CourtListener 10349613•People v. Luna CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 3/4/25 P. v. Luna CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B333697
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A889197-02
v.
WILLIAM VICTOR LUNA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon and Nancy Gaynor, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Chung L. Mar and Lauren N. Guber,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 2003, a jury convicted William Victor Luna of
the attempted murder of Esteban Leal. The jury found the
attempted murder was committed willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation, that Luna personally used a deadly
and dangerous weapon—a knife, and that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury on Leal. Luna now appeals from
an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 The trial court concluded Luna had not made
a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing relief. Luna
contends the trial court erred because “the jury instructions left
open the possibility that his conviction was based on a finding
of malice imputed from others.” We find the record of conviction
conclusively establishes Luna’s ineligibility for resentencing
as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial
of his petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Luna and Carlos Arciniega attack Leal; Luna
stabs Leal in the back 11 times
We refer to the factual background from Luna’s trial only
“for background purposes and to provide context for the parties’
arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978,
fn. 2.) We previously granted the Attorney General’s request for
judicial notice of the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts in Luna’s
direct appeal from his conviction, People v. Luna (Jan. 26, 2006,
B168860) [nonpub. opn.] (Luna I).
1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section
1170.95 to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)
2
In May 1988, Leal was walking through a park in El Monte
in the early morning hours. Two Latino men approached him
and demanded his money, his wallet, and his “personal effects.”
The men said, “ ‘Give me your money and anything you got.
If you don’t, I will kill you.’ ” Leal refused and the men attacked
him. One man punched Leal with his fists and the other man
stabbed him in the back. Leal lost consciousness. When he
came to, he saw that his watch and his wallet with $75 in it
were missing. Leal was taken to a hospital. He identified Luna
as the man who had stabbed him. A police officer who saw Leal
right after the robbery counted 11 stab wounds in his back.
(Luna I.)
2. The charges, trials, verdicts, and sentence
The People charged Luna with attempted murder, assault
with a deadly weapon, and robbery. The People alleged Luna
committed the attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. The People also alleged Luna personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon—a knife—in the commission of the
attempted murder and robbery, and that, as to all three counts,
he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Leal.2
2 Luna and Arciniega were tried together in 1989 on charges
arising from two separate incidents: the assault on Leal on
May 13, 1988, and an attack on an “Arthur B.” on May 11, 1988.
The jury convicted both defendants on all counts and another
panel of this court affirmed the convictions. (People v. Arciniega
and Luna (Apr. 29, 1992, B044320) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2002,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s
denial of Luna’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal
appellate court found Luna’s trial lawyer had been ineffective
for failing to interview his mother and sister as alibi witnesses.
(Luna v. Cambra (9th Cir. 2002) 306 F.3d 954.) Luna was retried
3
Luna’s mother and sister testified at trial that he was
at home in bed asleep when Leal was attacked. Luna also
testified in his own defense. He denied any involvement in
the crimes, claiming he had been at home sleeping. (Luna I.)
The trial court instructed the jury with (among other
instructions) CALJIC Nos. 3.00 (Principals–Defined), 3.01
(Aiding and Abetting–Defined), 6.00 (Attempt–Defined),
8.66 (Attempted Murder), 8.67 (Attempted Murder–Willful,
Deliberate, and Premeditated), 9.00 (Assault–Defined), 9.02
(Assault with a Deadly Weapon), 9.40 (Robbery), 9.43 (Second
Degree Robbery as a Matter of Law), 17.16 (Personal Use of
Dangerous/Deadly Weapon), and 17.20 (Infliction of Great
Bodily Harm). The court did not give the jury CALJIC No. 3.02
(Principals–Liability for Natural and Probable Consequences).
The jury convicted Luna on all three counts and found
all of the allegations true. The trial court sentenced Luna to life
with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder of Leal
(consecutive to his 1989 sentence in the Arthur B. case). The
court stayed the weapon and great bodily injury enhancements
as well as the sentences on the assault with a deadly weapon and
robbery counts. Another panel of this court affirmed Luna’s
conviction. (Luna I.)
3. Luna’s petition for resentencing
In July 2022 Luna, representing himself, filed a form
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Luna checked
in 2003 (as the sole defendant) and again was convicted of the
attempted murder, assault, and robbery of Leal. (Luna I.)
Luna’s petition for resentencing seems to be addressed only
to his 2003 conviction in the Leal matter, not his 1989 conviction
in the Arthur B. matter.
4
boxes on the form stating (1) “A[n] . . . information . . . was filed
against [him] that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine,” (2) he “was convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial,” and
(3) he “could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189,
effective January 1, 2019.” Luna also checked a box that stated,
“Having presented a facially sufficient petition, I request that
this Court appoint counsel to represent me.”
