CourtListener 10347837•People v. Hernandez CA2/1
Testo completo
Filed 2/28/25 P. v. Hernandez CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B333301
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA081703)
v.
ROBERTO DELOYA HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________
A jury convicted Roberto Deloya Hernandez of second
degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated,
and other offenses. On appeal, he contends insufficient evidence
supports the convictions and the court gave an erroneous jury
instruction and miscalculated his presentence custody credit. We
agree with only the last contention, and thus affirm the judgment
with directions.
BACKGROUND
Around 1:00 a.m. on July 16, 2021, Hernandez was driving
northbound on the 14 Freeway at close to 100 miles per hour in
his Buick Enclave. Humberto Balderrama and his wife, Maria
Hernandez Reyes, were going in the same direction in their
Chevrolet pickup truck, driving at the speed limit. Hernandez’s
vehicle struck Balderrama’s truck from behind, causing it to flip
and killing Balderrama.
California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Orlando Cisneros
gave Hernandez three field sobriety tests and concluded he was
under the influence of alcohol. Cisneros then performed two in-
field preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) breathalyzer tests,
which returned blood alcohol concentration results of 0.114
percent on the first test and 0.108 percent on the second.
Officer Cisneros arrested Hernandez and transported him
to a sheriff’s station, where two chemical breath tests reported
2
that his blood alcohol concentration was 0.09 percent on the first
test and 0.08 percent on the second.
No autopsy was performed. The coroner’s report
documented Balderrama’s injuries but drew no conclusion as to
the cause of death.
The District Attorney of Los Angeles County charged
1
Hernandez with: (1) murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) ; gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a));
driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (a)); driving with a 0.08 percent blood alcohol
content causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)); driving
when privilege suspended or revoked for DUI conviction (Veh.
Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)); and driving a vehicle not equipped
with an ignition interlock device when privilege restricted (Veh.
Code, § 23247, subd. (e)).
The district attorney further alleged: Hernandez inflicted
great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7,
subdivision (a); the offenses involved great violence [and] great
bodily harm, . . . disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
and callousness; Hernandez suffered prior convictions that were
numerous and of increasing seriousness; and Hernandez was on
probation or parole when he committed the offenses.
Hernandez initially pleaded not guilty and denied the
special allegations but later pleaded guilty to driving when his
1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
3
privilege was suspended and driving without an ignition
interlock device, both misdemeanors.
PRETRIAL
Before trial on the remaining counts, defense counsel
objected to admission of coroner’s photographs of Balderrama,
arguing they would be unduly prejudicial given that the defense
intended to stipulate that the collision caused Balderrama’s
death. However, apparently through inadvertence, no stipulation
was ever made.
The parties stipulated that in 2009, and 2017 a court read
to Hernandez and he understood the following. “Being under the
influence of alcohol or drugs or both impairs his ability to safely
operate a mother vehicle. Therefore, it is extremely dangerous to
human life to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs
or both. If he continues to drive while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs or both, and as a result of that driving someone
is killed, he can be charged with murder.”
Hernandez moved in limine to exclude the PAS
breathalyzer results pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 on
the ground they were unreliable and irrelevant for purposes of
determining blood alcohol content. The trial court deferred
ruling on the motion pending the prosecution establishing a
foundation at trial for Hernandez’s PAS results.
TRIAL
At trial, Joshua Greengard, a CHP Officer and PAS
coordinator, testified as to the operation and accuracy of a PAS
breathalyzer machine. He stated the machines were accurate to
within plus or minus 0.01 percent, and results would be valid
4
only if two back-to-back tests produced results within 0.02
percent of each other. Greengard testified that two days before
the accident and five days after it, he performed accuracy tests on
the breathalyzer machine that Officer Cisneros used to test
Hernandez.
Reyes testified she and Balderrama, who was driving, were
traveling at the speed limit of 65 miles per hour in the right-hand
lane at the time of the accident. She “was observing
[Balderrama] the whole time, talking with him, and he was very
at ease.” Reyes said, “I was chitchatting with him. And I
remember I was keeping an eye on the cars that were moving
along quickly. [¶] My husband said, ‘Look at those cars, how
hard they are driving. And we need to arrive in a good state for
our children. That’s why I always drive at the limit.’ ” Reyes
testified: “I didn’t see any lights approaching. I just felt a strong
impact, and I felt a hard blow to the back of my head. I never lost
consciousness. We wound upside-down. I managed to unbuckle
myself. And I was telling [Balderrama] to wake up, and he
wasn’t waking up.”
Reyes testified that Balderrama did not swerve or change
lanes before the accident, she was “chitchatting” with him when
the accident occurred, and she felt the impact from his side of the
vehicle.
At one point in her testimony, the prosecutor asked Reyes
how her husband had died. She responded, “Somebody who,
apparently is driving under the influence—.” Defense counsel
objected, after which Reyes added, “—struck us.” The court
sustained the objection and ordered the testimony stricken.
Scotty Southwell, who had stopped to help, testified he
joined “several people” offering assistance to Balderrama and
5
Reyes. He could not locate a pulse on Balderrama at the scene.
Southwell testified that Hernandez emitted a strong odor of
alcohol and was incoherent and babbling.
