CourtListener 10362749•People v. Studnicka CA2/1
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Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Studnicka CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B331329
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA107214)
v.
DONALD STUDNICKA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge. Affirmed.
Stanley Dale Radtke, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Blythe Leszkay and David E. Madeo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
A jury convicted defendant Donald Studnicka of one count
of assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced
Studnicka to the midterm of three years in prison.
On appeal, Studnicka argues the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the jury panel, declining to
continue the trial to permit his counsel to conduct discovery on
whether the jury panel was drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community, and instructing the jury it could infer from evidence
that Studnicka fled from the scene of the crime that he was
aware of his guilt. In addition, Studnicka contends the
cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial.
We reject Studnicka’s challenge to the denial of his motion
to dismiss the jury panel because we are bound by state Supreme
Court precedent requiring a defendant to show that an improper
feature of the jury selection process systematically excluded
members of a particular group from jury venires, and Studnicka
does not claim to have satisfied that requirement. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying a request to continue the
trial that Studnicka claims to have raised on the first day of jury
selection. Lastly, the flight instruction did not reduce the
prosecution’s burden of proof, and Studnicka fails to establish
that the evidence did not support issuance of the instruction.
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND1
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our resolution
of this appeal.
1 We derive our Background in part from admissions made
by the parties in their appellate briefing and assertions made by
the Attorney General that Studnicka does not contest in his reply
2
The People filed an information charging Studnicka with
one count of assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Penal
Code2 section 245, subdivision (a)(1). Each of the first two trials
ended in a mistrial because the jury was unable to return a
verdict.
At Studnicka’s third trial, there was evidence that on the
evening of September 18, 2022, Studnicka had a physical
altercation with C.M. at a park. The prosecution presented
evidence that Studnicka pulled out a knife and attacked C.M.
after C.M. declined Studnicka’s offer to have a drink with him,
and that C.M. was not armed.3 Studnicka took the stand and
brief. (See Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666,
668, 674 [“ ‘An express concession or assertion in a brief is
frequently treated as an admission of a legal or factual point,
controlling in the disposition of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make
use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions
against the party [advancing them].’ ”]; Reygoza v. Superior Court
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 & fn. 4 (Reygoza) [criminal case
in which the Court of Appeal assumed that an assertion made by
respondent was correct because “defendant did not dispute
respondent’s claim in his reply”]; Rudick v. State Bd. of
Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 (Rudick) [concluding
that the appellants made an implicit concession by “failing to
respond in their reply brief to the [respondent’s] argument on
th[at] point”].)
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
3 Studnicka does not dispute, and thus tacitly agrees with,
the Attorney General’s assertions the prosecution offered
evidence that one witness “did not see [C.M.] holding anything,”
another witness saw C.M. holding only an item “described as a
‘Bobo straw[,]’ ” yet another witness did not see C.M. “ever hold a
3
testified that his encounter with C.M. was mutual combat and
Studnicka was only defending himself. The prosecution offered
evidence that C.M.’s friend, J.M., pepper sprayed Studnicka in
his face until Studnicka stopped stabbing C.M.
In their briefing, the parties do not dispute that Studnicka
ran away from the scene of the altercation after he had been
pepper sprayed. The prosecution introduced evidence that when
police responded to the incident, C.M. was bleeding, and that
when Studnicka was later apprehended, he had a cut on his hand
and another cut or laceration on or above his knee.
At the conclusion of the third trial, the jury found
Studnicka guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Studnicka
to the midterm of three years in state prison. Studnicka timely
appealed the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Studnicka asserts the trial court erred in three respects:
(1) denying his motion to dismiss the jury panel “as being
unrepresentative because of the absence of Black male potential
jurors in the jury pool”; (2) declining to grant a continuance of the
trial to permit Studnicka’s counsel to “investigate [his] claim of
an unrepresentative jury venire further”; and (3) “giving
CALCRIM No. 372, the flight instruction,” to the jury. Studnicka
also contends the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors
warrants reversal of the judgment. As we explain below,
weapon,” footage from the park’s surveillance cameras “appeared
to show [C.M.] holding a stick or a straw,” and C.M. was not
holding anything in his hand when officers later arrived at the
scene. (See Reygoza, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 519 & fn. 4;
Rudick, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 89–90.)
