CourtListener 10361217•People v. Torres CA1/3
Testo completo
Filed 3/21/25 P. v. Torres CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169539
v.
ADRIAN TORRES, (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. PCF274440)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Adrian Torres appeals from an order of the trial court
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. He
claims the trial court failed to act as an independent factfinder and applied
the wrong burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing. He further argues the
error was structural and therefore reversible per se. We conclude defendant
fails to demonstrate that the court misunderstood its role or applied an
incorrect standard of proof. We further conclude any assumed error was not
structural, and that defendant forfeited any claim that the assumed error
was prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of resentencing relief.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Appeal
We draw the following facts from the unpublished opinion and record in
the prior appeal (People v. Torres (Dec. 16, 2014, A136219, A136232)).1
An information charged defendant, Rudolfo Raymond Ortega, Jr.,
(Ortega), and Jesus Antonio Vidrio (Vidrio) with (1) murder (Pen. Code,2
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 2);
and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 3). As to
counts 1 and 2, the information alleged that defendant and Ortega each
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that proximately caused
great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that the offenses were
committed for the benefit and at the direction of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). As to count three, the information alleged that
defendant and Ortega each personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subds. (a),
(d), 1192.7, subd. (c)). The fourth count charged Vidrio with evading an
officer with willful disregard while driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a))
and included a criminal street gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
The information was based on events that occurred in March 2010,
when Humberto Padilla (Padilla) and his mother’s boyfriend went to Alex
Guizar’s grandmother’s house so that Padilla and Guizar “could straighten
out whatever differences they were having in school.” Padilla did not go
there intending to fight Guizar, but a fist fight ensued nonetheless. Some
testimony was presented that Padilla was a Norteño gang associate, and that
the fight was over Guizar having contact with members of the Sureño gang.
1 On October 4, 2024, we granted the People’s request for judicial notice
of the record in the prior appeal.
2 Further unspecified statutory references are to this code.
2
At around 6:30 p.m., Padilla and his friends, R.E. and K.W.,3 stood
outside a friend’s house when two men wearing black clothing and beanies
walked by. The men doubled back and walked up to R.E., who did not
recognize them. The men “dapped” R.E.’s hand, and one asked, “ ‘Hey, you all
Norte’ ?” R.E. replied, “Yeah, Rocky Hill Posse.” The two men then stepped
back and each pulled out a handgun and fired. The shooters were aiming at
Padilla and in his direction “[f]or the most part,” and they “fired until their
guns were just clicking when they pulled the trigger, with no bullets coming
out.” Padilla was shot in the upper left side of his back and his right buttock
and died at the hospital from his wounds. Both bullets exited the body, and it
was not possible to tell the caliber of the bullets that caused the wounds.
R.E. suffered gunshot wounds to his pelvis and buttock but survived.
T.R., a resident of the neighborhood, testified that at about 7:40 p.m. on
the day of the shooting, he heard gunshots and saw two men unloading two
guns. According to T.R., “It looked like they were aimed, but it looked
random.” He could not see whom the men were firing at. They stopped
shooting when it appeared “they didn’t have any more bullets” and then
started to run. T.R. followed the men and saw them get into the passenger
side of a white car parked almost a block away.
Police officers located the white sedan traveling on the freeway. When
the police activated their lights, the white sedan exited the freeway and a
chase ensued before the sedan crashed. Three men fled from the vehicle but
were eventually apprehended.
Inside the white sedan, police officers found a black ski mask near the
front passenger doorjamb and a pair of black leather gloves on the front
3 Because victims R.E. and K.W. were minors at the time of the shooting,
we identify them by their initials to protect their anonymity.
3
passenger floorboard. The officers found a pair of black baseball-style gloves,
a .9mm bullet, a .9mm magazine loaded with four bullets, and a black t-shirt
in the back seat. Gunshot residue was detected on both pairs of gloves.
