CourtListener 10348746•People v. Clark CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 3/3/25 P. v. Clark CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B329936
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA092601)
v.
AARON CLARK,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David Walgren, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted appellant Aaron Clark of rape, oral
copulation, and kidnapping of two victims over the course of two
days. On appeal, he raises several claims of error. First, he
argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by
requiring him to wear a stealth belt without a showing that he
was dangerous. Second, he contends that the court should have
excluded from evidence a text message by one of his victims
referring to prior uncharged conduct of rape of a child. Finally,
he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer
expert testimony supporting his claim that he did not recall the
crimes due to substance abuse. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An amended information filed in September 2022 charged
appellant with two counts of forcible oral copulation committed
against victims D.M. and Y.G.1 (Pen. Code, § 287, subd. (c)(2)(A),2
counts one and three); the forcible rape of D.M. (§ 261, subd.
(a)(2), count two); and the kidnapping of Y.G. to commit oral
copulation (§ 209, subd. (b)(1), count four). The amended
information further alleged that appellant personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife (§§ 12022.3, subds. (a) and
(b), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 667.61, subds. (a), (b), and (e)) and
committed crimes against multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (a)
and (e)). In addition, the amended information alleged that
appellant suffered prior convictions of serious or violent felonies
(§§ 667, subds. (a) and (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
1 We refer to the victims by initials to protect their privacy.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
Appellant’s jury trial commenced on September 7, 2022.3
On September 14, 2022, the jury found appellant guilty as
charged on all counts and found the special allegations true.
Following a bifurcated court trial, the court found the prior strike
conviction true beyond a reasonable doubt. The court sentenced
appellant to 25 years to life on count one, doubled to 50 years to
life due to the prior strike conviction, plus a ten-year determinate
term for the weapon enhancement. The court imposed
consecutive terms of 50 years to life, plus ten-year determinate
terms on each of counts two and three. On count four, the court
sentenced appellant to a consecutive term of seven years to life,
doubled to 14 years to life, plus a six-year determinate term for
the weapon enhancement and prior strike. Appellant timely
appealed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence
A. Victim D.M.
D.M. testified that she met appellant through a dating
website. They texted each other for a few days and then agreed
to meet at his house to “chill.” Around 1:00 a.m. on April 13,
2019, D.M. drove to appellant’s house on Dyer Street in Sylmar.
After she pulled her car over, appellant got into the passenger
seat. They talked for a few minutes, then appellant pulled out a
knife, pointed it at D.M., and said “this is a rape. I’ll slit your
throat if you don’t listen.” D.M. testified that she was scared and
3 The case was continued multiple times in 2021 due to
prison quarantines and after appellant fired his retained counsel
and then rehired him several months later. In mid-2022, defense
counsel requested a section 730 competency evaluation; appellant
was found competent and the case proceeded.
3
told appellant, “you don’t have to rape me.” Appellant then told
her to perform oral sex on him and she complied. After three to
five minutes, she asked if he had a condom so they could be safe.
Appellant said they were going to have sex without a condom. He
reclined the passenger seat and told D.M. to slide into the seat
underneath him. She complied and appellant raped her for
approximately two hours.4 During the rape, appellant told D.M.
that he was going to keep her at his house for a year. D.M. asked
if she could leave and told appellant she had a young son.
Appellant told her they were going to go into his house and “do it”
again. After appellant ejaculated, D.M. said that she had to use
the bathroom. They both got out of the car and then D.M. got
back into the driver’s seat, locked the doors, and drove away.
A short time later, appellant texted her that he had left his
wallet in her car and asked her to throw it in front of his house.
D.M. found appellant’s wallet in her car, containing his driver’s
license. She texted back, “I’m never going back that way. You
just raped me at knifepoint. You better be lucky I don’t call the
cops.” Appellant responded, “All right.” Appellant continued to
try to call and text her later that morning. D.M. texted him back,
asking why he was calling her. Appellant responded, “Sorry,
won’t call ever.” D.M. replied, “You better not you effing rapist.
You’re going to hell. I looked your name up, and you went to jail
for rape before, even rape of a kid.” Appellant responded, “I’m
not going to call you. I’m sorry. Block me, and I’ll block you.”