4
Studnicka does not show the trial court erred. We thus affirm
the judgment.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Denying Studnicka’s
Motion To Dismiss the Jury Panel Because He Failed
To Show That an Improper Feature of the Jury
Selection Process Systematically Excluded Members
of a Distinctive Group
“ ‘Under the federal and state Constitutions, an accused is
entitled to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community. [Citations.] That guarantee mandates that the pools
from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude
distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]’ ” (People v.
Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 566 (Anderson).) “ ‘The federal
and state guarantees are coextensive, and the analyses are
identical. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Currie (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 225, 232.)
In Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, the United States
Supreme Court declared, “In order to establish a prima facie
violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant
must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation
of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”
(Id. at p. 364.) “ ‘If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of
systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing
that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a
compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the
5
disparity in the jury venire. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Anderson,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 566.)
Our high court explained, “ ‘As to the third element of the
Duren test, a defendant does not meet the burden of
demonstrating that the underrepresentation was due to
systematic exclusion, by establishing only statistical evidence of a
disparity. A defendant must show, in addition, that the disparity
is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process.
[Citations.] When a county’s jury selection criteria are neutral
with respect to race, ethnicity, sex, and religion, the defendant
must identify some aspect of the manner in which those criteria
are applied (the probable cause of the disparity) that is
constitutionally impermissible. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 566–567.)
Studnicka contends that “the third prong of . . . Duren[,] . . .
as interpreted by the California Supreme Court in People v.
Anderson, does not survive the adoption of the . . . Racial Justice
Act . . . and is ‘overly strict.’ ” Studnicka claims “the adoption of
the [Racial Justice Act] has fundamentally changed the
landscape in terms of jury selection” such that he should not be
required to “establish that the racial disparity [in the pool of
potential jurors] . . . was the result of some ‘constitutionally
objectionable’ procedure . . . .” Studnicka further argues that “the
burden should have shifted to the prosecution to refute [his]
challenge to the jury venire” because “the California Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the third prong of Duren is outdated”
and he “met the first two prongs of the Duren test . . . .”4
4 Because we reject Studnicka’s argument that we should
depart from Anderson’s interpretation of Duren’s third prong, we
do not decide whether he satisfied Duren’s first and second
6
“Effective January 1, 2021, the Racial Justice Act, which is
codified in a scheme of interrelated statutes in the Penal Code
(§§ 745, 1473, subd. (f), 1473.7, subd.(a)(3)), states that ‘[t]he
state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek,
obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
national origin.’ (§ 745, subd. (a).)” (Young v. Superior Court
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 147 (Young).) “[S]ection 745,
subdivision (a), a provision of the Racial Justice Act, sets forth
four categories of conduct that, if proven by a preponderance of
the evidence, establish a violation of the [A]ct.” (People v.
Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 990, 998.) For instance, “a
violation of the [A]ct” occurs “if, ‘[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in
court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the
case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert
witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise
exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not
purposeful.’ ” (See ibid.)
Studnicka insists he is not “argu[ing] that the [Racial
Justice Act] has literally altered the three-prong [Duren]
test . . . .” Rather, Studnicka argues the Racial Justice Act
“rejects the jurisprudential paradigm created by the United
States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279,
which tolerates racially disparate outcomes unless an individual
defendant can establish that he was the victim of intentional
prongs. (See Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 566 [holding that
a defendant must satisfy all three Duren prongs to “ ‘ “establish a
prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement” ’ ”].)
7
discrimination.”5 He asserts the Legislature’s rejection of
McCleskey renders untenable Anderson’s holding that a
defendant must show that an improper feature of the jury
selection process caused a racial disparity in the venires from
which jurors are selected.
Studnicka thus is asking us to ignore our Supreme Court’s
construction of the federal and state Constitutions. This we
cannot do. (See Tran v. Nguyen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 523, 531
[“ ‘Although the California Supreme Court is free to overrule its
own prior decisions, the doctrine of stare decisis compels lower
court tribunals to follow the Supreme Court whatever reason the
intermediate tribunals might have for not wishing to do so.’ ”].)
Further, because Studnicka does not claim to have met the third
Duren prong as interpreted by Anderson, his challenge to the
trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the jury panel
necessarily fails.6
5 (See also Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 149–150
[observing that in enacting the Racial Justice Act, the Legislature
“[s]tat[ed] its intent to depart from the discriminatory purpose
paradigm in federal equal protection law,” and “declare[d] an
objective ‘to reject the conclusion that racial disparities within
our criminal justice [system] are inevitable, and to actively work
to eradicate them[,]’ ” citing, inter alia, McCleskey, supra,
481 U.S. at p. 292].)
6 Studnicka also contends that the “legislative purpose
behind” newly added Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which
“specifically addresse[s] the discriminatory use [of] peremptory
challenges and challenges for cause, . . . provides further support
for abandoning the old approach to challenges to a jury venire.”