Ortega’s DNA was on the leather gloves, and defendant’s DNA was on the
baseball-style gloves.
In the front yard of the residence where the white sedan had crashed,
police found a magazine for a .9mm Taurus handgun with 12 rounds in it.
They also collected an unloaded .9mm semiautomatic pistol in a street gutter
along the route of the pursuit. Multiple shell casings were found near an
apartment building where the shooting took place including six .45-caliber
casings and ten .9mm casings. At trial, an expert in ballistics and crime
scene analysis testified that the .9mm cartridge casings found at the crime
scene were fired from the Taurus .9mm pistol.
There were six bullet holes to the apartment building and one bullet
hole to the front grill of a nearby vehicle. One of the bullet holes to the
apartment building and the hole in the vehicle appeared to have been caused
by a .9mm bullet because .9mm jackets were found beneath the holes. A
police officer testified that these holes would not have been caused by
someone shooting into the air.
Defendant took the stand and testified as follows. He had never been
in a gang but had grown up in an area with gang members and knew Ortega
was a member of the Sureño gang. On the day of the shooting, Ortega asked
defendant if he would go with him to Vacaville to pick up his cousin, Guizar.
Defendant did not know Guizar but agreed to go. Vidrio drove them to
Vacaville and circled an apartment complex a few times without seeing
anyone while Ortega tried to call Guizar. Defendant suggested they go home
but Ortega told Vidrio to stop the car, and defendant and Ortega got out.
4
They saw a group of people, and defendant was a little scared and walked
back a little bit. Someone asked, “Where the fuck are you guys from?”
Defendant thought that Ortega said, “Bay Area,” and that one of the others
said, “Rocky Hill Posse.”
One of the men came toward them with his hand inside his sweater.
When the man pulled his hand out, defendant thought he was going to pull
out a gun, so defendant turned and began to run. He heard a gunshot, pulled
out his gun, and shot as he ran. Defendant tried to shoot in the air because
he “didn’t want to hit nobody,” and he thought if he fired his gun, the others
would get scared and stop firing. He ran to the car and Vidrio drove off.
Defendant threw his gun out the window because he was scared and did not
want to get caught with it. He was carrying a gun for safety because he had
recently been jumped, robbed at gunpoint, and shot at by gang members. He
identified the .9mm gun as belonging to him.
The jury acquitted defendant and Ortega of first degree murder but
found them guilty of second degree murder, attempted murder, and assault
with a firearm. The jury also found the firearm use allegations on counts
one, two, and three to be true, but the gang allegations to be untrue. Vidrio
was convicted under count four of evading an officer with willful disregard
while driving. Defendant and Ortega were each sentenced to a total
determinate term of 21 years and four months and a total indeterminate
term of 65 years to life.
In December 2014, this division affirmed the judgment in an
unpublished opinion. (People v. Torres (Dec. 16, 2014, A136219, A136232).)
B. Resentencing Proceedings
In September 2022, defendant filed a petition under former section
1170.95 seeking resentencing on the second degree murder conviction. In the
5
form petition, defendant checked boxes indicating he had been prosecuted
under a theory of felony murder; murder/attempted under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine; or another theory in which malice was
imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime, and that he could
not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
amendments to sections 188 and 189 that became effective on January 1,
2019.
In response to the petition, the People’s briefing argued that defendant
was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because he was convicted as
the actual killer of Padilla and not under a theory of felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. However, at the initial hearing
on the petition in February 2023, the prosecutor apparently acknowledged
that defendant had established a prima facie case for relief. The trial court
agreed and found “[t]here’s enough to make a prima facie showing and set an
evidentiary hearing.”
Several months later, the People asked the trial court to reconsider the
prima facie finding, arguing that although the issue had previously been
“conceded,” a review of the applicable law and facts led the People “to move
this Court to reconsider their concession and the Court’s subsequent finding
based thereon.”
