People v. Germany CA3

CourtListener 10361140Calctapp21 mar 2025

Testo completo

Filed 3/21/25 P. v. Germany CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C100063

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE003389)

v.

BRANDON MONEZ GERMANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

After a single-car accident left two men dead, a jury determined that defendant
Brandon Monez Germany was the driver of the car and that he drove under the influence
of alcohol, rejecting the defense theory that he was merely a passenger. Accordingly, the
jury found Germany guilty of two counts of murder and other crimes. Before the jury
reached its verdicts, Germany unsuccessfully asked the trial court to appoint a new
defense attorney, claiming, among other things, that his attorney had failed to investigate
the facts and develop the evidence as Germany desired and had called him a racial slur.

1
On appeal, Germany contends the trial court (1) abused its discretion by denying
his requests to substitute appointed counsel (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
(Marsden)) without conducting an adequate inquiry into his concerns about counsel’s
racial bias; (2) erred under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) (Stats. 2020,
ch. 317) by failing to conduct that adequate inquiry, which should have considered
counsel’s unconscious bias; and (3) erred at sentencing by denying his request under
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike a prior strike offense
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1385, subdivision (a), and by failing to strike the prior
strike under section 1385, subdivision (c), as recently amended by Senate Bill No. 81
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 81) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Just before 3:00 a.m. one day in February 2022, a California Highway Patrol
(CHP) officer found Germany trapped in the driver’s seat of a “wrecked” BMW near a
highway on-ramp. He appeared dazed, was bleeding from significant facial lacerations,
and seemed to be calling out to his two cousins, who had died in the crash. A blood test
revealed Germany had a blood-alcohol level of approximately 0.27—more than three
times the legal limit.
In an October 2022 amended information, Germany was charged with two counts
of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and two counts of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)). The information also alleged that
Germany had prior driving under the influence (DUI) convictions in 2013 and 2021 for
unlawfully driving a vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (Veh.
Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and further alleged that Germany had a 1998 robbery

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
conviction (§ 211), a serious felony within the meaning of California’s “Three Strikes”
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
In March 2023, Germany made his first unsuccessful request to substitute
appointed defense counsel.
I
Second Marsden – May 2023
A. Germany’s Contentions
Germany made his second Marsden motion in May 2023, alleging that counsel
“did nothing that [he] asked for.” Germany explained: “I asked him to give me the time
stamps for the pictures” of the scene of the accident. “He gave me pictures with no time
stamps. I asked for DNA forensic on the vehicle that we were in.” “I asked for certain
witnesses.”
Regarding those witnesses, Germany asserted that (a) a fireman would testify that
he was in the passenger seat, not the driver’s seat; (b) a medical doctor from the county
jail who cleared him for placement in the general jail population would confirm that his
injuries from the accident were consistent with being in the passenger seat; (c) a medical
doctor from UC Davis who treated him after the accident would state that his “seat belt
scars” aligned with being in the passenger seat; and (d) family members who attended the
party he left just before the February 2022 car accident would testify that he was not
driving.
Germany further contended that “yesterday was the first time that [counsel] came
to see [him] for two hours in 15 months.” Germany told counsel: “[Y]ou didn’t do
nothing that I asked for. You haven’t even got all my full discovery. None of that.
When he walked out, he mumbled something under his tongue. . . . I know it was a racial
slur.” Germany asserted, “[H]e called me a stupid nigga.” Additionally, Germany stated
that one of counsel’s former clients had provided him with an “affidavit” that he wanted
to present to the trial court but had not shown to counsel. The trial court reviewed the

3
document, which appeared to have been created the day before the hearing, and alleged
that counsel called the former client an “ignorant nigger.”2
Germany also maintained that counsel told his family that he would secure his
release from custody pending trial and have his prior felony stricken. Germany further
insisted that he “need[ed] better counsel,” explaining that his attorney had represented
two other people “in custody since [Germany had] been in custody . . . and they got 25-
to-life. And I’m scared. I don’t want 25-to-life for something I didn’t do.”
B. Trial Court’s Initial Questions and Comments
When the trial court asked if Germany knew the names of people who attended the
February 2022 party that he wanted counsel to contact, he initially replied that he did not
but then named one person. The trial court then asked counsel, “Is this the first time you
are hearing this name, [counsel]?” Counsel replied, “Yes.” He then explained that he
and his investigator had repeatedly asked Germany and his family members “for any
witnesses, anything having to do with the party that may know anything or be willing to
talk to us,” but they were “met with nothing but complete refusals to give us any
information, any names.”
Regarding Germany’s fear of receiving a lengthy prison sentence, the trial court
clarified that he faced an aggregate term of 60 years to life due to his prior strike
conviction. The court noted that Germany’s counsel had “practiced . . . in front of” her
for many years. The trial court then explained to defendant, “He will file a motion to
strike your prior conviction. So even if your conviction was struck, you would be
looking at 30-years-to-life on this case.”