Officer Cisneros testified that when he arrived on the scene
there were “multiple parties pulled over on the right shoulder”
and “multiple” “passing motorists” who had stopped to help, eight
of whom reported having seen the crash. Balderrama appeared
to be lifeless in his truck, which had suffered heavy damage
focused on the front right side.
Hernandez reported to Cisneros that he had no medical
conditions, took no medications prior to the collision, and had
slept approximately eight hours the previous night. He stated he
had consumed two two-ounce glasses of wine while at work,
between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., approximately five hours before the
accident.
While speaking with Hernandez, Officer Cisneros detected
the odor of alcohol and noted his speech was slightly slurred and
his eyes were red and watery. Considering these to be “objective
signs . . . of alcohol impairment,” Cisneros gave Hernandez three
field sobriety tests.
The first, a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, was designed to
identify six signs of intoxication (three for each eye) due to
involuntary jerking in the eye as a result of higher blood alcohol
levels: Lack of smooth pursuit, in which the eye fails to track a
stimulus without jerking; “reveal,” “sustained” and “extreme”
nystagmus, where the eye continues to jerk while holding on a
stimulus at the far end of the subject’s peripheral vision; and
“onset” nystagmus, where the eye begins to jerk before the
stimulus has drawn the gaze 45 degrees from center. Cisneros
6
testified that the presence of any four signs would indicate that
the subject was over the legal limit of intoxication.
Hernandez tested positive for each of the three tests in
each eye, for a total of six signs that he was over the legal limit.
Officer Cisneros also had Hernandez perform a straight-
line walk-and-turn test, during which Hernandez started the test
before instructed to do so and twice stepped off line, both
indicators of possible intoxication. Cisneros had Hernandez
stand on one leg for 30 seconds, but he put his foot down at 23
seconds, an indicator of possible intoxication. Hernandez’s
inability to successfully complete these tests led Cisneros to
conclude he was under the influence of alcohol.
At 2:50 a.m., at approximately 2 hours after the accident,
Cisneros performed two in-field PAS tests, three minutes apart,
using an Intoximeter Alco-Sensor IV “breathalyzer” machine
bearing serial number 049704. Hernandez displayed an alcohol
concentration of 0.114 percent on the first test and 0.108 percent
on the second. Defense counsel renewed her in limine objection
to admission of the PAS results but the court found the
prosecution had laid a “more than sufficient foundation” to admit
the results both as evidence of the presence of alcohol and for the
numerical values reported.
Based on his observations and the PAS tests, Officer
Cisneros believed that Hernandez was under the influence of
alcohol, arrested him, and transported him to the sheriff’s
station. There, Cisneros administered chemical breath testing
using a DataMaster DMT breath testing instrument. The first
test, taken at 3:47 a.m., registered a 0.09 percent alcohol level;
the second, taken three minutes later, registered a 0.08 percent
7
alcohol level. Cisneros did not identify the DataMaster’s serial
number. Defense counsel offered no objection to this evidence.
Jennifer De la Cerda, a sheriff’s department criminalist
and expert in forensic alcohol analysis, testified about alcohol
impairment and testing. She testified that impairment for
driving begins for some people at a blood alcohol level of 0.05 to
0.07 percent, and for everyone at 0.08 percent. De la Cerda
opined that Hernandez’s DataMaster results were accurate, and
a subject exhibiting the same alcohol levels would be impaired to
drive a motor vehicle safely.
The prosecutor posed De la Cerda a hypothetical in which a
subject displayed signs of intoxication in field sobriety tests and
had PAS results of 0.11 and 0.10 percent, then an hour later had
blood alcohol readings from chemical testing at 0.09 and 0.08
percent. De la Cerda testified she could not opine that the
individual was impaired based solely on the field sobriety tests,
as other conditions such as age, medical condition, physical
coordination and weight could cause a sober person to exhibit
signs of impairment in those tests. However, De la Cerda opined
that based on the chemical testing alone, the individual would be
impaired to drive a motor vehicle safely at the time of driving.
De la Cerda offered no opinion about the PAS tests. (We will
discuss De la Cerda’s testimony in more detail below.)
Highway Patrol Officer Phillip Kasinger, an investigator
with the state’s Multidisciplinary Accident Investigation Team,
testified that he investigated the accident scene and observed
extensive damage to Balderrama’s truck caused by its being
struck “rear-to-front” by Hernandez’s Buick with a great deal of
force. The roof on the truck was caved in, and the Buick suffered
extensive damage to the front passenger side. Kasinger testified
8
that Hernandez’s cruise control was activated when the collision
occurred.
Officer Kasinger downloaded data from both vehicles’ event
data recorders (essentially their “black boxes”), which indicated
Hernandez’s Buick was traveling at 96 miles per hour 0.5 seconds
before the collision, its brakes had not been applied prior to that
time, and no “steering event” had occurred.
The data showed that three seconds before the collision,
Balderrama’s truck was traveling at approximately 72 miles per
hour, but dropped to 65 miles per hour within one second before
the collision. Officer Kasinger testified that the truck’s data
showed that some kind of “non-deployment event” occurred just
before the collision, but data specifying the nature of that event
was “overridden” when the collision occurred.