At a hearing in November 2023, the trial court first heard arguments
on the People’s motion for reconsideration. The court “decline[d] to revisit”
the prima facie finding and proceeded to the evidentiary hearing on the
petition. Defense counsel Maas then offered the following arguments. First,
there was no evidence defendant fired the shots that killed Padilla, and
second, the prosecutor’s arguments allowed the jury to convict defendant of
second degree murder based upon evidence that he just “did a bunch of bad
6
things” and “fired a bunch of rounds in a very dangerous manner.”
Additionally, Maas contended the jury instruction defining implied malice
“contained natural and probable consequences as a doctrine.” Maas further
argued that under People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 (Offley), the
jury’s true enhancement finding under section 12022.5, subdivision (d),
established only that defendant’s discharge of a firearm was a proximate
cause of Padilla’s death, not that he “intentionally caused a death.”
In December 2023, defendant testified at a continued hearing that he
never intended to retaliate against anyone, and that he did not aim towards
any of the victims. Following the direct examination, the trial court
remarked that because the jury had acquitted defendant of first degree
murder, “I get the idea that the record does not establish planning,
premeditation. . . . [¶] So it’s an interesting thing that the jury did what they
did. . . . I’m operating off the premise that I’m deferring to the jury and they
had doubt about premeditation, so I’m assuming they didn’t plan to kill
anybody before.” The prosecutor responded that defendant’s premeditation
“wasn’t proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
On cross-examination, defendant testified that the victims had
approached him and Ortega, and that he had turned around to walk away
when he heard a gunshot. He claimed he shot up into the air, not in the
direction of anyone, because when he “heard the gunshot I believed that one
of these guys was shooting at me, so I shot in the air believing that when they
heard another gunshot they would stop shooting and it would make them
run.” He further explained, “I didn’t find out until later on it was Ortega
[who] shot his gun. I had my back towards him when I shot my gun, that’s
what I believed, I was trying to stop one of those guys that were shooting at
me.”
7
After redirect, the trial court heard arguments from both sides. Maas
argued that “what the jury found before is actually not relevant anymore
after a prima facie finding. . . . [Y]ou cannot inquire into the jury
deliberations.” The trial court responded, “Right, you cannot inquire into
their deliberations, but they, in fact, when they render a verdict, just as I
would defer to the jury as to the finding on first degree. . . . I’m not
comfortable coming in and saying, based on my assessment, well, I think it
should have been a first. . . . I think you have to defer . . . I think jeopardy
attaches so I don’t think I can do that anyway.”
The trial court further remarked that the jury’s true enhancement for
defendant’s firearm use “looms large,” but Maas insisted the finding was not
dispositive of defendant’s malice “[b]ecause the Prosecutor got up and her
theory was, basically, [defendant] doesn’t have to be a good shot. He can be
guilty of murder if he does something dangerous.” Maas again cited the jury
instruction for implied malice under CALCRIM no. 520, arguing that the jury
was told “one of the theories [upon which] they could find implied malice was
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” The prosecutor promptly
objected, arguing that CALCRIM no. 520 is “not the natural and probable
consequences doctrine”; that “[t]hose are completely different issues”; and
that “[t]he language which uses the phrase natural and probable
consequences in 520 is still valid today.”
Defense counsel then argued that defendant could still be entitled to
resentencing even if he was a proximate cause of Padilla’s death, particularly
when the prosecutor “argues he fired some shots towards some guys and . . .
all else you can say is a couple of the bullets that you found didn’t have the
matching weight or diameter of the 45 caliber which is what Mr. Ortega used.
[¶] So when this evidence is presented and it’s argued to the jury that they
8
don’t even need to find he’s a good shot, if he did something dangerous, then
he’s guilty of Second Degree Murder and I think that’s the argument that she
made.”
