People v. Warren CA2/7

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Filed 3/12/25 P. v. Warren CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B334985

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA015595)
v.

ANDRE LA JUAN WARREN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
In 1993 Andre La Juan Warren and codefendants Keith
Eugene Barton and Bobby Maurice Tillman were convicted of
attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Warren
was also convicted of assault against a peace officer, and the jury
found true multiple firearm allegations, including that Warren
personally used a firearm during the commission of the offenses.
We affirmed the judgments. (People v. Barton (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 709.)
In 2022 Warren filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 After
appointing counsel for Warren, the superior court denied the
petition, finding Warren failed to make a prima facie showing he
was entitled to relief. Warren contends on appeal that his
conviction for conspiracy to commit murder did not make him
ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Evidence at Trial and Warren’s Convictions2
On December 3, 1992 Pomona Police Officer Roger Iwig,
while in full uniform and driving a marked police car, conducted
a traffic stop of a minivan after observing the minivan fail to stop
at a stop sign. The minivan did not pull over immediately and
instead moved to the curb lane and proceeded through another
intersection. Officer Iwig could see three men in the minivan.
Barton was the driver; Tillman was in the front passenger seat;

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We provide a summary of the facts as set forth in People v.
Barton, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 709 for background only.

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and Warren was in a rear seat. At this point a second patrol car
was behind Officer Iwig’s patrol car.
As the minivan slowed down and started to pull over, the
minivan’s right-side doors opened. Tillman and Warren jumped
out of the vehicle and began shooting at Officer Iwig. Officer Iwig
ducked down and was able to turn his patrol car around and
retreat to safety. Officer Iwig was unharmed, but seven bullets
struck the patrol car. The officer in the second patrol car fired
his weapon at Warren and Tillman, who ran away. Barton drove
the minivan away and crashed into a curb. Barton and a fourth
man jumped out of the minivan and fled. All four men were
located and arrested later that evening.
The jury found Warren, Barton, and Tillman guilty of
attempted murder (§§ 187, 664) and conspiracy to commit murder
(§§ 182, 187). Warren was also convicted of assault against a
peace officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(1)). The jury found true with
respect to the conspiracy and attempted murder convictions that
a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), a
principal was armed with an assault weapon (id., subd. (a)(2)),
and Warren personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subds. (a)
& (d)). Warren also admitted he had suffered prior felony
convictions and at the time of the offenses was on bail
(§ 12022.1). The trial court sentenced Warren to an
indeterminate state prison term of 25 years to life on the
conspiracy conviction, plus seven years for the enhancements; the
court stayed the sentences for attempted murder and assault.

B. Warren’s Petition for Resentencing
On November 14, 2022 Warren filed a form petition for
resentencing seeking to vacate his murder conviction on the basis
that he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder

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under the changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019. The superior court appointed counsel for
Warren, and the People filed an opposition. In their opposition
the People recounted the testimony from Warren’s trial and
concluded, based on “the strength of the evidence” against
Warren, that Warren “remains guilty of attempted murder as a
perpetrator, beyond a reasonable doubt” rather than pursuant to
any imputed malice theory. (Capitalization omitted.) In
Warren’s reply brief he argued the People’s opposition requested
the court weigh the evidence and make credibility
determinations, which are inappropriate at the prima facie
review stage.
On October 26, 2023 the superior court summarily denied
Warren’s petition for resentencing without issuing an order to
show cause. The court explained Warren was not entitled to
relief as a matter of law because he had been convicted of
conspiracy to commit murder and the jury was instructed that
one of the overt acts alleged by the prosecution to support the
conspiracy charge was that Warren had fired a firearm during
the commission of the conspiracy. Further, the jury found true
that Warren personally used a firearm during the course of the
conspiracy.3 Warren timely appealed.

3 The superior court also stated the jury was not instructed
on a theory of natural and probable consequences or felony
murder. As we discuss below, however, the record reflects that
the jury was instructed on the natural and probable
consequences theory of aiding and abetting on the attempted
murder charge.