4 During cross-examination, D.M. testified that during the
rape, appellant was making “chomping” motions with his mouth
and his eyes were rolling back into his head. She thought he
might have been intoxicated but was not sure.
4
Copies of the text messages between appellant and D.M. were
admitted into evidence.
D.M. called 911 later that morning to report the rape. She
gave police appellant’s name, address, and date of birth from his
driver’s license. A few days later, she identified appellant as the
assailant from a photo lineup.
B. Victim Y.G.
A second victim, Y.G., testified about an incident that
occurred the following day, April 14, 2019. At the time, Y.G. was
working as an entertainer and she was notified by her agency
that a client had requested her services. She was given
appellant’s name and address on Dyer Street. Y.G. arrived at
appellant’s house around 6:00 p.m. on April 14. She parked her
car in front of the house, but appellant came out and said she
could not park there because his neighbors would get upset.
Y.G. got back into her car and appellant followed,
attempting to get into the front passenger seat. Y.G. told
appellant that she was not allowed to have clients in her car, but
he “jumped” into the passenger seat anyway. Appellant then
pointed a knife at her and told her to drive around the corner.
Y.G. testified that she was scared and complied, stopping the car
around the corner as directed by appellant. Appellant pulled
down his pants, removed his penis, and told her to “suck it.” Y.G.
began to cry and orally copulated appellant for a minute or two.
When she saw some people approaching the car, she jumped out
of the car and began screaming. Appellant got out of the car, so
Y.G. got back in and drove away.
5
Y.G. drove home and called 911.5 That same night, Y.G.
identified appellant as her assailant as police detained him
outside his house.
The parties stipulated to the results of the DNA evidence
from the sexual assault examinations performed on D.M., Y.G.,
and appellant. The results found Y.G.’s DNA on appellant’s
genitals and appellant’s DNA on D.M.’s underwear and clothing.
C. Prior Crimes
The prosecution also offered evidence of several prior
convictions, including a 2003 conviction for one count of forcible
rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), and a 2014 conviction for one count of
child molestation with a prior conviction (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1)).
The victim from the 2014 conviction, J.L., testified that on three
occasions when she was 10 years old, appellant approached her
and asked if she wanted to go to a hotel with him. She was
scared and said no.
II. Defense Evidence
Appellant testified in his defense. He stated that he did not
remember any of the events involving D.M. or Y.G. because he
was on methamphetamines. He also was not taking his
prescribed medication, methazolamide, which he explained
“calms me down. It stops me from shaking and hearing voices.”
According to appellant, he did not recall much after April 1, 2019
because he was “blacking out” from taking “too much”
methamphetamine every day. He also took “wax marijuana.”
Appellant did not become aware of his surroundings again until
he was in jail and did not recall any part of the events on April 12
through 14.
5 The prosecution played the recordings of the 911 calls by
D.M. and Y.G. for the jury.
6
The parties stipulated to the toxicology results showing
only cannabinoids in appellant’s system at the time of his arrest
on April 14, 2019. Appellant denied that these findings showed
there were no methamphetamines in his system after his arrest.
He denied sending any text messages to D.M. either before or
after the assault and stated he did not recall having a knife.
When asked to explain the DNA results, he stated that he “didn’t
do this crime,” and that it was a lie or a mistake because he did
not rape the victims.
During cross-examination, the prosecution confronted
appellant with his 2003 conviction for rape. Appellant stated
that he “didn’t do that crime. It was sexual [sic] with a foreign
object. And they gave me 20 years.” Asked about a 2006 felony
conviction while in prison for gassing a correctional officer,6 he
testified he did not recall, but also that it “was with water.” He
also did not “really recall” his 2014 conviction for molesting a
minor, but then stated that he “didn’t talk to any minor” and
“didn’t do anything.” He stated that he was “wrongfully
convicted.”
DISCUSSION
I. Use of Restraints
The trial court ordered appellant to be placed in a stealth
belt restraint during trial. Appellant contends this was
unnecessary and therefore violated his due process rights. We
disagree.
