People v. Byrd CA2/5

CourtListener 10353137Calctapp10 mar 2025

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Filed 3/10/25 P. v. Byrd CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B328625

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA153257-02)
v.

TRYON DARNEL BYRD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Affirmed.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The jury found Tryon Darnel Byrd guilty of two counts of
premeditated murder, three counts of attempted premeditated
murder, and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. On
appeal, Byrd argues that (1) the jury instruction on conspiracy to
murder improperly lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof; (2)
there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for
murder and attempted murder; (3) the jury improperly imputed
premeditation to him based on his cohort’s mental state; and (4)
the jury was improperly permitted to find him guilty of
premeditated attempted murder without finding that he
personally premeditated the crimes.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS

A. Prior Uncharged Crimes

Byrd and his cousin, Ramaje Brumfield, were members of
the Grape Street Crips gang (Grape Street). The Bounty Hunter
Bloods gang (Bounty Hunters) was one of Grape Street’s biggest
rivals.
The prosecution presented cell tower evidence that in the
weeks prior to the commission of the instant shootings, Byrd and
Brumfield were in the area where the shootings of two Bounty
Hunter members took place.
On October 1, 2020, Bounty Hunter member Calvin
Williams was shot at an apartment complex on West 83rd Street.
Officers discovered multiple shell casings in the rear alleyway,
some in the parking lot, and some against a block wall and at the
rear of the complex. Nine cartridge casings, four live rounds, and

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three bullet fragments were recovered. The expended cartridge
cases and live founds were determined to be nine-millimeter and
.40-caliber Smith & Wesson.
On October 8, 2020, police responded to a call of shots fired
on Chadron Avenue. Bounty Hunter member Dominic Thomas
was found with a gunshot in his back, sitting in a black Inifiniti
sedan. There were several bullet impacts on the vehicle. The
Infiniti’s windows had been shattered and there were bullets
scattered around it. Nineteen cartridge casings and one bullet
fragment were recovered. The expended cartridge cases were
nine-millimeter and .40-caliber Smith & Wesson.

B. The Charged Murders and Attempted Murders
(Counts 1-5)

S.K. was a member of the Bounty Hunters. In August
2020, S.K. spoke on the phone and face-timed with Brumfield’s
sister frequently. S.K. never met with Brumfield’s sister in
person, but she invited him to meet her in different places. S.K.
knew Brumfield was a member of Grape Street and insulted him
over the phone during a video chat he had with Brumfield’s
sister. Brumfield told S.K. he had beaten up S.K.’s older brother,
who was a Bounty Hunter member S.K. made a derogatory
comment to Brumfield about a Grape Street member who had
been killed. In gang culture, making a comment about a
deceased gang member could provoke serious retaliation,
including killing.
Sometime in September 2020, a person with the Instagram
profile “thaatsexyybitcchh,” started following S.K.’s Instagram
account. A photo of a girl was associated with the

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“thaatsexyybitcchh” profile. The name “unbothered” was also
associated with the “thaatsexyybitcchh” profile in the bio. S.K.
had not met or communicated with unbothered before unbothered
began following his account.
On the night of October 15, 2020, S.K. was with four
friends— Jamele Hill, Millyon Colquitt, D.J., and J.M. They had
rented a Range Rover and were driving around. Hill was driving,
Colquitt was in the front passenger seat, S.K. was in the back on
the passenger side, J.M. was in the back on the driver’s side, and
D.J. was in the back seat in the middle.
S.K. posted on his Instagram stories that he and “plus four”
pulled up, meaning that he was with four other guys. S.K. then
posted to his stories “Let me pull up” with “K” under it and check
boxes designated “yes” and “no.” Instagram indicated that
unbothered viewed the story, checked “yes,” and posted an emoji.
After S.K. saw unbothered’s “yes,” he texted her through
Instagram. Unbothered gave her address as 12206 Maple
Avenue, but said she was getting something to eat and would text
him when he could come over. S.K. asked if unbothered had
anyone with her. She responded she was with “the homegirls”
and asked if he had anyone with him. S.K. responded that he
was with his cousin.
At about 10:20 p.m., S.K. texted unbothered that he was
coming over. S.K. asked if he could come into unbothered’s
house. Unbothered replied yes. S.K. then tried to video chat
with unbothered but unbothered did not answer, so he texted
unbothered to come outside. S.K. tried to video chat with
unbothered again but got no answer. Unbothered texted asking
where S.K. was, and S.K. responded “I’m outside.” S.K. asked
which house unbothered’s was. At approximately 11:00 p.m.,