2 Contrary to the People’s contention, this document is part of the record on appeal.

4
The trial court observed that the reason Germany had met other clients of his
counsel who faced lengthy prison sentences was because counsel was “such an
experienced attorney that he only handles big cases. He doesn’t handle misdemeanors.”
The court added, “It’s just the nature of the profession. Once you reach a certain point,
you start handling more serious cases.”
In response to the trial court’s questions, counsel stated that he had completed
approximately 50 to 60 jury trials over his 25 years of practicing criminal law and began
representing Germany in March 2022.
C. Counsel’s Responses to Germany’s Contentions
Counsel responded that the absence of time stamps on the accident scene
photographs was not a concern because it was indisputable that first responders took the
photographs upon arrival; DNA and forensic evidence was immaterial to Germany’s
desired defense, as it was undisputed that three people were in the car, all of whom left
substantial amounts of blood; and regarding witnesses, there were no medical records
from UC Davis or the county jail indicating Germany was a passenger, and Germany
consistently refused to provide the names of anyone who attended the February 2022
party. Counsel further stated that, contrary to Germany’s claims, he had met with
Germany numerous times over the previous 15 months, including three weeks before the
hearing.
Counsel also denied calling Germany “ ‘a stupid’ N-word,” describing the
allegation as “shocking” and “completely fabricated,” and characterized as fabricated the
document from a former client alleging that he had used a racial slur. Finally, counsel
clarified that he had never told Germany or his family that he would have the prior felony
stricken or secure Germany’s release pending trial but had stated he would file a motion
to strike the prior felony at the appropriate time.

5
D. Further Discussion Between the Trial Court, Germany, and Counsel
In connection with Germany’s contention that counsel had said he would get
Germany out of custody pending trial and have his prior felony stricken, the trial court
asked counsel, “[W]hat do you think the chances are that Mr. Germany would be able to
get out of custody pending these types of charges?” Counsel replied: “I don’t see really
any possibility . . . .” The trial court responded: “You have been practicing in this
community for many years and you know generally what the culture is here and how we
proceed with trials of this nature. Is it your experience that people who are facing murder
cases where there are two decedents, whether it be vehicular manslaughter with gross
negligence or second degree murder, are going to get released?” Counsel replied: “No.
Never. And Mr. Germany has asked me numerous times to address bail. I said no, it
doesn’t make sense. It’s a futile argument. Quite frankly, I said the Court would be
upset . . . with me if I did.”
In connection with Germany’s concerns that counsel failed to contact certain
witnesses, the trial court observed that Germany had named potential witnesses for the
first time during the Marsden hearing. Later, the trial court posed the following question
to counsel: “If you don’t have the names of witnesses, are you able to investigate it?”
Counsel replied: “No. . . . And again, we’ve repeatedly, repeatedly, repeatedly asked,
tried to help Mr. Germany, anyone we can talk to that might know something.” Germany
insisted that his family was angry with him and did not want to “get involved.” The trial
court then asked Germany: “[D]o you see the quandary you’ve put your own lawyer in?”
“How is he supposed to do the investigation?” Germany replied: “That’s my fault for
that. . . . I will accept all of that. But . . . I asked for, video cameras, body-worn
cameras.” The trial court explained that CHP officers did not wear body cameras when
the crash occurred.