We reject this argument for the same reason that Studnicka’s
8
B. Studnicka Does Not Demonstrate the Trial Court
Erred By Failing To Continue the Trial To Allow His
Counsel To Conduct Discovery on the Third Prong of
the Duren Test
Section 1050, subdivision (e) provides in pertinent part:
“Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good
cause.” (§ 1050, subd. (e).) “Under section 1050, subdivision (e),
‘[a] “trial court has broad discretion to determine whether good
cause exists to grant a continuance of the trial. [Citation.] A
showing of good cause requires a demonstration that counsel and
the defendant have prepared for trial with due diligence.”
[Citation.] Such discretion “may not be exercised so as to deprive
the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to
prepare.” [Citation.] “To effectuate the constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process of law, an accused must . . . have a
reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense and respond to the
charges.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[B]road discretion must be
granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an
unreasoning and arbitrary “insistence upon expeditiousness in
the face of a justifiable request for delay” violates the right to the
assistance of counsel.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Alexander (2010)
49 Cal.4th 846, 934–935.)
Studnicka maintains if we do not find that “the Anderson
interpretation of the third prong of Duren” is an “outdated”
“judicially created procedure,” we should conclude the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to continue the trial to allow his
counsel to conduct “additional discovery” to “fully address th[e]
reliance on the Racial Justice Act fails, to wit, we are bound by
Anderson’s interpretation of Duren’s third prong.
9
third [Duren] prong.” Although Studnicka acknowledges his trial
counsel did not move to dismiss the panel until the first day of
jury selection, he insists his counsel acted diligently because he
could not have been aware of the potential Duren claim until he
saw “the racial makeup of the jury panel [that] was assembled for
the third trial.” According to Studnicka, his counsel observed
that the panel of 62 potential jurors contained no “Black male
potential jurors” and only two African-American women.
As a preliminary matter, we note Studnicka’s trial counsel
did not state he needed a continuance to conduct discovery on the
third Duren prong. Instead, counsel asked the trial court to
“pause th[e] proceedings and have the sheriff’s department or
court personnel . . . contact the jurors who did not show up . . .
and inform[ them] that they do need to come in for their jury
service . . . .” Counsel also alluded to the possibility that the
court could “order a county-wide panel,” and asked the court to
issue an order “making sure that the jury commissioner has
indeed complied with the [statutory] requirements” for compiling
the list of potential jurors. Studnicka’s trial counsel concluded
his oral motion with the following statement: “I’m asking the
court on behalf of Mr. Studnicka to insure his right to a trial of
his peers and a trial by a fair cross-section representative of the
community that the court either take steps to get the other jurors
who are summoned who are not here into this courtroom so that
they can be potential jurors or dismiss this panel and order a new
one.”
Assuming arguendo that counsel’s statements constitute a
request for a continuance to undertake discovery on Duren’s third
prong, Studnicka’s claim of error fails because we reject his
assertion that “defense counsel [could not have] identified the
10
problem [until] . . . he saw in person the actual pool of available
jurors.” As our colleagues in Division Two of the First District
pointed out, “[The defendant] is not entitled to a panel that
represents a cross-section of the community. Rather, he is
entitled to a panel drawn from a representative cross-section of
the community. Thus, a challenge to the jury panel is always
necessarily a challenge not to the composition of the panel but to
the procedure by which the panel is composed. Indeed, the actual
composition of the jury panel in a defendant’s case is irrelevant to
a challenge to the jury panel.” (People v. De Rosans (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 611, 621 (De Rosans).)
The De Rosans court further explained, “The Duren
elements of a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation
are consistent with this understanding. The second Duren prong
requires a showing that the cognizable group is underrepresented
in venires from which juries are selected, not on the panel from
which the defendant’s jury is selected. The third Duren prong
requires a showing that the system for selecting prospective
jurors causes this underrepresentation; whether
underrepresentation on the defendant’s particular panel or
panels resulted is incidental. The evidence required for the
prima facie showing is therefore entirely available before voir
dire begins.” (De Rosans, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 621,
fn. omitted.)
