CourtListener 10355430•People v. Johnson CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 3/12/25 P. v. Johnson CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B330079
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA114628-01)
v.
KERRY JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Kerry Johnson appeals from his judgment of conviction of
first degree murder with a sodomy-murder special circumstance
(Pen. Code1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(D)) and forcible
sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)). He argues that the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jury or grant a mistrial regarding
the prosecution’s alleged failure to disclose the full scope of a
rebuttal expert’s testimony. Johnson also asserts that the trial
court erred in failing to conduct an in camera review of one of the
victim’s mental health records, and that the cumulative effect of
the alleged errors requires reversal. We conclude that none of
Johnson’s claims has merit and accordingly affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Charges
In an amended information, the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s Office charged Johnson with crimes against
two different victims. In count 1, Johnson was charged with the
first degree murder of Kathy Brown (§ 187, subd. (a)), with a
special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed
while engaged in the crime of sodomy (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(D)).
In count 2, Johnson was charged with the sodomy of Devorah H.
by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily
injury (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)).
2. Prosecution’s case-in-chief
2.1 Count related to Devorah
Johnson was a resident at an assisted living home.
He required the use of a walker to move around. On June 3,
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2
2020, then 68-year-old Devorah moved into the residence, and
was assigned to an available bedroom. Devorah also used a
walker because she previously sustained a fractured pelvis and
tailbone. According to the daytime managers of the house,
Avelino and Ludivina Acedo, Johnson helped Devorah buy some
shirts shortly after she arrived.
At about 6:00 p.m. that evening, as Devorah was lying on
her bed, Johnson entered her room and locked the door. He got
into the bed, grabbed Devorah from behind, and pulled down her
pants and underwear. Johnson then sexually assaulted Devorah
by inserting his penis into her rectum. Devorah screamed and
scratched Johnson’s face with her fingernails. In response,
Johnson placed his hand over Devorah’s nose and mouth, causing
her to lose consciousness. At some point, Johnson and Devorah
fell onto the floor, where he continued to forcibly sodomize her.
During the assault on the bed and the floor, Johnson was on his
right side. Devorah estimated the assault lasted one hour, and
ended when Johnson appeared to ejaculate. Johnson did not use
a condom or lubricant during the assault.
After the assault, Johnson crawled toward his walker and
lifted himself up. Before leaving the bedroom, he told Devorah,
“If you tell anyone, I’m going to kill you.” As soon as Johnson
left, Devorah went to find the house managers, and told them
that Johnson sexually assaulted her. In response, the Acedos
contacted the owner of the home, Gloria Caseda, and Devorah
was transferred to another residence.
About nine and a half hours after the assault, Devorah
went to the hospital for a sexual assault forensic exam. At the
hospital, Devorah reported that she had pain in her back and
rectum. She also reported that she washed her anal and genital
3
areas after the assault. The nurse who conducted the exam
observed bruising on Devorah’s right back, right hip and left leg.
The nurse further observed redness and tenderness in Devorah’s
rectal area, and opined that the redness could be consistent with
forcible sodomy. The nurse did not observe any tears or bleeding
in Devorah’s anal or rectal area, or semen on her body. Although
Devorah testified that the nurse told her during the exam that
her rectum “was tore up and bleeding,” the nurse denied ever
making this statement or finding.
Following his arrest, Johnson also underwent a forensic
exam at the hospital. During the exam, the nurse did not observe
any scratches on Johnson’s face or any recent injuries on his
body.
A DNA analysis was performed on evidence collected from
the forensic exams. Johnson’s DNA was found on Devorah’s right
fingernails. No male DNA was detected on Devorah’s anal or
rectal area, and no semen was found on her clothes or bedding.
2.2 Count related to Brown
On June 3, 2020, the date of Devorah’s sexual assault, then
66-year-old Brown was a resident at the same assisted living
home. The nighttime manager, Jorlene Donozo, started her shift
at 8:00 p.m., and at some point, noticed Brown was missing.
Donozo and her boyfriend began searching the home for Brown.