4
S.K. sent a video he took from inside the Range Rover where he
panned the area to show unbothered his location. The video
showed that it had been opened and viewed.
S.K. and his friends sat in the parked Range Rover for a
couple of minutes. S.K. tried to call again, but unbothered did
not answer. S.K. was turning off his phone when he saw a dark
figure a few feet from the car, moving alongside it from back to
front. The figure was close to the Range Rover on the driver’s
side. S.K. looked to see what was happening and the driver’s side
window shattered. He realized that someone was firing
gunshots. He had not told anyone other than his mother that
they were going to the Maple Avenue address. S.K. saw three
figures. Two were on the sidewalk and one was in the street. All
three were dressed in black. The person in the street wore a
long-sleeved hoodie with the hood tied tightly so that only the
person’s eyes could be seen. None of the person’s clothing had a
logo on it. The person also wore gloves.
J.M. also saw the window shatter and heard about thirty
gunshots. The first series of gunshots happened all in a row.
J.M. estimated that the shooter was four feet away from the
Range Rover. The shooter was wearing a hoodie with the hood
pulled up. Hill started to drive away, and the shooter fired two
more shots into the back of the vehicle. The Range Rover crashed
into the back of a parked car. J.M. got out and tried to get help.
He was able to get a resident to call the police.
Colquitt suffered four gunshot wounds. Hill suffered 12
gunshot wounds. Both died from their injuries.

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C. The Investigation

Investigators obtained information on the Instagram
account for “thaatsexyybitcchh”. It was registered to “Miniman”
whose e-mail address was tkmini103@gmail.com. Law
enforcement records listed Byrd’s gang moniker as “Mini Man.”
The number 103 is associated with Grape Street, which includes
103rd Street in its territory. The “thaatsexyybitcchh” Instagram
account was associated with the cell phone number that was used
to send texts to S.K. on the night of the shootings.
Surveillance video collected from nearby residences
depicted a light-colored Chevrolet Equinox arriving and reversing
into the driveway of 12206 Maple Avenue about 20 minutes
before the shooting on October 15, 2020. The video showed the
Range Rover rolling forward and one person shooting into the
driver’s side window. The shooter fell and a second suspect
appeared. The shooter then stood and fired additional bullets
into the Range Rover as it departed.
Officers searched S.K.’s phone and found a photo of
Brumfield displaying gang signs while standing in front of a
light-colored Equinox with a distinctive bullet hole on the rear
column on the driver’s side of the vehicle. They re-examined the
surveillance video and noticed a defect in the exact same location
on the Equinox that pulled into 12206 Maple Avenue prior to the
shooting.
On November 5, 2020, an officer made contact with
Brumfield at his residence and noticed a light-colored Equinox
with a bullet hole in the driver’s side rear column parked nearby.
On November 23, 2020, Officers observed Brumfield
standing in front of a double-parked black Infiniti. The doors of

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the Infiniti were open. As the officers approached, Brumfield
became startled. Brumfield reached toward the front passenger
compartment and made furtive movements as if he was
concealing a bulky item, then got up and closed and locked both
doors. Brumfield took off running, but the officers did not pursue
him because they already knew his identity and needed to secure
the vehicle and the other person who was present. The officers
saw a rifle in the passenger compartment partially covered by a
sweater. The rifle was a semi-automatic, blue-steel bushmaster
carbon fifteen with thirty rounds inside the magazine and one
round inside the chamber. One of the officers discovered a blue-
steel, semi-automatic nine millimeter handgun on the driver’s
side floor board. The gun was a “Polymer80” “ghost gun”. It had
one round in the chamber and 20 rounds in a drum magazine. A
ghost gun is a gun that can be made at home and is unserialized
and untraceable. The car registration reflected that Brumfield
was the owner of the Infiniti.
Officers collected 16 shell casings and nine fired bullets
related to the October 15, 2020 shooting. Two of the bullets were
recovered from Colquitt’s body and three of the bullets were
recovered from Hill’s body. All 16 shell casings matched the
Polymer80 discovered in Brumfield’s Infiniti. Nine of the 12 fired
bullets were fired from the Polymer80 and the other three were
too damaged to make a comparison.
All of the nine-millimeter casings recovered from the
October 1, 2020 and October 8, 2020 shootings were also fired
from the Polymer80, as was one recovered bullet.
A video clip of Byrd taken on Brumfield’s phone on
September 11, 2020, showed Brumfield driving and throwing
gang signs. The video then panned to Byrd holding the

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Polymer80. An October 21, 2020 photo of Byrd discovered on
Brumfield’s phone also depicted Byrd holding the Polymer80.
Cell phone records reflected that Byrd and Brumfield’s
phones were in the area of Maple Avenue near the time of the
shootings, and in the area of Brumfield’s house after the
shootings.