The trial court asked, “But if that’s the case wouldn’t [the jurors] have
found him guilty of second and found not true the enhancement and the—this
jury did not struggle finding things not true.” “[A]gain, the first and the gang
enhancements they found not true. So it seems to me . . . they vetted the
evidence and weren’t rolling over for the DA here.” Maas responded that
based on the record, “it’s pretty impossible to understand even what the
prosecution, the government that’s holding this gentleman in prison for life,
what he did do that amounted to enough to be guilty of a Second Degree
Murder of the victim in this case, Mr. Padilla? . . . . I believe sitting here
today that this record . . . doesn’t prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
should be held responsible for the murder of Mr. Padilla.”
The prosecutor asked the trial court if it had reviewed the trial
testimony of other witnesses, including T.R., the neighbor who had witnessed
the shooting. The court responded, “Sometime ago we went back through the
trial. It was, like, months and months ago.” The prosecutor reminded the
court that not only did K.W. testify that both defendant and Ortega
“ ‘emptied their clips at us,’ ” but T.R. likewise testified that “ ‘there was two
people standing there just unloading a couple of guns,’ ” and that “ ‘[i]t looked
like they were aimed, but it looked random.’ ” Based on this testimony, the
prosecutor argued that the court should reject defendant’s self-serving
testimony that he fired into the air. The prosecutor further suggested that
the jury’s true enhancement finding was “indicative of the intent of”
defendant, and moreover, it is “hard to believe how . . . the attempted murder
9
as to [R.E.] could be true if [defendant] was firing up in the air as he
indicated.”
At the close of the hearing, the trial court announced its decision to
deny the petition for resentencing on the second degree murder conviction.
As the court explained, “the 12022.53 finding is kind of logically dispositive
and factually dispositive. [¶] I—I agree we do have to do a review of the
evidence, but there were witnesses with no apparent obvious bias in terms of
describing what they saw, describing both gentlemen [as] shooting and no
one corroborating the story of shooting up in the air which is why I think the
jury made the finding that they did.” “I understand why [defendant] wants to
believe that, but I can’t find it credible in the face of what in fact, did happen
here, and what was seen and what was testified to by these witnesses.” The
court concluded, “I don’t think anything is changed in the presentation of the
evidence or in the record that would cause me to disturb those findings that
have previously been made. And I had—had been asked to do so, and I would
probably make those same findings.” This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof
in denying his section 1172.6 petition. In defendant’s view, the court did not
act as an independent factfinder to determine whether the prosecution had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant could be convicted of
murder under current law, but rather, applied a more lenient substantial
evidence test in deference to the jury’s findings. As we shall explain, we are
satisfied that the court understood and fulfilled its role as an independent
factfinder and applied the correct standard of proof. We further conclude
that any assumed error was harmless.
10
A. Governing Law
Prior to the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill No. 1437), malice could be imputed
to a person who did not personally harbor it who under two theories: (1) the
felony murder rule, and (2) the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Under the felony murder rule, a defendant could be liable for first or second
degree murder if the defendant or an accomplice killed someone during the
commission or attempted commission of an inherently dangerous felony.
(People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 942.) Under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor could be found “guilty not only of
the intended, or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the
target crime actually commits (the nontarget crime) that is a natural and
probable consequence of the target crime.” (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th
603, 611.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the statutes defining malice (§ 188) and
felony murder (§ 189, subd. (e)) to “eliminate[] natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and
limit[] the scope of the felony-murder rule.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) It also added former section 1170.95, “which
creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under
the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, at p. 957.) Effective
January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2; “Senate Bill No. 775”) amended section 1170.95 to extend the
resentencing procedures to a person convicted under any “other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” Former section 1170.95 has since been renumbered
as section 1172.6, with no substantive changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
11
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all required information (e.g.,
declaration of eligibility, case information, any request for appointed
counsel), the trial court “must ‘review the petition and determine if the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the
provisions of [section 1172.6].’ [Citation.] If the petitioner has made this
initial prima facie showing, he or she is entitled to appointed counsel, if
requested, and the prosecutor must file a response, and the petitioner may
file a reply. [Citation.] The court then reviews the petition a second time. If
it concludes in light of this briefing that the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction and recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts.” (People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997, 1003.) The
prosecutor and the petitioner may offer “new or additional” evidence at the
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
B. Standard of Proof
We begin with the general principle that “[a]bsent evidence to the
contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing
law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.) Here, the governing
statute explicitly provides that on a petition for resentencing, the prosecution
must “prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder under current law.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The statute also makes
clear that “[a] finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (Ibid.)