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DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-
843, 847-848; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984.)
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189,
subdivision (e). (Reyes, at p. 986; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
Section 189, subdivision (e), now requires the People to prove
specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual culpability:
The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although
not the actual killer, the defendant, with the intent to kill,
assisted in the commission of murder in the first degree (§ 189,
subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in an
underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted
with reckless indifference to human life as described in
section 190.2, subdivision (d) (the felony-murder special-
circumstance provision) (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong, at
p. 708.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), effective
January 1, 2022, expanded the scope of potential relief by
applying Senate Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes to individuals

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convicted of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure in former
section 1170.95, now codified in section 1172.6, for an individual
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to
vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
counts if the individual could not have been convicted of murder
under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189.
(People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner upon a request pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3). Further, upon the filing of a
facially sufficient petition, the court must determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c).) Where a petitioner makes the
requisite prima facie showing the petitioner falls within the
provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (Id., subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
We review de novo whether the superior court properly
denied the petition at the prima facie review stage under section
1172.6, subdivision (c). (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1251; People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 [denial at

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the prima facie review stage “‘“is appropriate only if the record of
conviction demonstrates that ‘the petitioner is ineligible for relief
as a matter of law,’”’ which ‘“‘is a purely legal conclusion . . . we
review de novo’”’”].

B. Warren Is Ineligible for Resentencing as a Matter of Law
On appeal Warren contends that to the extent the trial
court relied on the jury instructions to find he was ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6, the court erred because the People
did not submit the jury instructions to the trial court and the
instructions are not part of the record on appeal. Warren is
mistaken. The People’s opposition to Warren’s petition for
resentencing (in footnote 2) stated the reporter’s and clerk’s
transcripts from Warren’s prior appeal were lodged with the
superior court electronically. After Warren’s opening brief was
filed on appeal, we granted the Attorney General’s unopposed
request to take judicial notice of excerpts of the reporter’s
transcripts from Warren’s trial, including the People’s closing
argument, the jury instructions, and the trial court’s answer to a
jury question, which were attached to the request for judicial
notice. Warren did not file a reply brief on appeal, and he waived
oral argument. Accordingly, Warren has not responded to the
People’s argument that the jury instructions in this case are
dispositive.4

4 We agree with Warren’s assertion that in opposing his
petition in the superior court, the People erroneously urged the
court to make a factual finding Warren possessed an intent to
kill. (See People v. Campbell (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 350, 361 [“at
the prima facie stage, trial courts should not reject petitioners’
allegations on credibility grounds or engage in weighing of
evidence or factfinding”]; People v. Clements (2022)

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The jury instructions in this case conclusively establish
Warren is ineligible for resentencing. The trial court instructed
the jury on conspiracy with a modified version of CALJIC
No. 6.10, which stated in part: “A conspiracy is an agreement
entered into between two or more persons with the specific intent
to agree to commit a public offense of murder with a further
specific intent to commit such offense followed by an overt act
committed in this state by one or more of the parties for the
purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement. Conspiracy
is a crime. In order to find a defendant guilty of conspiracy, in
addition to proof of the unlawful agreement and specific intent,
there must be proof of the commission of at least one of the acts
alleged in the information. It is not necessary to the guilt of any
particular defendant that defendant personally committed the
overt act if he was one of the conspirators when such an act was
committed.” (Italics added.)
In addition, during his closing argument, the prosecutor
told the jury that “when an individual is charged with conspiracy
to commit murder, the malice has to be express malice. Implied
malice won’t get it. It’s got to be express malice or the specific
intent to kill. Implied malice won’t work, does not apply to
conspiracy to commit murder. There has got to be the specific
intent to kill . . . .” At the conclusion of argument, prior to
reading the jury instructions, the trial court told the jury,

75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292 [“the Legislature has decided trial judges
should not rely on the factual summaries contained in prior
appellate decisions”].) However, the superior court did not
engage in factfinding in denying Warren’s petition, instead
relying, at least in part, on Warren’s conviction for conspiracy to
commit murder.