6
E. Denial of Motion and Additional Comments
At the end of the hearing, the trial court said, “[A]t this point in time, I am
prepared to deny your Marsden motion.” The court added that it did not believe counsel
was a racist: “I think that is a very ugly accusation to make. I have known [counsel] for
years. He has an exceptionally good reputation in the legal community and amongst the
judges in this courthouse. I have never heard that accusation, not even once.” In
response, Germany referenced the document from counsel’s former client alleging the
use of a racial slur. The trial court replied: “Whatever he says, he says. But I will tell
you this: I accept [counsel’s] representation on this. I have never heard this said of
[counsel]. Never. That is not his reputation.” Germany insisted he heard counsel use the
racial slur the day before. The trial court replied, “You can believe that, but I’m telling
you to the extent that there is a discrepancy between your version and [counsel’s]
version . . . .” Germany interrupted: “There is a discrepancy through this whole . . . . He
has not been doing what I asked.” The trial court responded, “I think this hearing speaks
for itself, so I’m going to deny the Marsden motion and find that [counsel] has properly
represented you. He will continue to properly represent you.”
II
Additional Procedural Background
Third Marsden
In June 2023, the trial court sought to help the parties resolve the case before jury
selection. The prosecutor insisted that he would accept nothing less than a 30-year-to-life
sentence for Germany. The trial court confirmed with Germany that he understood he
faced a term of 60 years to life and did not want to accept the prosecution’s offer of 30
years to life. Germany then made another Marsden motion.

7
In the closed hearing, Germany insisted that he was not the driver of the car that
crashed and asserted, among other things, that there was “a lot of tampering with
evidence in [his] case, so it’s . . . insufficient counsel.” After further discussion with
Germany and counsel, the trial court denied this third Marsden motion.
Trial
At trial, Germany testified in his own defense, maintaining that when he left the
party in the BMW, he sat in the front passenger seat and fell asleep. When he woke up,
he was being pulled out of the BMW. Someone walked him around to the driver’s seat
and had him sit down in it. He explained that this was why there were photographs of
him in the driver’s seat after the accident.
During jury deliberations, the following colloquy occurred in another closed
Marsden hearing:
“THE COURT: Mr. Germany, during the course of these proceedings, a couple
times you have made Marsden motions, and I know that there were things that were said
in the heat of the moment, at least during one Marsden motion, and I want to give you the
opportunity to set the record straight as far as that is concerned, sir. [¶] Are you willing
to do that?
“[GERMANY:] Yes.
“THE COURT: Go right ahead.
“[GERMANY:] I apologize for accusing [counsel] of calling me a bad name.
“THE COURT: Because he didn’t do it?
“[GERMANY:] No, he didn’t.
“THE COURT: Do you accept that, [counsel]?
“[COUNSEL:] I do, Your Honor, and I appreciate the apology.
“THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Germany.”

8
Jury Verdicts
The jury found Germany guilty of two counts of second degree murder and two
counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and found true the related
allegations concerning Germany’s DUI convictions in 2013 and 2021.
Fourth Marsden
Germany made a fourth Marsden motion before sentencing. The trial court denied
it.
DISCUSSION
I
No Marsden Error
Germany contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an
adequate inquiry into his concerns regarding counsel’s racial bias, instead relying solely
on counsel’s reputation and prior courtroom performance to deny the second Marsden
motion in May 2023. He maintains that the trial court should have conducted further
inquiry into (1) why Germany claimed counsel used a racial slur, (2) the impact of his
allegations regarding counsel’s use of racial slurs on his trust in and relationship with
counsel, and (3) why he later retracted the allegation. He argues that if an adequate
inquiry had revealed his concerns to be well-founded, the appointment of new counsel
would have been appropriate.
We are not persuaded. The record reflects that the trial court denied the second
Marsden motion on credibility grounds after a thorough hearing. To assuage Germany’s
dissatisfaction with counsel, the court then shared its understanding of counsel’s
qualifications and experience.
A. Legal Background
To protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
court-appointed counsel, if a defendant seeks to replace appointed counsel on the grounds
of inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis

9
of the contention and provide specific examples of inadequate performance. A defendant
is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not
providing adequate representation or that the defendant and counsel have become
embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to
result. (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604 (Smith); Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at
pp. 123-124.)
A defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by manufacturing a conflict.
A claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, appointed counsel is, by itself,
insufficient to compel the appointment of substitute counsel. The right to appointed
counsel encompasses neither a “veto” power over an appointment nor the right to
appointment of one’s preferred attorney. (Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606; Marsden,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.)
We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. (Smith, supra, 30
Cal.4th at p. 604.) In conducting that review, we consider whether the trial court “made
an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s complaints.” (People v. Mungia (2008) 44
Cal.4th 1101, 1128.) We presume the trial court’s Marsden denial was correct. (People
v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 771, 779 [appellate courts presume the trial court’s
judgment is correct].)
A trial court’s Marsden ruling may rest on credibility findings. (People v. Smith
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696 [the trial court was entitled to accept counsel’s explanation in
resolving a “credibility question between defendant and counsel” at the Marsden
hearing]; cf. People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 722 [rejecting an RJA claim
and explaining that the trial court “credited defense counsel’s statement” in resolving a
factual dispute at a Marsden hearing concerning what counsel said to the defendant].)

10
B. Analysis
Here, the trial court listened to Germany’s numerous contentions of ineffective
representation, including the racial slur allegations. The court probed the details of
Germany’s contentions, asking follow-up questions and making comments. Then,
relevant here, after finding counsel’s denials of using a racial slur credible, the trial court
concluded that Germany’s reasons for seeking new counsel lacked merit. This decision
was not an abuse of discretion. (See Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 606-608 [no abuse of
discretion where the trial court “allowed defendant to express himself fully,” “ ‘listened
to defendant’s reasons for desiring new counsel, and found them to be without merit’ ”];
In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043 [“Only the trial judge as a trier of fact
is in a position to separate the truth from the exaggeration, sometimes revealed by things
like verbal hesitancy and body language which are not picked up in a reporter’s
transcript”].)
That the trial court mentioned counsel’s reputation and experience after denying
the Marsden motion does not indicate that the denial was based on those notions.3
(Cf. People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 154 [“Notwithstanding any inartful
language used to describe its ruling, the court properly exercised such discretion here”].)
To the contrary, the record suggests that the trial court mentioned counsel’s reputation
and experience in a continuation of its attempt to assuage Germany’s dissatisfaction with

3 The People cite People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1192, for the proposition that
in making credibility determinations at a Marsden hearing, a trial court may rely in part
on its knowledge of defense counsel and counsel’s reputation in the legal community.
Germany does not dispute this characterization of Cole. Rather, he contends Cole is
distinguishable because, in this case, the trial court relied solely on counsel’s reputation
when making its credibility ruling and denying the second Marsden motion. However, in
light of our conclusion that the trial court mentioned counsel’s reputation to assuage
Germany’s dissatisfaction with counsel, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute
regarding the meaning of Cole.

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counsel. (Cf. Clark v. Broomfield (9th Cir. 2023) 83 F.4th 1141, 1155-1156 [in addition
to providing a sufficient basis for making an informed decision about whether new
counsel should be appointed, a trial court’s inquiry into counsel’s performance during a
motion to substitute counsel “should amount to ‘such necessary inquiry as might ease the
defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern’ ”]; United States v. Iles (6th Cir. 1990)
906 F.2d 1122, 1131 [“An inquiry into whether the substitution of counsel is warranted
serves several important goals,” including “eas[ing] the defendant’s distrust”].)
For example, in relation to Germany’s fear that he would simply be next in a line
of counsel’s clients sentenced to long prison terms, the trial court sought to provide
necessary context: counsel had those clients because he was “such an experienced
attorney that he only handles big cases. He doesn’t handle misdemeanors.” Later, in
connection with Germany’s contention that counsel had promised to secure his pretrial
release from prison, the trial court asked counsel if, in light of his “many years”
practicing criminal law and his knowledge of “what the culture is here and how we
proceed with trials of this nature,” there was any chance that someone “facing murder
cases where there are two decedents, whether it be vehicular manslaughter with gross
negligence or second degree murder” would be granted pretrial release on bail. Counsel
replied, “No. Never.” Finally, in connection with Germany’s concerns that counsel had
failed to contact certain witnesses, the trial court observed that Germany had named
potential witnesses for the first time during the Marsden hearing and asked Germany if he
understood the difficult position he had put counsel in by not providing names earlier.
Germany responded, “That’s my fault for that . . . . I will accept all of that.”
Germany cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court has a duty at a
Marsden hearing to conduct further inquiry into why a defendant has made an allegation