The court appointed counsel for Luna. On July 21, 2023,
the prosecution filed a response to Luna’s petition. The
prosecution contended Luna “was convicted of willful, deliberate
and premeditated attempted murder.” The prosecution noted
the trial court had not instructed the jury “on the natural and
probable consequences theory of culpability.” Citing People v.
Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley), the prosecution
asserted Luna could not “make a prima facie showing that he
is eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.”
The prosecution attached as exhibits the court of appeal opinion
in Luna’s direct appeal, the jury instructions given at his trial,
and the verdict forms.
On July 24, 2023, counsel appeared (by Webex) before the
trial court. Luna’s counsel told the court he needed more time
to prepare a reply to the prosecution’s response and counsel had
agreed on September 27 as the next date.
5
Luna’s counsel filed his reply on August 15, 2023. Counsel
conceded Luna’s jury “was never instructed on natural and
probable consequences.” But, counsel contended, the jury
instructions “invited the jury to convict Mr. Luna of attempted
murder based on imputed malice and not his own intent to kill.”
Counsel noted CALJIC No. 8.66 referred to “[t]he person
committing the act” and CALJIC No. 8.67 referred to “the
would-be slayer.” Counsel cited People v. Powell (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 689 and People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
(Langi). Implicitly acknowledging those cases involved murder,
not attempted murder, counsel stated, “There are currently
no published appellate decisions on aiding-and-abetting
instructional issues under CALCRIM 401 and CALJIC 3.01
as they relate to attempted murder.” But, counsel asserted,
two unpublished cases have “highlighted the same concerns.”
There is no reporter’s transcript for September 27 or for
any date after July 24. On August 17, 2023, the trial court issued
a written Memorandum of Decision denying Luna’s petition. The
court stated Luna was “not entitled to relief as a matter of law.”
The court continued,
“The Court file reflects that the petitioner
was convicted of willful, premeditated, and
deliberate attempted murder on a theory of
being a direct perpetrator and not on a theory
of natural and probable consequences, said
theory never being presented to the jury.
The jury also found that petitioner personally
used a deadly weapon, to wit a knife, and that
6
he personally inflicted great bodily injury on
the victim.”3
DISCUSSION
1. Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as a basis for murder liability and limited the scope of the felony
murder rule. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis);
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile)).
Senate Bill 1437 also provided an avenue for a person convicted
under the former law to petition the sentencing court to vacate
his conviction and be resentenced if he could no longer be
convicted under the amended law. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708–709; Lewis, at pp. 959–960.) Senate Bill
No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022,
extended resentencing eligibility to individuals convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1(a).) Section 1172.6 “applies
by its terms only to attempted murders based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at p. 548.)
3 Nothing in the record indicates what happened to the
September date or whether, for example, counsel agreed the court
could decide the matter in chambers based on their briefs. In any
event, Luna has not raised any objection or argument on appeal
regarding any failure by the trial court—if there was in fact
a failure—to hear oral argument on whether he had made out
a prima facie case.
7
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner if requested. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962–963;
see § 1172.6, subds. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3).) The prosecutor must then
file a response to the petition, the petitioner may file a reply,
and the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he is entitled
to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, the court takes the
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must
issue an order to show cause. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971;
see People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463–464.) The court
may consider the record of conviction, which will “necessarily
inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see
Curiel, at pp. 463–464; People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1251.) “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction
at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise
of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Eynon (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 967, 975.) But if the record of conviction contains
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, the trial court
is justified in rejecting them. (Eynon, at p. 975; see Lewis, at
p. 971.)
The jury instructions are part of the record of conviction,
because the instructions “given at a petitioner’s trial may provide
8
‘readily ascertainable facts from the record’ that refute the
petitioner’s showing, and reliance on them to make the eligibility
or entitlement determinations may not amount to ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,’ ”
which may not take place until after an order to show cause
issues. (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055, review
granted on other grounds Sept. 23, 2020, S263939 and held for
Lewis, review dismissed Nov. 17, 2021, opinion citable to the
extent not inconsistent with Lewis; see People v. Estrada (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, 946 [jury instructions showed trial court
never instructed jury on natural and probable consequences
doctrine; summary denial of petition affirmed].) The verdicts
are also part of the record of conviction. (People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47–48, 55–56 (Harden) [affirming summary
denial of petition; jury instructions and verdict irrefutably
established as a matter of law that defendant was ineligible
for resentencing].)
We independently review the denial of a resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Beaudreaux (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238.)
2. Luna is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law
Section 1172.6 authorizes “[a] person convicted of . . .
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine” to petition for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Luna
concedes his jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Accordingly, he was not “convicted . . .
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” and
under the statute’s plain language he is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. (Ibid. See Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548
9
[“Section 1170.95 applies by its terms only to attempted murders
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”].)
