CourtListener 10348671•People v. Armenta CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 3/3/25 P. v. Armenta CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B328034
(Super. Ct. No. 2021010124)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
JASON ARMENTA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jason Armenta appeals the judgment after a jury convicted
him of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd (a); count 1)
and attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 2). The jury
found true the allegation on count 1 that Armenta personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)) and on count 2 that he personally and intentionally
used and discharged a firearm for the benefit of, at the direction
of, or in association with a criminal street gang (id., subds. (b), (c)
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
& (e)(1)). In a bifurcated trial, the jury found true the allegation
that he committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). Armenta was sentenced to a total of 50
years to life (25 years to life for count 1 plus 25 years to life for
the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and a
concurrent life sentence with the possibility of parole after 15
years on count 2 plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).
Armenta contends (1) he was denied his right to retained
counsel of choice, (2) the trial court erroneously admitted
prejudicial gang evidence, (3) instructional error, (4) the firearm
enhancement on count 2 must be vacated, (5) the gang
enhancement must be reversed, (6) cumulative error, (7)
resentencing was required under Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81), and (8) the abstract of judgment
must be modified. We modify the abstract of judgment to correct
the sentence on count 2 and to strike conduct credits, but
otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Guilt phase
The Squires Drive Chiques gang (the Squires) has 20 to 40
members/associates, and its claimed territory is in Oxnard, south
of Pleasant Valley Road, east of Saviers Road, including Squires
Drive, Howell Road, and Cypress Road. Squires members
congregate at the “dead-end”2 of Howell Road. The Squires wear
San Diego Padres and Chargers clothing, which bears the “SD”
logo.
2 The dead end is the end of Howell Road. There is a
wrought iron fence at the end of the road.
2
Armenta associated with the Squires gang. Joel Romero,
Joseph Rodarte, and Adrian Apodaca were members or associates
of the Squires. Romero was a relative of Armenta’s father, and
he lived on Howell Road.
The Squires rival gang was the South Side Chiques (the
SS). The SS had about 200 to 400 members/associates, and its
territory in Oxnard was west of Saviers Road, south of Pleasant
Valley Road, and east of Ventura Road. SS members congregate
on Cuesta del Mar, a residential street. Cristobal Gonzalez and
Alvaro Hernandez were members or associates of the SS gang.
On April 4, 2021, Armenta and his girlfriend, Desiree Giles,
were at their apartment when he received a phone call that made
him upset. Armenta told Giles that someone was at his uncle’s
house being disrespectful. He said that he was going to go to his
uncle’s house, which was “[s]omewhere around Howell Road.” A
surveillance video showed his car, a gray Honda Accord, leaving
his carport at 6:13 p.m. At 6:19 p.m., Giles sent Armenta a text
message saying, “Be careful please.”
At 7:01 p.m., Armenta texted Giles to open the garage
“quic[k].” Armenta parked and began pacing around the
apartment and was “hyped-up.” Armenta appeared agitated and
said, “Fuck that. Why would they go starting problems at [my]
uncle’s house?” Later that evening, Armenta told Giles he was
going to a friend’s house in San Bernardino. He packed his
clothes and left in his car. He returned a week later with a
different car.
Earlier in the evening on April 4, Marisol Lopez was at her
house on the dead end of Howell Road when she saw a Ford
Mustang driving slowly. Two men got out the car and began
yelling they were from South Side and yelled, “fuck Squires.” At
3
6:06 p.m. Lopez called 911 and told the operator there were SS
gang members yelling in front of her house. Lopez heard 10 to 20
gunshots and called 911 again at 6:56 p.m. Lopez told the
operator, “They’re shooting now.” Lopez said that someone had
been shot and the body was on the ground.
Monica Cruz also lived at the dead end on Howell Road and
was arriving home just before 7:00 p.m. on April 4. She saw
three males standing outside near the parked cars in front of her
house. Soon after she walked into the house, she heard several
gunshots. She saw one of the men fall in front of a car and get
run over by the car as it drove away.