12
Nothing in the record affirmatively suggests the trial court misapplied
the standard of proof or mistook its role in the manner urged by defendant.
In the briefing and arguments below, defendant’s counsel repeatedly argued
that the trial court’s role was to determine whether defendant could be guilty
of murder beyond a reasonable doubt under existing law. The prosecutor did
not argue to the contrary, and neither side suggested that the court was
tasked with simply determining whether substantial evidence supported the
jury’s findings. Although the court did not explicitly state the prosecution
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant could be convicted of
murder under a currently valid theory, section 1172.6 did not require the
court to make express findings or state the standard it employed.
Defendant nevertheless insists that various remarks by the trial court
revealed its confusion over its role and the appropriate standard of proof. For
instance, defendant cites the court’s statement that it “ ‘would defer to the
jury’ on whether the offense was first or second degree murder.” Defendant
also highlights the court’s remarks that the trial testimony of the
eyewitnesses was “why I think the jury made the finding that they did”; that
the court saw nothing in the evidence or record “that would cause me to
disturb those findings that have previously been made”; and that the court
“would probably make those same findings” “had I . . . been asked to do so.”
We are not convinced that these statements, when read in context,
demonstrate the court’s error.
The trial court’s remark that it would defer to the jury’s acquittal of
defendant on the first degree murder charge aligned with existing case law
holding that a court cannot deny resentencing based on new findings that
turn a jury’s “ ‘ “acquittals and not-true enhancement findings [at trial] into
their opposites.” ’ ” (People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376 [resentencing
13
court erred in failing to give preclusive effect to jury’s not-true finding on
knife-use enhancement]; see People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003
[error in finding defendant was armed during robbery in support of major
participant finding, as jury made opposite finding at trial]; People v. Cooper
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393 [same re court’s findings that defendant possessed
and fired gun during kidnapping].) Although defendant emphasizes the
People’s apparent disagreement with these decisions, the cases remain good
law. The trial court’s remark—consistent with published appellate case
law—that it would give effect to the jury’s acquittal on the first degree
murder charge does not demonstrate the court’s failure to act as an
independent factfinder on matters material to resentencing of the second
degree murder charge.
As for the trial court’s other remarks about not disturbing the jury’s
findings related to defendant’s firearm use, we acknowledge the statements
on their face could be viewed as applying a deferential standard of review.
However, when read in context, it reasonably appears the court was
emphasizing the strength of the incriminating evidence that supported
defendant’s role in the shooting, and thus, his culpability for murder under
current law. As the court noted, the eyewitnesses to the shooting had “no
apparent obvious bias in terms of describing what they saw,” and “no one
corroborat[ed] the story of the shooting up in the air which is why I think the
jury made the finding that it did.” The court also remarked that despite
defendant’s self-serving testimony, the court could not “find it credible in the
face of what, in fact, did happen here, and what was seen and what was
testified to by these other witnesses.” Meanwhile, the court acknowledged it
“went back through the trial” record, which included evidence that the .9mm
firearm recovered at the scene belonged to defendant, and that police found
14
.9mm bullet holes in the apartment building and the grill of a nearby vehicle,
which would not have been caused by someone firing into the air. Defendant
cites no authority that prohibited the trial court from considering the
evidence underlying the true enhancement finding and the logical inferences
to be drawn therefrom, in conjunction with other evidence of defendant’s
intent, in drawing its conclusion that defendant was not entitled to
resentencing under section 1172.6.
