CourtListener 10358146•People v. Carpio CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 3/19/25 P. v. Carpio CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B333336
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA149810)
v.
JOSE RODRIGO CARPIO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Matthew Missakian, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Jose Rodrigo Carpio (defendant)
appeals from the judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him
guilty of first degree murder and intentionally discharging a
firearm causing great bodily injury. Defendant contends the trial
court erred by denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to Penal
Code section 1387.11 because neither of the People’s two prior
dismissals of the felony were due solely to excusable neglect.
Defendant also argues the court erred by admitting Detective
Oscar Villarreal’s testimony regarding defendant’s recorded
statements. We conclude the court did not err in either instance,
and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The charges and the jury trial
Charges were first filed against defendant on May 5, 2017,
under the case No. TA143150. Defendant was held to answer and
arraigned on information, filed on January 24, 2018. The jury
trial was set for April 30, 2019. However, the People indicated
they could not proceed due to a breakdown of plea negotiations
after defense counsel highlighted evidence on a videotape the
prosecutor had not previously noticed. The People dismissed and
refiled the case under the case No. TA148820.
Defendant was held to answer and arraigned on
information, filed on May 31, 2019. The jury trial was set for
August 16, 2019. The People filed a motion to continue trial on
August 14, 2019, on the ground material witnesses were
unavailable. The trial court denied the motion on August 16,
2019. In denying the motion, the court found the People failed to
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
properly and with due diligence subpoena the witness, who the
People failed to show was material. On August 19, 2019, jury
selection began, but the People announced they could not proceed
as they thought they properly served the investigating officer
who was to testify. The court found they failed to do so. The
People also indicated they were awaiting a report regarding a
witness interview held by that investigator, who was on vacation.
The case was dismissed. The People refiled the case under case
No. TA149810.
Defendant was charged with one count of murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)), plus the allegation he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death
(§ 12022.5, subd. (b)–(d)). A jury trial commenced on
November 15, 2019. The trial ended in a deadlocked jury, and a
mistrial was declared. Another jury trial began on May 22, 2023.
Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, and the
allegation defendant personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury and death was found true.
Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life for the murder,
plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement. Defendant timely appealed.
The motion to dismiss
On February 18, 2021, defendant filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 995, contending the People were not
permitted to file charges against defendant for a third time under
section 1387.1, because neither of the prior dismissals were solely
due to excusable neglect. Defendant argued the People’s prior
dismissals were deliberately made for tactical reasons and
asserted the prosecution did not act reasonably in its efforts to
produce an investigating officer who was on vacation.
3
The People argued excusable neglect in the first dismissal
because the prosecution had to investigate the defense’s new
theory. The People asserted defense counsel brought new
information to their attention after the prosecution announced
they were ready for trial. Specifically defense counsel informed
them defendant planned to call a firearms expert to testify the
victim fired a gun at defendant, and the police untruthfully
omitted in their reports any mention of the victim having a gun.
Given this new information, the prosecution maintained it was
obligated to investigate the serious allegation and possible
affirmative defense.
As to the second dismissal, the prosecution contends it was
due to excusable neglect because Detective Villarreal had been
personally served to appear for trial, and there had been contact
with him. However, since on the defense motions, the trial was
continued several times, and Detective Villarreal was on vacation
in Mexico when trial finally commenced. The People represented
the detective communicated by text messages he was aware of
and was served with the subpoena.
The motion was heard on July 23, 2021. The court denied
the motion, finding both dismissals were due to excusable
neglect. The court found the first dismissal was due to excusable
neglect because the prosecution failed to closely and critically
review their evidence. The court rejected the prosecution’s
assertion there was new evidence and defendant intended to call
an undisclosed witness. Rather the court found the prosecution
was neglectful in missing portions of a surveillance video showing
the victim may have fired a gun.
The trial court found the second dismissal was due to
excusable neglect because the prosecution made efforts to
produce Detective Villarreal that were consistent with that which
4
had successfully worked for them in the past in their established
relationship with the detective. The court found the prosecution
reasonably believed they could produce Detective Villarreal for
trial and did not act in bad faith.
Prosecution trial evidence
Defendant worked at the Jonathan Lewis furniture factory
with Elvia Solorzano, German Navarro, and Josue Gonzalez.