DISCUSSION

A. Conspiracy to Murder Instruction

Byrd first contends that the trial court’s conspiracy to
murder instruction created a presumption that he was guilty as a
coconspirator and improperly lessened the prosecution’s burden
of proof. The instruction referred to Byrd as “coconspirator Byrd”
when describing each overt act he allegedly committed. Byrd
complains that language effectively advised the jury that he was
a coconspirator if it found any one of the overt acts to be true.
Byrd argues that the jury had to presume he was a coconspirator,
and consequently also had to presume that Byrd conspired to kill
and intended to kill, which unconstitutionally lightened the
prosecution’s burden of proving the conspiracy to murder charge.
The People argue that Byrd forfeited this argument by
failing to object to the instruction at trial. Alternatively, the
People assert there is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors
understood the instruction to establish a presumption that he
was guilty of conspiracy to murder, and that any error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Byrd contends the
instruction removed an element of the offense from the jury’s
consideration, we must review his claim to determine whether his

8
substantial rights were affected. (People v. Jimenez (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 726, 730.) We find no error as there is not a
reasonable likelihood that the jury construed the conspiracy
instruction as Byrd contends.

1. Legal Principles

“ ‘When considering a claim of instructional error, we view
the challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a
whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner.’ [Citations.]” (People v. McCarrick (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 227, 245.) “ ‘ “[J]ury instructions relieving the
prosecution of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
each element of the charged offense violate the defendant’s due
process rights under the federal Constitution[.]” ’ ” (People v.
Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163, 183.) “ ‘The threshold
inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to
this kind of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the
presumption it describes.’ [Citation.] The court must determine
whether the challenged portion of the instruction creates a
mandatory presumption, [citation], or merely a permissive
inference, [citation]. A mandatory presumption instructs the jury
that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain
predicate facts. A permissive inference suggests to the jury a
possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate
facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion.”
(Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 313–314, fn. omitted.)
“A permissive inference does not relieve the State of its burden of
persuasion because it still requires the State to convince the jury

9
that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on the
predicate facts proved. . . . A permissive inference violates the
Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one
that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts
before the jury.” (Id. at pp. 314–315 .)
The crime of conspiracy “has four elements: (1) the
existence of an agreement between at least two persons; (2) the
specific intent to agree to commit an offense; (3) the specific
intent to commit the offense that is the object of the agreement;
and (4) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which may
be committed by any conspirator.” (People v. Ware (2022) 14
Cal.5th 151, 163.)

2. Proceedings

At Byrd’s trial, the court instructed the jury on conspiracy
to murder using a modified version of CALCRIM No. 563:
“The defendant is charged in Count 9 with conspiracy to
commit first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section
182.
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the
People must prove that:
“1. The defendant intended to agree and did agree with
Ramaje Brumfield to intentionally and unlawfully kill;
“2. At the time of the agreement, the defendant and the
other alleged member of the conspiracy intended that one or more
of them would intentionally and unlawfully kill;
“3. The defendant or Ramaje Brumfield, or both of them
committed at least one of the following overt acts alleged to
accomplish the killing:

10
“a) On or about the month of October 2020, co-conspirator Tryon
Byrd controlled a fake Instagram account using his cell phone
and/or other devices.
“b) Co-conspirator Byrd used a fake persona that involved him
pretending to be a female interested in romantic liaisons or other
activity with unsuspecting male targets.
“c) Co-conspirator Byrd made contact with target S[.]K[.] who
was an acquaintance of co-conspirator Ramaje Brumfield’s sister.
“d) On October 15, 2020, co-conspirator Byrd used the fake
Instagram account, posing as a female, to contact S[.]K[.] and
arrange a meeting at a residence located at 12206 Maple Ave.,
Los Angeles.
“e) On October 15, 2020, co-conspirator Byrd informed co-
conspirator Brumfield that S[.]K[.] and at least one other person
were coming to 12206 Maple Ave.
“f) On October 15, 2020, co-conspirator Byrd and Brumfield lay
in wait for about 20 minutes until victim S[.]K[.] and others
arrived at 12206 Maple Ave.
“AND
“4. At least one of these overt acts was committed in
California.
“To decide whether the defendant committed these overt
acts, consider all of the evidence presented about the overt acts.
“To decide whether the defendant and the other alleged
member of the conspiracy intended to commit murder in the first
degree, please refer to Instructions 520 (First or Second Degree
Murder With Malice Aforethought) and 521 (First Degree
Murder) which define that crime.
“When deciding whether the defendant and the other
alleged member of the conspiracy intended to commit murder in