Surveillance videos showed Cristobal Gonzalez and Alvaro
Hernandez from the SS gang, and Gonzalez’s brother standing
near a Mustang on Howell Road. Gonzalez and Hernandez
appeared to flash SS gang signs. A car drove up on Squires
Drive, which ran perpendicular to the dead end of Howell Road,
and the shooter ran out of the car. The shooter fired several
shots, Gonzalez fell, and the shooter ran back to the car. Oxnard
police officers arrived at the scene and saw Gonzalez bleeding in
the street. He was transported to the hospital; he later died from
the gunshot wound to his head.
The officers found 15 expended bullet cartridges at the
scene. They were fired from the same firearm. Several of the
cartridges were manufactured by SAR, an unusual brand of
ammunition.
A surveillance video showed a dark gray Honda Accord
enter a housing complex on Squires Drive about a minute before
the shooting. The police traced the Accord to Armenta.
Eight days after the shooting, a police officer stopped a car
driven by Armenta and with Romero and another Squires gang
4
member/associate as passengers. Romero had a loaded gun in his
pocket. The police confiscated Armenta and Romero’s cell
phones. A search of Armenta’s phone revealed that on April 4 at
6:08 p.m., he received a call from Romero lasting about one
minute. At 6:52 p.m., Armenta sent an audio message to Romero,
in which he said, “I was about to let off on a fuckin’ paisa on
Cuesta3 that just kept dogging.” A search of Romero’s phone
showed an image of Gonzalez and Hernandez outside the
Mustang at the dead end on Howell Road, where Gonzalez was
later shot. Romero sent this photo to someone on a social media
account at 6:13 p.m. on the day of the shooting.
Armenta’s cell phone records showed that on the day of the
shooting, his phone was in the area of the crime scene around
6:56 p.m. A few minutes later, Armenta’s phone was near his
home. Around 10:20 p.m., his phone was in the San Bernardino
area.
Nine days after the shooting, police officers located
Armenta’s Honda at his mother’s residence in Palmdale. The
police later executed a search warrant at Armenta’s home. They
found a parking citation issued to a Honda, a San Diego Padres
hat and hoodie sweatshirt, an empty gun holster “velcro-ed” to a
body armor vest, a firearm (not the murder weapon) loaded with
various ammunition, including SAR ammunition.
Bifurcated gang allegation trial
Oxnard Police Detective Ricardo Vega testified as a gang
expert in both the guilt phase and the bifurcated gang allegation
trial. He opined that the charged offenses were committed to
benefit the Squires gang more than reputationally. Vega
3 “Cuesta” is in reference to Cuesta Del Mar, which is SS
territory.
5
explained the murder and attempted murder was an act in
retaliation against the rival SS gang after they drove into Squires
gang territory and “disrespect[ed]” the territory.
For the predicate offenses, the prosecution relied on two
firearm offenses by active Squires gang members, Israel Juarez
and Adrian Apodaca. The prosecution proffered certified records
of Juarez’s sustained juvenile petition for carrying a loaded
firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a)) in 2018. At the time of the offense,
Juarez was in a car with other Squires gang members on Howell
Road. Vega testified that Squires members “carry firearms in
case a violent confrontation rises upon them especially in their
own neighborhood. My understanding is that there had been
shootings prior to that arrest in the Squires Drive neighborhood
possibly from rival gang members.” Vega testified the offense
more than reputationally benefited the gang by “defending their
own turf.”
For the second predicate offense, the prosecution proffered
evidence of a firearm offense in March 2021. To establish this
offense, the prosecution presented certified records of two of
Apodaca’s felony convictions for unlawfully taking or driving a
vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) in 2015, and carrying a concealed
firearm (§ 25400 subd. (a)(2)) in 2016 with a special allegation
that he was a convicted felon carrying a firearm. The prosecution
also presented a video of four Squires gang members, including
Apodaca, at a shooting range in March 2021. Vega testified that
Apodaca was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. In
the video, all individuals were wearing Squires gang attire.