Defendant was Navarro’s and Gonzalez’s supervisor and
Solorzano was a human resources manager. Navarro had begun
demanding money from and threatening Solorzano during their
employment. Navarro told Solorzano he murdered and robbed
someone in Mexico, was involved with “bad people” there and
owed them money. Navarro said he told those people Solorzano
owed Navarro money. Navarro told Solorzano those people would
come after her and her family if she did not give Navarro the
money to pay them back.
Solorzano paid the money Navarro demanded. She had to
take out loans, borrow money from friends and coworkers, and
gave Navarro almost all of her paychecks. When Solorzano could
not pay more, Navarro coerced her into a fraudulent check-
cashing scheme involving fictitious employees. Navarro continued
to separately demand money from Solorzano and had brandished
a gun to intimidate her.
Solorzano and defendant eventually agreed to pay someone
to assault Navarro in an effort to stop his threats, but the plan
failed to materialize. Defendant later told Solorzano he would
attack Navarro himself. They agreed defendant needed a gun in
case he had to defend himself against Navarro. Solorzano
supplied information to someone who could help him get a gun.
Defendant later told Solorzano he obtained a gun and was
keeping it in his backpack. Later that evening, defendant told
5
Gonzalez he was meeting Navarro to kill him. Gonzalez knew
about Navarro’s threats and agreed to go with defendant.
They drove in defendant’s car to meet Navarro. Defendant
called Navarro and told him he had money for him. When they all
arrived at the meeting place, defendant approached Navarro and
shot at him about four times while he was still in his car.
Navarro drove to the end of an alley, he got out of his vehicle and
began running, and defendant chased after him while still
shooting. Defendant then ran out of bullets and stopped shooting.
During this time, Navarro ran towards defendant but fell down.
While Navarro was lying on the ground, defendant reloaded his
gun, shot Navarro, and kicked him in the face. Gonzalez watched
the incident from defendant’s car as it happened. Defendant and
Gonzalez then returned to the factory.
Defendant initially said nothing to Solorzano about killing
Navarro and acted as though he was not involved in the
homicide, leading Solorzano to believe defendant was not
involved. But later defendant went into Solorzano’s office and
told her he killed Navarro. Defendant said he never intended to
fire the gun, which accidentally discharged. However he
contradicted these statements by indicating his gun jammed, he
went back to his car for more bullets, and returned to Navarro to
finish the job he started.
A surveillance video of the incident did not clearly show
defendant or the license plate of the shooter’s car. However, the
recorded incident was consistent with Gonzalez’s description of
the events. Further, the car shown in the video was “strikingly
similar” to defendant’s car. Defendant and Navarro had
exchanged text messages concerning the check-cashing scheme,
defendant’s desire to get a gun, and meeting up on the day of the
shooting. In addition, defendant’s phone, when examined for cell
6
tower usage, contained data showing the phone was in the area of
the shooting when Navarro was killed.
Following defendant’s arrest, conversations between an
undercover agent and defendant while in his jail cell were
recorded. Defendant responded, “I didn’t think I’d get caught,”
when asked why he did not flee to Mexico. Defendant was also
recorded saying, “[T]hey know it was me.”
Defense trial evidence
Defendant called his former high school principal who
testified that, nine to 10 years ago, defendant was a “good kid,”
an above average student, very respectful, and never engaged in
or had a reputation for violence. The principal testified murder
would be inconsistent with defendant’s character. Some of
defendant’s high school teachers also provided testimony
consistent with the principal’s statements regarding defendant’s
character and reputation.
Defendant’s high school soccer coach testified the shooter in
the surveillance video ran in a manner that was inconsistent
with how defendant ran. The coach knew defendant’s running
form because he taught defendant how to run when he played
soccer. The coach kept a close relationship with defendant that
continued after high school. They continued to play soccer
together every Sunday until defendant was arrested. The coach
testified defendant was a leader, family-oriented, and was never
violent.
Defendant’s father testified he had no financial problems
and would have given defendant money if he had need.
Defendant’s father testified, given their relationship, defendant
would have asked him for help if he was in any financial trouble
and needed money. Defendant’s father does not believe defendant
7
would be involved in a murder for financial reasons because their
family never had any issues with money.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Defendant asserts two main arguments. First, he contends
the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to
section 1387.1 because neither of the People’s dismissals were
due solely to excusable neglect. Second, he argues the court erred
by admitting Detective Villarreal’s testimony regarding
defendant’s recorded statements because it was inadmissible
hearsay and improper lay opinion. Defendant asserts it was
reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to
defendant if the court excluded the testimony because Detective
Villarreal’s statements tainted the jury’s ability to objectively
assess the evidence.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss
A. Standard of review
Defendant contends a de novo standard of review should
apply to what constitutes excusable neglect because of the
decision in People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889. We disagree.