11
the first degree, do not consider implied malice. Conspiracy to
commit murder requires an intent to kill.
“The People must prove that the members of the alleged
conspiracy had an agreement and intent to commit murder. The
People do not have to prove that any of the members of the
alleged conspiracy actually met or came to a detailed or formal
agreement to commit that crime. An agreement may be inferred
from conduct if you conclude that members of the alleged
conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crime.
“An overt act is an act by one or more of the members of the
conspiracy that is done to help accomplish the agreed upon crime.
The overt act must happen after the defendant has agreed to
commit the crime. The overt act must be more than the act of
agreeing or planning to commit the crime, but it does not have to
be a criminal act itself.
“You must all agree that at least one alleged overt act was
committed in California by at least one alleged member of the
conspiracy, but you do not have to all agree on which specific
overt act or acts were committed or who committed the overt act
or acts.
“Someone who merely accompanies or associates with
members of a conspiracy but who does not intend to commit the
murder is not a member of the conspiracy.
“Evidence that a person did an act or made a statement
that helped accomplish the goal of the conspiracy is not enough,
by itself, to prove that the person was a member of the
conspiracy.” (Italics added.)

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3. Analysis

Here, the references to “coconspirator Byrd” created at
most a permissive inference. The specific overt acts listed in the
instruction were not elements of conspiracy to commit murder.
Our Supreme Court has held that “the requirement of an overt
act is an element of the crime of conspiracy in the sense that the
prosecution must prove it to a unanimous jury’s satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt. But that element consists of an overt
act, not a specific overt act.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1124, 1134.) The element that the jury had to determine was
whether “[t]he defendant, or Ramaje Brumfield, or both of them
committed at least one of the [listed] overt acts alleged to
accomplish the killing.” Byrd was not referred to as a
coconspirator in this regard, but rather as “the defendant.” If the
jury did find that Byrd committed one of the six alleged overt
acts, the language of the instruction would, at most, “suggest[] to
the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State prove[d]
predicate facts, but [it would] not require the jury to draw that
conclusion.” (Francis v. Franklin, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 314, fn.
omitted.) It did not create a mandatory presumption of guilt.
Viewed in light of the conspiracy instruction as a whole, as
well as the other instructions given, there is not a reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have understood that if it found
one alleged overt act to be true it followed that Byrd was guilty of
conspiracy to murder regardless of whether the other three
elements of the offense had been satisfied.
CALCRIM No. 563 instructed the jury that to find Byrd
guilty of conspiracy, it must find all four elements of the crime

13
had been satisfied. In addition, the instruction separately
emphasized that “[t]he People must prove that the members of
the alleged conspiracy had an agreement and intent to commit
murder.” CALCRIM No. 563 also specifically stated that,
standing alone, a finding that Byrd committed an overt act was
insufficient to prove his guilt: “An overt act is an act by one or
more of the members of the conspiracy that is done to help
accomplish the agreed upon crime.” “Evidence that a person did
an act or made a statement that helped accomplish the goal of
the conspiracy is not enough, by itself, to prove that the person
was a member of the conspiracy.” Other than when describing
the specific overt acts, the instruction did not refer to Byrd as “co-
conspirator Byrd.” Rather, Byrd was referred to as “the
defendant” and an “alleged member of the conspiracy.”
Brumfield was referred to as “the other alleged member of the
conspiracy,” which also indicated that Byrd was alleged—not
presumed—to have conspired. (Italics added.)
The trial court instructed the jury under CALCRIM No.
220 that Byrd was presumed innocent and that the burden was
on the People to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
trial court instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 251 that
“[t]he crimes charged in this case require proof of the union, or
joint operation, of act and wrongful intent. [¶] For you to find a
person guilty of the crimes in this case, that person must not only
intentionally commit the prohibited act, but must do so with a
specific intent or mental state. The act and the specific intent or
mental state required are explained in the instruction for that
crime.” In other words, the jury was told that it was not
sufficient to find that Byrd committed an overt act—it must also
find that he intended to agree to kill and intended to kill, as

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proscribed in CALCRIM No. 563. The trial court did not err in
instructing the jury on conspiracy to murder.

B. Evidence of Murder and Attempted Murder
Convictions (Counts1-5)

With respect to his convictions for murder and attempted
murder, Byrd contends there is insufficient evidence to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he was the
actual shooter or (2) he directly aided and abetted the shootings.
The contention lacks merit.

1. Legal Principles

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘we review
the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from
which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] ” (People v. Cravens
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “We must presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v.
Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) “The conviction shall stand
‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” ’
[Citation.]” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508.) The standard
of review is the same in cases in which a conviction is based
primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Clark (2016) 63
Cal.4th 522, 625.)

