CourtListener 10362623•People v. Lowe CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Lowe CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085026
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI23001113)
CURTIS LOWE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Michael Dauber, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded for resentencing.
Garrick Byers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In April 2023, Curtis Lowe threatened to harm Troy H. Troy called law
enforcement for help, and four San Bernardino Sheriff’s Deputies responded.
The deputies found Lowe and his girlfriend in a small bedroom they shared.
Lowe was manifestly intoxicated. The room was littered with drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Amongst the clutter, deputies found a 12-gauge shotgun shell
cartridge on the floor right next to the narcotics and other contraband. They
also found a loaded shotgun inside a black container right by the bedroom
door.
A jury convicted Lowe of three offenses involving the possession of
contraband. He contends (1) the trial court mis-described the element of
“ ‘personal possession’ ” in its instruction to the jury on the offense of being
under the influence of a controlled substance while in possession of a loaded,
operable firearm; (2) his sentence, which consists of three consecutive terms,
is unauthorized because it punishes a single act three ways; (3) the court
abused its discretion when it selected and imposed the upper term for one of
his convictions without proper consideration of his childhood trauma; and
(4) the court erred when it failed to state its reasons for imposing consecutive
sentences.
We agree with Lowe on one point. He is correct the trial court must
stay one of his two sentences because they are both based on the single act of
possessing a shotgun. We remand for resentencing to correct this error but
otherwise affirm.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
The Prosecution’s Case
In late February or early March 2023, Troy met Lowe and his
girlfriend, Erica C., through Lowe’s sister. They were homeless, so Troy let
them stay with him in his apartment in Adelanto. Troy had been homeless in
New York City and he knew what it felt like. He wanted to give back to the
community, and he had helped more than 20 other homeless people over the
years. Lowe and Erica stayed in a small second bedroom. They kept the
bedroom locked when they were not there.
Sometime in late March, at about 1:00 a.m., Troy woke up when he
heard someone knock on the door to give Lowe a cigarette. Erica was not
there. She had left earlier that day. Troy heard Lowe go to the door to get
the cigarette. Troy sat up in bed because he “knew something wasn’t right.”
He saw Lowe “just standing there” by the door to his bedroom. Troy asked
Lowe if he was all right, and Lowe pointed a shotgun at him “with a blank
look on his face.” Troy said, “No, don’t do this. Don’t do this. . . . I got kids.
You got kids, you know. I have grandkids. You have grandkids.” Troy was
scared; his “heart was beating” and he was crying.
Troy was able to run to where Lowe was standing and grab the barrel
of the shotgun. He and Lowe began “wrestling” and “tussling with it.” Lowe
said, “You took everything from me,” and Troy had no idea what he was
talking about. Troy thought Lowe was going to shoot him. Troy “didn’t want
to get hurt” and he also didn’t want to hurt anybody, so he ran outside to a
nearby field. He was barefoot and wearing nothing but his underwear. Troy
was later able to identify the shotgun when he testified at trial, because
“there was no handle on it.”
3
Lowe left the apartment that night and did not return for about a week.
Troy eventually let Lowe and Erica stay at his apartment again. Troy
forgave Lowe, and the two shook hands. Troy told Lowe to “respect [his]
house.”
At the beginning of April, shortly after Lowe moved back in, Lowe
began giving Troy “intimidating” looks. Troy had been around violence all his
life and “felt [his] life was in danger,” so he left the apartment and called law
enforcement for help.
A deputy sheriff arrived and spoke to Troy about 40 yards away from
the apartment. Troy gave the deputy permission to enter the apartment and
told him that Lowe probably had a shotgun. Sheriff’s deputies knocked on
the door to the second bedroom, and Lowe and his girlfriend came out.
The room was “very small” and “extremely cluttered.” In plain view,
deputies saw narcotics and paraphernalia “scattered throughout the room.”
They saw “crack pipes,” a “bubbler,” a rubber band that could be “used [as] a
tourniquet” to aid in injecting drugs, “hypodermic needles,” including one
“loaded” with narcotics, and a small vial with narcotics in it as well.
Lowe appeared to be under the influence of a controlled substance,
most likely methamphetamine. He was sweating and unable to maintain a
conversation “without diverting off topic.” He had dilated pupils, “rapid
eyelid tremors,” and a “white-coated tongue.” Subsequent testing confirmed
the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine in his blood. A
toxicologist opined he was under the influence of methamphetamine at that
time.
