CourtListener 10354196•People v. Padilla CA1/2
Testo completo
Filed 3/11/25 P. v. Padilla CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170695
v.
RONNIE PADILLA, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. H44529A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Ronnie Padilla appeals from the trial court’s order denying,
at the prima facie stage, his petition for resentencing on his attempted
murder conviction under Penal Code former section 1170.75 (now section
1172.6).1 Defendant argues that the jury instructions given at his trial
allowed the jury to convict him under some theory of imputed malice other
than the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that therefore the
record did not conclusively establish he was ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. We disagree and affirm the order.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with
no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the renumbered
section throughout this opinion.
1
BACKGROUND
The Attempted Murder Conviction and Initial Sentence2
In 2011, a jury convicted defendant of 13 crimes arising from different
incidents that took place in 2005, 2006, and 2008. (Padilla, supra, A139259.)
For the 2006 incident, defendant was convicted of attempted premeditated
murder (§§ 187, 664; count one) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); count two). (Padilla, supra, A139259.) The jury also found true
the allegations accompanying both charges that defendant personally
inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and committed the offenses
to promote a criminal street gang (§ 186.22). (Ibid.)
According to the evidence at trial, on October 3, 2006, defendant and
his accomplice Ismael Contreras, while incarcerated at the county jail,
attacked another inmate in his cell with weapons fashioned out of jail-issued
razors. (Padilla, supra, A139259.) Contreras sliced the victim’s throat, and
defendant sliced the victim’s back, neck, stomach, and right temple. As the
victim stumbled out of his cell, defendant and Contreras followed him and
continued to attack him by kicking and swinging at him. Deputies assisted
the victim to safety, and he underwent surgery for life-threatening
lacerations to his neck and head. Defendant and Contreras were members of
the Sureño gang. The victim was also a member of the gang, but had
attempted to distance himself from it. Sureños oftentimes killed other
2 We draw our summary of the facts and procedural history of this case
from our prior opinion in defendant’s direct appeal. (People v. Padilla (Mar.
18, 2016, A139259) [nonpub. opn.], as mod. Apr. 14, 2016 (Padilla).) We refer
to the facts only “for background purposes and to provide context for the
parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Patton (2025) ___ Cal.5th ___ [2025
Cal. LEXIS 1165 at *25 & fn. 12].)
2
members who attempted to drop out of the gang. (Padilla, supra, A139259)
In 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 71
years and four months to life, which included an indeterminate term of 18
years to life for the attempted murder conviction. (Padilla, supra, A139259.)
Defendant appealed, and in 2016, this court reversed his conviction for
aggravated kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (a); count 11) arising from an incident
unrelated to the attempted murder, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.
(Padilla, supra, A139259.) Subsequently, defendant’s conviction on count 11
was reduced to simple kidnapping (§ 207), and he was resentenced to an
aggregate term of 64 years and eight months to life. His indeterminate term
for the attempted murder conviction was unaffected and remained 18 years
to life in prison.
Petition for Resentencing
In 2022, defendant filed, in propria persona, a petition for writ of
habeas corpus requesting resentencing on his attempted murder conviction
pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court denied defendant habeas corpus
relief, finding he had an alternative remedy under the resentencing
procedure in section 1172.6. The court, however, elected to treat the petition
as a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The court appointed
counsel for defendant and ordered briefing. The People filed an opposition to
the petition, and defendant, through counsel, filed a reply.
On May 21, 2024, the court denied defendant’s petition, finding he
failed to make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief. The court
determined defendant was not entitled to section 1172.6 relief as a matter of
law because the jury at his trial was not instructed on attempted murder
based on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
In addition, the court noted that the jury was instructed on aiding and
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abetting, but found it could not have convicted defendant of attempted
murder without a determination that he intended to kill the victim.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The Law and the Standard of Review
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended sections 188 and 189—the laws
pertaining to felony murder and murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine—“to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The
legislation also added what is now section 1172.6, which provides a procedure
to petition for retroactive relief for those who could not now be convicted
because of changes to sections 188 and 189. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
Then, effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No.
775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), which amended section
1172.6 “to allow persons convicted of ‘attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine’ and manslaughter (in addition to those
convicted of murder) to seek relief from their convictions.” (People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 544 (Coley).)
As the law now stands, a petition under section 1172.6 may be filed by
“[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
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manslaughter . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), italics added.)