Officer Kasinger testified he could arrive at no opinion as to
the cause of the collision.
The prosecution offered no coroner or medical records, nor
any other medical evidence reflecting the physiological cause of
Balderrama’s death.
For the defense, Babak Malek, an accident reconstruction
expert, testified that Hernandez’s Buick and Balderrama’s truck
collided at a 4.4 degree angle, but none of the vehicle data
established the cause of the accident. The data from the Buick
indicated Hernandez did not change direction before the accident,
as there was no “steering” or “swerving” data. Malek therefore
surmised it was possible that Balderrama, not Hernandez,
caused the collision by moving into the number two lane while
slowing, or by suddenly slowing in the right half of the number
9
three lane while Hernandez approached in the left half of the
same lane.
In closing argument, defense counsel focused on insufficient
evidence showing that Hernandez caused the collision, arguing
that to establish guilt, the jury had to find appellant was the
“cause of this accident, the cause of this death.”
The court instructed the jury on second-degree murder
pursuant to then-current CALCRIM No. 520, in pertinent part as
follows:
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of [murder], the
People must prove that, one, the defendant committed an act that
caused the death of another person. And two, when the
defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice
aforethought.” The defendant had “[i]mplied malice if, one, he
intentionally committed the act; two, the natural and probable
consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; three, at
the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life[;]
and four, he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
human life.”
The jury convicted Hernandez on all counts, and the court
sentenced him to 18 years to life in prison.
DISCUSSION
Hernandez contends insufficient evidence supports his
convictions because no evidence establishes that he was impaired
to drive or had a blood alcohol content of at least 0.08, that he
caused the collision with Balderrama, or that the collision caused
Balderrama’s death. He also contends the trial court improperly
instructed the jury on implied malice and miscalculated his
custody credits.
10
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Convictions
1. Evidence of Impairment and Intoxication
Hernandez argues his convictions must be reversed because
insufficient evidence supported a finding that he was driving
while impaired or with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 at the time
of the accident. This is so, he argues, because the prosecutor
failed to adduce any evidence that the DataMaster instrument
Officer Cisneros used in the sheriff’s station was the same
instrument that De la Cerda certified at trial, and thus no
substantial evidence established that the instrument was reliable
or properly calibrated or maintained.
Hernandez also argues the DataMaster results should have
been excluded for lack of foundation.
We disagree with both arguments.
a. Relevant Proceedings
Officer Cisneros testified that at 3:47 and 3:50 a.m., he
used a DataMaster instrument at the sheriff’s station to test
Hernandez’s breath samples. The results indicated Hernandez
had a blood alcohol level of 0.09 and 0.08 percent, respectively.
Cisneros did not identify the DataMaster instrument by
serial number.
Sheriff’s criminalist De la Cerda testified she was familiar
with the DataMaster breath instrument “used in this case,”
which she identified as instrument number 300202.
De la Cerda testified that a printed breath alcohol report
from instrument number 300202, which was designated People’s
exhibit 8, reflected that the instrument analyzed two breath
samples at approximately 3:45 a.m. on July 16, 2021, reporting
results of 0.09 the first time and 0.08 the second. The report was
also uploaded to De la Cerda’s own computer, but with additional
11
decimal places reported. De la Cerda testified that the
information in her “logs” matched that reported in exhibit 8.
Defense counsel objected to exhibit 8 on the ground that De
la Cerda could not authenticate it because the printout had been
delivered to Officer Cisneros, not to De la Cerda. The court
sustained the objection and excluded the printout, observing that
De la Cerda could authenticate the results sent to her own
computer but not the printout itself.
Although defense counsel objected to exhibit 8, she
represented she was not contending “that [De la Cerda’s]
testimony or anybody’s testimony [was] off in numbers.”
De la Cerda testified that each of the 80 DataMaster
instruments used by the Sheriff’s Department in Los Angeles
County would perform an accuracy test on itself every Monday at
1:00 p.m. by measuring an internal standard sample three times.
If the measurement was accurate to within plus or minus 0.01
percent in each of the three readings, the instrument would be
deemed accurate and stay in service. Results of these accuracy
checks were automatically transmitted to De la Cerda’s lab,
where a technician would verify them.
The instruments would also automatically self-test during
the interval between the two tests conducted by law enforcement
on a person suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. If
the self-test failed, the instrument would abort the breath testing
and report an error code.
De la Cerda testified that according to her records,
DataMaster number 300202 conducted these self-diagnostics four
days before and four days after the accident, as well as in the
interval between the two tests Officer Cisneros performed on
12
Hernandez, and all tests indicated the instrument was
performing correctly.
Given these results, De la Cerda opined that the July 16
test results were accurate. She further opined that the subject of
the test would have been impaired to drive a motor vehicle safely.
b. Legal Principles
1. Elements of the Offenses
“Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice.” (§ 192.) “Gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving
was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle
Code, and the killing was . . . the proximate result of the
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and
with gross negligence . . . .” (§ 191.5, subd. (a).) Gross negligence
is the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to exhibit a
conscious indifference or “I don’t care” attitude concerning the
ultimate consequences of one’s conduct. (People v. Bennett (1991)
54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036-1038.)