Applying these principles to the case before it, the
De Rosans court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defense counsel’s request, made during jury
selection, for a continuance to “prepare and file a [Duren]
challenge to the jury panel.” (See De Rosans, supra,
27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 614, 616–617, 619–620, 622.) Because the
11
composition of the particular jury panel assigned to Studnicka’s
case has no bearing on his Duren claim, we likewise conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance
that Studnicka claims to have requested on the first day of jury
selection.
Studnicka intimates in his reply brief that Anderson
supports his position that trial counsel acted diligently by
requesting a continuance upon observing the racial composition
of the jury panel. We disagree.
In Anderson, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, two
counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death. (Anderson,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 559.) On appeal from the first trial, the
high court “affirmed the guilt judgment . . . and reversed the
penalty judgment . . . .” (Ibid.) On remand, “less than one month
before the penalty retrial was then scheduled to begin, [the]
defendant moved to quash the petit jury panel on [the] ground[ ]
that . . . the panel failed to represent a fair cross-section of the
community.” (See id. at pp. 559, 564.) Unlike Studnicka, the
defendant in Anderson did not rely upon his counsel’s visual
observations of the racial makeup of the panel. (See id. at
pp. 564–565.) Instead, the defendant’s motion was based on “a
comparative ethnic and demographic survey of persons who
appeared at the Indio/Palm Springs courthouse in response to
superior court jury summons” over “an eight-week period” that
ended more than two years before the motion was filed, census
data, and evidence concerning the county’s process for selecting
jurors. (See id. at pp. 564–565.) The defendant also moved to
continue the trial “pending further study of the
underrepresentation issue.” (See id. at pp. 564–566.)
12
The trial court denied the motions to quash the petit jury
panel and continue the trial. (Anderson, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at
pp. 565–566.) The Supreme Court found the trial court did not
err in denying the motion to quash because the defendant failed
to satisfy Duren’s third prong, given that “ ‘there was an
insufficient showing that any discrepancy in the jury pool was
attributable to “systematic exclusion[.]” ’ ” (See Anderson, at
pp. 566–568.) The high court further concluded “the [trial]
court’s denial of a continuance was amply justified” because the
defendant presented the “belated request for further delay” “a
scarce month before trial was scheduled to begin” and it was
“based solely on . . . unsupported speculation” that
constitutionally impermissible jury selection procedures were
employed. (See id. at p. 568.) In short, Anderson offers no
support for Studnicka’s assertion that his trial counsel acted
diligently in waiting until the first day of jury selection to
challenge the racial composition of the panel.
Accordingly, Studnicka fails to establish the trial court
abused its discretion by not continuing the trial to permit his
counsel to gather evidence in support of the motion to dismiss the
jury panel.
C. Studnicka Fails To Establish the Trial Court Erred
In Issuing CALCRIM No. 372 to the Jury
The trial court provided CALCRIM No. 372 to the jury,
which states: “If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately
after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he
was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled or
tried to flee, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance
of that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled or
tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.”
13
Studnicka argues that by instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 372, the trial court violated his federal right to
due process. Specifically, he contends the instruction “reduces
the prosecution’s burden of proof and is inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence” because “people of color . . . have
objective reasons to fear contact with police even when they have
done nothing wrong . . . .”7 Studnicka further contends the court
should not have issued the instruction because “[t]he evidence
here belied any . . . permissible inference” that by leaving the
scene of the altercation, Studnicka manifested his awareness that
he assaulted C.M.8
Because we assume for the sake of argument the
correctness of the factual premise underlying Studnicka’s
constitutional challenge, that is, that “people of color . . . have
objective reasons to fear contact with police even when they have
done nothing wrong,” we independently review his due process
7 The parties agree that Studnicka is a Black man.
8 Additionally, for the first time in his reply brief,
Studnicka argues that “[t]he CALCRIM No. 372 flight instruction
is only appropriate when there is specific, clear evidence the
accused fled due to consciousness of guilt after the crime was
committed,” and that “[a] flight instruction is improper unless the
evidence is sufficient to support” “ ‘a chain of unbroken inferences
from the defendant’s behavior to the defendant’s guilt of the
crime charged.’ ” Studnicka also raises in his reply, but omits
from his opening brief, his argument that the flight instruction
violated his right to due process under our state’s Constitution.
We disregard these belated contentions. (People v. Taylor (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 628, 642–643 [concluding that a defendant had
forfeited a contention by raising it for the first time in a reply
brief].)
