People v. Crawford CA2/3

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Filed 3/7/25 P. v. Crawford CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes
of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B329399

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA124987)
v.

BRODERICK CRAWFORD, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Richard Lennon and Tanya Dellaca, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Shezad H. Thakor,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Broderick Crawford, Jr. was identified for
recalling his 2012 sentence and resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.75,1 which invalidated sentencing
enhancements for prior prison terms2 under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). The trial court denied resentencing because the
now-invalid enhancements were imposed and stayed in his
original sentence. Crawford contends that the stayed
enhancements do not render him ineligible for resentencing. We
agree and remand for a full resentencing hearing.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
On December 13, 2012, Crawford pleaded no contest to one
count of second degree robbery (§ 211). He admitted to five prior
prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Crawford also
admitted to two prior convictions alleged under the Three Strikes
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), which were
also alleged as serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The trial
court granted Crawford’s request to strike the punishment for his
two prior convictions under the Three Strikes law.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2 Prior to the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011
(Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 12, §1), all felony
sentences were served in state prison, not county jail. Crawford’s
enhancements at issue here involved state prison commitments.
For convenience, we refer to the enhancement as a prior prison
term enhancement.

3 A summary of the facts underlying Crawford’s conviction is
not necessary to resolve this appeal.

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The trial court sentenced Crawford to two years on the
robbery and imposed an additional 10 years for the two serious
felony conviction enhancements for an aggregate term of 12
years. The court also imposed and stayed one year on each of the
five prior prison commitment enhancements.
On December 21, 2022, the superior court received notice
that Crawford was identified for recall of his sentence and
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. On March 9, 2023, the
trial court found him ineligible for resentencing under section
1172.75 because he was not serving time on the stayed prior
prison term enhancements.
On March 15, 2023, Crawford timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Crawford’s appeal asks whether section 1172.75 applies
when the abstract of judgment on which he is currently serving
time includes one or more prior prison term enhancements that
were imposed and stayed. One court has held the term for the
prior prison term enhancement must be imposed and executed to
warrant resentencing under section 1172.75. (People v. Rhodius
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 48–49, review granted Feb. 21, 2024,
S283169 (Rhodius).) But other courts agree that an imposed and
stayed prior prison term enhancement entitles a defendant to
resentencing. (People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300,
305, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson);
People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1278–1279, review
granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547 (Saldana); People v. Renteria
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282–1283 ; People v. Mayberry
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 676, review granted Aug. 14, 2024,
S285853 (Mayberry).)

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Pending resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court, we
agree with the decisions that interpret section 1172.75 to include
defendants whose prior prison term enhancements were imposed
and stayed by the trial court.
I. Resentencing Under Section 1172.75
Former section 667.5, subdivision (b) required imposing one
year for each true finding of a separate prior commitment to
prison or jail under section 1170, subdivision (h), unless the
defendant remained free from custody for at least five years.
Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) added section
1172.75 (renumbered from section 1171 and then section 1171.1)4
which invalidates prior prison term enhancements imposed
before January 1, 2020.5 The statute instructs the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and
county jail administrators to “identify those persons in their
custody currently serving a term for a judgment” on these
enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) The statute set deadlines
of March 1, 2022 for CDCR to inform the sentencing courts about
“individuals who have served their base term and any other

4 Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) expanded the
scope of retroactivity of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) “to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration . . .
for [the] repealed enhancements.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) The
amendments previously applied to all cases not yet final on
January 1, 2020. Section 1171.1 was renumbered as section
1172.75 without substantive change. (Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)

5 The exception for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600,
subdivision (b) is not applicable here. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)

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enhancements and are currently serving a sentence based on the
enhancement,” and July 1, 2022 for all others. (Id., subd. (b)(1) &
(2).)
The sentencing court must review the judgment and verify
that it includes a prior prison term enhancement. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (c).) If it does, the court must “recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.) The plain language of section
1172.75 requires a full sentencing.6 (Saldana, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 1276, review granted; People v. Monroe (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402; People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857,
893 (Buycks) [the full sentencing rule provides that “when part of
a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a
full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court
can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances’ ”].) Merely striking the invalid enhancement is
insufficient. (Monroe, at p. 402.)
Four provisions of section 1172.75, subdivision (d) support
application of the full resentencing rule. First, subdivision (d)(1)
establishes a presumption that resentencing “shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed” by eliminating
the enhancement.7 (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) Second, subdivision
(d)(2) mandates application of “any other changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to

6 A full resentencing is required even when the original
sentence resulted from a plea agreement, as did Crawford’s
sentence. (People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 968
(Carter); People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 981, 990.)

