto
conviction but in doing so acknowledge “appellate factfinding is permitted to cure a
failure to instruct on one or two elements, [but] at some point the severity of the error
must tip the balance the other way.” (Id. at p. 835 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) Based on the
record in this case, we do not believe the balance has tipped.
VII. The Trial Court Should Stay the Sentences On Counts 6 and 7
In Counts 5, 6, and 7, the jury convicted Bolanos of forcible oral copulation, false
imprisonment, and criminal threats for the crimes committed against victim two. The
court sentenced Bolanos to serve an indeterminate term on Count 5,15 and an additional
three years, eight months on Counts 6 and 7.
Bolanos contends “section 654 requires stay of two of the three sentences in
counts 5, 6[,] and 7.” The People suggest “the sentences on Counts 6 and 7 must be
stayed.”
We agree with the People. On remand, the court must stay the sentence on Counts
6 and 7.16

14 See CALCRIM No. 1804.

15 See II., ante.

16 Bolanos correctly notes section 654 now allows the court to stay the sentence on
any count, including the count carrying the longest sentence. But he also correctly notes
section 667.61, subdivision (h) contains an exception to this rule. Because we have

18.
DISPOSITION17
The judgment on Count 8 is reversed. The terms imposed on Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7
are vacated. The trial court is directed to enter judgment of acquittal on Count 8, and
pronounce judgment on Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 consistent with this opinion. The judgment
is otherwise affirmed.

SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

FRANSON, J.

found the court must also impose a One Strike sentence on Count 5 (see II., ante), the
court must impose that sentence and stay sentence on Counts 6 and 7. (See Caparaz,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 689-690.) For this reason, we note the recent amendment to
section 654 has no application to this case. (See, generally, People v. Mani (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 343, 351.)
17 We note the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment included a stay on
Count 9. The abstract of judgment does not reflect the stay. On remand, the court must
ensure the abstract of judgment reflects the court’s oral pronouncement.

19.

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