The door to Johnson’s bedroom was locked, and no one
answered when Donozo first knocked on it. After Donozo
knocked a second time, Johnson’s roommate, Eric Williams,
opened the door. Williams was fully dressed and standing near
the door when it opened. Johnson and Brown were lying close
together on the floor. Brown was partially covered with a
blanket, and her pants were pulled down. Johnson’s pants were
4
also pulled down, and he appeared to be having sexual
intercourse with Brown. When Donozo asked what they were
doing, Johnson repeatedly stated, “Don’t tell Gloria.” He also
pulled Brown’s arm while trying to hide her under the blanket.
Brown was not moving.
Donozo called the owner of the house, Caseda. After
Caseda arrived, the police were called. When paramedics
responded to the residence, Brown was nonresponsive, and she
was pronounced dead at the scene. The cause of death was
strangulation. Brown suffered trauma to the neck and fractures
to her hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage.
A DNA analysis was performed on evidence collected from
Brown, Johnson, and Johnson’s roommate, Williams. Williams
was a low level contributor of DNA recovered from Brown’s neck.
No semen was detected on Brown’s clothing or body, and no male
DNA was found on Brown’s anal, rectal, or genital areas.
Johnson’s DNA was not detected in any of the samples taken
from Brown. However, Brown’s DNA was found on Johnson’s
scrotal area.
2.3 Johnson’s statements to the police
Long Beach Police Officer Miriam Leserman arrived at the
scene shortly before 11:00 p.m. She saw Johnson standing
around a courtyard outside the house. Johnson approached the
officer and began talking to her. According to Officer Leserman,
Johnson said that he had been in his bedroom earlier that
evening with two other people. One of them was a woman who
was smoking a cigarette at the window. The woman began
coughing and fell to the ground. Johnson tried to wake her by
pulling on her arm. Someone told Johnson to drag the woman
5
out of the room, and as he was doing so, her pants started to
come off.
According to Officer Leserman, Johnson also described
having sex with another woman. Johnson said that he had “big
serpent” stuck in his pants, that the head was pointed up at him
and kept getting bigger, and that he had to take off his clothes.
Johnson then said that he could not get pregnant, but he could
fertilize eggs. When Officer Leserman asked Johnson if he
fertilized any eggs that day, he referred to a woman who was no
longer at the residence. He said that the woman wanted to “test
out his wrath” and be with “a real ghetto boy,” and that they
connected because they were both handicapped.
While Officer Leserman was speaking with Johnson, Long
Beach Police Officer Amanda Aknin arrived. Officer Aknin was
wearing a body camera, and a portion of her conversation with
Johnson was recorded and played for the jury. As Officer
Leserman was describing Johnson’s statement to Officer Aknin,
Johnson interjected that he had sex with a “lady that came
through.” He also said that he bought her a shirt. When Officer
Aknin asked if the woman consented to sex, Johnson replied, “No.
She didn’t consent. I just . . . muscled my way to what I want.
You see me walking like this, man, I’m 69 years old and beat up.
I get lucky once in a while. I ain’t got many more years and I’m
gonna tell you, if you make a mistake, I got you. You know. And
that’s you, and any other lady. I ain’t got that many more years
to do that, you know, and as long as I can, if you make a mistake,
or . . . you let me have it, I’m gonna have it.” Officer Aknin again
asked Johnson if the woman agreed to have sex with him. In
response, Johnson stated, “You think I’d sit here and tell you
6
I had sex with a lady, and she didn’t agree to it? Do you really
think I’ll bring it up? Am I that stupid?”
3. Defense evidence
Dr. William Stetson, an orthopedic surgeon, testified as an
expert for the defense. Dr. Stetson reviewed Johnson’s medical
records and videos documenting his mobility. As described by
Dr. Stetson, Johnson was struck by a car in 2018, and suffered
multiple serious injuries, including fractures to his right arm,
shoulder, and leg, his mid and lower back, and both hips. As a
result, Johnson had residual partial paralysis in his back and
legs, and required a wheelchair or walker to get around. He also
had limited ability to use his right arm and shoulder, or to lie on
his right side for a significant period of time. Dr. Stetson opined
that, while Johnson was physically able to have sex, it was
unlikely that he could do so for one hour while lying on his right
side.