In sum, we are satisfied that the trial court properly understood and
performed its role of independently considering and weighing the evidence to
determine that defendant could, beyond a reasonable doubt, be convicted of
murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
C. Prejudice
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court applied an
incorrect standard of proof at the evidentiary hearing, we conclude the
purported error was harmless.
As a threshold matter, defendant claims the purported error was
structural and therefore subject to automatic reversal. The weight of
authority holds otherwise, and we join those decisions holding that
application of the wrong standard of proof at a section 1172.6 resentencing
hearing is not structural error.
“ ‘Structural defects requiring automatic reversal of a criminal
conviction typically involve basic protections without which “ ‘a criminal trial
cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally
fair.’ ” [Citations.] These include total deprivation of the right to counsel,
denial of the right of self-representation, trial before a judge who is not
impartial, unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a
15
grand jury, and denial of the right to a public trial.’ ” (People v. Garrison
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745–746 (Garrison).) “An error is ‘ “structural,”
and thus subject to automatic reversal, only in a “very limited class of
cases,” ’ such as the complete denial of counsel, a biased decision maker,
racial discrimination in jury selection, denial of self-representation at trial,
denial of a public trial, and a defective reasonable-doubt instruction.
[Citation.] What unites this class of errors is ‘a “defect affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in
the trial process itself.” ’ ” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 410.)
In Garrison, the appellate court concluded the concept of structural
error does not apply to a resentencing hearing under former section 1170.95
because the hearing is not a criminal trial, and thus, the purported
application of an incorrect standard of proof during resentencing does not
affect the framework of a trial. (Garrison, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 746–
747; see also People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 972, fn. 9 (Garcia).)
However, Garrison did not decide whether the applicable test for prejudice
was the federal constitutional standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 24 or the test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson),
finding the error harmless under either standard. (Garrison, at p. 747.)
In People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706 (Vance), the court adopted
the reasoning of Garrison and held that a trial court’s application of the
incorrect burden at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 was not
structural error. (Vance, at pp. 715–716.) Vance further held that the
Watson harmless error test applied. As the court explained, because a
petition under section 1172.6 is not a criminal prosecution, most of the
federal protections that attend a criminal conviction (e.g., right against
double jeopardy, right against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury) do not
16
apply. (Vance, at p. 716.) And because the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in resentencing proceedings under section 1172.6 is merely
a statutory right provided by the Legislature, “a violation of the right is
subject to the state law harmless error standard.” (Vance, at pp. 716–717;
accord, People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 459 [“Even if the
trial court erred in describing its role or applying the burden of proof, the
error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable that absent the
error appellant would have achieved a more favorable result.”].)
Defendant does not contend these decisions were wrongly decided.
Instead, he relies primarily on the disposition in People v. Frierson (2017) 4
Cal.5th 225 (Frierson), which reversed the trial court’s application of a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in a resentencing proceeding under
the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 and remanded for further proceedings.
However, Frierson did not address the concept of structural error and
therefore it is not authority for the proposition urged by defendant. (People v.
Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1109; see Garrison, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 747, fn. 7 [declining to rely on Frierson as authority on structural error in
resentencing proceedings].) Furthermore, remand was necessary in Frierson
for reasons unique to the resentencing statute in that case. On remand, the
trial court had to decide not only whether the prosecution had proven the
petitioner’s ineligibility for relief beyond a reasonable doubt, but even if it
had not, whether the court should nonetheless exercise its “broader
discretion” under the “ ‘escape valve’ ” provision of the Three Strikes Reform
Act of 2012 to deny resentencing on the ground that the petitioner posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to the public. (Frierson, at pp. 238–240.) For
these reasons, we are not persuaded that Frierson supports the conclusion
17
that a burden of proof error in a resentencing proceeding under section
1172.6 is structural.