14
challenge to the flight instruction. (See In re J.R. (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 569, 587–588 [reviewing de novo a due process
claim that presented “a purely legal question”].)
“ ‘[A] permissive inference violates due process “only if the
suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense
justify in light of the proven facts before the jury[.]” . . . .
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (See People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
409, 456.) The inference that a defendant exhibited
consciousness of guilt by fleeing “ ‘ “immediately after the
commission of a crime” ’ ” is consistent with reason and common
sense. (See ibid.) Furthermore, “CALCRIM No. 372 [does not]
lessen the prosecution’s burden [of proof]” because the instruction
“leaves it ‘up to you [the jury] to decide the meaning and
importance of that conduct’ and . . . limits the use of flight
evidence by providing that it is not alone sufficient to prove
guilt.” (See Price, supra, at p. 458.) Accordingly, Studnicka’s due
process challenge to the flight instruction fails.9
As to Studnicka’s assertion the evidence did not support
the trial court’s issuance of CALCRIM No. 372, “a flight
instruction is appropriate where there is substantial evidence of
flight by the defendant apart from his identification as the
perpetrator, from which the jury could reasonably infer a
consciousness of guilt.”10 (See People v. Rhodes (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1476 (Rhodes), italics omitted.) Under the
substantial evidence standard, “we view the evidence most
9 Studnicka does not argue that CALCRIM No. 372
violates his constitutional right to equal protection.
10 Studnicka acknowledges he was the individual who had
the physical altercation with C.M.
15
favorably to the judgment presuming the existence of every fact
that reasonably may be deduced from the record in support of the
judgment.” (See People v. Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283,
1290.)
In support of Studnicka’s position that his decision to leave
“the scene after the incident” cannot be interpreted “as flight due
to consciousness of guilt,” Studnicka argues that he was merely
“try[ing to] find water to wash the pepper spray out of his
eyes . . . .” Studnicka further argues he “believed his co-
combatant had a weapon that he used to attack [Studnicka].”
Although Studnicka does not support these assertions with
citations to the trial evidence, Studnicka seems to be relying
upon his assertion that at trial, he testified that (1) C.M. struck
him first, lunged at his leg and stabbed him twice above the knee;
and (2) Studnicka fled the scene to wash the pepper spray off his
face and eyes at a McDonald’s restaurant.
In deciding whether to issue CALCRIM No. 372 to the jury,
the trial court did not have to credit Studnicka’s self-serving
testimony as to his reasons for leaving the scene. (See San Diego
Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 575–576
[holding that under the substantial evidence standard, an
appellate court “ ‘give[s] appropriate deference to how the trier of
fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved
conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from
the evidence’ ”].) Indeed, the existence of “[a]lternative
explanations for flight conduct go[es] to the weight of the
evidence, which is a matter for the jury, not the court, to decide.”
(See Rhodes, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1477.) Studnicka’s
16
contentions thus fail under the deferential substantial evidence
standard of review.11
In sum, we reject Studnicka’s arguments that the trial
court’s issuance of CALCRIM No. 372 violated his right to due
process and that the instruction lacked evidentiary support.
D. Studnicka’s Cumulative Error Claim Fails
Studnicka argues, “Even if the errors [he raises] . . . do not
require reversal when examined separately,” their “cumulative
impact . . . denied [him] due process and a fair trial.” (Boldface &
capitalization omitted from second quotation.) We have
concluded the trial court did not err in denying Studnicka’s
motion to dismiss the jury panel, declining to continue the trial to
permit Studnicka’s counsel to prepare a Duren motion, and
providing CALCRIM No. 372 to the jury. (Discussion, parts A–C,
ante.) We thus reject his claim of cumulative error. (See
11 At oral argument, Studnicka’s appellate counsel
asserted the trial court denied his client’s request to introduce at
trial a video showing that several months prior to his altercation
with C.M., police had subjected Studnicka to excessive force.
Counsel intimated that had this video been presented, the jury
could have found that Studnicka left the scene of the altercation
with C.M. merely to avoid being harmed by the police.
Although Studnicka makes oblique references to an alleged
excessive force incident in his appellate briefs, absent from his
briefing is any argument the trial court erred in excluding the
video depicting this incident. Accordingly, we do not address this
issue further. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793
[“ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of
authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a
particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it
without consideration.’ ”].)
17
People v. Kocontes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 787, 891 [indicating that
a necessary predicate of a cumulative error claim is the existence
of “ ‘a series of trial errors’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
18
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