Dr. Theodore Hariton also testified for the defense as an
expert in forensic gynecology. He reviewed the medical reports
on the sexual assault forensic exams conducted for Devorah and
Brown. With respect to Devorah, Dr. Hariton testified there was
no medical evidence that she was anally penetrated. According
to Dr. Hariton, if a postmenopausal woman like Devorah suffered
nonconsensual anal penetration for one hour, the exam would
show evidence of bruising, abrasions, swelling, or tears in the
anal or rectal areas. However, Devorah’s exam showed no injury
to her anus or rectum. Dr. Hariton further testified that, while
redness in the anal or rectal areas could be a sign of friction,
it was not a sign of sexual injury. With respect to Brown,
Dr. Hariton similarly testified there was no medical evidence of
sexual assault because Brown’s autopsy showed no injury to her
7
vaginal or anal areas. If either vaginal or anal penetration
without consent occurred, the expected findings on a sexual
assault exam would include swelling, bruising, abrasions, or
tears. Dr. Hariton testified that the absence of male DNA on
Brown’s anal, rectal, and genital areas further supported his
opinion that she was not sexually penetrated.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Hariton if
he ever heard the phrase “traumatic response to a crisis.”
Dr. Hariton testified that he heard the words before, but did not
know what the phrase meant. He agreed, however, that a
traumatic event like rape can “affect different people in different
ways.” He acknowledged that a traumatic event might affect a
person’s memory and perception of time, such as a rape victim
believing the assault lasted a long time when the actual duration
was very short. Dr. Hariton also testified that both men and
women can suffer forcible anal penetration without any physical
injury. He explained that there are no recognized studies
showing how often forcible anal penetration results in an injury
because there are different factors involved that are individual to
each victim.
4. Prosecution’s rebuttal evidence
On rebuttal, the prosecutor called Malinda Wheeler to
testify as an expert on sexual assault. Wheeler was a registered
nurse and the owner of a business that contracts with law
enforcement and government agencies to conduct sexual assault
forensic exams. In the past 29 years, she performed
approximately 900 sexual assault exams herself and provided
training in numerous other cases. When the prosecutor asked if
she ever heard the phrase “traumatic response to a crisis,”
Wheeler replied that it referred “to a new field in science and
8
psychology.” She then explained that in her personal experience
of seeing sexual assault victims, “the emotional and psychological
response varies greatly from person to person.” Wheeler opined
that a traumatic event such as rape can affect a person’s memory
and perception of time, and can cause a more heightened
emotional state when the event is recent. In addition, after a
sexual assault, even a slight amount of pressure to the external
sphincter can be perceived as very painful based on the person’s
psychological response to trauma. Whether forcible anal
penetration results in an injury depends on a number of different
factors, including the age and health of the victim, the degree of
force used, the length of the assault, and the amount of any
resistance. In the sexual assault cases that Wheeler studied,
anal penetration caused a physical injury about 30 percent of the
time.
On cross-examination, Wheeler acknowledged that she was
not relying on any scientific articles or research to support her
testimony. Rather, Wheeler was basing her opinions on the
examinations that she conducted and the cases that she reviewed
over the years.
5. Jury verdict and sentencing
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Johnson guilty
of the first degree murder of Brown and the forcible sodomy of
Devorah. The jury also found true the special circumstance
allegation that the murder of Brown was committed while
Johnson was engaged in the crime of sodomy. The trial court
sentenced Johnson to life in prison without the possibility of
parole, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life.
Johnson filed a timely appeal.
9
DISCUSSION
1. The prosecution’s compliance with discovery
Johnson argues the prosecution violated its discovery
obligations when it failed to timely disclose the full scope of its
rebuttal witness’s testimony. He asserts the trial court abused
its discretion and violated his constitutional rights in refusing to
either instruct the jury on the prosecution’s late disclosure or to
grant a mistrial based on the discovery violation. We conclude
the trial court did not err in finding that the prosecution complied
with its discovery obligations, and even if there was error, it was
harmless under the circumstances of this case.
1.1 Relevant proceedings
Trial commenced on March 7, 2023. At a pretrial hearing
held on February 1, 2023, defense counsel informed the trial
court that he was still awaiting discovery regarding the People’s
anticipated expert, Wheeler, and that the prosecutor indicated a
written report was forthcoming. The prosecutor confirmed that
Wheeler was reviewing the records provided by the defense, and
that the prosecutor had requested the completion of a report
within a week.