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“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
1
malice aforethought.” (Pen. Code, § 187.) “Under California law,
the elements of murder—that the prosecution, by definition, is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt—are as follows: (1)
the defendant committed an act that caused the death of another
person; (2) when the defendant acted, he had a state of mind
called malice aforethought; and (3) he killed without lawful
excuse or justification.” (People v. Navarette (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th
829, 843.) “To prove the crime of attempted murder, the
prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing
the intended killing.’ (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623
(Lee).) When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of
two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined
independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim. . . .”
(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.)
“A person who aids and abets the commission of a crime is
culpable as a principal in that crime. (§ 31.)” (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843.) “[A]n aider and abettor’s guilt ‘is
based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the
aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.’ [Citation.]
‘ “[O]nce it is proved that ‘[a] principal has caused an actus reus,
the liability of each of the secondary parties should be assessed
according to his own mens rea.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Perez
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) “[A]n accomplice is guilty of an
offense perpetrated by another if the accomplice aids the
commission of that offense with ‘knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

16
achieving those unlawful ends.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) “Thus, proof of aider and abettor
liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct
perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct
perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of
the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in
achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s
actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists
the achievement of the crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Perez,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225.)

2. Analysis

Byrd divides his contention into two separate arguments
(insufficient evidence of direct perpetration, insufficient evidence
of aiding and abetting) based on his assumption that the jury
could not find him guilty if it could not determine beyond a
reasonable doubt which role he played in the crimes—shooter or
aider and abettor. This is not the law. “ ‘ “[A]s long as each juror
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty
of murder as that offense is defined by statute, it need not decide
unanimously . . . whether defendant was guilty as the aider and
abettor or as the direct perpetrator. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Not only is
there no unanimity requirement as to the theory of guilt, the
individual jurors themselves need not choose among the theories,
so long as each is convinced of guilt. Sometimes . . . the jury
simply cannot decide beyond a reasonable doubt exactly who did
what. There may be a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
the direct perpetrator, and a similar doubt that he was the aider
and abettor, but no such doubt that he was one or the other.”

17
[Citations.]’ ” (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 618.) Here,
even if we assume it cannot be determined beyond a reasonable
doubt whether Byrd was the actual shooter or an aider and
abettor of the crimes, substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that he is guilty.

a. Actus Reus for Murder and Attempted Murder
(Counts 1-5)

Byrd does not contest that substantial evidence
demonstrated he lured S.K. to Maple Avenue on the night of the
crimes. Byrd instead illogically suggests that, although he and
Brumfield agreed to kill S.K. and intended to kill S.K., he lured
S.K. to Maple Avenue so that Brumfield could merely shoot, but
not kill, S.K. Put another way, Byrd argues that, despite his
intent, through his actions he aided and abetted a shooting
rather than a murder. The argument defies both the evidence
and reason. Nonetheless, Byrd attempts to bolster it by treating
the evidence that he lured S.K. to the location of the shooting as
proof of the conspiracy charge that cannot serve as evidence of
the murders and attempted murders.
Byrd analogizes his case to People v. Leon (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 149 (Leon). In Leon, the defendant and a fellow gang
member were burglarizing a car in rival gang territory when a
witness yelled that the men should leave because he was going to
call the police. (Id. at pp. 153–154.) In response, Leon’s
codefendant raised a gun in the air and fired it. (Id. at p. 154.)
The witness left. (Ibid.) After Leon and his cohort fled the scene,
Leon was found with ammunition and a firearm in his
possession. (Id. at p. 154.) The jury found Leon guilty of

18
burglary, attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a
crime, and firearm offenses related to active gang participation.
(Id. at p. 152.) The Court of Appeal reversed Leon’s conviction of
intimidating a witness because there was insufficient evidence
that he aided and abetted that crime. (Id. at p. 159.) The People
argued that Leon and his cohort were members of the same gang,
armed, and burglarizing cars in rival gang territory, and that
Leon stared at the witness when his cohort fired the gun. (Ibid.)
The appellate court found that, even assuming Leon could aid
and abet his fellow gang member in witness intimidation by
staring, there was no evidence that he had done so. (Ibid.) The
court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Leon’s
conviction for aiding and abetting witness intimidation. (Ibid.)
Leon is inapposite. Leon was merely present when his
codefendant intimidated a witness by shooting into the air.
There was no evidence that Leon intended to intimidate a
witness—he went into rival territory with his cohort to commit
burglary. Nor was there any evidence that Leon knew his cohort
would use a gun to intimidate the witness or that Leon took any
action to facilitate the crime.
In contrast, here the crimes of conspiracy to murder,
murder, and attempted murder are not unrelated. Byrd was not
simply a fellow gang member who was present at the scene of a
shooting. There is substantial evidence that he and Brumfield
agreed to commit murder and intended to commit murder.
Byrd’s act of luring S.K. to the scene of the shooting using a fake
Instagram account to pretend he was a girl was “conduct . . . that
in fact assist[ed] the achievement of the crime[s].” (People v.
Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225.) Moreover, Byrd did not only
lure S.K. to the shooting, Byrd knew that S.K. had at least one