Sheriff’s deputies found a shotgun in a black, tube-shaped canister
located right in front of the door to Lowe’s room. The container was open at
the top, making the shotgun easily accessible. The shotgun was loaded with
4
four live cartridges of 12-gauge buckshot. Sheriff’s deputies found a fifth
shotgun shell cartridge on the ground right next to some of the narcotics and
paraphernalia that were strewn about the room. Troy identified the shotgun
as the same one Lowe pointed at him the month before. An expert tested the
shotgun and determined it was functional.
The parties stipulated that Lowe had been convicted of a felony and
was prohibited from possessing firearms and ammunition.
II.
Charges, Conviction, and Sentence
Lowe was charged with four offenses in the operative information:
possession of a loaded, operable firearm while under the influence of
methamphetamine (Health & Saf.1 Code, § 11550, subd. (e); count 1); felon in
possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2); unlawful
possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 3); and
possession of a short-barreled shotgun (Pen. Code, § 33210; count 4). It was
alleged that Lowe had suffered a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code,
§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)) and four aggravating
circumstances were present (id., § 1170, subd. (b)(2)).
A jury convicted Lowe of possession of a loaded, operable firearm while
under the influence of methamphetamine, of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, and of unlawful possession of ammunition (counts 1, 2, and 3,
respectively). It acquitted him of possession of a short-barreled shotgun,
count 4. In a bifurcated proceeding, he admitted the prior strike conviction
and the trial court found true three aggravating factors alleged in the
information.
1 Undesignated code citations are to the Health and Safety Code.
5
At sentencing, the trial court sentenced Lowe to eight years and eight
months in state prison. The sentence consisted of three consecutive terms.
On count 1, the court imposed a three-year upper term, doubled to six years
pursuant to the Three Strikes law. On count 2, the court imposed a term of 8
months doubled to one year, four months. On count 3, the court imposed an
identical term of 8 months doubled to one year four months.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Trial Court Incorrectly Instructed the Jury on the Element of “Personal
Possession” but the Error Was Harmless
In count 1, Lowe was charged with possession of a loaded, operable
firearm while under the influence of methamphetamine in violation of section
11550, subdivision (e)(1) (section 11550(e)(1)). Section 11550(e)(1) provides
that “a person who is unlawfully under the influence of cocaine, cocaine base,
heroin, methamphetamine, or phencyclidine while in the immediate personal
possession of a loaded, operable firearm is guilty of a public offense.” (Italics
added.) Lowe contends the trial court failed to correctly instruct the jury on
the required element of “personal possession.” We agree the instruction
given by the court incorrectly described this element, but conclude the error
was harmless. Our review is de novo. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158,
1210.)
The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM
No. 2400. The instruction told the jury they could convict Lowe if they found
he possessed the shotgun either personally or through another person:
“The defendant is charged in Count 1 with being under the
influence of methamphetamine, a controlled substance,
while in possession of a firearm.
6
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the
People must prove that:
“The defendant was willfully and unlawfully under the
influence of methamphetamine, a controlled substance,
when he was arrested; and
“The defendant was in possession of a loaded, operable
firearm. [¶ . . . ¶]
“Two or more people may possess something at the same
time.
“A person does not have to actually hold or touch something
to possess it. It is enough if the person has control over it,
or the right to control it, either personally or through
another person.” (Italics added.)
We agree the italicized aspect of the instruction was incorrect. Section
11550(e)(1) expressly requires “personal” possession to establish a violation.
It contains no provision allowing for possession to be “through another
person,” whether vicariously, through an agency relationship, or otherwise.
“A defendant has ‘personal possession’ of a firearm when he himself has the
weapon.” (People v. Pena (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1084 (Pena).)
“ ‘Personal possession’ precludes the imposition of vicarious liability that may
flow to a technically unarmed principal when another principal in the offense
has a weapon.” (Ibid.) It was error for the trial court to provide the jury with
an avenue for finding Lowe guilty if they did not conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt he personally possessed the shotgun and thought he
possessed it vicariously or otherwise through another person.
The People contend the instruction was correctly given, because it
correctly states the general principles of constructive possession and those
principles apply here. This argument is misplaced. Lowe’s challenge to the
instruction is that it incorrectly told the jury he could be convicted if he
7
possessed the shotgun either personally or through another person, when the
statute penalizes personal possession only. He did not challenge the
instruction on the ground that it misstates the principles of constructive
possession applicable to section 11550.