Defendant’s remaining authorities are likewise inapplicable, as they
pertain to structural errors that occurred during criminal and civil trials, not
a resentencing hearing under section 1172.6. (See Sullivan v. Louisiana
(1993) 508 U.S. 275 [erroneous jury instruction on reasonable doubt
standard]; People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 [invalid jury trial
waiver in mentally disordered offender proceeding]; Severson & Werson, P.C.
v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938 [workplace violence restraining
order issued without jurisdictional statutory notice to restrained party];
People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165 [erroneous jury instruction
lowered standard of proof]; People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178 [same].)
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the assumed error in this
case was not structural and that it is subject to the Watson harmless error
analysis. (Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 716–717; Garrison, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at pp. 746–747.) Critically, as was the case in Vance, defendant
“has staked all of his chips on the proposition that reversal is automatic” and
“does not argue that even if reversal is not automatic, the error was
prejudicial.” (Vance, at p. 717.) He does not address the substance of the
People’s argument that any purported error in applying the standard of proof
was harmless because defendant was ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law.4 (See Garrison, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 745 [no prejudice in
resentencing court’s application of wrong standard of proof at evidentiary
hearing because defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law].)
4 Instead, defendant merely contends the prosecution procedurally
forfeited the eligibility question at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
But defendant does not address the merits of the eligibility question in the
context of the People’s harmless error argument.
18
Nor does defendant renew any of the contentions defense counsel raised
at the resentencing hearing below—e.g., that (1) defendant was convicted of
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or some other
theory of imputed malice; (2) the jury was given an instruction for implied
malice under CALCRIM no. 520 that incorporated the invalidated natural
and probable consequences doctrine or otherwise permitted the jury to
impute malice to defendant merely from his participation in a crime; and
(3) the trial court could not deny resentencing based on the true enhancement
finding because that finding did not establish defendant’s malice (see Offley,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 593, 599). Because defendant had the burden of
showing prejudice and has not done so, he “has forfeited any claim that the
trial court’s application of an erroneous burden of proof was prejudicial.”
(Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 717.)
Moreover, and in any event, the above contentions lack merit, as
defendant was not convicted of murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any other theory of imputed malice; the implied
malice instruction did not incorporate the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or otherwise permit the jury to impute malice to defendant based on
his mere participation in a crime (see Garcia, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 972,
fn. 10); and no other instruction incorporating the natural and probable
consequences doctrine such as the conspiracy instruction in Offley, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at pp. 593, 599, was given in this case. As recounted in our
factual background, the evidence in the record showed that defendant and
Ortega—who were each armed with guns and multiple clips of ammunition,
dressed in black, and wearing gloves—approached Padilla and his friends
and opened fire on them, aiming “[f]or the most part” at Padilla, who had just
been in a fight with Ortega’s cousin. They “fired until their guns were just
19
clicking when they pulled the trigger, with no bullets coming out.” Based on
the number of casings found at the scene, defendant fired his .9mm weapon
10 times, and Ortega fired 6 times. They then ran to a waiting getaway car
and fled from police, dumping a gun along the way. Though it could not be
determined whose bullet caused Padilla’s death, the law provides that when
multiple shooters concurrently engage in gunfire and a victim is killed by a
single bullet, each shooter may be liable for murder even though the evidence
does not establish who fired the fatal shot. (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th
313, 337; People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845; People v. Lopez (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 327, 333.) Senate Bill No. 1437 did not impact this theory of
substantial concurrent causation. (People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130,
1145–1147.) Because there was strong evidence supporting a finding beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant either expressly intended to kill Padilla, or
that he deliberately and with conscious disregard for human life performed
an act that was dangerous to human life—and because the evidence fails to
support a contrary finding—we see no reasonable probability that defendant
would have obtained a more favorable result absent any assumed error by the
trial court.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.
20
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P. J.
_________________________
Petrou, J.
People v. Torres (A169539)
21
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