People v. Ackles CA4/1

CourtListener 10355382Calctapp12 mar 2025

Testo completo

Filed 3/12/25 P. v. Ackles CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082151

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN412537)

CALVIN LAMAR ACKLES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County.
Michael D. Washington, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Calvin Lamar Ackles of first degree murder for
shooting and killing Francisco Cruz. Ackles contends the trial court erred
when it admitted extensive testimony and other evidence about two assaults
he committed many years before he killed Cruz. We agree the court abused
its discretion with the admission of this evidence, but we conclude the error
was harmless. At the request of the Attorney General, we have reviewed a
security video that recorded the homicide. With chilling clarity, consistent
with witness testimony, the video shows Ackles shooting Cruz nine times in
the back at point blank range as he tries to get away. We are certain beyond
a reasonable doubt the erroneously admitted evidence did not affect the jury
verdict of first degree murder in this case. The judgment is affirmed.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.
Charges, Conviction, and Sentence
In January 2021, Ackles was charged with first degree murder (Pen.

Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The operative information alleged as to
count 1 that Ackles intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury and death to a nonaccomplice. (§12022.53, subd. (d).) It
further alleged he had two serious felony priors (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668,
1192.7, subd. (c)), and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668,
1170.12).
In January 2023, Ackles admitted the truth of his prior convictions. In
February 2023, a jury convicted him of first degree murder and unlawful
possession of a firearm and found true the enhancement allegation that he
personally discharged a firearm.
At sentencing, the trial court struck the serious felony priors and prior
strike convictions in the interests of justice. The court sentenced Ackles to 50

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
years to life in prison, consisting of 25 years to life for the first degree murder
and 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. Pursuant to section 654,
the court stayed the sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm.
II.
The Prosecution’s Case
On the night of March 26, 2020, Ackles was working at an unlicensed
marijuana dispensary with three other security guards. The illegal
dispensary operated out of a warehouse in Vista, California. The warehouse
was located at the top of a hill about 80 feet from a strip mall parking lot
where customers were not supposed to park while purchasing marijuana at
the dispensary. Sometimes, to make extra cash, the security guards would
bring their own marijuana and sell it to the dispensary’s customers in the
parking lot outside the dispensary.
At approximately 9:30 p.m., Julian B. drove to the warehouse with his
cousin Deshawn E. to buy some marijuana. Julian also worked for the
marijuana dispensary as a security guard, but he was off duty that night.
Julian went inside the warehouse and “got some weed” from Ackles while
Deshawn remained in his truck. Julian then returned to his car and started
driving away.
As Julian reached the bottom of the hill, near the strip mall parking
lot, Ackles flagged him down. Julian stopped and Ackles asked him if he had
any marijuana to sell. Julian and Deshawn could both see another man,
later identified as Cruz, standing in front of his car in the strip mall parking
lot. His car was a convertible and the top was down.
Julian told Ackles he had no marijuana to sell. Ackles then told Cruz
“[t]he weed shop is closed and we can’t get it for you.” Cruz did not believe
the dispensary was closed, and he and Ackles started arguing. Ackles told

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Cruz to leave and Cruz refused, saying that they “don’t own the parking lot.”
Ackles told Julian and Deshawn to get out of their car. They got out and the
three men started walking toward Cruz’s car. According to Julian, Cruz
“smirked,” got into his car, stayed there for about five seconds, and then
“popped his trunk.” Deshawn became concerned for his safety when Cruz
opened the trunk, fearing he might be getting a weapon.
A surveillance video from a nearby market captured what happened
next. Ackles slowly approached Cruz with one of his hands visibly holding
something in his jacket pocket. Julian and Deshawn followed him and began
walking toward Cruz as well.
As the three men approached, Cruz got out of his car, walked around to
the trunk, and opened it. Ackles continued walking toward Cruz, reached the
area of the car near the trunk, paused, and pulled a handgun out of his
pocket. As Cruz began to pull a metal object, later determined to be a
steering wheel lock, from the trunk, Ackles, now only a few feet from Cruz,
suddenly pointed the gun directly at Cruz’s face. Cruz, seeing the gun, began
backing up.
The video shows Ackles then fired the gun at point blank range
towards Cruz. Cruz ducked and hunched his body away from where the gun
had been fired. Cruz then turned his back to Ackles and began to try to run.
At this point, Ackles quickly stepped forward and shot Cruz in the back
multiple times from less than a foot away until Cruz collapsed and fell to the
ground. Ackles then stepped over Cruz’s body, stared at it briefly, and calmly
walked away.
Julian and Deshawn were about ten feet away when the shooting
happened, but they did not have a clear view of the back of Cruz’s car where
the shooting took place. Neither one heard Cruz threaten Ackles in any way