The phrases “intoxicated” and “under the influence” mean
the alcohol “must have so far affected the nervous system, the
brain, or muscles as to impair to an appreciable degree the ability
to operate a vehicle in a manner like that of an ordinarily
prudent and cautious person in full possession of his faculties.”
(People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1193.) “[E]vidence of
actual impairment may include the driver’s appearance, an odor
of alcohol, slurred speech, impaired motor skills, slowed or erratic
mental processing, and impaired memory or judgment.” (Id. at p.
1198; see also Baker v. Gourley (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1264
[“a jury . . . could certainly conclude . . . that a driver was
13
intoxicated based on such indicia as slurred speech and an
unsteady gait without a valid chemical test”].)
Second degree murder “is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought but without the additional
elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation,
that would support a conviction of first degree murder.” (People
v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151 (Knoller).)
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing
is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’
[Citation.] ‘ “To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s
death, the defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor
contributing to the result, rather than insignificant or merely
theoretical.” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988
(Reyes).) “[A]cts that merely create a dangerous situation in
which death is possible depending on how circumstances unfold
do not, without more, satisfy this causation requirement.” (Id. at
p. 989.) “[T]he defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to
life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[] a high
degree of probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
A drunk driver may be convicted of second degree murder
on a theory of implied malice. (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d
290, 300-301 (Watson).) When a defendant commits homicide
while driving under the influence of alcohol, malice may be
implied where the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was above the
0.08 percent legal limit, the defendant evinced an intent before
drinking to drive, the defendant knew the hazards of driving
14
while intoxicated, and the defendant drove in a highly dangerous
manner. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.)
2. Admissibility and Sufficiency of
DataMaster Evidence
A breath test to determine blood alcohol concentration is
admissible if “(1) the particular apparatus utilized was in proper
working order, (2) the test used was properly administered, and
(3) the operator was competent and qualified.” (People v. Adams
(1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 561.) “Absent a controlling statute, the
test results must be interpreted at the trial by an expert witness
[citation], under the general requirements for expert testimony.”
(Ibid.) A result of “0.10 [now 0.08] percent or more by weight of
alcohol in the blood gives rise to the presumption that the person
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” (Ibid.) The
requirements for admissibility may be satisfied “upon either a
showing of compliance with . . . title 17 [of the California Code of
Regulations] or independent proof of the three elements.” (People
v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 414; see also Adams, at p.
567.)
3. Standard of Review
“A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the
light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record
contains reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a
reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the
conclusion in question. Once such evidence is found, the
substantial evidence test is satisfied. [Citation.] Even when
there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the
testimony of a single witness that satisfies the standard is
sufficient to uphold the finding.” (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41
Cal.4th 1038, 1052.)
15
Substantial evidence may consist of inferences based on
evidence, logic and reason in light of the whole record. (People v.
Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 331.) Substantial evidence based
on inferential reasoning must not be based on suspicion,
imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or
guesswork, but rather “must be an inference drawn from
evidence . . . .” (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360.) “We
must accept all logical inferences that the jury may have drawn
from circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘If the circumstances
reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal
of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.’ [Citation.] It is well settled that ‘ “[a] reversal
for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” ’ ” (People v. Lucero
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 370, 411.)
We review a trial court’s admission of evidence for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 627.) We will
reverse a judgment based on improperly admitted evidence only
if the appellant can show that if the evidence had been excluded,
he would have enjoyed a more favorable result. (See People v.
Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836.)
c. Analysis
As noted above, when a defendant commits homicide while
driving under the influence of alcohol, malice may be implied
where the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was above the 0.08
percent legal limit, the defendant evinced an intent before
drinking to drive and knew the hazards of driving while
16
intoxicated, and the defendant drove in a highly dangerous
manner.
Hernandez does not contest the evidence establishing he
evinced an intent to drive before drinking, knew the hazards of
doing so, and drove at high speeds. Neither does he dispute that
Cisneros was qualified to administer the DataMaster test and did
so properly, nor that De la Cerda was qualified to interpret the
DataMaster results at trial. Hernandez contends only that the
evidence was insufficient to establish his blood-alcohol level was
above the 0.08 percent legal limit because no evidence identified
the DataMaster instrument certified by De la Cerda at trial as
the same instrument Cisneros used to test Hernandez. We
disagree.
De la Cerda was asked, “Are you familiar with the
DataMaster breath instrument used in this case?” (Italics
added.) She responded, “Yes,” and testified about the
instrument’s self-diagnostics. This evidence alone established
that De la Cerda certified the same instrument Cisneros used to
test Hernandez, irrespective of Cisneros’s failure to identify the
instrument by number.
Even assuming De la Cerda was not speaking about the
specific instrument Cisneros used to test Hernandez, and meant
only that she was familiar with DataMaster instruments
generally, she testified that all of the sheriff’s DataMasters in Los
Angeles County automatically conducted the same self-diagnostic
protocol both every Monday at 1:00 p.m. and during the interval
between two breath tests on any real subject. The instruments
all reported results of these diagnostics to De la Cerda’s lab,
where they were checked by technicians. De la Cerda testified
that if an instrument failed the self-diagnostic during a real test,
17
it would abort the test and report an error code. Officer Cisneros
did not mention receiving an error code when he tested
Hernandez.