On February 27, 2023, the defense filed a motion to compel
discovery regarding Wheeler. The motion requested that the
court compel the prosecution to provide “a detailed report from
Ms. Wheeler explaining the conclusions and opinions that will
encompass [her] testimony, as well as a statement of the reasons
supporting her conclusions and opinions.” In support of the
motion, defense counsel attached a one-paragraph e-mail that
Wheeler sent the prosecutor in response to her request for a
written report. Wheeler’s e-mail stated: “I do not recall ever
having to write a report for one of our own sexual assault cases.
10
I will not be ‘relying’ on any scientific research or articles for my
opinion, but my 29 years of training and education, and seeing
sexual assault victims, and reviewing thousands of photos and
cases in review. My testimony will basically be that injury can
occur in some people with reported anal penetration, and then
not in others. When I start my examination with any patient I do
not have any expectation of an injury. Of course this is a general
statement and it could be influenced by the history. For example,
if the patient stated, ‘I started bleeding from my vagina after he
raped me’—I would expect the possibility of an injury to be
present but not always. It could be her normal menstrual cycle
which she may not realize because of the stress of the trauma.
The patient’s perception of how their body reacted during a
trauma does not always present to a medical professional with
obvious consistency.”
At a February 27, 2023 pretrial hearing, the trial court
discussed the discovery motion with the parties. The prosecutor
noted that Wheeler’s curriculum vitae was provided to the
defense. The prosecutor also stated that Wheeler did not prepare
a written report because she was not relying on scientific tests or
methods, but rather on her own experience in conducting sexual
assault exams where there are sometimes cases of anal
penetration without a resulting injury. Defense counsel
responded that the relevant issue was not whether anal
penetration can occur without injury, but whether “a 60-minute
assault without consent with no lubrication [is] going to result in
injury.” Defense counsel asserted that he was entitled to know
the basis for Wheeler’s opinion on that issue. The court
explained to defense counsel that it could not order Wheeler to
produce a report that did not exist, and that it had “nothing to
11
order the People to give to you.” The court added that it would
consider holding an Evidence Code section 402 hearing at the
appropriate time.
Prior to the start of the prosecution’s rebuttal case, defense
counsel raised the scope of Wheeler’s testimony with the trial
court. After recounting his prior efforts to obtain a written report
from Wheeler, defense counsel asked the court to review her one-
paragraph e-mail to the prosecutor describing her proposed
testimony. Defense counsel stated that “if the witness exceeds
the scope of that paragraph,” he intended to object on the basis of
a discovery violation.
After reviewing Wheeler’s e-mail, the court noted that her
proposed testimony appeared to be within the proper scope of
rebuttal. The court asked the prosecutor what evidence she
intended to elicit from Wheeler. The prosecutor explained that
she planned to ask Wheeler the same questions she asked the
defense expert, Dr. Hariton, regarding “anal penetration,
traumatic condition of somebody’s response to a crisis,” and how
often Wheeler found no injury in cases of forcible penetration.
When defense counsel asserted that “traumatic response to crisis
is something brand-new,” the court disagreed, noting that the
subject was raised by the prosecutor during her cross-
examination of Dr. Hariton. Defense counsel also argued that the
concept of traumatic response to a crisis sounded “like a technical
term,” and if he had been properly apprised of the concept, he
could have reached out to appropriate experts. Defense counsel
asked for a brief Evidence Code section 402 hearing to allow him
to question Wheeler about this subject.
The court denied defense counsel’s request. The court
explained that Wheeler’s proposed testimony involved a “very
12
brief rebuttal,” and that the concept of differing reactions to
traumatic events “has been inquired throughout this trial by both
counsel.” The court further noted that “it is in fact a
commonsensical layperson opinion [that] somebody might shut
down during a traumatic event,” and that “a traumatic evidence
for one person may not be a traumatic event for another person.”
The court then allowed the prosecutor to call Wheeler as a
rebuttal witness.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Wheeler
when she discussed the concept of traumatic response to a crisis
with the prosecutor. Wheeler replied that she and the prosecutor
talked about the concept that week, but she could not recall if
they had earlier conversations about it. Defense counsel also
asked Wheeler whether she discussed that concept in her one-
paragraph e-mail to the prosecutor describing her proposed
testimony. In response, Wheeler pointed to the last line of that
paragraph, which stated, “ ‘The patient’s perception of how their
body reacted during a trauma does not always present to a
medical professional with obvious consistency.’ ” Wheeler
explained that sentence alluded to the trauma response concept
because “how the body perceives the trauma and how the body
reacts can be their physical body as well as their psychological.”
