CourtListener 10361141•People v. Bui CA1/5
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Filed 3/21/25 P. v. Bui CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168734
v.
RYAN BRIAN BUI, (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. SC061477A)
Ryan Brian Bui appeals from a resentencing order entered
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He does not challenge
the trial court’s ruling insofar as it struck now invalid one-year
prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). He
argues only that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his invitation to dismiss five prior strike convictions, pursuant to
section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13
Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5, former subdivision
(b), required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence
enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the defendant
had served a prior prison term and not remained free of custody
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
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for at least five years. (§ 667.5, former subd. (b), as amended by
Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
375, 379–380 (Burgess).) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill
No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 by limiting
the enhancement solely to prior prison terms served for sexually
violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; Burgess, at p. 380.)
As a result of later legislation, section 1172.75 now
retroactively invalidates all other prior prison term
enhancements—imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision
(b), before January 1, 2020 (§ 1172.75, subd. (a))—and provides a
mechanism for courts to resentence defendants serving terms
which include such enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)-(d);
People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966; Burgess, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)
Specifically, section 1172.75 “directs the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . to ‘identify
those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a
judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision
(a) and . . . provide the name of each person, along with the
person’s date of birth and the relevant case number or docket
number, to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.’
(§ 1172.75, subd. (b).)” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)
The statute then directs the trial court to review the judgment,
verify that it includes such an enhancement, “and if so, ‘recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)”
(Burgess, at p. 380.) “By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires
a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the
newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
B.
The following facts are taken from this court’s unpublished
opinion in People v. Bui (Oct. 7, 2009, A119404) (Bui I). On
March 10, 2004, multiple homes in Foster City were burglarized.
2
One homeowner heard his doorbell ring but did not answer
because he did not recognize the Range Rover parked in front of
his house. Ten or 15 minutes later, he heard his gate open and
discovered two men at his sliding glass door. Both men fled when
the homeowner started yelling. The homeowner called police,
described the Range Rover, and gave police a partial license plate
number. When a Foster City Police Department officer
attempted to pull over the Range Rover two minutes later, the
two men in the vehicle led the police on a high speed chase down
an alley, followed by a foot pursuit. Bui was eventually taken
into custody. During the foot chase, Bui dropped his interim
driver’s license and a list of names, addresses, and telephone
numbers on the ground. Two of the Foster City homes previously
burglarized were on the list; one of the addresses was struck
through. (Bui I, supra, A119404.)
Bui was convicted of two counts of first degree (residential)
burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); counts one and three), one count of
attempted residential burglary (§§ 460, subd. (a), 664; count two),
and one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count
four). Bui admitted that he was on parole at the time of the
charged offenses (§ 1203.085, subd. (a)) and that he had suffered
six prior strike convictions—all six for first degree burglary
(§§ 460, subd. (a), 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2), 1192.7,
subd. (c)(18)). He also admitted having suffered one prior felony
conviction for which he served a prior prison term (§ 667.5,
former subd. (b)), and two prior serious felony convictions within
the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a). (Bui I, supra,
A119404.)
At Bui’s original sentencing (in 2007), the trial court
granted the defense’s Romero request in part and sentenced him
as a third striker with respect to only count one. For the
remainder of the counts, Bui was sentenced “as if he had two
strikes.” Accordingly, the trial court imposed an indeterminate
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term of 25 years to life for the first count of burglary under the
Three Strikes law and a consecutive determinate term of 21 years
and eight months on the remaining counts and enhancements.2
(Bui I, supra, A119404.) This court affirmed the judgment
(People v. Bui (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 675, 679, 689, review
denied June 30, 2010, S182703).
In 2022, after receiving notice from the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation that Bui might qualify for relief
under section 1172.75, the trial court appointed counsel to
represent him. Defense counsel filed a sentencing memo, which
argued he was entitled to recall of sentence and a full
resentencing, pursuant to section 1172.75. Bui asked the court to
strike his now invalid prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5,
former subd. (b)) and, additionally, invited the court to dismiss
the two five-year enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)), pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (c), along with five of his six strike
priors, pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a), and Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th 497. Bui argued that he should be sentenced to
a determinate term of 22 years or less.
Bui supported this argument with (among other things)
declarations from his mother and two sisters, which described
Bui’s traumatic childhood. Bui’s prison records showed that he
had been placed in the lowest possible security assignment that
2 Bui was originally sentenced before the Three Strikes
Reform Act of 2012 (§ 1170.12; Prop. 36, as approved by voters,
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)) (Reform Act). “Under the ‘Three
Strikes’ law as originally enacted in 1994, an individual convicted
of any felony offense following two prior convictions for serious or
violent felonies was subject to an indeterminate term of life
imprisonment with a minimum term of no less than 25 years.”