Our inquiry could end there. Nevertheless, we address
Luna’s contention that “[t]he jury instructions allowed the
potential of a conviction based on imputed malice.” Luna relies
on Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972 and People v. Maldonado
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 (Maldonado).
Langi involved a conviction for second degree murder,
which can be based on the killer acting with implied malice
instead of express malice. In Langi, the court of appeal found
the standard aiding and abetting instruction—which the court
had given—created “an ambiguity under which the jury may find
the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder
without finding that he personally acted with malice.” (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982–983.) Maldonado extended
this logic to a first degree lying-in-wait murder, because that
crime essentially can be a second degree implied malice murder
accompanied by lying in wait. The required “ ‘state of mind
simply is the intent to watch and wait for the purpose of gaining
advantage and taking the victim unawares in order to facilitate
the act [that] constitutes murder. . . . It does not include the
intent to kill . . . .’ ” (Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1262–1263.)
Langi and Maldonado have no application to Luna’s
conviction, which was not murder, much less second degree
implied malice murder or murder potentially based on a lying-
in-wait theory. Luna’s jury convicted him of the attempted
murder of Leal. It found true the allegation that Luna
committed the attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation. It also found true the allegations that
10
Luna personally used a knife in the commission of the crime
and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Leal.
In contrast to the implied malice murder involved in Langi,
the perpetrator of an attempted murder must have the specific
intent unlawfully to kill another human being. (See People v.
Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 190 [“[A]ttempted murder requires
a specific intent to kill.” (italics omitted)]; People v. Covarrubias
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890 [attempted murder requires the specific
intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act
toward accomplishing the intended killing].) “An intent to kill
is the equivalent of express malice, at least where there is
no question of justification or excuse, and by finding appellant
guilty of attempted murder, the jury necessarily found he had
personally harbored intent to kill or express malice . . . .” (Coley,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 547–548.) This requirement of
a specific intent to kill applies equally to a defendant convicted
of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor.4 (See People
v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118; People v. Nguyen (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 [the person guilty of attempted murder
as an aider and abettor must intend to kill].)5
4 It appears the jury convicted Luna—who, according to
the testimony, stabbed Leal in the back 11 times—as a direct
perpetrator rather than an aider and abettor. In resolving this
appeal, we need not consider the question of whether Luna acted
as a direct perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor. (See Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 847–848 [well settled that Senate Bill
1437 “does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability
for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must
possess malice aforethought”].)
5 Luna contends the “equally guilty” language in CALJIC
No. 3.00 and the term “would-be slayer” in CALJIC No. 8.67
11
Moreover, the jury found true, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Luna personally inflicted great bodily injury on Leal
and that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon—
a knife—in the commission of the attempted murder. The true
finding on the great bodily injury enhancement “irrefutably
establishes as a matter of law that the jury determined” Luna
was the person who stabbed Leal. (See Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 55–56.) “The natural meaning of ‘personally
inflicted’ is that the defendant [himself] inflicted the injury.”
(Id. at p. 55; People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 578–579.)
And while a “true” finding on an allegation that the defendant
“incorporated imputed malice concepts.” These contentions are
without merit. The “equally guilty” language in CALJIC No. 3.00
did not allow the jury to find Luna guilty of attempted murder
without considering his own mental state. (See People v. Johnson
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 638–641 [rejecting the argument that
CALCRIM No. 400’s “equally guilty” language allows a jury to
convict an aider and abettor of first degree murder based on
the perpetrator’s culpability without considering the aider and
abettor’s mental state]; People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433 [former CALJIC No. 3.00 “generally
stated a correct rule of law”; all principals, including aiders and
abettors, are “ ‘equally guilty’ ” in the sense that they are all
criminally liable].) In arguing the “would-be slayer” language
in CALJIC No. 8.67 caused the jury to impute malice, Luna
overlooks the preamble to the instruction. It requires the jury to
find the defendant guilty of attempted murder before considering
the truth of the allegation that the crime attempted was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. CALJIC No. 8.67 does
not concern the requisite intent or mental state for conviction
of attempted murder. We assume Luna’s jury understood and
followed the instructions given. (See People v. Buenrostro (2018)
6 Cal.5th 367, 431.)
12
personally used a weapon in the commission of the crime
doesn’t automatically render him ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 592),
the true finding here of Luna’s “use” of a knife—coupled with
a “true” finding on the personal infliction of great bodily injury
allegation—certainly seems to reflect the jury’s conclusion that
Luna stabbed Leal and that he did so willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation.
In sum, the record of conviction demonstrates the jury
convicted Luna as the perpetrator of the attempted murder (or,
at a minimum, as a direct aider and abettor). The trial court did
not instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Luna accordingly is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law.
13
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying William Victor
Luna’s petition for resentencing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
14
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.