During the conference on jury instructions, defense counsel
asked the court to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 306
regarding late discovery. Defense counsel argued that Wheeler’s
testimony exceeded the scope of her e-mail, which left the defense
unable to appropriately respond to her new assertions regarding
the concept of traumatic response to a crisis. The prosecutor
responded that the concept was encompassed in the last line of
Wheeler’s e-mail, and that it was appropriate for the People to
13
ask Wheeler the same questions that they asked the defense
expert.
The court denied defense counsel’s request for a jury
instruction on late discovery. The court explained that Wheeler
was a rebuttal witness, and that the lack of forensic evidence to
support Devorah’s account of the alleged sexual assault had been
at issue since the start of trial. The court also noted that defense
counsel described the case in his opening statement as one of
“statement versus science,” and that over the course of the trial,
he examined the witnesses, including the experts, about whether
a sexual assault could have occurred for the length of time and in
the manner described by Devorah. The court stated that it did
“not believe that the People intentionally, or unintentionally,
sandbagged the defense or failed to fulfill their discovery
obligations.” Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial on the
same ground, and the court denied the motion.
1.2 Governing law
Section 1054.1 requires the prosecution to disclose to the
defense certain categories of evidence, including the “[r]elevant
written or recorded statements of witnesses,” and the “reports of
the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call
at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made
in conjunction with the case.” (Id., subd. (f); see People v. Suarez
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 167.) “ ‘Absent good cause, such evidence
must be disclosed at least 30 days before trial, or immediately if
discovered . . . within 30 days of trial. (§ 1054.7.)’ ” (People v.
Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280.) Section 1054.1’s disclosure
requirements also apply to rebuttal witnesses. (People v. Mora
and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 513.) In addition, some
appellate courts have interpreted section 1054.1 to require the
14
disclosure of unrecorded oral statements of witnesses as well as
written ones. (See People v. Hughes (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 257,
280; Roland v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 154, 160.)
“Upon a showing both that the defense complied with the
informal discovery procedures provided by the statute, and that
the prosecutor has not complied with section 1054.1, a trial court
‘may make any order necessary to enforce the provisions’ of the
statute, ‘including, but not limited to, immediate disclosure, . . .
continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order.’ (§ 1054.5,
subd. (b).) The court may also ‘advise the jury of any failure or
refusal to disclose and of any untimely disclosure.’ ” (People v.
Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 280.) The court may prohibit the
testimony of a witness only if all other sanctions have been
exhausted. (§ 1054.5, subd. (c).)
We review the trial court’s ruling on whether a discovery
violation occurred for abuse of discretion. (People v. Thompson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1105; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th
225, 299.) Even where the prosecution fails to comply with its
discovery obligations, “[a] violation of section 1054.1 is subject to
the harmless-error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [].” (People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 280.) To demonstrate reversible error, the defendant “ ‘must
establish that “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 960.) “To the extent the denial of
discovery implicated defendant’s federal due process rights
[citation], the applicable test is whether the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18 [].)” (Id., at p. 961.)
15
1.3 The trial court did not err in finding there was
no discovery violation, and even if it did, the
error was harmless
Johnson contends the prosecution violated its discovery
obligations when it failed to timely disclose that its rebuttal
expert, Wheeler, would testify about the concept of traumatic
response to a crisis. Johnson claims the trial court should have
provided a remedy for this violation either by instructing the jury
with CALCRIM No. 306 on the prosecution’s untimely disclosure
of evidence, or by granting the defense motion for a mistrial. He
further asserts the trial court’s alleged error in failing to provide
a proper remedy violated his constitutional right to a fair trial,
due process, and effective assistance of counsel. We conclude the
trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated Johnson’s
constitutional rights in finding there was no discovery violation.