6 A violation of section 4501.1, aggravated battery by
gassing, occurs when a prisoner intentionally throws onto a peace
officer “any human excrement or other bodily fluids or bodily
substances . . . that results in actual contact with the person’s
skin or membranes.”
7
A. Factual Background
Prior to the start of trial on September 7, 2022, the court
considered the issue of restraints, reviewing a report from the
prison that indicated “substantial incidents of lack of cooperation
in the jail facility going back at least two years.” For example,
the court cited two incidents in August 2020, one in which
appellant refused to enter a cell and threatened to bite the other
inmates, and another in which a nurse assistant alleged that
appellant “attempted to touch her breast during an examination.”
In July 2019, appellant refused to leave his cell, and staff noted
“there have been numerous times of insubordination and
discipline in the past 30 days.” The court cited multiple incidents
between April and June 2019 where appellant refused to leave or
enter a cell and refused to follow orders. The court also noted
that appellant had previously refused to come to court, requiring
an extraction order. The court stated, “Although I do not feel the
burden as to shackling is a manifest need, I do think there is a
manifest need for such restraints.”
The court then asked the bailiff for additional information.
The bailiff responded that appellant was “classified in our jail as
a K-12 which is an inmate that has to be restrained 24 hours a
day in a cell. We do 25-minute checks every time to make sure for
his safety as well.” The bailiff also stated that he had spoken to a
“mental health clinical supervisor downtown who said that as of
this year, July of 2022, [appellant] was also in a suicide gown and
has had a history of that before. Mr. Clark has had issues, at
least that we know of, of mental health issues dating back [sic]
July of 2019 and has been so since.”
The court also noted that the previous day, appellant was
wearing a yellow jail shirt, “which does indicate he’s housed in
8
the mental ward.”7 The court then concluded, “based on
everything I just recited as well as what the deputy recited --
again, although I do not believe there’s a need to show manifest
need because it will be a stealth belt that will be completely
concealed under his clothing, the jury will have no idea that he is
restrained -- I am going to order that stealth belt be used, again
not visible to the jury, and I find that there is a manifest need for
that to take place.” After appellant was restrained with a stealth
belt, the court added that he had been previously convicted of
gassing a peace officer under section 4501.1. Defense counsel did
not object to the use of restraints; he concurred that the belt was
completely hidden under appellant’s clothing and not visible to
the jury.
During the prosecution’s case, the court admonished
appellant for two “outburst[s] in front of the jury,” and cautioned
him that further disruption would result in his absence from the
courtroom. When he testified, appellant took the witness stand
outside of the presence of the jury.
B. Legal Principles
“‘In general, the “court has broad power to maintain
courtroom security and orderly proceedings.”’” (People v. Poore
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 285 (Poore), quoting People v. Hayes (1999)
21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269.) “However, the court’s discretion to
impose physical restraints is constrained by constitutional
principles. Under California law, “a defendant cannot be
subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom
while in the jury’s presence, unless there is a showing of a
manifest need for such restraints.”” (Poore, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 285, quoting People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–291
7 Appellant wore civilian clothing for trial.
9
(Duran).) “We have held that these principles also apply to the
use of an electronic ‘stun belt,’ even if this device is not visible to
the jury. [Citations.]” (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530,
558–559.)
“In determining whether there is a manifest need to
restrain the defendant, courts consider several factors, including
evidence that the defendant poses a safety or flight risk or is
likely to disrupt the proceedings.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1
Cal.5th 98, 115.) The trial court is not required to hold a formal
hearing to determine whether restraints are necessary. (See
People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1221.) But “when the
imposition of restraints is to be based upon conduct of the
defendant that occurred outside the presence of the court,
sufficient evidence of that conduct must be presented on the
record so that the court may make its own determination of the
nature and seriousness of the conduct and whether there is a
manifest need for such restraints; the court may not simply rely
upon the judgment of law enforcement or court security officers
or the unsubstantiated comments of others. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“‘[W]e will not overturn a trial court’s decision to restrain a
defendant absent ‘a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.’”
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390
(Bryant), quoting People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1050.)