Apodaca said he was “training up his little homies,” which meant
he was training the younger gang members in using firearms in
case they need to use it against a rival or to protect themselves in
6
their own neighborhood. Vega opined the conduct benefited the
gang because its members could “talk about what’s going on in
the Squires Drive neighborhood, who they’re committing crimes
towards, and also practicing their shooting and being trained up
on firearms.”
DISCUSSION
Request to substitute counsel
Armenta contends the trial court erred in denying his
constitutional right to retained counsel of choice. We disagree.
1. Relevant facts
In April 2021, Armenta retained private counsel, Martin
Zaehringer, who represented Armenta at the preliminary
hearing. On March 22, 2022, the parties announced ready for
trial, and the last day for trial was April 1, 2022.
On April 1, 2022, Zaehringer informed the trial court that
Armenta wished to substitute Christopher Welch as counsel.
Welch asserted that Armenta had “strong concerns and wishes to
change counsel, regardless of it being . . . Welch, the Public
Defender, or other counsel.” Welch stated he was “ready to enter
the case with a minimum of six months estimate to prepare for
trial.” Welch also noted the case was “not even a year old which
is almost unheard of in getting a homicide case to trial.” The
prosecutor objected to the substitution as untimely. She also
contended that the parties had announced readiness for some
time and that some witnesses, including Hernandez, were
reluctant to testify and required a court order to ensure their
presence. She also argued that a continuance of at least six
months was “an inordinate amount of time” and a “complete
injustice.” Zaehringer explained that Armenta “indicated that he
no longer has confidence and faith in me.” He also noted that
7
payment for the retainer fee was not an issue in this case. Welch
acknowledged that he had been “contacted at the last minute.”
Armenta personally explained to the trial court that he was
requesting a lawyer late “only because [he was] expecting [his]
lawyer to come visit [him] before today many times to talk over
[his] case. And [he hasn’t].” He had only seen Zaehringer about
two or three times in the past year and did not “feel comfortable
with the investigation that has been done to support [his]
defense.” Armenta said he only needed one week “to finish the
financial deal with [Welch].”
The trial court denied the motion to substitute counsel. It
reasoned that this case “had been ready and is ready.” It noted
that it was “confident that Mr. Zaehringer is ready to try this
case, [with] the same skill and ability that he’s demonstrated
throughout his career.” The court recognized that this case
involved a “particularly notorious gang” and that “witness
intimidation [was] a serious issue in the People’s presentation.
And every day of delay that goes by jeopardizes further the
likelihood that those witnesses are going to be available” and
willing to testify. The court found that substitution of counsel
would “disrupt the orderly process of justice.”
2. Analysis
“The right to retained counsel of choice is—subject to
certain limitations—guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to
the federal Constitution.” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th
263, 310.) In California, this right reflects not only a defendant’s
choice of an attorney, but also their decision to discharge an
attorney. (Id. at p. 311.) However, the right to discharge a
retained attorney is not absolute. A trial court has discretion to
deny a motion to relieve counsel “ ‘if discharge will result in
8
“significant prejudice” to the defendant [citation], or if it is not
timely, i.e., if it will result in “disruption of the orderly process of
justice” [citations].’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) In evaluating whether a
motion to discharge counsel is timely, the trial court considers
the totality of circumstances. (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th
482, 513 (Maciel).) We review the decision to relieve counsel for
abuse of discretion. (Verdugo, at p. 311.)
There was no abuse of discretion here. Armenta’s motion to
substitute counsel was made on the last day for trial, after the
parties had indicated readiness for trial. New counsel was
contacted “last minute” and requested an open-ended
continuance of at least six months. The court considered the
potential serious consequences of this delay in a case where
witness intimidation was a concern, exacerbating witnesses’
reluctance to testify. (See Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 513.)
The court also considered the absence of inadequate
representation by Zaehringer. (See ibid. [court considered “the
absence of abandonment or inadequate representation by counsel
or an actual conflict of interest” in denying the motion to relieve
counsel].) Given these circumstances, it was not arbitrary,
capricious, or outside the bounds of reason for the court to deny
the substitution request.