On this record, the trial court reasonably could find that
the prosecution complied with its discovery obligations under
section 1054.1 regarding Wheeler’s testimony. First, the court
properly denied Johnson’s pretrial motion to compel the discovery
of a written report from Wheeler that detailed her opinions and
conclusions. As the court explained in denying that request, it
could not order the prosecution to produce a written report that
did not exist. Second, the court reasonably could find that the
prosecution disclosed the scope of Wheeler’s rebuttal testimony,
including the concept of traumatic response to a crisis, when it
provided the defense with a copy of the one-paragraph e-mail
from Wheeler describing her proposed testimony. The e-mail
explained that Wheeler did not intend to rely on any scientific
research or articles for her opinions, but rather on her personal
experience in treating sexual assault victims and reviewing
16
sexual assault cases. The e-mail summarized Wheeler’s planned
testimony that “injury can occur in some people with reported
anal penetration, and then not in others.” It also described how
psychological trauma from a sexual assault may affect the
victim’s perception of the assault and its impact on their body.
The e-mail provided an example, stating that “because of the
stress of the trauma,” a woman may not realize that the vaginal
bleeding she experienced after a rape was not the result of an
injury, but rather due to her regular menstrual cycle. The e-mail
further explained that a victim’s “perception of how their body
reacted during a trauma does not always present to a medical
professional with obvious consistency.”
Prior to the People’s rebuttal case, defense counsel argued
that Wheeler should not be allowed to testify on the subject of
“traumatic response to a crisis” because it was a “brand-new”
theory. However, as the trial court noted, the concept that
different people might have different reactions to a traumatic
event such as a sexual assault was not “brand-new,” but rather
was explored during the defense expert’s testimony. In his direct
testimony, Dr. Hariton opined that Devorah was not sexually
assaulted because she would have suffered an injury if she had
been forcibly anally penetrated for the length of time that she
claimed. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Hariton
if he was familiar with the phrase “traumatic response to a
crisis.” While Dr. Hariton testified that he was not, he agreed
that a traumatic event such as a sexual assault can “affect
different people in different ways.” He also stated that it “makes
sense” that a person’s perception of time may be affected by a
traumatic event, such as a rape victim not accurately recalling
the duration of the assault. Under these circumstances, the trial
17
court reasonably could find that the prosecution did not violate
its discovery obligations regarding Wheeler’s proposed testimony.
Johnson argues that Wheeler’s actual testimony on the
concept of traumatic response to a crisis was based on a “new
scientific and psychological theory,” and that the defense was
unable to challenge Wheeler’s opinions and conclusions because it
had no prior knowledge of this theory. We disagree. During her
direct examination, Wheeler did state that the phrase “traumatic
response to a crisis” referred to a “new field in science and
psychology.” However, in response to the prosecutor’s next
question, Wheeler explained that she was basing her testimony
about the traumatic response of sexual assault victims on her
own personal experience “in seeing victims for the 29 years that
I’ve been doing this.” Indeed, Wheeler did not reference any
scientific or psychological articles or research in describing how a
traumatic event such as a sexual assault might affect a person’s
memory and perception of time. Rather, Wheeler opined that,
based on her experience in treating sexual assault victims, “the
emotional and psychological response varies greatly from person
to person.” Moreover, on cross-examination, Wheeler expressly
acknowledged that she was not relying on any scientific articles
or research to support her opinions in this case. She also made
clear that her opinions were based solely “on the cases that [she]
conducted and the cases that [she] studied over the years.” Thus,
contrary to Johnson’s claim, Wheeler’s rebuttal testimony did not
rely on a new or undisclosed theory that unfairly surprised the
defense.
Because the trial court reasonably determined that there
was no discovery violation with respect to Wheeler’s testimony, it
did not err in denying Johnson’s request for a jury instruction on
18
the untimely disclosure of the evidence. Yet even assuming there
was a discovery violation, Johnson cannot show prejudice under
either the state or federal standard for harmless error. Wheeler’s
testimony on the concept of traumatic response to a crisis was
relatively brief and limited in scope. She explained that there
were significant variations in how people react to traumatic
events, and that the psychological trauma of a sexual assault can
affect how the victim perceives the assault and its physical
impact. The defense expert also acknowledged that responses to
traumatic events vary from person to person, and agreed as a
matter of common sense that the trauma of a sexual assault
might affect the victim’s memory and perception of time. As the
trial court observed, the concept that a person “might shut down
during a traumatic event” was a “commonsensical” opinion that
did not disadvantage the defense.