“To establish an abuse of discretion, defendants must
demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was so erroneous that
it ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ A merely debatable ruling
cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] An abuse
of discretion will be ‘established by “a showing the trial court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
10
justice. . . .”’” (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390.)
C. Analysis
Respondent contends that appellant forfeited his right to
challenge the use of restraints because he did not object below.
(See People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583 [“It is settled
that the use of physical restraints in the trial court cannot be
challenged for the first time on appeal. Defendant’s failure to
object and make a record below waives the claim here.”].)
Appellant acknowledges that he did not raise the issue below, but
appears to argue that an objection would have been futile because
the court explained its reasoning “purporting to justify the use of
restraints.” Appellant therefore asserts there was “nothing an
objection would have added.” This claim is particularly meritless
given appellant’s assertion that the trial court’s ruling was
“confusing, to say the least.” By failing to object to the restraints
on the bases he now raises, appellant denied the prosecution the
opportunity to respond to his concerns, and denied the court the
ability to clarify its reasoning and/or correct any errors. (See
People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590 [“‘The purpose of the
general doctrine of waiver is to encourage a defendant to bring
errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be
corrected or avoided and a fair trial had.’”].) He therefore
forfeited this claim.
Appellant argues that if the issue was forfeited, his counsel
was ineffective for failing to object at trial. But in order to
establish ineffective assistance, appellant must show that he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland). He cannot do
so here. In a case rejecting a similar ineffective assistance claim,
our Supreme Court reasoned, “counsel’s performance could not
11
possibly have affected the outcome at trial. The guidelines
imposed by People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 290, are
intended, in large part, to avoid prejudice in the minds of jurors
where a defendant appears or testifies in obvious restraints, or
where the restraints deter him from taking the stand in his own
behalf. We have consistently found any unjustified or
unadmonished shackling harmless where there was no evidence
it was seen by the jury.” (People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
pp. 583-584; see also Poore, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 288-289;
People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1322.) Here, the stealth
belt was not visible to jurors, and it did not deter appellant from
testifying.
Moreover, even if we were to consider the merits of
appellant’s claim, we would find no abuse of discretion in the
court’s imposition of restraints. Appellant contends that the
court’s order was confusing and that the court did not make the
requisite finding that there was a manifest need for restraint.
The court appeared to believe there was no required showing of
manifest need where the restraints would not be visible to the
jury. To the extent the court made such a finding, it was in error,
as any physical restraints imposed in the jury’s presence require
a finding of manifest need for such restraint. (See, e.g., People v.
Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 558–559.) However, any such
error was harmless, as the court also found there was a manifest
need for restraints.
We conclude that appellant has not established that the
trial court abused its discretion in finding a manifest need to
restrain appellant in the courtroom. The court cited evidence of
multiple incidents of violent and disruptive behavior by appellant
over the course of several years, including refusal to comply with
12
orders to enter and exit a cell, refusal to come to court requiring
an extraction, threatening to bite other inmates, attempting to
assault a nurse, and throwing bodily fluids onto a peace officer.
In addition, the court relied on testimony from an officer that
appellant was considered such a safety risk that he was
restrained in his jail cell at all times and was checked every 25
minutes. Based on this evidence, the court was within its
discretion to find a manifest need for restraint because appellant
posed a safety risk and/or was likely to disrupt the proceedings.
Appellant suggests that the court erred because the
evidence related only to appellant’s conduct outside the
courtroom. But he cites no cases supporting the contention that a
court cannot consider a defendant’s disruptive or violent behavior
elsewhere as relevant to whether there is a risk of such violence
or disruption in the courtroom. Indeed, it is well-established that
the court may consider such evidence. (See, e.g., People v.
Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 347 [“The fact that these incidents
occurred outside of the courtroom does not diminish their
relevance or their support for the trial court's order.”]; Bryant,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 [“Given the serious potential
consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the
court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks [of using
restraints] should be broad.”].) We therefore conclude that the
trial court properly considered the evidence of appellant’s
behavior and mental state and did not abuse its discretion in
ordering restraints in the courtroom.