12
or why the defendant may have retracted it.4 Such a duty would be inconsistent with case
law recognizing that criminal defendants must raise and articulate their own Marsden
motions, and cautioning trial courts not to interfere with the attorney-client relationship.
(See People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 864 [“the burden is ultimately on the
defendant to articulate his request” to substitute counsel, and while “the trial court has an
obligation to make a clear record and give a defendant the necessary latitude to request
the remedy being sought,” it “must take care not to interfere with the attorney-client
relationship”]; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 421-422 [“the trial court is not
required to conduct a Marsden hearing on its own motion,” and “any obligation” a trial
court has to “uphold a proper standard of representation by appointed counsel” “is
circumscribed and must be understood in light of the countervailing duty of the court to
respect the inviolability of the attorney-client relationship”].)
Having failed to cite any authority to support his argument, and having found
none, we further determine that the trial court had no duty to conduct further inquiry into
the impact of Germany’s allegations regarding counsel’s use of racial slurs on his trust in
and relationship with counsel. (See Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606 [a criminal
defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by manufacturing a conflict].)
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the second
Marsden motion.
II
Further Inquiry Under Marsden in Conjunction with the RJA
Germany contends that the RJA required further scrutiny into whether counsel
exhibited racial bias or animus against him by making one or both racial slurs. He
contends that, even if counsel did not make the slurs, a question remains as to whether

4 Appellate counsel questions whether Germany was “simply acquiescing to defense
counsel and the court by subsequently saying it did not happen and apologizing.”

13
counsel had “nonetheless unintentionally or unconsciously displayed any sort of implicit
bias during representation which affected [Germany’s] perception of the proceedings.”
Germany maintains that such unconscious bias may have “pervaded the proceedings and
informed each of” his Marsden motions. We are not convinced.
A. Legal Background
While “all persons possess implicit biases” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (g)),
the Legislature enacted the RJA to eliminate racial bias, including the unconscious
variety, from California’s criminal justice system (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i)
[“racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable” and
“inimical to a fair criminal justice system,” and “[i]mplicit bias, although often
unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and unfairness into proceedings similar
to intentional bias”]). The RJA includes four categories of conduct that, if proven,
establish a violation. (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)-(4).) Relevant here, it is an RJA violation if:
“(1) . . . an attorney in the case . . . exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(1).)
B. Analysis
Germany contends section 745, subdivision (a)(1) required the trial court to
conduct “further, careful scrutiny” into whether counsel may have unconsciously
displayed implicit bias towards Germany, and whether that implicit bias may have
affected Germany’s perception of the proceedings. We disagree. Generally, trial courts
in our adversarial system do not have a duty to consider issues that the parties themselves
do not raise. If the Legislature wants to impose a sua sponte duty on the trial courts, it
knows how to do so. (See People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 234 [“the
Legislature clearly did not mandate courts to sua sponte consider mental health diversion
in every case,” because “[i]t could have simply included such a requirement in the statute
if that was its intent”].) The text of section 745, subdivision (a)(1) simply does not

14
contemplate imposition of a sua sponte duty on the trial courts to inquire about the
unconscious implicit bias of appointed defense counsel.
Though Germany references uncodified legislative findings in the RJA’s preamble
(see Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2), we discern no argument in his briefing that those findings
should affect our construction of section 745, subdivision (a)(1). Accordingly,
Germany’s hybrid Marsden/RJA claim is unpersuasive.5
III
Sentencing Claims
Germany contends the trial court erred by declining to strike his prior strike (the
1998 robbery conviction) pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a), and section 1385,
subdivision (c), which was recently amended by Senate Bill No. 81. Regarding the
section 1385, subdivision (a) analysis, he contends the trial court abused its discretion by
confusing some of the facts of his two DUI convictions, and appearing to have an
incorrect understanding of when he will be eligible for parole. Regarding section 1385,
subdivision (c), he contends a different panel of this court wrongly held in People v.
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237 (Burke) that a prior strike is not a type of punishment
for which one can obtain relief under the statute. Burke was not wrongly decided, and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the interests of justice analysis under
section 1385, subdivision (a).