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beforehand, and they did not see Cruz with any weapons. According to
Julian, Cruz did not appear angry or upset, “just kind of confused on why he
had to leave.”
As soon as the shooting started, Julian and Deshawn ran away, back
up the hill toward the dispensary. Julian hid in a shed for about 10 seconds.
After the shooting stopped, he and the other security guards gathered in the
parking lot to find out what happened. As they stood there, Ackles walked up
to them and said something along the lines of “I just killed him and I don’t
give a fuck.” Julian ran back to his car, found Deshawn, and drove away.
A private security guard happened to be driving by and arrived at the
scene within minutes. Within a short time, Sheriff’s deputies arrived. Cruz
was lying face down next to his car with his keys and a steering wheel lock on
the ground next to him. There was blood everywhere. He had several
gunshot wounds and was lying in a pool of blood. He had no pulse and was
dead at the scene.
Deputies found 10 shell casings on the ground. A forensic medical
examiner determined Cruz had been shot in the back nine times. He likely
died within minutes from his injuries.
The parties stipulated that Ackles had two prior convictions for assault
with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), one in
2005 and one in 2013. Over Ackles’s objection, the trial court judge allowed
testimony about both incidents on the ground they were not unduly
prejudicial and involved “sneak attacks” that were sufficiently similar to the

charged offense to be probative of identity.2

2 Ackles’s actions in the uncharged incidents are more accurately
described as sudden attacks. According to the testimony, both victims were
aware of his presence, but were taken by surprise by the sudden escalation of
violence.
5
Three witnesses testified about the 2005 incident. According to Hiep P.
and Tong N., in January 2005, they saw Ackles get into a verbal altercation
with another male customer while they were getting fried chicken at the
Crispy Fried Chicken restaurant. Ackles and the other customer went
outside and continued arguing, saying, “Do you know who I am?” back and
forth to each other. The other customer did not appear to have a weapon.
Suddenly, Ackles pulled out a hammer from his jacket, hit the other customer
on his head, and said, “ ‘I’m a gangster.’ ” Ackles hit the other customer from
the front, not from behind, and the other customer fell to the floor.
An investigator from the San Diego District Attorney’s office showed
the jury photographs of the victim’s injuries. The hammer blow fractured his
skull and he went to the hospital.
Two witnesses testified about the 2013 incident. According to
Ruben O., he was working as a security officer in an apartment building in
downtown San Diego in August 2013. He saw Ackles smoking marijuana in
the courtyard, and told him to stop. Ruben started to walk away, but he saw
Ackles enter the building’s “day room,” where he started to speak with the
person who had complained about him in a way that seemed “harassing”
Ruben confronted Ackles and Ackles “sucker punched” him in the face. They
ended up in a “brawl,” exchanging punches “back and forth.” Ruben picked
up a chair to defend himself and swung it at Ackles. Ackles then grabbed a
chair, hit Ruben over the head with it, and walked out of the building.
David J. witnessed the first part of the encounter between Ackles and
Ruben. According to David, Ruben got very close to Ackles when he spoke to
him and “was talking to him . . . in a very unprofessional manner.” But he
confirmed that Ruben “was brutally attacked for no real logical reason,” and
that Ackles hit him suddenly in the face, with no warning at all, leaving it