Nor was the issue forfeited. “A trial court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on all of the elements of a charged offense.” (People v. Jo (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 1128, 1160.) Trial courts must comply with this duty even in the
absence of a request by the defendant. (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d
524, 531.) No objection, accordingly, was required to preserve the issue for
review.2
2 We observe there are two additional potential errors with the trial
court’s instruction that were not identified or discussed by either party.
First, the instruction did not tell the jury the shotgun had to be in the
“immediate” personal possession of Lowe. The legislative history of section
11550 indicates the use of the word “immediate” in the statute was intended
to circumscribe the reach of constructive possession principles, which
ordinarily extend to contraband not in the immediate presence of the
perpetrator. (Pena, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1082–1083.) For example,
“the provision was not intended to penalize those who use drugs but keep
their firearms in a locked closet at home or in the car trunk—i.e., not nearby
or quickly and directly accessible—while they are under the influence.” (Id.
at p. 1087.) As such, with the omission of the word “immediate,” the
instruction appears to have incorrectly described constructive possession
principles in a manner that is overbroad in the context of section 11550.
Second, the instruction failed to instruct the jury on the knowledge
element of possession with respect to the first count. For offenses that
criminalize possession or custody of contraband, knowledge of the presence of
the contraband is an essential required element. (People v. Snyder (1982) 32
Cal.3d 590, 592.)
Lowe did not raise these potential errors here or below, so we are not
required to address them. We have nevertheless considered whether either
error could potentially affect Lowe’s substantial rights. (Pen. Code, § 1237.)
We conclude any error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the
same reasons we find the instructional error that was identified by Lowe to
8
We turn now to prejudice. The error identified by Lowe is known as
“ ‘alternative-theory error.’ ” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7, fn. 3
(Aledamat).) This is because the trial court’s mis-description of the required
element provided the jury with two theories of liability, one legally correct
and the other legally incorrect. The legally correct theory allowed the jury to
find Lowe guilty if they found he personally possessed the shotgun. The
legally incorrect theory allowed the jury to find him guilty if he possessed the
shotgun through another person.
The harmless error test that applies to this type of error is the
Chapman standard for evaluating federal constitutional errors. (Chapman,
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 424–425
[general rule re omitted and mis-described elements]; Aledamat, supra, 8
Cal.5th at p. 3 [specific rule re alternative-theory error].) Under the
Chapman standard, we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining
the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant
circumstances, [we] determine[ ] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Aleldamat, at p. 13.) Explained another way, we must determine
whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
rendered the same verdict absent the error. (People v. Merritt (2017) 2
Cal.5th 819, 831 (Merritt).) In the case of alternative-theory error in
particular, reversal is required unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
the jury based its verdict on a legally valid theory. (Aledamat, at p. 12.)
Applying these principles, we conclude the jury based its verdict on the
legally valid theory that Lowe personally possessed the shotgun. We come to
this conclusion for two reasons. First, the record does not “contain[ ] evidence
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).)
9
that could rationally lead to a contrary finding,” i.e., that the verdict was
based on an invalid theory. (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19
(Neder).) To find Lowe guilty based on an invalid theory here, jurors would
have had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Lowe did not possess
the shotgun personally, and (2) he instead had control of it or the right to
control it through another person. But here, while there was evidence Lowe
may have had exclusive possession of the shotgun, and there was also
evidence that Lowe and Erica may have had joint possession of the shotgun,
there was no evidence at all to support a finding that Erica personally
possessed the shotgun to the exclusion of Lowe and his possession of the
shotgun was only through her.
The evidence the shotgun was possessed jointly or exclusively by Lowe
included testimony by Troy that Lowe and Erica had exclusive access and
control over the bedroom, and they kept it locked when they were out.
According to sheriff’s deputies, at the time of Lowe’s arrest, Lowe and Erica
were both in the small bedroom. The shotgun was in an unlocked container,
it could be seen through a hole in the top of the container, and it was easily
accessible to anyone in the room. In addition, according to Troy, Lowe
pointed the very same shotgun at him a few weeks earlier. By contrast, there
was no evidence at all that Erica was carrying the weapon on her person at
the time of the arrest, that she was aware of the presence of the gun and
Lowe was not, nor of other facts that could potentially support a conclusion
that Lowe possessed the weapon vicariously or otherwise solely through her.