Armenta relies on People v. Williams (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th
627 (Williams), but that case is distinguishable. In Williams,
after the court denied the Marsden motion, the defendant moved
to substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel and sought a
four-month trial continuance. Retained counsel informed the
prosecutor and the court six days before the day set for the start
of trial that she intended to request substitution. At the hearing,
retained counsel explained that the defendant’s mother spoke to
9
her six weeks prior, but the mother did not have the money for
the retainer fee. (Id. at pp. 643-644.) The prosecutor opposed the
motion, primarily focusing on the inconvenience it would cause a
material witness who lived out of state. The prosecution
expended considerable resources to secure the witness at trial
and the delay caused the witness anxiety. (Id. at pp. 641-642.)
The trial court denied the substitution motion. The appellate
court reversed, noting the record contained “ ‘compelling
circumstances’ ” that mitigated the tardiness of the motion,
including the Marsden hearing, which was delayed at no fault of
the defendant, and the considerable several-week effort to obtain
funds necessary for retained counsel. (Id. at pp. 652-653.) The
court also noted the defendant retained counsel “nearly a week
prior to the trial,” and that counsel acted “promptly to alert” the
court and prosecutor. (Ibid.)
Unlike Williams, Armenta did not present “compelling
circumstances” that would excuse the late substitution request.
Welch was contacted “last minute,” and the prosecutor was
informed of the request the day before the last day for trial.
Welch also indicated he would need a minimum of a six-month
continuance, whereas the retained counsel in Williams indicated
she needed a set four months. (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th
at p. 657.) Additionally, the prosecutor in Williams only argued
the inconvenience, but not unavailability, of the key witness. (Id.
at p. 655.) But here, the court emphasized the serious
consequences of witness intimidation and reluctance to testify if
the case were delayed. Moreover, unlike Williams, there was no
financial impediment that caused the delay. There was no abuse
of discretion in denying the request to substitute counsel and
postpone the trial.
10
Gang evidence in guilt phase
Armenta contends the trial court erred by admitting highly
prejudicial gang evidence during the guilt phase of trial. We
conclude there was no prejudicial error.
1. Relevant proceedings
Before trial on the substantive offenses, the prosecution
moved to admit gang evidence in their case-in-chief to show
motive and intent. Over Armenta’s objection, the trial court
admitted the gang evidence. The court found that “testimony
about what a criminal street gang is and the history of the
particular street gangs involved in this case . . . and the dynamics
that are involved in how they conduct themselves, how they are
related to each other, how they react to certain provocations, all
would be appropriate territory for evidence. And then, obviously,
the extent to which the victims and the defendant were
associated with respective street gangs . . . and opinions that
would flow from that . . . that would involve opinion testimony.”
The trial court instructed the jury that it may consider
evidence of gang activity for the limited purpose of deciding
motive and evaluating the credibility of a witness. The jury was
also instructed that it may not consider the evidence for any
other purpose and cannot conclude from this evidence that
Armenta was a person of bad character or that he had a
disposition to commit the crime. (CALCRIM No. 303.)
2. Analysis
The prosecution is “generally entitled to introduce evidence
of a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the
charged offense.” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31
(Chhoun).) Relevant evidence on issues such as motive and
identity can include “[e]vidence of the defendant’s gang
11
affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory,
membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal
enterprises, rivalries, and the like.” (People v. Hernandez (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049.) “Even when it is relevant, however,
‘courts should carefully scrutinize evidence of a defendant’s gang
membership because such evidence “creates a risk the jury will
improperly infer the defendant has a criminal disposition and is
therefore guilty of the offense charged.” ’ [Citations.]” (Chhoun,
at p. 31.) Relevant evidence is admissible if the probative value
is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (People
v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1194.) We review the admission
of gang evidence for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
Armenta acknowledges People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1, 23, which recognized that gang evidence used to prove a gang
enhancement might also be admissible at a trial on the
underlying charge. He also acknowledges that “some, limited
amount of gang evidence” here was relevant to prove motive.