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“like a pool of blood.” Ruben identified pictures of his injuries right after the
attack, and the pictures were shown to the jury. Ackles broke Ruben’s orbital
bone and a dental plate that he had had installed.
II.
The Defense Case
Ackles did not testify or present any evidence. During closing
argument, he conceded guilt on the felon in possession count and did not
contest he was the person seen shooting Cruz on the security video. He
disputed only the murder charge, claiming he acted in self-defense or
imperfect self-defense. In the alternative, he argued he could not be
convicted of first degree murder, because there was no evidence he committed
the shooting with premeditation and deliberation.
DISCUSSION
Ackles contends the trial court committed prejudicial evidentiary error
by admitting evidence of the two uncharged prior offenses. He contends the
evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code sections 1101 and
352, because it was impermissible propensity evidence, and its probative
value was outweighed by its highly prejudicial nature. He further claims the
error violated his right to due process and a fair trial under the United States
and California Constitutions.
Our review is for abuse of discretion. (People v. Spector (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 1373.) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 370.) We conclude
the court erred when it admitted evidence of the earlier offenses pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), because the evidence was not
probative of a material fact other than propensity. But we conclude the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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A. The Trial Court Erred When It Admitted the Other Crimes Evidence
Subject to certain exceptions, “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a
trait of his or her character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his or
her conduct on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)
“Evidence of other crimes is admissible only if relevant to prove a material
fact at issue, separate from criminal propensity.” (People v. Demetrulias
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 14.) “The trial court has the discretion to admit evidence
of crimes committed by a defendant other than the one for which he is
charged, if such evidence is relevant to prove some fact at issue, and if the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.” (People v.
Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 951, disapproved on other grounds in People
v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101.) By way of example, such evidence is
admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident. (Evid. Code, § 1101,
subd. (b); People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402–403 (Ewoldt).)
“When reviewing the admission of evidence of other offenses, a court
must consider: (1) the materiality of the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the
probative value of the other crime evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and
(3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion even if the evidence
is relevant.” (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 856.) “As long as there
is a direct relationship between the prior offense and an element of the
charged offense, introduction of that evidence is proper.” (Id. at p. 857.)
However, because this type of evidence can be so damaging, “[i]f the
connection between the uncharged offense and the ultimate fact in dispute is
not clear, the evidence should be excluded.” (People v. Thompson (1980) 27
Cal.3d 303, 314, 316.)

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Here, the People contend the evidence of the 2005 and 2013 assaults

was admissible to prove motive.3 They argue, “the jury here could . . .
permissibly infer that [Ackles] similarly lost control during his verbal
altercation with Cruz like he did with the prior assault victims and thus had
the same motive in this incident as he had during those assaults—that is to
violently assault those who challenge or disrespect him when they least
expect it.” While we agree this is a reasonable inference, it is a prohibited
one because it is just a roundabout way of saying the jury could infer that
Ackles had a propensity to engage in sudden violence when he felt
disrespected. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) And, in fact, propensity is
exactly what the prosecutor argued to the jury with this evidence during
closing argument: “This is what he does when he is confronted in a verbal
altercation. This is what he does when he is told ‘no.’ This is what he does

3 As noted, the trial court ruled the evidence was admissible and
relevant on the question of identity. On appeal, the Attorney General does
not argue in support of this theory of admissibility. He asks us to uphold the
court’s ruling on alternate grounds. (People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
188, 205 [reviewing court may “affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it
is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, even if for reasons
different than those expressly stated by the trial court”].)
We agree with the Attorney General’s de facto concession that the prior
assaults were not sufficiently similar to be probative of identity. “The
greatest degree of similarity is required for evidence of uncharged misconduct
to be relevant to prove identity.” (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.) “The
pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive
as to be like a signature,” to the point of virtually eliminating the possibility
that anyone other than the defendant committed the charged offense. (Ibid.)
Here, there is nothing about either of the two uncharged offenses that even
approaches the makings of a distinctive signature sufficient to be probative of
identity. Regardless, and in any event, Ackles conceded the element of
identity during closing argument, thus rendering any error on this particular
point harmless under any standard. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18 (Chapman); People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).)
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when he feels he is being disrespected. He assaults people. He assaults them
physically and with weapons, whether it is a hammer, whether it is sucker
punching, whether it is a chair, or whether it is a gun down by his side. He
sneak attacks people when they turn away from him in a verbal altercation.”
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) precisely guards against
admitting prior crimes evidence for this purpose.
In the alternative, the People contend the evidence was admissible to
demonstrate Ackles’s state of mind at the time of the shooting. Specifically,
the People’s theory for admissibility is “the nature and degree of similarities
between the prior assaults and the [charged] murder made the uncharged
crimes highly probative of [Ackles’s] intent in this case.” We are not
persuaded. To be admissible to prove intent, uncharged crimes need only be
“sufficiently similar” to the charged offense so as to support the inference the
defendant “probably harbored the same intent in each instance.” (Ewoldt,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402 (cleaned up).) Although this is a relatively easy
standard to fulfill, the People fail to meet it here.
The People contend the incidents all share several common features.
Those common features are (1) the victims in all three crimes were “male
strangers” who had become involved in a verbal altercation with Ackles in a
public setting, and (2) Ackles was observed to suddenly escalate the
altercation to a violent physical encounter without warning. We do not agree
these asserted similarities have probative value, beyond propensity, with
respect to the elements of murder.
To prove Ackles guilty of first degree murder, the People were required
to prove the killing was “willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” (§ 189.) In
addition, because Ackles asserted he had an honest belief that he needed to
defend himself, the prosecution was required to prove he did not act in