Further, there was compelling evidence of Johnson’s guilt
of the charged crimes. Johnson told the police at the scene that
he committed a sexual act with a woman who “came through” the
residence and then left, and that she “didn’t consent.” Within a
few hours of Devorah reporting that Johnson sexually assaulted
her, one of the managers of the residence found Johnson
attempting to engage in a sexual act with Brown, who had been
strangled to death. Based on the totality of this record, any
alleged error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury on
the untimely disclosure of evidence was harmless.
For these same reasons, the trial court did not err in
denying the motion for mistrial based on the prosecution’s
purported discovery violation. “In general, ‘a motion for mistrial
should be granted only when “ ‘a party’s chances of receiving a
fair trial have been irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Bell
19
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 121.) “ ‘ “Whether a particular incident is
incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and
the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on
mistrial motions.” ’ ” (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623,
673.) Here, the trial court acted well within its discretion in
determining that the prosecution complied with its discovery
obligations regarding Wheeler’s rebuttal testimony, and that
any alleged lack of compliance was not prejudicial.
2. Request for an in camera review of Devorah’s
mental health records
Johnson contends the trial court erred in denying his
request for an in camera review of Devorah’s mental health
records for discoverable material related to her credibility. He
claims the denial of his request deprived him of his constitutional
rights to due process, to confront witnesses against him, and to
present a defense. We conclude the trial court properly denied
the request because Johnson failed to show good cause for an
in camera review of Devorah’s privileged records.
2.1 Relevant proceedings
On March 6, 2023, the defense filed a written motion
requesting that the trial court conduct an in camera review of
Devorah’s mental health records and disclose relevant portions of
those records. The motion asserted that Devorah’s account of the
alleged sexual assault was inconsistent with the forensic evidence
in three areas: (1) the sexual assault exam of Devorah did not
reveal any bleeding, cuts, or tears in the anal or rectal areas;
(2) no semen or male DNA was detected in the anal or rectal
swabs taken from Devorah; and (3) Johnson had significant
restrictions on his mobility. The motion argued that these
inconsistencies “lead to a reasonable conclusion that Devorah H.
20
is not being accurate in her claims of being sodomized” by
Johnson, and that “[t]hese inaccuracies can be the result of a
compulsion to lie and/or fabricate situations, to exaggerate
incidents, and a myriad of other mental health issues related to
psychotic and/or hallucinatory behavior that can be reflected in
Devorah H.’s mental health records.”
At a pretrial hearing held that same day, the trial court
told defense counsel that it did not “see the relevance of
[Devorah’s] mental or psychiatric records” based on the three
areas set forth in the motion. The court noted that it reviewed
Devorah’s conditional examination as well as Johnson’s
statements to the police, and that the lack of forensic evidence
was not necessarily inconsistent with Devorah’s account of the
sexual assault. After hearing the argument of counsel, the court
indicated that it would conduct a preliminary review of Devorah’s
records in camera to determine if there was any discoverable
material.
At a subsequent hearing on the motion, the trial court
explained that, based on the relevant case law, it had to consider
the evidence admitted at trial before deciding whether there was
a sufficient showing of good cause for an in camera review. The
court also noted that it reread Devorah’s testimony, and “did not
see anything . . . that would support a review of [her] mental
health records” at that time. The court stated, however, that it
would wait to hear the other evidence presented at trial before
making its ruling.
Prior to the prosecution’s rebuttal case, defense counsel
again raised the issue of an in camera review of Devorah’s mental
health records. Defense counsel asserted that, in addition to the
reasons stated in the prior written motion, the evidence at trial
21
showed that Devorah “affirmatively lied” in her testimony about
the sexual assault exam when she claimed that the nurse told her
that she was “tore up” and “bleeding from her rectal area.” In
response, the trial court noted the scenarios described by defense
counsel involved “very routine witness credibility issues that are
issues of fact” for the jury. The court also found that there was
no showing of a “nexus between . . . the witness testimony and
hallucinations or schizophrenia or some other type of mental
disease or defect” that would make Devorah’s medical records
probative on the issue of credibility. The court denied the request
for an in camera review of Devorah’s mental health records.