We therefore conclude the record does not contain evidence that could
rationally lead to a finding the verdict was based on an invalid theory.
Indeed, the evidence of personal possession was overwhelming.
10
Second, our conclusion is buttressed by a concession made by Lowe’s
trial counsel. Counsel made an unusual argument to the jury during closing
argument based on the requirements for drawing inferences and conclusions
from circumstantial evidence. The argument relied on a principle underlying
the reasonable doubt standard. The trial court, as required, instructed the
jury on that principle as follows: “If you can draw two or more reasonable
conclusions from [the] circumstantial evidence, and one of those points to
innocence and one to guilt, you must accept the one that points [to]
innocence.”
Relying on this instruction, Lowe’s trial counsel specifically conceded to
the jury that it was reasonable to conclude the element of possession was
satisfied by the evidence and that Lowe “possessed that firearm.” However,
counsel argued, the evidence also supported the contrary conclusion—that
Lowe was not in possession of the shotgun—because there was evidence the
gun was placed in his room without his knowledge. According to counsel’s
theory, Troy had the motive and opportunity to place the shotgun in Lowe’s
room because, by framing him, he could effectively arrange for police
assistance in evicting him from the apartment. He argued, in light of the
evidence Lowe was framed and not aware of the shotgun, the jury was
required to accept the conclusion that pointed to innocence and acquit Lowe
of the firearm possession counts. Counsel did not contest that all of the
elements required to establish possession were met with the exception of the
requirement that Lowe have knowledge of the presence of the shotgun.3
3 Specifically, counsel argued: “If you can draw two or more reasonable
conclusions from circumstantial evidence, and one of those points to
innocence and one to guilt, you must accept the one that points [to]
innocence. [¶ . . . ¶] There is a reasonable conclusion that you can point to
that he possessed that firearm —I’m sorry, [Mr. Lowe]. I have to be
11
One situation in which instructional error involving a required element
of proof has been deemed harmless is when the defendant concedes or admits
the element that that has been omitted or erroneously described. (Merritt,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 831.) A second way an error may be found harmless is
by examining the jury’s verdict to determine “what the jury necessarily did
find” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15), and then asking whether it would
be impossible on the evidence for the jury to make its findings i.e., “ ‘ “to have
found what the verdict did find without finding” ’ ” the jury relied on a legally
correct theory (id. at pp. 12–15, quoting People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th
1172, 1204).
Here, based on trial counsel’s argument and the jury’s verdict on the
second count, we are certain beyond a reasonable doubt the jury convicted
Lowe based on the legal theory that he personally possessed the shotgun.
This is because the trial court correctly instructed jurors on the required
element of knowledge with respect to count 2, and the jury convicted Lowe on
that count. The jury therefore necessarily found Lowe knew the gun was in
the bag in his room, and necessarily rejected the defense theory that Troy
framed Lowe by placing the shotgun in his room without his knowledge.
Under this scenario, defense counsel expressly conceded it would be
reasonable to conclude the element of possession was satisfied. The jury thus
resolved the only contested issue on the question of possession in the
prosecution’s favor when it found, with respect to count 2, that Lowe was
reasonable. I’m asking them to be reasonable; right. There is a reasonable
conclusion. [¶] [But] [t]he problem with the District Attorney’s case is it’s
not the only reasonable conclusion that you can point to. [¶ . . . ¶] [O]ne of
the essential elements of this crime is knowledge. Is it reasonable that
somebody put that gun in that room and Mr. Lowe didn’t know about it?
. . . Isn’t it reasonable he had no knowledge of that gun being in that room?”
12
aware of the shotgun’s presence in his bedroom. “[W]here a reviewing court
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that [an] omitted [or misdescribed]
element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that
the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous
instruction is properly found to be harmless.” (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at
p. 17; id. at p. 10.)
We are thus persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt the jury convicted
Lowe based on a legally valid theory. Nothing suggested Lowe possessed the
shotgun through another person. And, based on the trial court’s correct
instruction on count 2, the jury affirmatively found he knew the shotgun was
in the container in his bedroom under circumstances where Lowe conceded it
would be reasonable to conclude the element of possession was satisfied. We
affirm Lowe’s conviction for possessing a loaded, operable firearm while
under the influence of methamphetamine.
II.