Upon submission of a section 1172.6 petition, “the court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) In conducting this inquiry, the trial court must
accept as true the allegations of the petition, but, without engaging in
factfinding, may look to the record of conviction in determining whether the
allegations have been refuted as a matter of law. (See Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.) The record of conviction includes jury instructions
and verdict forms. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50.) If the
petition and record in the case establish conclusively the defendant is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, the trial court may deny the petition.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) “For example, if the record
shows that the jury was not instructed on either the natural and probable
consequences or felony-murder doctrines, then the petitioner is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law.” (People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
If the defendant establishes a prima facie case for relief, the trial court
must issue an order to show cause, conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide
whether to vacate the conviction, and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts if it finds the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (c) & (d); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.)
We review de novo the trial court’s prima facie determination that a
petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (Coley,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 545.)
Defendant Is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
Defendant concedes that his jury did not receive any instructions on
felony murder or the natural and probable consequences theory.
Nonetheless, he argues he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because
5
the jury instructions were “abstruse” and permitted the jury to convict him
under a theory of imputed malice. Thus, defendant argues that the record
does not conclusively establish he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law,
and consequently the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition. We
disagree.
As the People observe, defendant’s argument ignores the plain
language of section 1172.6. We noted above that section 1172.6, subdivision
(a) identifies, and limits, the individuals who “may file a petition” seeking
sentencing relief to those persons “convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter.” (Italics added.) This language is
plain and unambiguous. For individuals convicted of attempted murder, the
statute affords relief only to those convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [section
1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine”].)
Moreover, the language in section 1172.6 regarding convictions under
any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person” refers only to
individuals convicted of murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Here, it is undisputed that defendant’s jury was not instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Therefore, the jury could not
have convicted defendant on that basis, making him ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. For this reason alone, the trial court properly denied
defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage. (See Coley, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [defendant convicted of attempted murder not entitled
6
to § 1172.6 relief because the jury was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine]; see also People v. Offley (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 588, 599 (Offley) [“if the jury did not receive an instruction on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury could not have
convicted the defendant on that basis, and the petition should be summarily
denied”].)
But even assuming section 1172.6 relief were available to individuals
convicted of attempted murder under a theory of imputed malice other than
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, defendant would still be
ineligible for relief because the instructions given at his trial did not allow
the jury to convict him under such a theory.
The jury at defendant’s trial was instructed that it could find defendant
guilty of attempted murder on either the theory that he was a direct
perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor. As to aiding and abetting,
defendant argues the instructions were ambiguous because it did not tell the
jury that it needed to find that the aider and abettor personally harbored an
intent to kill. Defendant contends the instructions thus permitted the jury to
impute malice to him solely based on his participation in the crime. We are
unpersuaded. The jury instructions, read as a whole, demonstrate that
regardless of whether defendant was convicted as the perpetrator or as an
aider and abettor of attempted murder, in order to convict him, the jury had
to find he harbored a specific intent to kill—the definition of express malice.
(People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739; § 188, subd. (a)(1).)
CALJIC No. 3.31 instructed the jury that the crime of attempted
murder required a “union” between the act or conduct and “a specific intent
in the mind of the perpetrator.” It stated, “Unless this specific intent exists
the crime or allegation to which it relates is not committed or is not true.” It
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referred to the attempted murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.66, for the
specific intent required.
CALJIC No. 8.66 instructed the jury that “[i]n order to prove attempted
murder, each of the following elements must be proved; [¶] 1. A direct but
ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another human being;
and [¶] 2. The person committing such act harbored express malice
aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human
being.”
As to the theory of aiding and abetting, CALJIC No. 3.01 instructed
that “[a] person aids and abets the commission or attempted commission of a
crime when he or she: [¶] (1) [w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and [¶] (2) [w]ith the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) [b]y act or
advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
Under these instructions, the jury would have found that, if defendant
aided and abetted the commission of the crime, he did so with knowledge of
the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of
committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the crime.
(CALJIC No. 3.01.) And the perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose” with regard to
attempted murder (CALJIC No. 3.01) was a “specific intent to kill” (CALJIC
No. 8.66). Our Supreme Court has explained that an accomplice “ ‘ “share[s]
the specific intent of the perpetrator” . . . when the accomplice “knows the full
extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement
with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the
crime.” ’ . . . .” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118.) Thus, “ ‘[t]o
be guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a person must give aid
or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill
8
and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment
of the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted
murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.’ ” (See People v. Nguyen
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054.)