19
other companion with him, and possibly more, and Byrd lured
S.K.’s companions to the shooting as well. Byrd obtained an
exact location for the Range Rover when it arrived. The
attempted murder victims testified, and surveillance video
showed, that more than one person approached the vehicle. It is
reasonable to infer that Byrd was one of those people, along with
Brumfield. Cell phone evidence placed Byrd and Brumfield in
the area and demonstrated that Byrd left with Brumfield
afterwards. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that, at
a minimum, Byrd aided and abetted the crimes.
The prosecution also presented evidence that suggested
Byrd may have been the shooter. A photo and a video on
Brumfield’s phone depicted Byrd holding the Polymer80 that was
used in the shooting. The video of Byrd was taken a few weeks
before the shooting and the photo was taken only six days
afterwards. Byrd argues that no one saw him with the gun
during the shooting and his fingerprints were not on the
Polymer80. He claims that the photographic and video evidence
merely suggests he was “aware” of the gun. But the evidence
does much more: it demonstrates that Byrd had possession of the
gun both before and after the shooting. That evidence, combined
with the substantial evidence that Byrd aided and abetted the
crimes, provided a basis for the jury to reasonably infer that Byrd
was the shooter. Even assuming, however, the evidence falls
short in proving Byrd was the shooter, it supports the reasonable
inference that either Byrd or Brumfield was the shooter, and if
the shooter was Brumfield, Byrd’s actions aided and abetted the
shooting.

20
b. Mens Rea

i. Attempted Murder (Counts 4, & 5) 2

At trial, the prosecution theorized that Byrd had the
requisite intent to be guilty of the attempted murders of D.J. and
J.M. in counts 4 and 5 under the “kill zone” theory. “[T]he kill
zone theory for establishing the specific intent to kill required for
conviction of attempted murder may properly be applied only
when a jury concludes: (1) the circumstances of the defendant’s
attack on a primary target, including the type and extent of force
the defendant used, are such that the only reasonable inference is
that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm—that
is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill everyone
present to ensure the primary target’s death—around the
primary target and (2) the alleged attempted murder victim who
was not the primary target was located within that zone of harm.
Taken together, such evidence will support a finding that the
defendant harbored the requisite specific intent to kill both the
primary target and everyone within the zone of fatal harm.”
(People v. Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) “In determining
the defendant’s intent to create a zone of fatal harm and the
scope of any such zone, the jury should consider the
circumstances of the offense, such as the type of weapon used, the
number of shots fired (where a firearm is used), the distance

2
Byrd concedes that substantial evidence supports the
finding that he and Brumfield intended to kill S.K., so we do not
discuss the intent requirement in count 3 for the attempted
murder of S.K.

21
between the defendant and the alleged victims, and the proximity
of the alleged victims to the primary target.” (Ibid.)
Here, the circumstances of the offense demonstrate that the
shooter, whether Brumfield or Byrd, intended to create a zone of
fatal harm. Byrd does not contest that the shooter knew that
there was more than one person in the vehicle. The shooter used
a semi-automatic weapon. He fired 16 shots into a vehicle with
five occupants from a distance of only two to six feet away. Both
D.J. and J.M. were in the kill zone, sitting in the back seat of the
Range Rover next to S.K., the intended target.
There is also substantial evidence to support the finding
that, even if he was an aider and abettor and not the shooter,
Byrd knew that the shooter intended to kill everyone in the
vehicle in order to kill S.K. Byrd had possessed, and was familiar
with the gun the shooter used, and it can be reasonably inferred
Byrd knew its capabilities. The evidence of uncharged crimes
showed that Byrd was with Brumfield at the scene of two prior
Bounty Hunter murders, which occurred only weeks before the
instant shooting. In both instances the shooter fired numerous
bullets, which struck objects all around the victims. Even if we
assume Brumfield and not Byrd used the Polymer80 in those
crimes, Byrd was nonetheless familiar with this pattern. Byrd
knew that at least one other person was in the Range Rover. It is
reasonable to infer that he shared this information with
Brumfield. The evidence also indicates that Byrd and Brumfield
approached the vehicle together—i.e., both knew that the
shooting was to take place at close range. In sum, even if Byrd
aided and abetted and was not the actual shooter, he had all of
the information that the shooter did, and the jury could
reasonably infer that he knew Brumfield’s intent was to kill

22
everyone in the vehicle in order to ensure S.K.’s death. It can
further be inferred that Byrd shared Brumfield’s intent—he lured
S.K. and his companions to the scene, approached the Range
Rover at close range with Brumfield, and left the scene of the
shooting with Brumfield afterwards.