Thus, De la Cerda’s testimony applied to all sheriff’s
DataMaster instruments in Los Angeles County, including the
one Cisneros used to test Hernandez. Her testimony indicated
that any inaccurate instrument would either be flagged after
failing a weekly self-diagnostic or would abort a real-time test
and give an error code. Because Cisneros was able to complete
his test on Hernandez without an error code, the trial court could
reasonably infer the instrument was in proper working order,
satisfying the Adams requirements for admission of the
DataMaster results.
From the DataMaster results, the finder of fact could
reasonably conclude Hernandez’s blood alcohol level was at least
0.08 at the time of the accident.
Even without the DataMaster results, substantial evidence
supported the jury’s findings that Hernandez was impaired to
drive and had a blood alcohol level of at least 0.08. Southwell
testified that immediately after the accident, he smelled a strong
odor of alcohol on Hernandez, who was babbling and incoherent.
Officer Cisneros reported that Hernandez showed objective signs
of intoxication including exhibiting nystagmus and failing to
complete the field sobriety tests satisfactorily, and had in-field
2
alcohol levels of 0.114 and 0.108 percent. De la Cerda testified
2
Hernandez does not contend the Alco-Sensor IV used by
Cisneros was unreliable, that Cisneros was not competent to
operate it, or that he administered the test improperly.
18
that everyone with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or greater is
impaired from driving a motor vehicle safely.
This evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that
Hernandez was intoxicated and impaired to drive. (Burg v.
Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 266, fn. 10 [“both parties
may . . . adduce other circumstantial evidence tending to
establish that the defendant did or did not have a 0.10 [now 0.08]
percent blood-alcohol level while driving”]; McKinney v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 519, 526, fn. 6
[“ ‘Evidence regarding the manner in which a defendant drove,
performed field sobriety tests, and behaved is admissible and
relevant as tending to establish that he did or did not have a 0.10
[now 0.08] [blood alcohol level] while driving’ ”].)
Therefore, substantial evidence supported Hernandez’s
convictions irrespective of the DataMaster results.
Hernandez argues that De la Cerda testified that Officer
Cisneros’s “FST and PAS [field sobriety test and preliminary
alcohol screening] testimony” was not sufficient to establish
impairment. He is incorrect. De la Cerda testified she could not
opine that an individual was impaired based solely on the results
of a field sobriety test, as other conditions such as age, medical
condition, physical coordination and weight could cause a sober
person to exhibit signs of impairment. De la Cerda said nothing
about the PAS results, and there was no testimony that she
considered a PAS test to be a “field sobriety test.”
d. Prejudice
Hernandez argues that erroneous admission of the
DataMaster results was prejudicial.
As discussed, De la Cerda’s testimony laid the foundation
for the DataMaster results. But even if they lacked foundation
19
and were improperly admitted, reversal is required only if
Hernandez can show that if the results had been excluded, he
would have enjoyed a more favorable result. He can make no
such showing.
As discussed above, substantial evidence other than the
DataMaster results supported the conviction: A witness testified
Hernandez smelled of alcohol at the scene of the accident and
was babbling and incoherent; Officer Cisneros reported that
Hernandez showed objective signs of intoxication, including
exhibiting nystagmus and failing to complete the field sobriety
tests satisfactorily, and was measured to have in-field alcohol
levels of 0.114 and 0.108 percent; and De la Cerda testified that
an individual with a 0.08 level of alcohol in his blood would be
impaired from driving a motor vehicle safely.
Where field sobriety tests and breathalyzer results
indicated that Hernandez’s blood alcohol levels were at least 0.08
percent two hours after the accident, nothing suggests that
DataMaster results reflecting a 0.09 and 0.08 percent blood
alcohol levels three hours after the accident tipped the balance
for the jury from acquittal to conviction. Therefore, Hernandez
cannot show that if the DataMaster results had been excluded, he
would have enjoyed a more favorable result.
2. Evidence on the Cause of the Collision
Hernandez argues his convictions must be reversed because
insufficient evidence established that he caused the collision that
killed Balderrama. We disagree.
a. Legal Principles
Both murder and manslaughter require proof that the
defendant’s actions caused the death of the victim. (§§ 187, 189,
192, subd. (c)(1); People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660-
20
662.) In a homicide case, causation is established by proving that
an act of either the defendant or an accomplice proximately
caused the death. (People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130,
1137-1138; People v. Wilson (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 509
[gross vehicular manslaughter requires proof the defendant’s act
killed the victim].) “ ‘Whether the defendant’s conduct was a
proximate, rather than remote, cause of death is ordinarily a
factual question for the jury unless “ ‘undisputed evidence . . .
reveal[s] a cause so remote that . . . no rational trier of fact could
find the needed nexus.’ ” [Citation.] A jury’s finding of proximate
causation will be not disturbed on appeal if there is “evidence
from which it may be reasonably inferred that [the defendant’s]
act was a substantial factor in producing” the death.’ ” (People v.
Jones (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 83, 90.)
b. Analysis
Here, uncontradicted evidence established that when the
accident occurred, Balderrama was driving in his lane at the
speed limit. Hernandez drove into Balderrama’s vehicle at 96
miles per hour, making no attempt either to brake or steer away.