(People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651 (Conley).) “The
Reform Act changed the sentence prescribed for a third strike
defendant whose current offense is not a serious or violent
felony.” (Id. at p. 652, italics added.)
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can be obtained by a life prisoner and had suffered no rule
violations in the preceding five years. He had also completed
rehabilitative programming, paid his restitution, and been
assessed as a “low risk” to commit more burglaries.
The prosecutor conceded that Bui was entitled to have his
one-year prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, former subd.
(b)) stricken but argued that his sentence should not be further
reduced because he had not established that he fell outside the
spirit of the Three Strikes law. The People pointed out that Bui’s
problems with the law dated back to when he was a juvenile and
that all six of his qualifying strike convictions were for the same
crime (residential burglary).
The trial court recalled the sentence and resentenced Bui.
Pursuant to section 1172.75, it struck the one-year enhancement
originally imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision (b),
and stayed the punishment imposed under section 667,
subdivision (a). The court acknowledged that it had discretion to
dismiss one or more of Bui’s prior strikes and apparently struck
five of them with respect to counts two through four. However,
with respect to count one, based on its conclusion that the record
failed to show Bui was outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law,
the court declined to do so. The court imposed an aggregate
sentence of 30 years and four months to life in prison, comprised
of a 25 years-to-life indeterminate sentence on count one, plus a
consecutive determinate sentence of four years (the low term
doubled pursuant to § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) on count three and a
consecutive term of one year and four months (one third the mid-
term doubled) on count two. Punishment was stayed with
respect to count four.
DISCUSSION
Bui argues that the trial court abused its discretion
because it relied on the wrong legal standard in declining to
strike or dismiss five of his prior strike convictions, pursuant to
5
section 1385, subdivision (a), and Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497.
Bui fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.
(See People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 354-355
(Rogers) [standard of review].)
A.
Section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing for all
defendants who qualify for a recall. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)-(c);
Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 361.) In conducting a full
resentencing, trial courts have authority to exercise their
discretion, under section 1385, subdivision (a), and Romero, to
dismiss or strike a strike prior. (Rogers, at pp. 361-362.) “[T]he
full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing
decisions when resentencing a defendant.” (People v. Valenzuela
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425, italics added.) When a trial court
conducts a recall and resentencing under section 1172.75, it does
not reconsider the original sentencing judge’s Romero order but
makes a wholly new Romero determination. (Rogers, at p. 364.)
“Resentencing . . . shall result in a lesser sentence than the
one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the
repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. Resentencing . . . shall not result in a
longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1).) “The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(Id., subd. (d)(2).) The court is further directed that it “may
consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
6
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3), italics added.)
The Three Strikes initiative established sentencing
requirements “ ‘to be applied in every case where the defendant
has at least one qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court
“conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme should be made
because, for articulable reasons which can withstand scrutiny for
abuse, this defendant should be treated as though he actually fell
outside the Three Strikes scheme.” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).)
A trial court has discretion to dismiss a prior strike
conviction alleged under the Three Strikes law if the dismissal is
in the furtherance of justice (§ 1385, subd. (a)), “subject . . . to
strict compliance with the provisions of section 1385.” (Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) “[T]he underlying purpose of
striking prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust
sentences.” (People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500.) In
exercising this discretion, the trial court must consider “whether,
in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies
and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit.” (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
These are “stringent standards.” (Carmony, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 377.) The Three Strikes law establishes that not
dismissing a prior strike conviction is the “norm,” and there is a
“strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these
sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Id. at p. 378.) A
trial court does not abuse its discretion unless it was unaware of
its discretion, it refused the invitation to strike for impermissible
reasons, or “its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
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reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377; see id. at p.
378.)
B.
Bui primarily insists that the trial court abused its
discretion because, instead of “sentenc[ing] anew under present
circumstances” (Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 361), the
court refused to consider the factors specified in section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(3), and relied solely on Romero and its progeny.
We disagree.
“The trial court is not required to state reasons for
declining to exercise its discretion to strike a strike. We presume
the trial court has considered all relevant factors in the absence
of an affirmative record to the contrary. When the record is
silent as to the trial court’s reasons for declining to strike a prior
strike, we presume the court correctly applied the law.” (People
v. Edwards (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 523, 529.)
Here, the trial court explained its decision as follows: “I
want to thank both attorneys for your excellent briefs . . . , and I
want to especially thank [defense counsel] for all the material you
have provided the Court. It is extensive, and it certainly paints
the picture . . . of [Bui]’s life up to this time and what he’s gone
through, particularly in his childhood. I have reviewed all of
them.” (Italics added.)