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“During the argument there was reference to conspiracy to
commit murder and the forms of malice, specifically they were
referred to as express malice and implied malice. In the law of . .
. conspiracy to commit murder those crimes may only be based on
express malice. You cannot consider implied malice.”
Moreover, during the jury’s deliberations, the jury
submitted a question to the trial court regarding the overt act
requirement of the conspiracy charge. The court responded by
telling the jury that conspiracy “is an agreement between two or
more persons with the specific intent to agree and with the
further specific intent to commit the crime of murder. If I sit
down with another person and we agree and we have a specific
intent to agree and we have the specific intent to kill, and we are
at the dinner table, we are sitting there and we have come up to
that point, we agree and we have the intent to agree and the
intent to kill, that is not a criminal conspiracy because there is an
element missing. There is required, to put it one way, to do
something about it, and what you have to do is you have to
commit an overt act.”
Based on these instructions and statements to the jury, to
find Warren guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, the jury
necessarily found Warren had the specific intent to kill.
Accordingly, Warren is not eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
(See People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 866 [defendant
was not eligible for resentencing under § 1172.6 where she was
“convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, which necessarily
required an intent to kill”]; People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
389, 396 [same]; see also People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th
548, 641 [“‘all conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily

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conspiracy to commit premeditated and deliberated first degree
murder’”].)
Warren contends these jury instructions do not render him
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because a conviction of
conspiracy is not sufficient to show the defendant had the
necessary mens rea and actus reus, apparently suggesting he
could have been convicted of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. It is true that the jury here
was instructed that Warren could be guilty of attempted murder
if he aided and abetted an assault (the target offense) on Officer
Iwig and the attempted murder of Officer Iwig was the natural
and probable consequence of the assault. The trial court
instructed the jury on direct perpetrator liability for attempted
murder (CALJIC No. 8.66), direct aiding and abetting (CALJIC
Nos. 3.00 and 3.01), and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine (CALJIC No. 3.02). “‘Under the natural and probable
consequences theory of aiding and abetting a murder [or
attempted murder], a defendant can be found guilty of murder [or
attempted murder] if he or she aids and abets a crime (i.e., the
target crime) and murder (i.e., the nontarget crime) is a natural
and probable consequence of that target crime.’” (People v.
Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 182.)
Despite these instructions, the jury verdicts establish that
the jury did not convict Warren pursuant to the natural and
probable consequences theory of attempted murder. As
discussed, the jury’s finding Warren was guilty of conspiracy to
commit murder necessitated a finding he harbored an intent to
kill Officer Iwig. Had the jury believed Warren’s intent was to
aid and abet his codefendants only in the crime of assault, then
they could not have found him guilty of conspiracy to commit

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murder. (See People v. Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 183-184 [“in convicting appellant of first degree murder, the
jury did not rely on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine because it found him guilty of conspiracy to commit first
degree murder”]; accord, People v. Beck & Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th
at p. 645 [“Beck and Cruz were charged with conspiracy to
murder, not conspiracy to commit a lesser crime that resulted in
murder. There is thus no possibility they were found guilty of
murder on a natural and probable consequences theory.”].)
Warren relies on People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
22, 33 for the proposition that a “defendant convicted of
conspiracy to commit murder is not ineligible for relief as a
matter of law.” This characterization of the holding in Whitson is
misleading. In Whitson, the Attorney General argued, as he does
here, that the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit
murder made him ineligible for resentencing as to his murder
conviction. (Id. at p. 31.) However, when the trial court
instructed the jury on conspiracy to commit murder, it instructed
with CALJIC No. 6.10 that the jury must find Whitson had the
intent to commit murder, but it omitted the language requiring
the jury to find the defendant acted “‘with the further specific
intent to commit that crime.’” (Whitson, at p. 32, fn. 7.) Thus,
the court held, the jury could have convicted the defendant of
conspiracy to commit murder without finding he had the specific
intent to commit murder. (Id. at pp. 32-33.) The court observed,
however, that “[h]ad the jury been fully instructed with respect to
conspiracy to murder, including the portion of the form
instruction deleted, its guilty verdict would have encompassed
the finding that Whitson intended to kill.” (Id. at p. 32.)

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Warren’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440-441 is similarly
misplaced. In Curiel, the court held the jury’s true finding on the
gang-murder special circumstance, which required the jury to
find petitioner Freddy Curiel intended to kill, did not render
Curiel ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 at the prima facie
review stage. (Ibid.) The court explained that “[b]ecause the jury
was instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, the jury was required to find only that Curiel knew that
[the shooter] intended to commit one of the underlying target
offenses and that Curiel intended to aid him in that offense, not
murder.” (Id. at p. 468.) Although the jury here was instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, it was
instructed on the elements of conspiracy (in contrast to Curiel)
and, as discussed, it was told that to convict Warren for
conspiracy, he must have the specific intent to commit murder.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Warren’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

STONE, J.

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