Cromer applied a de novo standard because of the importance of
the Sixth Amendment confrontation right; the fact that
determining reasonable diligence there requires applying an
objective, constitutionally based legal test; and the fact the trial
court has no first-person vantage point as to the prosecutor’s
efforts to find a witness but is in the same position as an
appellate court in applying the objective test. (Id. at pp. 896–897,
900–901; see People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 850–851
8
[distinguishing the application of independent review in
Cromer].) None of these issues are implicated with section 1387.1
here, which requires no application of an objective,
constitutionally based legal test. Thus, Cromer is not instructive
here.
Instead, “[w]e review the trial court’s section 1387.1
excusable neglect finding for an abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Mason (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 (Mason).) “Under an
abuse of discretion standard, ‘“we ask whether the trial court’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether
its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the
law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.”’” (People v.
Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 857.) “The abuse of discretion
standard is highly deferential.” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) “An abuse of discretion means the trial
court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Kocontes
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 787, 853.) “[A] ‘“decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree.”’”
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
B. The trial court reasonably found the first
dismissal was solely due to the prosecution’s
excusable neglect
Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding the first
dismissal resulted from excusable neglect because the
prosecution was ready for trial and only dismissed the case to
further prepare. Defendant adds the People’s refiling was a
tactical decision designed to circumvent the court’s denial of a
continuance. We disagree.
Section 1387.1, subdivision (a) states in relevant part:
“Where an offense is a violent felony, as defined in Section 667.5
9
and the prosecution has had two prior dismissals, as defined in
Section 1387, the [P]eople shall be permitted one additional
opportunity to refile charges where either of the prior dismissals
under Section 1387 were due solely to excusable neglect.”
“Excusable neglect” is broadly defined to “include[], but is not
limited to, error on the part of the court, prosecution, law
enforcement agency, or witnesses.” (§ 1387.1, subd. (b).) The
statute adds, “[i]n no case shall the additional refiling of charges
provided under this section be permitted where the conduct of the
prosecution amounted to bad faith.” (§ 1387.1, subd. (a).)
“The term ‘excusable neglect’ in section 1387.1 is given the
same construction in criminal cases as it has been given in civil
cases.” (Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728,
741.) “‘Simply expressed, “[e]xcusable neglect is neglect that
might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent
person under the same or similar circumstances.”’” (People v.
Massey (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 204, 211 (Massey).) “Section 1387.1
is a remedial tool designed to save serious felony prosecutions
from improvident loss where there is no bad faith on the part of
the prosecution and the inability to prosecute the action is due to
excusable neglect.” (Id. at p. 212.) “As a result, the policy favoring
trial on the merits must prevail unless there is clear inexcusable
neglect.” (People v. Turner (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 568, 574
(Turner).)
The trial court reasonably found the People’s first dismissal
resulted from their excusable neglect. While the court rejected
the People’s position there was new evidence and that defendant
intended to call a witness he failed to disclose, it found the
prosecution was neglectful in overlooking certain portions of a
surveillance video showing the victim may have fired a gun.
Defendant asserted this same fact showing the prosecution’s
10
neglect in his response brief to the People’s opposition to the
motion to dismiss. Defendant indicated, when the parties tried to
settle the case on the day of trial, he showed two photos taken
from the aforesaid portions of the surveillance video. Defendant
stressed, however, the prosecution had possession of the
surveillance video since the night of the incident. The prosecutor
submitted a declaration attesting he never saw a gunshot from
the victim in the video. Accordingly, substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding the prosecution was neglectful in
reviewing their evidence.
The trial court concluded the prosecution’s neglect was
excusable because they simply failed to adequately review the
evidence. The court acknowledged the portion of the video the
prosecutor missed was not readily apparent as it required a close,
critical examination of the evidence. There is no evidence
defendant’s claim was clearly evident from the face of the
surveillance video, suggesting the prosecution acted in bad faith
by failing to make the observation. There was also no report of a
gun recovered from the victim and no evidence at trial the victim
fired a gun at defendant. Hence, the prosecution’s neglect falls
within the acts or omissions of a reasonably prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances (see Massey, supra, 79
Cal.App.4th at p. 211), providing substantial evidence that the
People did not dismiss the case in bad faith or only for tactical
reasons. It was therefore not arbitrary or capricious for the court
to have found the prosecution’s neglect was excusable.