This constitutes substantial evidence that Hernandez caused the
accident.
Hernandez argues evidence indicates that Balderrama
must have swerved, turned, or drifted into Hernandez’s path.
This is so, he argues, because Reyes testified that before the
collision, she saw no headlights approaching from behind, which
established that the two vehicles were in parallel lanes and could
not have collided unless one of them drifted into the other’s lane.
However, Hernandez argues, Malek testified that Hernandez’s
vehicle recorded no steering event. Therefore, Balderrama must
have veered into his lane. We disagree.
21
Reyes, the only person to testify regarding any vehicle’s
position before the accident, stated Balderrama neither swerved,
turned, nor changed lanes.
That Hernandez’s vehicle recorded no steering event does
not mean he stayed in his lane. Substantial evidence includes
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. (People v.
Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 331; see People v. Lucero, supra,
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 411 [“We must accept all logical inferences
that the jury may have drawn from circumstantial evidence”].)
From Reyes’s testimony that Balderrama stayed in his lane, the
jury could infer that Hernandez drifted into Balderrama’s lane,
even without actively steering.
Hernandez identifies several factors that could have
established causation and argues that because evidence of those
factors is lacking here, causation cannot be established. For
example, he observes he made no admission as to causation at
the scene or at trial; no expert or other witness could determine
the cause of the collision; there was no affirmative evidence that
Hernandez could have avoided Balderrama, who was going
slower than traffic; Balderrama’s vehicle data, which was
overridden when the collision occurred, reflected some kind of
“non-deployment event” just before the crash, which might have
shed light on the cause of the accident; and no independent
witnesses testified that Hernandez caused the collision.
In light of our standard of review and the substantial factor
test that governs the determination of causation, however, none
of these considerations defeats the jury’s verdict. Our inquiry
examines only whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding that Hernandez’s conduct was a substantial factor in
22
causing Balderrama’s death. Once such evidence is found, the
nonexistence of confirming evidence is immaterial.
3. Evidence on the Cause of Death
Hernandez argues his convictions for murder and
manslaughter must be reversed because no medical evidence
established that the accident caused Balderrama’s death. We
disagree.
Accident data retrieved from Hernandez’s and
Balderrama’s vehicles indicated that Hernandez’s Buick struck
Balderrama’s truck at a speed differential of 31 miles per hour
while both were traveling at high speeds. Observations by Reyes
and other witnesses indicated the collision was of sufficient force
to cause Balderrama’s truck to flip and sustain substantial
damage. Reyes testified that Balderrama was alert and
responsive immediately before the accident and nonresponsive
immediately after it. First responders testified Balderrama was
dead within moments after the accident.
The evidence thus established that Balderrama was alive
immediately before the accident, which was of catastrophic force,
and died immediately after it. This evidence supports the jury’s
reasonable inference that the collision proximately caused
Balderrama’s death.
Hernandez argues the evidence was insufficient to
establish the cause of Balderrama’s death because the
prosecution presented no medical evidence such as a coroner’s
report. We disagree.
Although the parties contemplated stipulating that the
collision caused Balderrama’s death, and in light of that
intention, the prosecution put on no medical evidence, the other
evidence discussed above, including the testimony of Reyes and
23
first responders, supported the reasonable conclusion that the
collision proximately caused the death.
Hernandez argues without explanation or citation to
authority that medical evidence is necessary to establish a cause
of death as a matter of law.
This argument conflates proximate and medical causation.
“In homicide cases, a ‘cause of the death of [the decedent] is an
act or omission that sets in motion a chain of events that
produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the act
or omission the death of [the decedent] and without which the
death would not occur.’ [Citation.] In general, ‘[p]roximate cause
is clearly established where the act is directly connected with the
resulting injury, with no intervening force operating.’ ” (People v.
Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866.)
Medical causation concerns only the physiological
mechanism leading to death, not whether an outside actor was a
substantial factor in bringing about the mechanism. (See People
v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 802 [nothing in an autopsy
report or medical evidence implicated the defendant as the
person who shot a peace officer who died of gunshot wounds].)
In Thomas, the defendant shot and killed a police officer.
An autopsy was performed but the person who performed it was
deceased at the time of trial, and a forensic pathologist was called
to testify about the results of the autopsy. The defendant
contended the autopsy report and testimony constituted
testimonial hearsay, the admission of which violated his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.
(People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 802.) Our Supreme
Court held that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because the fact and cause of the officer’s death were
24
sufficiently established by an admission by the defendant and the
testimony of two eyewitnesses, evidence which, the Court held,
“overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that defendant shot”
the officer. (Id. at pp. 802-803.) Furthermore, the Court
observed, “[T]he cause of death was not actively contested at
trial. Defense counsel, hoping to avoid exposing the jury to
autopsy photographs and other evidence he considered to be
inflammatory, offered to stipulate to the cause of death and the
nature of the wounds.” (Id. at p. 802.)
Similarly here, the cause of Balderrama’s death, which
Hernandez did not actively contest at trial, was sufficiently
established by Reyes’s description of the accident and eyewitness
descriptions of the aftermath and Balderrama’s condition at the
scene.