Lowe’s Sentence Is Unauthorized Because It Violates the Prohibition on
Multiple Punishment of a Single Act
Penal Code section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a single act
or an indivisible course of conduct. (Pen. Code, § 654; People v. Hester (2000)
22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) Lowe contends all three of his convictions arose from a
single act and separate sentences for each conviction are therefore precluded
by Penal Code section 654. He contends two of the sentences must be stayed.
We conclude he is correct with respect to one of the sentences, but not both.
Our review is de novo. (People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776,
795.)
Penal Code section 654 provides, in relevant part, “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be
13
punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or
omission be punished under more than one provision. (Pen. Code, § 654,
subd. (a).) “The statute does not prohibit multiple convictions for the same
conduct, only multiple punishments.” (People v. Broadbent (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 917, 921.) In such cases, “the proper procedure is to stay
execution of sentence on one of the offenses.” (People v. Monarrez (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 710, 713 (Monarrez).)
Lowe’s first contention is that his convictions for possession of a loaded,
operable firearm while under the influence of methamphetamine and
possession of a firearm by a felon are both based on the single act of
possessing the single shotgun found in his bedroom, and separate
punishment with consecutive sentences was improper. We agree. The error
is a straightforward one. Under People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353,
357 (Jones), Lowe’s possession of a single shotgun at the time of his arrest
was a single actus reus that cannot be punished more than once.
Punishment for one of Lowe’s convictions for illegal possession of the shotgun
must accordingly be stayed. (Monarrez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 713.)
The Attorney General disagrees and contends the first and second
counts are based on more than one act and more than a single intent. He
argues, that “count 1 and count 2 involved different acts with separate
intents,” and “count 1 required the additional determination act of [Lowe]
being under the influence of methamphetamine.” Citing no authority, he
contends separate sentences for counts 1 and 2 are proper because “[i]n
count 1, the significant act was that [Lowe] was under the influence of
methamphetamine, while the significant act in count 2 was the possession of
the shotgun.” (Italics added.)
14
The Attorney General’s “significant act” test is based on principles that
are no longer good law. The California Supreme Court overturned prior
authority that countenanced the multiple punishment of a single act so long
as it was undertaken in more than a single unlawful manner. (Jones, supra,
54 Cal.4th at pp. 353–358.) The Court specifically rejected the reasoning in
prior cases that allowed courts to consider the unlawful subcomponents of a
single physical act and punish them separately. (Id. at p. 356.) The fact
Lowe was under the influence and the fact he was a felon while in possession
of the shotgun are subcomponents of a single physical act. Multiple
punishment is therefore prohibited. Our Supreme Court’s holding on this
point could not be more clear: “we . . . hold that a single possession or
carrying of a single firearm on a single occasion may be punished only once
under [Penal Code] section 654.” (Id. at p. 357, italics added.)
In contrast, we agree with the Attorney General that Lowe’s second
contention of multiple punishment error lacks merit. Lowe asserts that
Penal Code section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the possession of a
firearm and the possession of ammunition when the firearm is loaded with
the same ammunition in question. He contends there is no way to know
whether the jury’s verdict here was based on the ammunition found in the
shotgun or the ammunition found in plain view on the bedroom floor. We are
not persuaded.
As the Attorney General points out, Lowe’s argument is factually
unsupported. The prosecutor here specifically elected during closing
argument to base the illegal possession of ammunition count on the
ammunition found on the bedroom floor, not the ammunition found in the
loaded gun. “ ‘[S]imultaneous possession of different items of contraband,’ ”
such as the ammunition and shotgun here, are separate acts for purposes of
15
Penal Code section 654 and, consequently, may be subject to separate
punishment. (Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 358.) The trial court accordingly
did not err when it ran Lowe’s sentence on the illegal ammunition possession
count consecutive to the principal term.
In sum, we agree with Lowe in part. It was error to impose consecutive
sentences on counts 1 and 2 when they were both based on the single act of
possessing the shotgun, but it was not error to impose consecutive sentences
on counts 1 and 3 based on his possession of the shotgun and the ammunition
found on his bedroom’s floor. We vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.
Our remand for resentencing requires a full resentencing. (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893–895.) At the resentencing hearing, the trial
court will be empowered to revisit both its reasoning and ultimate sentencing
choices including whether to impose the upper term and/or consecutive
sentences. For this reason, we need not address Lowe’s other contentions of
sentencing error.
16
DISPOSITION
Lowe’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for
resentencing. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
17
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