Defendant also posits the People’s first dismissal was not
excusable neglect because the prosecution requested and was
denied a continuance. This argument, however, presumes the
trial court properly denied the People’s request for a continuance
and considered the same factors under section 1387.1 in so doing.
11
We note a request for a continuance was never formally
requested and denied. The court indicated it wanted to at least
swear in a panel of jurors, but the issue of trial continuance was
never formally addressed. It would be speculative to conclude any
informal denial of a trial continuance necessarily meant the
People’s dismissal was not due to excusable neglect.
C. The trial court reasonably found the second
dismissal was solely due to the prosecution’s
excusable neglect
We note section 1387.1, subdivision (a) only requires either
of the prior dismissals to be due to excusable neglect. We have
concluded the trial court properly found the first dismissal was
solely due to excusable neglect. Thus, we need not consider the
second dismissal. Nevertheless, it was reasonable for the court to
find the second dismissal also resulted from the prosecution’s
excusable neglect.
The trial court originally found the People failed to
sufficiently show they subpoenaed Detective Villarreal. However,
the court ultimately found the dismissal was due to excusable
neglect because the prosecution had made efforts they reasonably
believed would produce the witness. The prosecutor submitted a
declaration attesting he personally served Detective Villarreal to
be in court to begin trial. When Detective Villarreal was
unavailable on the trial date, the prosecutor texted him to inquire
about his absence. Detective Villarreal responded he was aware
of and was served with the subpoena but was then in Mexico and
would return in about a week. While the prosecutor’s efforts to
produce the witness may have been informal, the court found the
People acted reasonably and in good faith given the good
relationship with Detective Villarreal and how he had previously
responded. The court ruled the prosecution’s actions were
12
neglectful but excusable because they were in accordance with
procedures that had worked in the past. Accordingly, we conclude
the court acted within its discretion as substantial evidence
shows the prosecution’s neglect might well have been the acts or
omissions of a reasonably prudent person under the same or
similar circumstances. (See Massey, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at
p. 211.)
The circumstances here are similar to those in Mason,
where the witness who the prosecution failed to produce had been
fully cooperative. (Mason, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pages 1196–
1197.) The witness and the prosecution had kept in contact with
one another, even while the defense delayed the trial several
times. (Id. at p. 1196.) The witness at some point left the country
to work on filming a movie but was unaware the trial would
commence. (Ibid.) The prosecution had every reason to believe
the witness would make himself available as he had in the past.
(Id. at p. 1197.) The Mason court found the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by finding excusable neglect. (Ibid.)
Like Mason, defendant here filed multiple motions to
continue trial, which was continued several times. When the trial
was finally set to commence, Detective Villarreal was out of the
country on vacation. The prosecution had an established
relationship with Detective Villarreal, who reliably responded
when requested. While the People failed to properly subpoena
Detective Villarreal, the prosecutor reasonably, and in good faith
believed, the informal efforts were sufficient to produce Detective
Villarreal based on their past interactions. Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by finding the dismissal was due to
excusable neglect.
In short, the trial court acted reasonably within its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
13
section 1387.1. The evidence does not show the prosecution’s
neglect was clearly inexcusable. (See Turner, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 574.) In the first dismissal, the prosecution
overlooked certain portions of a surveillance video showing the
victim may have fired a gun. But the portion of the video missed
was not easily apparent, there was no report of a gun recovered
from the victim, and the defense never presented evidence of the
victim firing a gun at defendant. In the second dismissal, the
prosecution failed to subpoena Detective Villarreal. But the case
had been continued several times due to defendant’s motions and
the prosecution reasonably believed their informal efforts would
produce Detective Villarreal given their established relationship.
Although the prosecution’s efforts fell short and they clearly
made mistakes, substantial evidence shows they acted
reasonably and not in bad faith.
II. The trial court did not err in admitting Detective
Villarreal’s testimony regarding defendant’s
recorded statements
A. Standard of review
“‘[A]n apellate [sic] court applies the abuse of discretion
standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the
admissibility of evidence.’” (People v. Thomas (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 924, 970.) “This deferential standard of review
applies to our review of the trial court’s determination . . .
whether to receive lay opinion testimony . . . [and] whether
proffered evidence constitutes inadmissible hearsay . . . .”