Hernandez argues there was medical evidence in Thomas,
describing the officer’s wounds, which is lacking here. But
Thomas gave no particular import to medical evidence, and did
not hold it was essential to a causation inquiry. On the contrary,
when summarizing “evidence that overwhelmingly supported”
the finding of guilt, the Court discussed only the defendant’s
admission and eyewitness testimony, not the medical evidence.
No authority or principle holds that medical evidence is
essential to establish that a defendant proximately caused a
death.
Hernandez argues that other evidence failed to establish
the cause of death: (1) accident scene photos of Balderrama’s
body, (2) that portion of Reyes’s testimony to which a defense
objection was sustained—that Balderrama died because his truck
was struck from behind—and (3) defense counsel’s implication
during closing argument that the accident caused the death. But
25
again, our inquiry examines only whether substantial evidence
supports the jury’s finding. Once such evidence is found, the lack
of confirming evidence is immaterial.
Hernandez argues that Reyes offered no pertinent
testimony on the cause of her husband’s death other than the
statement which the court ordered stricken. We disagree.
Although the court struck Reyes’s testimony that Balderrama
died because “Somebody who, apparently is driving under the
influence—struck us,” this was not her only pertinent testimony.
Reyes also testified that Balderrama was alert and responsive
immediately before the accident and nonresponsive immediately
after it. This supported the reasonable inference that the
accident caused his death.
Hernandez argues there was evidence that three seconds
before the collision, Balderrama dropped his speed from 72 to 65
miles per hour, which may have been due to a fatal medical-
related event. He argues that if such an event occurred, it would
have constituted an intervening and superseding cause of
Balderrama’s death.
Although it is conceivable that a catastrophic medical event
caused Balderrama to slow to the speed limit three seconds
before the accident, no affirmative evidence indicates this
occurred, and Reyes, who was talking to Balderrama at the time,
observed nothing amiss. The jury was entitled to draw the much
more reasonable inference that Balderrama, who habitually
drove the speed limit, found himself exceeding it and
momentarily took his foot off the gas pedal to compensate.
Hernandez also argues that Reyes held that the causation
element requires that the act must involve a high degree of
probability of death. We reject Hernandez’s reading of Reyes as
26
to what is required to show proximate cause, as Hernandez has
improperly conflated Reyes’s analysis of proximate cause with its
analysis of the objective component of implied malice murder.
B. Jury Instruction on Implied Malice Murder
Hernandez argues that Reyes established a standard for
the “actus reus/causation element” of implied malice murder, in
which causation requires that the act in question carry “high
degree of probability that it will result in death.” He argues that
pursuant to this standard, a trial court must instruct that to find
causation, the jury must find that the defendant’s act involved a
“high degree of probability” that it would result in death.
Hernandez further argues Reyes held that the actus reus of
implied malice murder requires that the defendant did more than
“merely create a dangerous situation in which death is possible
depending on how circumstances unfold,” and the jury should
have been so instructed. He argues the trial court here erred by
failing to properly instruct the jury.
Lastly, Hernandez argues the jury should have been
instructed that the act in question must be one involving a “high
degree of probability that it will result in death.” (See Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.)
Hernandez, however, conflates two distinct elements of
implied malice murder—actus reus and causation—and
interchanges Reyes’s holding as to each element, improperly
conflating Reyes’s analysis of proximate cause and the objective
component of implied malice murder. We conclude the trial court
did not err in instructing the jury that in order to find implied
malice, it must find the natural and probable consequences of the
act were “dangerous to human life.”
27
1. Relevant proceedings
As noted above, the court instructed the jury on second-
degree murder pursuant to then-current CALCRIM No. 520, in
pertinent part as follows:
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of [murder], the
People must prove that, one, the defendant committed an act that
caused the death of another person. And two, when the
defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice
aforethought.” The defendant had “[i]mplied malice if, one, he
intentionally committed the act; two, the natural and probable
consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; three, at
the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life[;]
and four, he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
human life.”
2. Legal Principles
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on
all elements of any charged offenses. (People v. Mil (2012) 53
Cal.4th 400, 409.) This duty extends to the general principles of
law that govern the case, i.e., those principles closely and openly
connected with the facts before the court, and which are
necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v.
Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 529-530.)
The California Supreme Court in Knoller acknowledged two
lines of decisions describing the nature of the risk of the
defendant’s act. The first derives from Justice Traynor’s
concurring opinion in People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480
(Thomas), which said malice is implied when the defendant for a
base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life,
“ ‘does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.’ ” (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152, italics
28
added.) The second line derives from People v. Phillips (1966) 64
Cal.2d 574, overruled on another ground in People v. Flood (1998)
18 Cal.4th 470, 490, footnote 12, in which the Court stated that
malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by an
act, “the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human
life . . . .’ ” (Phillips, at p. 587.)
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Thomas
and Phillips tests in essence articulate the same standard.
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989 [“under the objective
component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’ means the
same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the act in
question ‘ “will result in death” ’ ”]; Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 152; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219-1222;
Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300.)
After trial in this case, our Supreme Court decided Reyes,
which involved an appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6
petition. The petitioner, Reyes, accompanied a group of fellow
gang members, one of whom had a gun, into rival gang territory,
where the person with the gun shot and killed someone. (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 985.) Reyes was convicted of second
degree murder and later petitioned for resentencing under
section 1172.6. (Id. at p. 986.) The trial court denied the
petition, finding Reyes was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
second degree murder. (Id. at p. 987.) The Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that the evidence established Reyes’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 987.)