Consistent with these principles, the instructions given in this case
necessarily required the jury to find that in order to convict defendant of
aiding and abetting attempted murder, it would have to find he harbored the
same specific intent to kill as the perpetrator. (See People v. Lee (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1164, 1190–1191 [similar instructions given to the jury
necessarily required the jury to find he “intended to aid and abet an unlawful
killing, that is, that [he] had an intent to kill, the very definition of express
malice”].) We see no ambiguity in the language of the relevant instructions
as to this requirement—a reasonable jury would not have been misled into
concluding that imputed malice was a sufficient basis upon which to find
defendant guilty. (See People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 [“Jurors
are presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and . . . to have
followed the court’s instructions”].)
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
(Langi) to argue otherwise is misplaced. In Langi, the defendant was
convicted of second degree murder on an implied malice theory. (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 975.) The murder victim died after someone in a
group, which included the defendant, punched him, causing him to fall and
hit his head. (Ibid.) The defendant petitioned for resentencing under section
1172.6, arguing that while the jury was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the instructions were ambiguous and
allowed the jury to find him guilty on a theory that imputed malice to him
based solely on his participation in the crime. (Langi, at p. 977.) The trial
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court summarily denied the petition. (Ibid.)
Division Four of this court reversed and ordered an evidentiary hearing
on the merits of the section 1172.6 petition. (Langi, 73 Cal.App.5th at p.
984.) It observed that the second degree murder instruction (CALJIC No.
8.31) required the jury to find the perpetrator deliberately performed a fatal
act—in that case, a punch—“with knowledge of the danger to, and with
conscious disregard for, human life,” but it did not require finding that the
perpetrator’s purpose was to kill the victim. (Langi, at pp. 981–982.) For the
jury to then convict the defendant as an aider and abettor of second degree
murder under CALJIC No. 3.01, the jury could have found the defendant only
intended to encourage the deliberate punch, regardless of whether or not he
“intended to aid or encourage [the] killing,” or “knew of and disregarded the
risk of such a killing.” (Langi, at p. 983.) Thus, the defendant’s record of
conviction did not conclusively negate the possibility that the jury found him
guilty as an aider and abettor on an imputed malice theory. (Id. at pp. 983–
984.)
Langi is distinguishable. The instructions in this case did not include
the problematic second degree murder instruction. Also, Langi involved
implied malice, which does not require an intent to kill. (People v. Gonzalez
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653–654, superseded by statute on other grounds as
explained in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868.) In contrast to
second degree implied malice murder, attempted murder requires a specific
intent to unlawfully kill another human being. (People v. Covarrubias (2016)
1 Cal.5th 838, 890 [“ ‘Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill
and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the
intended killing.’ ”].) And as explained above, the jury instructions required
the jury to find that defendant, as an aider and abettor to attempted murder,
10
shared the perpetrator’s intent to kill before convicting him of attempted
murder. Thus, the possibility of imputing malice to an aider and abettor
identified in Langi was not present here. (See Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 547–548 [holding Langi did not apply because jury convicted defendant
of attempted murder based on jury instructions requiring an intent to kill].)
Likewise unavailing is defendant’s assertion that “the ‘group beating’
portion of the instruction” pertaining to the enhancement for personally
inflicting great bodily injury allowed the jury to find that enhancement true
“based on imputation of the intent and actions of others.” But defendant does
not set forth what the “group beating” portion of the instruction is, much less
explain how it supports his position. In any event, there is no basis to
conclude that the instruction regarding the great bodily injury enhancement
(CALJIC No. 17.20) permitted the jury to convict defendant of attempted
murder based on a theory of imputed malice. The instruction required the
jury to find defendant guilty of attempted murder before determining
whether “defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on [the victim].”
This means the jury already determined defendant was guilty of attempted
murder—and necessarily that he harbored the requisite intent to kill, as
explained above—before considering whether defendant personally inflicted
great bodily injury on the victim. Moreover, CALJIC No. 17.20 does not
concern the requisite intent or mental state required for a conviction of
attempted murder.
In sum, the instructions did not permit the jury to convict defendant of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
any other theory of imputed malice. Rather, the trial court instructed the
jury on direct perpetrator liability or direct aider and abettor liability, each of
which required a finding that defendant harbored a specific intent to kill. As
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a result, the record of conviction conclusively establishes defendant is
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (See People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 204–205 [defendant was ineligible for § 1172.6 relief where
the jury was not instructed on a theory of liability for attempted murder or
murder that required that malice be imputed to him]; see also Coley, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [“Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory
of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
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RICHMAN, J.
We concur.
STEWART, P.J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A170695)
13
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