2.2 Governing law
A patient’s mental health records are generally protected
from discovery by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. (Evid.
Code, § 1014; see People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 912.)
Under certain circumstances, however, “the mental illness or
emotional instability of a witness can be relevant on the issue of
credibility, and a witness may be cross-examined on that subject,
if such illness affects the witness’s ability to perceive, recall or
describe the events in question.” (People v. Gurule (2002)
28 Cal.4th 557, 591–592.) At the pretrial stage of the
proceedings, “psychiatric material is generally undiscoverable.”
(Id. at p. 592; see People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117,
1127–1128.) But during trial, “[w]hen a defendant proposes to
impeach a critical prosecution witness with questions that call for
privileged information, the trial court may be called upon . . . to
balance the defendant’s need for cross-examination and the state
policies the privilege is intended to serve.” (People v. Hammon,
at p. 1127.)
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To obtain an in camera review of a witness’s mental health
records during trial, a defendant must first establish good cause
for their discovery. (People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523,
531, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hammon, supra,
15 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) In this context, good cause “means the
defendant must describe the records sought ‘with reasonable
specificity’ and provide a ‘plausible justification’ for producing
them.” (People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1691,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hammon, at p. 1123;
see People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219, 257 [as part of
a good cause showing for discovery of third party records,
“defendant has the burden to show a ‘plausible justification’ for
inspection”].) If good cause is shown, the trial court reviews the
records in camera, weighs the defendant’s constitutional right to
cross-examination against the statutory privilege, and
determines which, if any, privileged material is essential to
vindicate the defendant’s constitutional right. (People v. Reber,
at p. 532.) We review the trial court’s ruling on the disclosure of
privileged records for abuse of discretion. (People v. Dworak,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 912.)
2.3 The trial court did not err in declining to
review Devorah’s mental health records
In this case, the trial court reasonably concluded that
Johnson failed to make a good cause showing for an in camera
review of Devorah’s mental health records. In seeking the
disclosure of those records, defense counsel argued that there
were inconsistencies between the forensic evidence and Devorah’s
account of the sexual assault, and that such inconsistencies “can
be the result of a compulsion to lie and/or fabricate situations, to
exaggerate incidents, and a myriad of other mental health issues
23
related to psychotic and/or hallucinatory behavior.” Defense
counsel also asserted that Devorah lied in her testimony when
she stated that the nurse who conducted her sexual assault exam
told her that she had tearing and bleeding in her rectum.
The defense theory of relevancy thus appeared to be that, because
there were conflicts in the evidence, Devorah may have either
fabricated her claim that Johnson forcibly sodomized her or
hallucinated the event due to an undisclosed psychiatric
condition. This was insufficient, however, to show good cause for
an in camera review of her privileged records.
As the trial court observed, the asserted inconsistencies
between Devorah’s testimony and the forensic evidence involved
standard issues of witness credibility for the jury to weigh. But
there was no showing that such inconsistencies were related to
mental illness, or that Devorah had mental health issues that
could affect her ability to perceive or recall the alleged sexual
assault. Even if Devorah had been diagnosed with a mental or
psychological condition, it is “a fact of modern life that many
people experience emotional problems, undergo therapy, and take
medications for their conditions. ‘A person’s credibility is not in
question merely because he or she is receiving treatment for a
mental health problem.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th
543, 579; Susan S. v. Israels (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1297
[“although a witness’s credibility is always in issue, this does not
mean the defense is entitled to rummage through the medical
records of every witness in a criminal prosecution looking for
evidence to impeach the witness’s credibility”].) While Devorah’s
credibility as the alleged victim of the charged sex offense plainly
was at issue, the defense failed to demonstrate a nexus between
her mental health and her credibility as a witness. On this
24
record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate
Johnson’s constitutional rights in declining to conduct an
in camera review of Devorah’s mental health records.
3. Cumulative error
Johnson argues the cumulative effect of the claimed errors
deprived him of due process of law and a fair trial. “Cumulative
error is present when the combined effect of the trial court’s
errors is prejudicial or harmful to the defendant. [Citations.]
Although a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, he or she is not
entitled to ‘a perfect one.’ ” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th
989, 1017.) Here, Johnson received a fair trial and has failed to
show any cumulative error requiring reversal of his conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WILEY, J.
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