The court continued, “[i]n this case [Bui]’s prior strikes
include five residential burglaries in San Mateo County and one
in San Francisco. He also had a significant juvenile history noted
in the probation report. [¶] Most troubling . . . is that, when
arrested, the police found what was characterized as a hit list of
37 residences, including the victimized residences. [¶] As pointed
out in the prosecution’s sentencing brief[,] from November 21,
1999[] up to [Bui]’s original sentencing in 2007, he was either on
parole, a parolee at large, or serving a prison sentence. [¶] [The]
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[d]efense has made much, and it certainly appears true, of [Bui]’s
abuse and trauma as a child, and the Court has considered that
very deeply. . . . [¶] . . . It really boils down to, however, [that] the
Court has to follow the law. The Court has to [decide] whether or
not the circumstances arise to say that [Bui] is [outside] the
scheme and spirit of the three strikes law. [¶] So that’s what the
Court has been weighing and considering. [¶] And ultimately, in
looking at all of the circumstances of the crimes, of the defendant’s
background, of his childhood, I just don’t find that [Bui] -- again,
I appreciate that [defense counsel] is talking about the legislature
in passing . . . [section] 1172.75, but . . . [Romero] . . . is really the
controlling law [with respect to the Three Strikes Law]. [¶] I’ve
come to the conclusion, reluctantly, very reluctantly, that it
would be an abuse of discretion and reversible error to find that
[Bui] does not fall within the statutory spirit of the three strikes
law or to strike the strikes. I just don’t believe the Court can do
that.” (Italics added.)
We assume (without deciding) that Bui is correct that a
resentencing court is required to consider if postconviction factors
weigh in favor of exercising discretion to strike a prior strike.
Nonetheless, the trial court’s comments do not affirmatively
reflect that it declined or refused to consider the postconviction
information that Bui’s counsel had supplied with the petition for
resentencing. Far from it, the court acknowledged having
considered all the information defense counsel provided,
including information that brought the court current regarding
Bui’s circumstances to the present day. Thus, contrary to Bui’s
assertion, we cannot assume the trial court ignored or declined to
apply section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3). (See People v. Edwards,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 529.) We do not read the trial court’s
statements as Bui does.
Nor did the court otherwise abuse its discretion. It did not
ignore Bui’s background, the nature of his offenses, or any other
9
individualized factor. (See Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 531.)
Rather, the trial court was presented with ample information
regarding the nature and circumstances of Bui’s convictions,
character, and prospects. (See People v. Williams, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 161.) It considered the length of Bui’s aggregate
sentence and implicitly determined that the tragic circumstances
of Bui’s childhood, his young age when he committed his prior
strikes, and the absence of violence in his record counseled in
favor of striking five of the six strikes with respect to counts two
through four. (Cf. § 1172.75, subd. (d)(1) [“[r]esentencing
pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than
the one originally imposed”]; People v. Terwilligar (March 10,
2025, A170304) __ Cal.App.5th __, __ [2025 Cal.App.LEXIS 139,
at p. *25] [revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act do not
apply to § 1172.75 resentencing].)3 But the court decided that
this did not take Bui completely outside of the spirit of the Three
Strikes law. After all, Bui’s six prior strike convictions were all
for first-degree burglary, which is the same serious (but not
violent) offense that he stands convicted of in counts one and
three.
In contrast to People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134,
1143-1145, Bui’s multiple instant offenses were committed, with
significant planning and sophistication, less than five years after
he served a 10-year prison sentence and while he remained on
parole. Thus, we cannot say that Bui is not the type of
3In Terwilligar, this Division “interpret[ed] the
Legislature’s requirement to ‘resentence’ the defendant as not
requiring the court to resentence on a blank slate” and
“construe[d] the Legislature’s directive in section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(2) to ‘apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing’ as
excluding section 1170.12 as amended by the Reform Act.”
(People v. Terwilligar, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. __ [2025
Cal.App.LEXIS at p. *25].)
10
“ ‘revolving door’ career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law
is addressed.” (People v. Stone (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 707, 717.)
A different court may have reasonably disagreed with the
trial court’s balancing and focused more on Bui’s adverse
childhood experiences and his recent rehabilitation efforts. But
that does not mean that the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard or otherwise abused its discretion. (See Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 379 [appellate court erred in finding an
abuse of discretion where it “simply disagreed with the [trial]
court’s weighing of the[] factors”].) And while the trial court
declined to strike all of Bui’s prior strike convictions, it did
implicitly strike five of them with respect to counts two through
four, along with every other sentencing enhancement. The record
reflects that “ ‘the trial court balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the
law.’ ” (Carmony, at p. 378.) Bui has not shown an abuse of
discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.
People v. Bui (A168734)
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