5 In support of his argument, Germany invokes a statement signed by two justices of our
Supreme Court concurring in the denial of a petition for review, which articulates the
view that it would have been “appropriate—perhaps even required—for the court to
construe” a defendant’s Marsden motion and argument “as raising an RJA claim” in that
case. (People v. Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 725c (conc. stmt. of Evans, J.).)
However, this concurring statement is not binding precedent. Furthermore, the
concurring statement emphasized that, when considering the criminal defendant’s
Marsden motion, the trial court did not ask counsel “whether she made the specific
statements [the defendant] alleged.” (Ibid.) In contrast, here, the trial court did ask
counsel if he made the racial slurs, counsel denied it, and the trial court believed him.

15
A. Additional Background
1. 2013 Statement to a Police Officer
At trial, the police officer who arrested Germany in connection with his 2013 DUI
conviction testified that Germany told him he “almost died” and “barely” escaped from
his severely damaged car that was on fire when the two men spoke.
2. Prior Strike and Romero Motion
In a bench trial after the jury’s verdicts, the trial court found true the allegation
that Germany was convicted of robbery in 1998, a serious felony under California’s
Three Strikes law.
Defense counsel asked the trial court to dismiss the prior strike pursuant to section
1385, subdivision (a), and Romero, arguing in his filing that Germany fell outside the
spirit of the Three Strikes law because he committed the offense as a teenager, more than
25 years before his instant offenses. Among other arguments, counsel urged the trial
court to consider the trauma Germany experienced as a child: he grew up without a
parental figure, lacked stability after his father abandoned him when he was seven years
old, and he witnessed a family member being shot when he was 15 years old.
At the beginning of the December 2023 hearing at which Germany was sentenced,
the trial court confirmed with the parties that Germany was on probation for DUI when
he committed the instant offense. Defense counsel reiterated points he made in the filed
Romero motion and argued that if the trial court struck the prior strike, Germany still
would face a sentence of 30 years to life.
The trial court denied the Romero motion, emphasizing Germany’s near-death
experience in 2013, and that he was on probation for DUI when he committed the instant
offense: “[T]he jury heard about” the DUI “in which his car actually caught on fire and
he almost -- he himself almost died. That was quite jarring testimony to hear about, and
it’s something that I have to consider, because you would think an individual who had
such a close brush with death would stop drinking at that point in time.” Germany

16
“[n]ever committed another violent or serious offense.” But he still “engaged in
extremely reckless and dangerous conduct, and I decline to exercise my discretion to
strike his prior conviction because he was on probation for driving under the influence
when he engaged in this conduct.” He “was almost seriously injured on the case on
which he was on probation.” “I just cannot turn a blind eye to what occurred, not just in
2013 with this prior conviction for driving under the influence, but also in 2021 for which
he was on probation when he committed this offense. So for all of those reasons, I am
going to deny” the Romero motion. (Italics added.)
3. Imposition of Sentence and Other Remarks
After denying the Romero motion and before pronouncing the sentence, the trial
court invited the victims’ family members who were in the courtroom to speak. They
declined.
The trial court sentenced Germany to an aggregate term of 60 years to life,
consisting of consecutive terms of 30 years to life for the two murder convictions (two
terms of 15 years to life, each doubled due to the prior strike). The court imposed and,
pursuant to section 654, stayed terms for the vehicular manslaughter convictions. The
trial court also ordered Germany to pay restitution to the families of his two deceased
victims in an amount to be determined, remarking it was more important for the families
to receive restitution for counseling and funeral services: “I would prefer to have the
family get that restitution as opposed to any fines to the State of California.”
The trial court then confirmed Germany’s custodial credits with the courtroom
clerk, and remarked: “Mr. Germany, it is possible that you will get paroled. . . . For
instance, there is something called elder parole. That means if you are 50 years of age
and you have served 20 years in prison, the Department of Corrections can parole you
under the elder parole provisions, so that could indeed apply to Mr. Germany when he
has been incarcerated for 20 years. [¶] I say that to the people seated in the audience
today because I know as you leave here today you think Mr. Germany may never get out