7 The presumption can be rebutted if “the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)

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eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Third, subdivision (d)(3) requires
consideration of other factors related to the defendant’s
postconviction record for discipline and rehabilitation, any
reduction of his or her risk for future violence, and changed
circumstances since the original sentencing that reflect whether
the interests of justice are no longer served by continued
incarceration. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Fourth, subdivision (d)(4) limits
imposing the upper term when deciding which term of the
sentencing triad to impose. (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
II. Statutory Interpretation
Interpreting a statute requires determining the
Legislature’s intent to effectuate the statute’s purpose. (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) We first examine the statute’s
language and give it plain meaning. (Ibid.) We consider related
statutes and harmonize terms when possible. (People v. Gonzalez
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) If unambiguous, the plain meaning
is determinative, and no further analysis is required. (People v.
Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.) If a statute is amenable to
two interpretations, we follow the one that leads to the more
reasonable result. (People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 68.)
If the language is subject to more than one reasonable
construction, we may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative
history, the statute’s purpose, and public policy. (Coalition of
Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34
Cal.4th 733, 737.) We review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. (Lewis, at p. 961.)
The plain language of section 1172.75 supports
resentencing when enhancements were imposed and stayed.
First, the statute orders CDCR to identify eligible inmates.

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(§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) These inmates are “currently serving a
term for a judgment” that includes the prior prison term
enhancement. (Ibid.) A judgment may include a sentence that
has been imposed but stayed. (People v. Mani (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 343, 380 [judgment is imposed on each count for
purposes of section 654, then execution is stayed on the
duplicative sentence]; Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp.
311–312, review granted.) CDCR merely identifies inmates with
the enhancement included in their abstracts of judgment,
regardless of whether it was executed or stayed. (Christianson,
at pp. 311–312.) The Legislature did not limit the identification
of inmates to those required to serve an additional term based on
the enhancement. (Ibid.)
Next, the statute requires the sentencing court to “verify
that the current judgment includes” a prior prison term
enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Christianson interpreted
the court’s job here as limited to verifying that CDCR correctly
identified the inmate, as described in subdivision (b).
(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312, review granted.)
Christianson reasoned that the verification would not logically
include the additional step for a court to determine whether the
inmate had an enhancement imposed and not stayed when CDCR
reviewed the same abstracts of judgment in its initial screening.
(Ibid.) The requirement in section 1172.75, subdivision (a) that
CDCR identify eligible inmates based on the abstract of judgment
should not be subject to another screening of the same abstract of
judgment by the trial court to confirm the enhancement had been
executed. (Christianson, at p. 312, review granted.)
The Legislature also demonstrated its ability to
differentiate between inmates currently serving time on a prior

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prison term enhancement and those who are not by prioritizing
relief to the first group in section 1172.75, subdivisions (b)(1) and
(2), and (c)(1) and (2). (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p.
313, review granted.) These provisions impose a deadline for
CDCR to identify, and courts to verify, inmates who are currently
serving time on the enhancement after already serving the
remainder of the time imposed by the judgment. (Ibid.)
Including imposed but stayed enhancements as eligible for
relief also comports with the requirement in section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(1) that trial courts must impose a “lesser sentence
than the one originally imposed.”
We reject the argument that striking the enhancement
would result in a lesser sentence only if it originally increased the
sentence by being imposed and executed. (Rhodius, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at pp. 43–44, review granted.) Removal of an
imposed and stayed enhancement also “provide[s] some relief to
the defendant by eliminating [the] potential” for the trial court to
lift the stay and impose the term. (Christianson, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 312, review granted.) The stayed enhancement
“remains as part of the judgment and [can] continue[] to carry the
potential for an increased sentence.” (Ibid.) Striking it thus
results in a “ ‘lesser sentence than the one originally imposed.’ ”
(Ibid.; Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1278, review granted;
Mayberry, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 674–675, review
granted.)
We reject the Attorney General’s argument that the stay
will never be lifted because the enhancements are invalid. We
agree with Crawford that this argument supports striking the
imposed and stayed enhancements precisely because they are
invalid and should not remain part of the judgment. The plain

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language of section 1172.75 and the full sentencing rule require a
full resentencing contemporaneously with striking the invalid
enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c); Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p.
893.) Under the full resentencing rule, the trial court may
reconsider all sentencing choices without limitation to merely
striking the illegal portions. (People v. Garner (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118.) “ ‘This rule is justified because an
aggregate prison term is not a series of separate independent
terms, but one term made up of interdependent components. The
invalidity of one component infects the entire scheme.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
We therefore reverse the order denying resentencing under
section 1172.75.8 We order the trial court to strike the invalid
prior prison term enhancements and conduct a full resentencing

8 Crawford and the Attorney General additionally disagreed
over whether the resentencing can be used to allow the
prosecutor to withdraw from the original plea agreement and
rescind that plea agreement for any sentencing modification
beyond striking a prison prior enhancement. A split of authority
existed on this issue. (Cf. People v. Coddington (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 562, 565 [holding the prosecutor may withdraw from
plea agreement if the court on remand intends to further reduce
the sentence] with Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 972, 977
[holding the opposite].)
We need not address this issue. The Legislature enacted
Assembly Bill No. 2483 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), which added
section 1171. Subdivision (c)(3) of section 1171 prohibits a
prosecutor or court from rescinding a plea agreement based on
changes to a sentence from a postconviction resentencing. (Stats.
2024, ch. 964, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2025.)

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hearing. We express no opinion on how the trial court should
exercise its discretion at that hearing.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying resentencing is reversed.
The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to
recall Crawford’s sentence and resentence him in compliance
with section 1172.75.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.*

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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