ii. Murder (Counts 1 & 2)

“The element of malice aforethought . . . encompasses two
alternative mental states, express malice and implied malice,
which must be formed before the act that causes death is
committed.” (People v. Navarette, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p.
843.) “[A] defendant acted with express malice if he unlawfully
intended to kill.” (Ibid.) “Express malice does not mean an
intent to kill a specific person; it is defined as the intent to
unlawfully kill a person. ‘Malice is express when there is
manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life
of a fellow creature.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) . . .
[L]iability for express malice murder does not require a finding
that the defendant specifically intended to kill the deceased
victim(s). ‘A defendant can be liable for the unlawful killings of
both the intended victims and any unintended victims. . . .
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
668, 679–680.)
Here, Byrd does not challenge for insufficient evidence his
conviction of conspiracy to murder. The jury’s finding that he
intended to kill in conjunction with that count satisfies the
requirement that Byrd intended to kill as to the murder victims
in counts 1 and 2, regardless of whether Byrd was the shooter or
a direct aider and abettor.

23
The evidence also supports the conclusion that Byrd
intended to kill the victims independent of his intent to kill S.K.
Byrd knew that at least one other person was in the vehicle with
S.K. and lured them all to the shooting. That and the manner in
which the shooting was conducted—at close range with numerous
bullets fired—showed that Byrd intended to kill everyone inside
the Range Rover, regardless of their specific identities.
For Byrd to have the mental state to be liable as a direct
aider and abettor he must additionally have known that
Brumfield intended to kill. The jury found that Byrd and
Brumfield agreed to commit murder in connection with the
conspiracy to murder charge. Byrd had to know that Brumfield
intended to murder in order to agree to commit murder with him.
Byrd and Brumfield ran toward the vehicle together, and, as in
the two uncharged crimes, the shooter fired the gun numerous
times. The evidence tends to show that if he was not the shooter,
Byrd knew Brumfield intended to kill everyone in the vehicle.
Accordingly, the second mens rea requirement for murder as an
aider and abettor is also satisfied.

C. Liability for Premeditated Murder of All Persons
Killed

Byrd contends that, even if substantial evidence supports
the murder convictions in counts 1 and 2 on an aiding and
abetting theory, the convictions must be reduced to second degree
murder because premeditation cannot be transferred from an
intended victim to an unintended victim. Byrd concedes that the
jury was not instructed on “transferred premeditation,” yet

24
advances the specious argument that the theory was “the best
fit.” We reject the contention.
Byrd’s argument that he did not act with premeditation
assumes that there was insufficient evidence to show that he
intended to murder Hill and Colquitt in addition to S.K. As we
discussed in the previous section, the prosecution introduced
substantial evidence that Byrd intended to kill everyone in the
vehicle. The same evidence—Byrd’s knowledge that there was at
least one other person in the Range Rover and the manner of the
shooting—also supports the jury’s finding that Byrd had the
opportunity to consider whether to kill all the occupants of the
vehicle and made a cold calculation to do so, whether as the
actual shooter or as an aider and abettor.
Byrd also argues that the statement in CALCRIM No. 521
that “[t]he defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to
kill before completing the acts that caused death” may have lead
the jury to find that he committed first degree murder based on
Brumfield’s mental state. The argument rests on another invalid
assumption that we previously addressed—that the evidence
showed Brumfield was the shooter and Byrd aided and abetted
the crimes. Under the evidence presented either Byrd or
Brumfield may have been the shooter. The jury did not have to
agree which role Byrd played. The instruction was correct in law
and responsive to the facts. Byrd failed to preserve this
argument because he did not object to the wording of the
instruction or request clarification in the trial court. (People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1223 [failure to object to
instruction that is correct in law forfeits the issue on appeal].)
Moreover, the jury would not have understood the
instruction to refer to Brumfield’s intent. CALCRIM No. 521

25
stated in part: “The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if
the People have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he intended
to kill. The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed
the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with
premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the acts that
caused the death.” (Italics added.) The instruction repeatedly
emphasized that the jury was to consider Byrd’s mental state, not
Brumfield’s.
Byrd also argues that the prosecutor’s closing remarks may
have improperly led the jury to believe that it could find he acted
with premeditation under a “transferred premeditation” theory.
He forfeited this argument by failing to object to the prosecutor’s
argument at trial. (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 794.)
The argument also lacks merit. Byrd finds fault with portions of
the prosecutor’s closing argument stating that the victims were
all lured to Maple Avenue. As we have discussed, evidence was
presented that Byrd lured S.K. and his companions to the
shooting and that both the aider and abettor and the shooter
knew how the shooting would be carried out in advance—
substantial evidence showed that Byrd and Brumfield planned to
kill everyone in the vehicle using a semi-automatic weapon at a
close range, firing numerous bullets into the vehicle. Byrd also
complains that his actions and Brumfield’s were commingled in
the closing statement, but, as we have discussed, either Byrd or
Brumfield may have been the shooter, and the evidence
presented demonstrated that Byrd personally lured S.K. and his
companions to the shooting. There was nothing misleading about
the prosecutor’s argument. The prosecutor did not suggest that