However, he argues that other gang evidence, such as predicate
offenses and patterns of criminal gang activities, was
inadmissible at the guilt phase at trial.
Even if the court erred in admitting some gang evidence,
we conclude any error is harmless given the overwhelming
evidence of guilt in this case. It was undisputed that Armenta
associated with Squires gang members, a rival of the SS gang.
His cell phone records including his call records and location
history, Gile’s testimony, surveillance video evidence, and
Armenta’s flight to San Bernardino after the shooting all support
his conviction. In our view, it is not reasonably likely that
exclusion of some of the gang evidence would have changed the
jury’s verdict. (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1210;
12
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
Furthermore, the trial court gave limiting instructions. We
presume the jury understood and followed them. (Chhoun, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 30.)4
Armenta compares this case to People v. Albarran (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 214, 232 which presented “one of those rare and
unusual occasions where the admission of evidence has violated
federal due process and rendered the defendant’s trial
fundamentally unfair.” In Albarran, two men shot at a house
during a party. (Id. at p. 217.) The gang motive was “not
apparent from the circumstances of the crime,” but the trial court
allowed a “panoply of incriminating gang evidence” against the
defendant. (Id. at p. 227.) Gang evidence such as the identity of
other gang members, the crimes they had committed, and the
contacts police had with other gang members, may have been
“tangentially relevant to the gang allegations, but had no bearing
on the underlying charges.” (Ibid.) Such evidence was
prejudicial as its “paramount function . . . was to show Albarran’s
criminal disposition” and not to prove motive. (Id. at p. 228.)
Unlike Albarran, the underlying gang-related motivation
here was clear, and the gang evidence was proffered for the
purpose of proving such motive and intent for the shootings.
“While not itself an element of the crimes, motive can illuminate
intent.” (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 32.) Any error in
admitting gang evidence did not result in a violation of Armenta’s
right to due process.
4 For these reasons, People v. Garcia (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 1040 does not persuade us otherwise.
13
“Kill zone” instruction
Armenta contends the attempted murder conviction should
be reversed because the evidence did not support a kill zone
instruction and the instruction was legally incorrect. Although
the trial court erred, we conclude the error was not prejudicial.
1. Relevant proceedings
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 600,
attempted murder, which states, in part:
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted
murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step
toward killing another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The
defendant intended to kill that person. [¶] . . . [¶]
“A person may intend to kill a primary target and also
a secondary target within a zone of fatal harm or ‘kill
zone.’ A ‘kill zone’ is an area in which the defendant
used lethal force that was designed and intended to
kill everyone in the area around the primary target.
“In order to convict the defendant of the attempted
murder of Alvaro Hernandez, the People must prove
that the defendant not only intended to kill Alvaro
Hernandez but also either intended to kill Alvaro
Hernandez, or intended to kill everyone within the kill
zone.
“In determining whether the defendant intended to
kill Alvaro Hernandez, the People must prove that (1)
the only reasonable conclusion from the defendant’s
use of lethal force, is that the defendant intended to
create a kill zone; and (2) Alvaro Hernandez was
located within the kill zone.
14
“In determining whether the defendant intended to
create a ‘kill zone’ and the scope of such a zone, you
should consider all of the circumstances including, but
not limited to, the following: [¶] The type of weapon
used; [¶] The number of shots fired; [¶] The distance
between the defendant and Alvaro Hernandez.
“If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant
intended to kill Alvaro Hernandez or intended to kill
Alvaro Hernandez by killing everyone in the kill zone,
then you must find the defendant not guilty of the
attempted murder of Alvaro Hernandez.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that
Armenta intended to kill Hernandez and took multiple direct
steps, including running and shooting. She said Hernandez was
“lucky” because he was “standing next to Cristobal Gonzalez.
Cristobal is the one that got it to the back of the head and Alvaro
was able to escape.” She also highlighted the surveillance video
depicting the shooting as evidence that Armenta took direct steps
towards the offense.