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reasonable or unreasonable self-defense. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13
Cal.4th 1073, 1082.)
Here, the asserted similarities between the charged and uncharged
incidents—male strangers arguing in public and a sudden, unexpected
escalation to physical violence—are generic and entirely commonplace
features of assault offenses. Aside from pure propensity to commit violent
acts, it is not a reasonable inference from these similar aspects of the prior
assaults that Ackles harbored a premeditated and deliberated intent to kill
Cruz, or even malice aforethought sufficient to support second degree
murder. There is nothing distinctive about escalating a verbal argument to
physical violence. There is also nothing remarkable about doing so without
giving the other person a chance to respond. Beyond propensity, these
aspects of the prior assaults do not have probative value on the question of
whether Ackles intended to kill Cruz, and if so, whether he premeditated and
deliberated before doing so.
Nor are the circumstances of the prior assaults probative of Ackles’s
state of mind with respect to self-defense. On this question, the
circumstances underlying the prior uncharged acts were actually dissimilar
to the circumstances in the instant case. Neither victim was observed to
have a weapon or reach for a weapon before Ackles attacked. And, during the
2013 incident, Ackles hit Ruben with a chair after the two engaged in a fist
fight and Ruben swung a chair at him, not suddenly with no prior physical
interaction as was the case with the shooting here. The evidence thus had no
tendency, beyond propensity, to prove whether or not Ackles harbored a good
faith belief in the need for self-defense when he shot and killed Cruz.

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The trial court accordingly erred when it admitted evidence of the two
prior uncharged offenses. The evidence was inadmissible pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1101, subsection (a).
B. The Error Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Ackles argues the Chapman standard applies to the assessment of
prejudice, because the admission of the evidence was unduly prejudicial in
violation of Evidence Code section 352 and fundamentally unfair under
federal law as a consequence. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.)
We do not reach this question because we hold the error was harmless under
any standard for assessing prejudice. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18; Watson,
supra, 46 Cal.2d 818.)
This was not a close case. The evidence that Ackles premeditated and
deliberated before he killed Cruz and did so with no good faith belief in a
need for self-defense was not only overwhelming, it came in the form of
neutral documentary evidence—a third party’s surveillance video—that
squarely captured the brutal killing in a well-lit parking lot.
The video shows Cruz in a convertible with its top down late at night.
He does not appear aggressive and does not appear to be armed. Ackles
approaches him with his hand visibly holding something (the handgun) in his
pocket and with Julian and Deshawn close behind. Cruz sees the men
approach and walks to his trunk. Ackles is perhaps a dozen feet away, but he
continues to approach Cruz with his hand still on the handgun until he is
right behind Cruz, near the trunk. At this point, he removes the handgun
from his pocket, pauses, and then shoots at Cruz as he is removing the
steering lock. As Cruz turns and tries to run away, Ackles steps forward and
shoots him multiple times in the back.

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Based on this evidence alone, we are certain jurors could have no
reasonable doubt that Ackles premeditated and deliberated the decision to
kill Cruz, and that the addition of the evidence of the prior assaults was
superfluous to the prosecution’s case on this point. Whether to kill Cruz is
manifestly what Ackles must have been thinking about as he slowly walked
toward Cruz with his hand on the handgun and when he paused before
shooting him. “Premeditated” means “considered beforehand.” (People v.
Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863 (cleaned up).) “Deliberate” means “formed
or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing
of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” (Id. at pp.
862–863 (cleaned up).) The evidence Ackles was thinking about whether to
kill Cruz as he walked toward him was virtually unequivocal.
The evidence Ackles did not act in self-defense, whether reasonably or
unreasonably, was also an open-and-shut case. The video shows Cruz
initially standing alone without a weapon by his convertible. It shows him
pop open the trunk and walk to get the steering wheel lock only after Ackles
appears in the camera’s view, with his hand in his pocket visibly holding
something, and with Julian and Deshawn following him. Cruz backed away
from Ackles when he first saw the gun. He was then shot in the back as he
tried to run away. The defenses of self-defense and imperfect self-defense are
not available to a person “who seeks a quarrel with the intent to create a real
or apparent necessity of exercising self-defense.” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53
Cal.4th 735, 761.) The video makes it clear that Ackles was not in any
danger from Cruz that was not of Ackles’s own making.
This evidence—all captured on video—is more than enough for us to be
certain the admission of evidence of the prior uncharged conduct was
harmless. It is nevertheless worth pointing out that we also have Ackles’s

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statement to the other security guards about his state of mind after the
murder: “I just killed him and I don’t give a fuck.” The prosecution’s case
here was airtight. We have no doubt “the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O'ROURKE, J.

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