26
the jury could rely on “transferred premeditation.” Nor was it
necessary for the jury to rely on a theory of “transferred
premeditation” to determine the degree of murder. Substantial
evidence showed that Byrd not only engaged in a ruse to lure
S.K. to the shooting; it also demonstrated that he knew at least
one other person was present. Byrd had the opportunity to
consider whether to kill everyone in the Range Rover and made a
deliberate decision to do so, either as the shooter or as an aider
and abettor.
To summarize, the jury was properly instructed under
CALCRIM No. 521 that to find Byrd guilty of first degree murder
it must find that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. Nothing in the instructions or closing argument
suggested otherwise. The jury is presumed to understand and
abide by the instructions that the court gives. (People v.
McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670.) We cannot conclude that
the jury ignored legally correct instructions that were responsive
to the evidence and instead applied a theory of “transferred
premeditation” upon which it was not instructed.

D. Liability for Attempted First Degree Murder Even if Byrd
Did Not Personally Premeditate

Section 664, subdivision (a) provides that if an attempted
murder is willful, deliberate, and premeditated, a person who is
found guilty of the attempt shall be sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. Here, the jury was instructed
under CALCRIM No. 601 that it could find the attempted
murders were done willfully, deliberately, and with

27
premeditation if either Byrd or Brumfield acted with that state of
mind.
Byrd contends that he should not be subjected to life terms
for his convictions for attempted first degree murder in counts 3,
4, and 5 because the jury did not find that he personally
premeditated the attempted murders. Byrd acknowledges that
the California Supreme Court has held that, because a direct
aider and abettor “necessarily acts with knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s intent to kill and with a purpose of facilitating the
direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing[,]” the
defendant may be liable for first degree attempted murder even if
he does not personally premeditate the attempted murder. (Lee,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 621–625.) Byrd instead argues that in
promulgating Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), the Legislature
intended to abrogate imputed premeditation for attempted
murder.
We disagree. The Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
“to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
The amendments that Senate Bill No. 1437 made to sections 188
and 189 provide relief only where a defendant has been convicted
under a theory of imputed malice, not imputed premeditation. (§
1172.6, subd. (a).) Byrd’s argument that premeditation “involves”
express malice does not aid him. Whether a crime was
committed with express malice is a separate consideration from

28
whether it was premeditated. (See People v. Smith (2005) 37
Cal.4th 733, 740 [attempted murder requires specific intent to
kill, and the prosecution may seek an additional finding of
premeditation “for purposes of sentence enhancement”].) Here,
the jury was instructed under CALCRIM No. 600 that it must
find Byrd had the intent to kill to find him guilty of attempted
murder. The jury’s finding that the attempted murders were
premeditated did not undermine its finding that Byrd personally
acted with express malice in committing the attempted murders,
as the amendments to sections 188 and 189 require.
Senate Bill No. 775 relates to petitions for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6, not direct appeals. Regardless, it also
addresses imputed malice, not imputed premeditation, and
applies only to attempted murder charges prosecuted under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, which was not
implicated here.
We reject Byrd’s argument that his personal premeditation
must be determined under the United States Supreme Court’s
holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466
(Apprendi) and Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99
(Alleyne), which require that the existence of any fact other than
a prior conviction that increases punishment must be submitted
to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi and
Allyene are not implicated here. The jury determined that the
attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated,
which is the relevant factor for consideration under section 664,
subdivision (a). Under Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th 613, the jury was
not required to consider whether Byrd personally acted willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation for punishment to be
increased.

29
We also reject Byrd’s argument that our Supreme Court’s
decision in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu) “started a
trend against imputed premeditation.” Chiu held that aider and
abettor liability for premeditated attempted murder must be
based on direct aiding and abetting principles rather than aiding
and abetting under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Chiu concerned the impact of imputed intent on
premeditation. It addressed premeditation only in cases where
intent had been imputed. Byrd was convicted under the theory
that he was either the perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor,
not under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Malice was not imputed to him.
The authorities discussed above do not conflict and do not
leave unresolved the issue of whether a greater penalty may be
imposed for attempted murder on the basis that the murder was
premeditated, even if an aider and abettor did not personally act
with premeditation. We see no need to address the issue that our
Supreme Court already decided in Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th 613.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

31

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