In addressing how the conviction could not be sustained
under a direct perpetrator theory, the Supreme Court held the
evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion
“that Reyes committed an act that ‘proximately caused’ [the
29
victim’s] death.” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) The
evidence “established that Reyes proceeded to an area on the
edge of territory belonging to a rival gang and, alongside the
other bikers, chased after [the victim’s] car. But” the Court held,
“acts that merely create a dangerous situation in which death is
possible depending on how circumstances unfold do not, without
more, satisfy this causation requirement. There was no evidence
that Reyes’s acts precipitated or provoked the shooting. And
there is no reason to believe that the killing of [the victim] would
not have occurred if Reyes had not accompanied his fellow gang
members on the ride or participated in the chase.” (Id. at p. 989,
italics added.) The Court held that “Reyes’s acts of bicycling into
rival territory and chasing after [the victim’s] car with [the
shooter] and other fellow gang members were too attenuated in
the chain of events to have proximately caused the killing; any
causal link between Reyes’s conduct and [the victim’s] death is
tenuous at best.” (Ibid.)
After thus concluding that insufficient evidence
demonstrated proximate cause, the Court “also [took] issue with
the trial court’s conclusion that ‘[t]he natural and probable
consequences’ of Reyes’s act of traveling to rival gang territory
with several other gang members, one of whom was armed, ‘were
dangerous to human life.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989,
italics added.) “To suffice for implied malice murder,” the Court
held, “the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in
some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[] a high degree
of probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The court
held that although it may have been likely that Reyes’s act of
entering rival gang territory with fellow gang members, one of
whom was armed, “would result in some sort of gang
30
confrontation, and it is possible that someone would get hurt or
killed,” “the act [did] not by itself give rise to a high degree of
probability that death [would] result.” (Ibid.)
In March 2024, the Judicial Council modified CALCRIM
No. 520. Under the modified instruction, implied malice murder
requires that the defendant “committed an act that caused the
death of [another person]” and “the natural and probable
consequences of the act were dangerous to human life ‘in that’ the
act involved a ‘high degree of probability that it would result in
death.’ ” (CALCRIM No. 520; see also Judicial Council of Cal.
Crim. Jury Instns. (2024) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 520, p.
251; People v. Doaifi (Oct. 16, 2024, No. S286155) ___Cal.5th___
[2024 Cal. LEXIS 5774], at *1 (conc. opn. of Evans, J.).)
To summarize, Reyes held that proximate causation
requires more than an act that “merely create[s] a dangerous
situation in which death is possible depending on how
circumstances unfold,” and the act itself “must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must
‘ “involve[] a high degree of probability that it will result in
death.” ’ ” However, Reyes neither discussed any “actus
reus/causation element” of implied malice murder, as Hernandez
argues, nor held that causation requires that the act in question
carry “high degree of probability that it will result in death.”
Neither did Reyes hold that the actus reus of implied malice
murder requires a separate instruction that the defendant did
more than “merely create a dangerous situation in which death is
possible depending on how circumstances unfold.” Therefore, the
trial court did not err in refusing to instruct according to
Hernandez’s misreading of Reyes, in which he improperly
31
conflates the holding on proximate cause with the holding on the
objective component of implied malice.
Finally, for purposes of the jury instruction on implied
malice, Reyes did not differentiate between the terms “dangerous
to human life” (the Phillips test) and “an act that involves a high
degree of probability that it will result in death” (the Thomas
test). On the contrary, Reyes stated that “under the objective
component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’ means the
same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the act in
question ‘ “will result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
989.)
We conclude that the court properly instructed the jury
with the then-current version of CALCRIM No. 520, which
remains a correct statement of the law notwithstanding its later
3
clarification in Reyes.
C. Sentence Credits
Hernandez argues the trial court miscalculated his
presentence custody credits. Respondent concedes the point, and
we agree.
A defendant is entitled to actual custody credit for all days
in custody in county jail, including partial days, from the day of
arrest through the day of sentencing. (People v. Rajanayagam
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) A person convicted of murder or
involuntary manslaughter may accrue no more than 15 percent of
worktime credit. (§ 2933.1.) “ ‘A sentence that fails to award
legally mandated custody credit is unauthorized and may be
3
To be sure, post-Reyes, a trial court would be well advised
to instruct a jury with the newly modified CALCRIM No. 520.
32
corrected whenever discovered.’ ” (People v. Taylor (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 628, 647.)
Here, the collision occurred on July 16, 2021, and
Hernandez was arrested the same day. He was held in custody
throughout the criminal proceedings and was sentenced on
August 16, 2023, 762 days after his arrest, and was entitled to
good time/work time credit of up to 15 percent of his actual
custody credits, or 114 days. The court awarded only 732 days of
actual custody credit and 109 days of good time/work time credit.
We will therefore order that the judgment be corrected.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
amend the abstract of judgment to reflect 762 days of actual
custody credit and 114 days of conduct/work credit, and to
forward a copy of the amended abstract to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
33
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