The prosecutor alternatively argued the kill zone theory,
stating that if “Cristobal Gonzalez was the primary target and
Alvaro was in that zone, he’s also guilty of attempted murder.
And I submit to you the defendant intended to kill Alvaro as well.
He wanted to kill them both.” “But even if you think maybe he
just intended to kill Cristobal, there is a kill zone where if you’re
in the zone, you are still liable for your actions. It’s designed so if
you intend to kill one person, the people are also put into that
target. So we must prove that he intended to kill Alvaro
Hernandez or he intended to kill everyone in that zone. And he
did. You don’t unload 15 rounds into a residential neighborhood
without wanting to kill somebody or all of them and he was mad
15
that his family was being disrespected.” “The only reasonable
conclusion from the defendant’s use of lethal force is that the
defendant intended to create a kill zone. That’s his conduct and
he was located within it. Alvaro was standing right next to
Cristobal when they were shot at.”
2. Analysis
“To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution
must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602
(Canizales).) “When a single act is charged as an attempt on the
lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be
examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder
victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one
attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent
doctrine.” (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court has recognized the concept of a
“concurrent intent to kill as a permissible theory for establishing
the specific intent requirement of attempted murder.”
(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602, italics omitted.) Under a
kill zone theory, if the defendant intended to target a specific
person by killing everyone in the area in which the targeted
person was located (i.e., the kill zone), the defendant can be
convicted of the attempted murder of persons within that kill
zone. (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 330-331.)
Recognizing the potential misapplication of the kill zone
theory, our high court in Canizales held that the kill zone theory
may properly be applied “only when a jury concludes: (1) the
circumstances of the defendant’s attack on a primary target,
including the type and extent of force the defendant used, are
16
such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant
intended to create a zone of fatal harm—that is, an area in which
the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure the
primary target’s death—around the primary target and (2) the
alleged attempted murder victim who was not the primary target
was located within that zone of harm. Taken together, such
evidence will support a finding that the defendant harbored the
requisite specific intent to kill both the primary target and
everyone within the zone of fatal harm.” (Canizales, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 607; People v. Hin (Feb. 3, 2025, S141519) __
Cal.App.5th __ [2025 WL 457799 at p. *27].) The “kill zone
theory does not apply where ‘the defendant merely subjected
persons near the primary target to lethal risk. Rather, in a kill
zone case, the defendant has a primary target and reasons [that]
he cannot miss that intended target if he kills everyone in the
area in which the target is located. In the absence of such
evidence, the kill zone instruction should not be given.’ ”
(Canizales, at p. 607, italics added.)
Canizales emphasized that when “the kill zone theory is
used to support an inference that the defendant concurrently
intended to kill a nontargeted victim, . . . evidence of a primary
target is required.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. at 608,
italics added.) “ ‘[W]ithout a primary target, there cannot be
concurrent intent because there is no primary intent to kill as to
which the intent to kill others could be concurrent.’ ” (Id. at p.
609; People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 193 [“Without
substantial evidence showing the defendant acted with intent to
kill a primary target, the essential basis for a concurrent intent
analysis is not satisfied”].)
17
We conclude there was not substantial evidence to support
a kill zone instruction because there was no evidence Armenta
intended to kill a primary target. The evidence established that
Armenta told Giles that someone was at his uncle’s house being
disrespectful, but he did not specify who. There was no evidence
Armenta knew Gonzalez or Hernandez, other than the fact that
they were SS members. Armenta fired 15 times towards
Gonzalez or Hernandez, but the evidence does not support he
targeted any person in particular. Without evidence of a primary
target, it was improper to instruct on the kill zone. (Canizales,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.)
Having concluded the court erred in instructing the jury on
a kill zone theory, we must decide if this error requires reversal
of count 2. We conclude the error is harmless under either
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836 or Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) because there is overwhelming
evidence that Armenta specifically intended to murder
Hernandez. Armenta shot 15 times towards the direction of
Gonzalez and Hernandez, who were standing next to each other
at the dead end of Howell Road. Because Armenta repeatedly
shot at rival gang members indiscriminately, the evidence
established the specific intent to kill required for attempted
murder. (See People v. Medina (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 146, 156.)