17
of prison. That is not necessarily correct. He could very well be released from prison
and I think you deserve to know the truth of that.”
B. Analysis of the Romero Denial
Under section 1385, subdivision (a) the trial court “may, . . . in furtherance of
justice, order an action to be dismissed.” This authority under section 1385, subdivision
(a) includes the power to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes
law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent
felony . . . .” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.)
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion
asking it to strike a prior strike under section 1385, subdivision (a). A defendant must
show that the denial was irrational or arbitrary. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 375, 378.) It is not enough that reasonable people disagree about whether to strike a
prior conviction. The Three Strikes law “not only establishes a sentencing norm, it
carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm.” (Id. at p. 378.)
Only extraordinary circumstances justify finding that a career criminal is outside the
Three Strikes law. (Ibid.) The purpose of the Three Strikes law is to punish recidivists
more harshly. (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140.)
Here, the trial court properly considered the unique circumstances of Germany’s
reckless and fatal conduct. Germany’s 2013 DUI conviction and associated near-death
experience and being on probation for a second DUI conviction when he committed the
instant offenses were both relevant recidivism considerations when the trial court decided
he did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Accordingly, the Romero denial
was not irrational, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Germany was on probation in 2022 because of his 2021 DUI. And the testimony
at trial was that Germany narrowly escaped death in connection with the 2013 DUI
conviction. Thus, it appears the trial court misspoke when it said Germany “was almost
seriously injured on the case on which he was on probation.” But considering the totality

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of the trial court’s comments at the December 2023 hearing, it is clear the trial court
understood the material facts and circumstances of Germany’s situation when it denied
the Romero motion: Germany had two prior DUI convictions, he knew that he almost
died in connection with one, and he was on probation for a DUI when he committed the
instant offenses.
Germany observes that the trial court also appeared to misspeak when it indicated
it was possible Germany would be eligible for elderly parole, because a person sentenced
under the Three Strikes law is ineligible for such parole. (See § 3055, subds. (a), (g)
[under the Elderly Parole Program, the Board of Parole Hearings reviews the parole
suitability of inmates who are over 50 years old and have served a minimum of 20 years
of continuous incarceration on the inmate’s current sentence; but the program does not
apply to cases in which sentencing occurs pursuant to the Three Strikes law].) He
contends this apparent misunderstanding may have “compounded the court’s flawed
analysis” in denying the Romero motion. We disagree.
As the People note, the trial court made this comment after it had already denied
the Romero motion and imposed sentence. It also made the comment after expressing
hope that the victims’ families would be able to use any victim restitution to pay for
counseling and funeral services, and before the State of California received payment of
any fines from Germany. Further, the trial court indicated that it made the comment for
the benefit of the victims’ families who were in the courtroom, because they “deserve[d]
to know the truth.”
Accordingly, the record reflects the trial court referenced the possibility of elderly
parole not because it was a factor in its decision to deny the Romero motion, but out of
solicitude and a sense of responsibility to inform the victims’ families that a day might
arrive when Germany would be a free man. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the Romero motion.

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C. Section 1385, Subdivision (c) and Burke
Senate Bill No. 81 amended section 1385 to “add specific mitigating factors the
trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a
defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c); People v. Sek (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) Section 1385, subdivision (c) now provides: ‘(1)
Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by
any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
any of the mitigating circumstances . . . are present.’ ” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 242-243.)
In Burke, a different panel of this court explained that because it is “well
established that the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement” but “an alternative
sentencing scheme for the current offense,” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243)
“section 1385, subdivision (c)’s provisions regarding enhancements do not apply to the
Three Strikes law” (id. at p. 244). Germany argues Burke was wrongly decided and the
trial court should have stricken his prior strike under section 1385, subdivision (c).
No other court that has considered the question has disagreed with the
fundamental conclusion in Burke applicable here. (See, e.g., People v. Olay (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 60, 67 [“we . . . agree with Burke’s ultimate conclusion—that section 1385,
subdivision (c) does not apply to the Three Strikes law”]; People v. Tilley (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 772, 776, fn. 2 [citing Burke and reasoning that because a prior strike
conviction is “not an enhancement but part of an alternative sentencing scheme,” § 1385,

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subd. (c) does not apply to prior strike convictions].) Germany’s argument is not
persuasive.6 Accordingly, the trial court did not err at sentencing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.

6 This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to address (1) the People’s contention that
Germany’s section 1385, subdivision (c) argument is forfeited on appeal because it was
not raised below, and (2) Germany’s contention that, if the argument is forfeited on
appeal, counsel provided ineffective assistance.
 Judge of the Placer County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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