II. Reference to Uncharged Conduct
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the portion of a text message from D.M. stating that
appellant “went to jail for rape before, even rape of a kid.” He
13
argues that this was evidence of uncharged conduct that was
irrelevant and highly prejudicial. We find that appellant
forfeited this claim and further, that any possible error was
harmless.
A. Factual Background
Prior to trial, the court ruled that the prosecution could
introduce evidence of appellant’s prior convictions for sex offenses
under Evidence Code section 1108.8 The prosecution presented
documentary evidence of appellant’s 2003 conviction for forcible
rape and 2014 conviction for child molestation with a prior
conviction, as well as the testimony of J.L. regarding the latter
conviction. Appellant does not challenge the admission of these
prior convictions on appeal.
The prosecution also sought to introduce the text messages
between appellant and D.M. These messages included the
exchange after the rape in which D.M. told appellant not to call
her again and that “I looked your name up, and you went to jail
for rape before, even rape of a kid.” Appellant responded, “I’m
not going to call you. I’m sorry. Block me, and I’ll block you.”
The prosecution argued that appellant’s apology was relevant as
an admission. The court admitted the evidence, finding that “[i]n
light of the fact that the court has already ruled under Evidence
Code 1108 that the prior sexual crimes can be admitted and in
light of the fact that that reads as an admission of the defendant,
I will allow that.” Defense counsel did not object during this
8 Evidence Code section 1108 allows admission of the
defendant’s prior sexual offenses as evidence of propensity,
subject to the usual admissibility requirements of Evidence Code
section 352.
14
discussion or during D.M.’s testimony regarding the text
messages.
B. Analysis
At the outset, respondent contends that this claim is
forfeited due to appellant’s failure to object at trial. We agree. A
party must make a timely and specific objection to the admission
of evidence to preserve a challenge on appeal (see People v.
Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1171; People v. Goldman (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 950, 960), and appellant did not do so.
Further, we would also reject appellant’s claim on the
merits. Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” We review rulings regarding relevance
and admission of evidence for abuse of the trial court’s broad
discretion. (See People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 237.)
Appellant argues that D.M.’s statement was inadmissible
under section 352 because there was no evidence that appellant
was ever convicted of raping a child and the suggestion that he
did so was highly inflammatory. While the text message thread
was otherwise admissible, and is unchallenged by appellant here,
we agree with appellant that the reference to “rape of a kid” did
not clearly refer to any of the prior offenses allowed into evidence
by the court. Although respondent contends the jury likely
“understood” the statement to refer to the prior conviction for
child molestation, the message accused appellant of rape, not
molestation. We therefore agree with appellant that it was error
15
for the trial court to admit the portion of D.M.’s message
referring to “rape of a kid.”
We disagree with appellant, however, that this error
requires reversal. We assess the erroneous admission of other
crimes evidence for prejudice under the standard of People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (See People v. Coffman and
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 76; see also People v. Felix (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 997, 1007–1008.) This standard requires reversal if
it appears reasonably probable that, absent the error, a result
more favorable to the defendant would have been reached. (See
People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 836-837.)
We find no prejudice here, as the evidence of appellant’s
guilt was overwhelming. Both victims repeatedly identified
appellant as the perpetrator and gave consistent and detailed
testimony regarding the crimes. Their testimony was
corroborated by the DNA evidence found on appellant and the
victims, appellant’s wallet in D.M.’s car, and the text messages
between appellant and D.M. in which he apologized after D.M.
accused him of raping her at knifepoint. Appellant threatened
both victims with a knife and told D.M. he would “keep her for a
year” despite her pleas to release her because she had a young
son. The jury also heard evidence that appellant had been
previously convicted of rape and child molestation, including
testimony from victim J.L. regarding appellant asking her to go
to a hotel multiple times when she was 10 years old. Given the
weight of this evidence, we find it was not reasonably probable
that, absent the admission of the challenged portion of D.M.’s
16
text message, the jury would have reached a more favorable
verdict to appellant.9
III. Failure to Call an Expert
Appellant testified at trial that he did not recall any of his
crimes due to blackouts caused by overdosing on
methamphetamines. He argues that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to call an expert witness to support this claim. We are
not persuaded.
A. Legal Principles
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must establish both that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficient
performance. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687; People v.
Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 218.) To establish deficient
performance, a defendant must show that counsel’s
representation was objectively unreasonable “under prevailing
professional norms.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688.) To
establish he was prejudiced, a defendant must show there is “a
reasonable probability”—meaning “a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome”—“that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” (Id. at p. 694; see also People v. Goldman (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 950, 957.) Unless the defendant establishes
otherwise, we presume that “counsel’s performance fell within
the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s
actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial
strategy.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211.)
9 Appellant’s failure to establish prejudice also dooms his
claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object.
17
If the record “‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed
to act in the manner challenged,’ an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must be rejected ‘unless counsel was asked
for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citations.]” (People
v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 745-746.)
B. Analysis
Appellant fails to establish either deficient performance or
prejudice and thus cannot sustain a claim of ineffective
assistance. First, he cannot show that his trial counsel was
deficient for failing to present an expert as to his mental state.
Tactical decisions, such as witness selection, “are generally not
deemed reversible, and counsel’s decisionmaking must be
evaluated in the context of the available facts.” (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333 (Bolin), citing Strickland, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 690.) Appellant posits that his counsel could have
offered expert testimony supporting the idea that the absence of
methamphetamines from his drug test results “does not preclude
a lingering effect on the defendant’s mental state.” But he has
provided no evidence that his counsel failed to consult an expert
or that such an expert would have been able to provide favorable
testimony. Appellant’s speculation about potentially favorable
expert testimony cannot meet his burden to establish ineffective
assistance. As our Supreme Court has explained, “[s]uch claims
must be supported by declarations or other proffered testimony
establishing both the substance of the omitted evidence and its
likelihood for exonerating the accused. [Citations.] We cannot
evaluate alleged deficiencies in counsel’s representation solely on
defendant’s unsubstantiated speculation.” (Bolin, supra, 18
Cal.4th at p. 334; see also People v. Datt (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
18
942, 952–953 [counsel not ineffective where defendant “failed to
establish that his trial counsel failed to consult an expert or that
such an expert would have been able to provide favorable
testimony”].)
Appellant’s counsel advanced the voluntary intoxication
defense in his opening and closing arguments to the jury. He
argued that appellant was intoxicated and “wasn’t fully there.”
He also told jurors during closing argument that they could,
“based on your own experiences” determine that appellant was
under the effects of methamphetamine despite the negative lab
results and therefore was not acting of his own volition. This
record strongly suggests that counsel’s decision not to call an
expert was tactical, which we will not second-guess on appeal.
(See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1185.)
Second, we find that appellant cannot establish he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to call an expert. Appellant
acknowledges that the lab results showing only cannabinoids in
his system “surely undermined” his claim that he had taken large
amounts of methamphetamines and did not intentionally commit
the crimes. In addition, appellant’s claim was undercut by the
significant evidence that he was not severely impaired at the
time of the crimes, including his text messages with D.M. before
and after the rape and his use of a ruse to get Y.G. to a more
secluded location before assaulting her.
Moreover, as the jury was instructed, voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to forcible oral copulation or forcible
rape, as those are general intent crimes. (See People v. Atkins
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 82 [“certain sexually based offenses require
a showing of only general intent, that is, the intent to commit an
act ‘without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a
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future consequence’”]; see also People v. Warner (2006) 39 Cal.4th
548, 557 [“[R]ape (§ 261), . . . and oral copulation (§ 288a) are all
general intent crimes and, hence, contain no ‘sexual gratification’
specific intent element.”].) Thus, the only charge for which
appellant could have asserted this defense was count four,
kidnapping to commit oral copulation. The evidence at trial that
appellant directed Y.G. to a secluded location at knifepoint,
pulled down his pants, removed his penis, and ordered Y.G. to
“suck it” overwhelmingly established that he possessed the
requisite mental intent to commit oral copulation. As such,
appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance fails.
Finally, we reject appellant’s claim that the cumulative
effect of the asserted errors was prejudicial. As we have
explained, any errors were harmless and the evidence of
appellant’s guilt was overwhelming.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, ACTING P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
ZUKIN, J.
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