In People v. Stone, our high court held that “a person who
intends to kill can be guilty of attempted murder even if the
person has no specific target in mind. An indiscriminate
would-be killer is just as culpable as one who targets a specific
person.” (People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 140 [attempted
murder conviction upheld where the defendant fired into a group
of 10 rival gang members about 60 feet away].) Canizales also
18
recognized that “there are evidentiary bases, other than the kill
zone theory, on which a fact finder can infer an intent to kill for
purposes of attempted murder liability that do not depend on a
showing that the defendant had a primary target (for example,
when a terrorist places a bomb on a commercial airliner
intending to kill as many people as possible without intending to
kill a specific individual).” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608.)
The prosecutor here pursued a theory as described in Stone.
She argued Armenta “wanted to kill them both” and “[y]ou don’t
unload 15 rounds into a residential neighborhood without
wanting to kill somebody or all of them and he was mad that his
family was being disrespected.” The facts here do not present a
scenario in which an intent to kill one victim was clearer than an
intent to kill another. There was no evidence of a primary target.
But the evidence overwhelmingly established that Armenta
indiscriminately shot at Gonzalez and Hernandez, who were
standing next to each other, and intended to kill both of them.
Under these facts, we conclude the instructional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Firearm enhancement
Armenta contends the enhancement on count 2 for the
personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd.
(c)) must be vacated because the verdict form does not reflect that
the jury made a finding on the firearm enhancement as alleged in
the information. We conclude such error does not warrant
reversal here. “ ‘ “ ‘A verdict is to be given a reasonable
intendment and be construed in light of the issues submitted to
the jury and the instructions of the court.’ [Citations.]”
[Citations.]’ ” (People v. Camacho (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1269,
1272.) The jury found true that Armenta personally and
19
intentionally discharged the firearm in the verdict form. The
additional language in the verdict form that the discharge of the
firearm “caused great bodily injury or death” was mere
“surplusage that may be disregarded.” (Ibid.)
Gang enhancement
After Armenta’s trial, our Supreme Court decided People v.
Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743 (Clark). Clark analyzed the
language of section 186.22, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) and interpreted “collective engagement” to
require “a nexus between the individual predicate offenses and
the gang as an organized, collective enterprise.” (Clark, at p.
749.) Clark applies retroactively. (People v. Guerra (1984) 37
Cal.3d 385, 399-400.)
Armenta argues the gang enhancement must be reversed
because the jury was not instructed on Clark’s organizational
nexus requirement and there was no evidence of a nexus between
the predicate offenses and the gang as an organized collective
enterprise. The Attorney General contends the lack of
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree
with the Attorney General.
Assembly Bill No. 333 amended section 186.22 to define
“criminal street gang” as an “ongoing, organized association . . .
whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a
pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics
added; Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4.) Interpreting this amendment,
Clark concluded the “Legislature’s reference to collective
engagement . . . calls for an inquiry not just into how the
predicate offenses benefited the gang, but also how the gang
works together as a gang. It calls for a showing of a connection,
or nexus, between an offense committed by one or more gang
20
members and the organization as a whole.” (Clark, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 762.) “This organizational nexus may be shown by
evidence linking the predicate offenses to the gang’s
organizational structure, meaning its manner of governance; its
primary activities; or its common goals and principles.” (Ibid.)
Collective engagement can be established in different ways.
(Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 762.) Examples of collective
engagement include evidence of a direct order from the gang to
commit a crime, a more “general, well-understood expectation
that members must engage in certain types of offenses,” or a
demonstration that the offenses are reflective of the primary
activities of the gang or else adhere to a common goal or plan
characteristic of the gang in question. (Ibid.)
Clark emphasized that the “collective engagement”
requirement was “conceptually distinct” from the “common
benefit” requirement. However, the “facts necessary to prove the
two requirements will often overlap with one another.” (Clark,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 763.) The core inquiry for the collective
engagement element is “whether there exists an organizational
nexus between the crime and the gang.” (Ibid.)