(Osborne v. Todd Farm Service (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 43, 50–51,
citations omitted.) “The trial court’s ‘discretion is only abused
where there is a clear showing [it] exceeded the bounds of reason,
all of the circumstances being considered.’” (People ex rel. Lockyer
v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 640.)
14
B. Detective Villarreal’s testimony was not
inadmissible hearsay
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting
Detective Villarreal’s testimony regarding defendant’s recorded
statements because it is inadmissible hearsay. Defendant argues
Detective Villarreal lacked personal knowledge of defendant’s
statements and only repeated what he heard on the recording.
We disagree.
“‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and
that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid.
Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) “‘Hearsay . . . is generally inadmissible.’”
(Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 764; see Evid. Code
§ 1200, subd. (b).) Under Evidence Code section 1220, however,
“[e]vidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to
which he is a party in either his individual or representative
capacity, regardless of whether the statement was made in his
individual or representative capacity.”
“Evidence Code section 1220 makes a ‘statement’ of a party
an exception to the general rule forbidding hearsay evidence
when the statement is offered against that party.” (People v.
Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 637.) This exception is not
limited to admissions—it “applies to all statements of the party
against whom they are offered.” (Ibid.)
Detective Villarreal’s testimony falls within the exception
to the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1220. A
recording of a conversation between defendant and an undercover
agent was played in open court during the prosecution’s direct
examination of Detective Villarreal. Afterwards, Detective
Villarreal testified defendant stated in the recording to the
15
undercover agent, “They know it was me, they know.” Detective
Villarreal also testified defendant responded, “I didn’t think I’d
get caught,” when the undercover agent asked why he did not flee
to Mexico. Thus, Detective Villarreal simply testified to what
defendant stated in the recording. Since Detective Villarreal’s
testimony was evidence of defendant’s own statements, it fell
squarely within Evidence Code section 1220 and was thus
admissible.
Defendant cites People v. Wimberly (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
439 to support his argument. Defendant’s reliance on Wimberly is
misplaced. In Wimberly, a detective who investigated the
burglary the defendant was charged with testified to statements
made by the manager of the apartment where the victim lived.
(Id. at pp. 442, 445.) The manager made the statements to
another officer, who included them in his crime report. (Ibid.) The
Wimberly court concluded the statements were inadmissible
hearsay (id. at p. 447), but the decision there is not instructive for
the circumstances here. The manager who gave the statements in
Wimberly was not a party to the case, and Evidence Code section
1220 was never at issue there. (See id. at pp. 442, 445.) In
contrast, the statements at issue here were defendant’s own
words. Accordingly, Wimberly is inapposite to the analysis here.
Defendant also cites People v. Sundlee (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d
477 (Sundlee), but Sundlee is not dispositive here for the same
reasons. In Sundlee, 13 employees of the State Division of
Forestry formed a surveillance team to watch the defendant, a
suspected arsonist. (Id. at p. 481.) They recorded their
communications with each other, which were played to the jury
in open court. (Id. at pp. 481–482.) None of these witnesses were
parties to the case, so Evidence Code section 1220 was not at
16
issue. (Id. at pp. 482–483.) Accordingly, Sundlee is also not
instructive here.
C. Defendant forfeited arguments that Detective
Villarreal’s testimony was improper lay opinion
In addition, defendant maintains the trial court erred in
admitting Detective Villarreal’s testimony because it was
improper lay opinion. However, “the general rule [is] that trial
counsel’s failure to object to claimed evidentiary error on the
same ground asserted on appeal results in a forfeiture of the
issue on appeal.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 756.)
“What is important is that the objection fairly inform the trial
court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific
reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should
be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond
appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.”
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 (Partida).) An
objecting party “may not argue on appeal that the court should
have excluded the evidence for a reason different from the one
stated at trial. A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to
conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct.” (Ibid.)
“The objection requirement is necessary in criminal cases
because a ‘contrary rule would deprive the People of the
opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would “permit the
defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the
knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.”’”
(Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 434.) “The reason for the
requirement is manifest: a specifically grounded objection to a
defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It allows the
trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its
admission to avoid possible prejudice. It also allows the
proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the
17
offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the
prospect of reversal.” (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 187–
188, disapproved of on another ground by People v. Stansbury
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.)
After Detective Villarreal testified regarding defendant’s
recorded statements, defense counsel objected on the ground of
speculation. Defense counsel provided no explanation he was
objecting on the ground the testimony was improper lay opinion.