A trial court has a sua sponte obligation to provide correct
instructions of law. (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409.)
When jury instructions fail to account for new elements that
apply retroactively, a defendant is entitled to a remand for
further proceedings unless the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 763; Chapman,
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) “[I]nstructional error is harmless
‘where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by
overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Mil, at p. 417.)
21
We conclude the lack of instruction was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) There
was overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence of the
organizational nexus “linking the predicate offenses to the gang’s
organizational structure, meaning its . . . primary activities; or its
common goals and principles.” (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 762.) Detective Vega testified that the Squires’s primary
activities included carrying and possessing firearms. He testified
that gang members carry firearms in their own neighborhood in
case a violent confrontation arises against a rival gang. The
evidence established that active Squires members, Juarez and
Apodaca, committed predicate crimes reflective of the Squires’s
primary activities and in furtherance of a common goal (i.e.,
defending the gang’s territory). As Detective Vega explained,
Juarez was defending Squires turf. He was in Squires territory
with other Squires gang members shortly after a shooting had
occurred between a rival gang in the neighborhood. The evidence
also established that Apodaca’s predicate offense of being a
prohibited person possessing a firearm was reflective of the
gang’s primary activity. He was with other Squires members and
associates and training them to use firearms so that they could
defend their turf in future confrontations. This evidence
established that the two predicate offenses not only benefited the
gang but was linked to the gang’s organizational structure,
including its primary activities and common goals. Reversal of
the gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C)
is thus unwarranted.
Cumulative error
Armenta contends cumulative error deprived him of due
process and a fair trial. We are not persuaded. We have rejected
22
Armenta’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request to substitute new counsel and continue trial.
We have also concluded any error regarding the gang evidence in
the prosecution’s case-in-chief and the instructional error on the
kill zone instruction were harmless. Error regarding the gang
enhancement only pertained to the bifurcated portion of the trial,
and we have concluded that it, too, was harmless. “Defendant
was entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” (People v. Cain
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 82.)
Senate Bill 81
Armenta contends resentencing is required under Senate
Bill 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1).
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385
to specify factors a trial court must consider when deciding
whether to strike enhancements in the interest of justice.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(7); People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657,
674.) The Attorney General acknowledges that Senate Bill 81
was effective during Armenta’s sentencing, but contends remand
for resentencing is not warranted. We agree with the Attorney
General. The court declined the invitation to strike the
punishment for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d))
because it found Armenta’s conduct “extreme.” It concluded, “I’m
satisfied that this should be the sentence as pronounced.” The
record “clearly indicates” the trial court would not strike the
firearm enhancement in light of Senate Bill 81. (People
v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424.)5
5 We reject Armenta’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim because he cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel’s
failure to object. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
684-685, 700.) The court rejected counsel’s request for a lesser
23
Abstract of judgment
Both parties contend the abstract of judgment must be
corrected. We agree. The concurrent sentence on count 2 was life
with the possibility of parole after 15 years (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)(5)) and 20 years pursuant to the firearm enhancement
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). However, the abstract of judgment
incorrectly reflects the firearm enhancement as “20 to life.” The
abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect “20 years.”
The abstract of judgment also reflects an error in custody
credits. The trial court pronounced Armenta was entitled to 705
days of credit served. The abstract of judgment reflects 1,004
days of credit, consisting of 705 actual days served and 299 days
of conduct credit. But a person convicted of murder is prohibited
from accruing presentence conduct credits. (§ 2933.2; see People
v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1336.) The 299 days of conduct
credit must be stricken.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified (1) to reflect the concurrent
sentence for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) in
count 2 to be 20 years, and (2) to strike the 299 days of conduct
credit for a total of 705 days of presentence credit. The trial court
shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a
sentence or probation, and it clearly indicated that it would
impose the 50-year-to-life sentence regardless of its discretion to
impose a lesser sentence.
24
copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
25
David R. Worley, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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