The trial court therefore had no fair notice the issue it was being
called upon to decide was whether Detective Villarreal’s
testimony was inadmissible lay opinion. Speculation and lay
opinion objections each challenges different aspects of a witness’s
testimony. “‘[A]n examiner’s question asking a lay witness to
testify to facts that the witness has not personally observed, or to
state an opinion not based on his or her own observations, calls
for speculation and conjecture by the witness and is prohibited
by’ Evidence Code sections 702 and 800.” (People v. Rodriguez
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 631.) In contrast, “‘[a] lay witness may
testify to an opinion if it is rationally based on the witness’s
perception and if it is helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony.’” (People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 83
(Bradley); see Evid. Code, § 800.)
Detective Villarreal testified regarding defendant’s
recorded statements immediately after the recording was played
in open court. Hence, Detective Villarreal’s testimony was clearly
not speculation as it was based on a recording he had just heard
and personally observed. The trial court therefore properly
overruled defendant’s objection. The court could not be expected
to have known defendant was also challenging the testimony on
grounds of improper lay opinion. While the rule concerning lay
opinion requires a witness’s opinion to be based on their own
18
perception, it further requires the opinion to be rationally
connected thereto and helpful to understanding the testimony.
(See Bradley, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 83.) Nothing in the
trial record suggests Detective Villarreal’s testimony failed to
meet either of the latter two requirements of admitting lay
opinion. Accordingly, defendant forfeited this issue on appeal.
D. Any error in admitting Detective Villarreal’s
testimony was not prejudicial
Even assuming arguendo the trial court erred in admitting
Detective Villarreal’s testimony, the error was not prejudicial
because it is not reasonably probable the result would have been
more favorable to defendant if the court excluded the testimony.2
Immediately after the trial court overruled defendant’s
objection to Detective Villarreal’s testimony, it specifically
instructed the jury the recording of defendant’s statements was
the actual evidence. The court informed the jurors they were to
form their own judgments based on the recording, indicating the
transcript provided was merely to assist them. The recording was
played for and made accessible for the jurors. The jurors
therefore had both the opportunity and awareness they were to
independently and individually determine what defendant stated
2 Defendant also argues this court should conclude defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance if it found defendant
forfeited an objection. However, ineffective assistance of counsel
requires there be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 907.)
Because we conclude here it was not reasonably probable the
result would have been more favorable to defendant if the court
excluded Detective Villarreal’s testimony, defendant also fails to
show there was ineffective assistance of counsel.
19
in the recording. Accordingly, we disagree Detective Villarreal’s
testimony “usurped” the jury’s role as an independent factfinder
and tainted its ability to assess the evidence as defendant
asserts. Even if the testimony was excluded, the jury had access
to the recording and a transcript that was consistent with
Detective Villarreal’s statements.
Further, one accomplice to the murder saw the incident and
identified defendant as the shooter. Another accomplice testified
defendant confessed to committing the homicide the next day.
Defendant argues both accomplices had credibility issues given
their plea bargains. However, the prosecution did not only rely on
the credibility of the accomplices, as their testimonies were
corroborated by objective evidence and data. There was
surveillance video of the shooting. Though the video did not have
a clear picture of defendant, the recorded events were consistent
with Gonzalez’s description of the incident. And while the license
plate of the shooter’s car was not clearly visible in the video, the
car was “strikingly similar” to defendant’s car.
In addition, cell tower usage data showed defendant’s
phone was at the location of the shooting at the time Navarro was
killed. Text message data showed defendant and Navarro
exchanged texts concerning the check-cashing scheme,
defendant’s desire to get a gun, and them meeting up on the day
of the shooting. While defendant offered alternative theories, he
could not refute this objective data and physical evidence
implicating his guilt.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Detective Villarreal’s testimony. The testimony
concerned defendant’s own statements was not inadmissible
hearsay under Evidence Code section 1220. Further, the defense
forfeited any lay opinion objection because they never raised it or
20
gave the court fair notice of the issue. And even if there was error
in admitting the testimony, it was not prejudicial. After
overruling defendant’s objection, the court specifically instructed
the jurors the recording was the actual evidence and they were to
determine themselves what defendant said, with the transcript
only serving to assist them. The prosecution also presented other
unrefuted objective data and forensic evidence that corroborated
the accomplices’ testimonies, strongly implicating defendant’s
guilt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
________________________
LUI, P. J.
________________________
RICHARDSON, J.
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