CourtListener 10346978•Creal v. Nasiri CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 2/27/25 Creal v. Nasiri CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
KENNETH L. CREAL et al., B322023, B325879
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YC072653)
v.
AMITISS NASIRI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Deirdre H. Hill, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Dodd & Associates and John L. Dodd for Defendant
and Appellant.
De Castro & Morrow, David M. De Castro, and Arthur D.
Morrow for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Appellant and defendant Amitiss Nasiri appeals from a
judgment after bench trial in which respondents and plaintiffs
Kenneth L. Creal and his accounting firm Kenneth L. Creal, An
Accountancy Corporation, prevailed on their causes of action for
defamation. Creal’s lawsuit stemmed from various online
statements posted by Nasiri on the websites Yelp and RipOff
Report. The trial court awarded Creal $1,598,000 in damages,
consisting of lost profits, general damages, and punitive damages.
Nasiri also appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment orders,
denying her motion for new trial on the issue of punitive damages
and granting Creal $358,365 in attorney fees.
On appeal, Nasiri argues the trial court erred when it
issued evidentiary sanctions after her counsel failed to file
certain pretrial documents. She also argues the damage award
was not supported by substantial evidence and that Creal should
have been precluded from recovering lost profits as they were too
speculative and remote. She also claims Creal failed to establish
he was entitled to general damages as Creal offered no evidence
that he suffered any serious physical or emotional harm as a
result of her posts. Nasiri also claims that the award of punitive
damages was based on speculative hearsay, and that she was
entitled to a new trial on punitive damages after new evidence of
her net worth became available. Last, Nasiri argues the attorney
fee award must be reversed because she had reasonable grounds
to deny Creal’s requests for admission during discovery.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Creal’s first amended complaint alleged four causes of
action: (1) defamation per se; (2) defamation per quod; (3) trade
libel; and (4) intentional interference with prospective economic
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advantage. Creal alleged that Nasiri published false and
defamatory statements on the internet when she posted
numerous online reviews on the website Yelp. The trial court
conducted a two-phase bench trial, bifurcating the issue of
punitive damages.
I. Creal’s evidence
Creal is a certified public accountant (CPA). He has been a
practicing CPA since 1978 and operates an accountancy firm in
Torrance under the name Creal & Creal, An Accountancy
Corporation. Creal’s business consists primarily of preparing
individual tax returns, business tax returns, and litigation
support.
Creal’s daughter, Kimberly Creal, is also a CPA and a
shareholder in Creal’s firm. Creal’s daughter is the third
generation of accountants in the Creal family, which began with
Creal’s parents opening an accounting business in Hawthorne in
1956. Additionally, both of Creal’s brothers were accountants
who worked with Creal until Creal opened his own firm in 1982.
Creal maintained a website for his firm for 20 years but did
not generally advertise as most of his new clients were referrals
from existing clients. While Creal’s firm had a webpage on Yelp,
Creal did not create the page but merely confirmed with Yelp
that the firm was his. He could not delete the Yelp page or
modify any of the Yelp reviews. Creal believed newly referred
clients would check Yelp for reviews. His daughter generally
oversaw and monitored the firm’s Yelp page.
In June 2015, Creal was retained as an expert by Nasiri’s
ex-husband, Mohamadali Abolahrar, in the dissolution case
between Abolahrar and Nasiri. Although originally retained as
an expert, Creal also filed an amended tax return for Abolahrar
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after learning there was an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax
credit for $65,000 for 2013. To claim the tax credit, Creal filed a
married-filing-separately return for Abolahrar in March 2017,
claiming half the credit for Abolahrar, believing the tax credit
was a community property interest. Despite only claiming half
the credit, the IRS refunded the entire amount to Abolahrar.
On October 26, 2017, Abolahrar’s family law attorney
asked Creal to pick up Abolahrar’s laptop from Nasiri’s family
law attorney, Nadine Jett. Creal went to Jett’s office and
informed the receptionist that he was there for the laptop. While
he waited in the reception area, Nasiri walked in and spoke to
the receptionist. Creal did not interact with Nasiri in the office,
and left once he received the laptop.
After Creal left Jett’s office, he noticed a Porsche parked in
the parking area and believed it belonged to Nasiri. Believing
the Porsche was a community property asset, Creal photographed
the vehicle. As Creal was taking the photos, Nasiri came outside
and told him, “ ‘You cannot do that.’ ” Creal replied, “ ‘Yes, I can.
It’s in a public place.’ ” Creal noticed Nasiri had her cell phone
camera pointed at him, so he took a picture of Nasiri.
On October 26, 2017, Nasiri posted a one-star review on
Creal’s Yelp page. The posting read: “I would give him zero if I
could. My tax return was Manipulated and $69000 was refunded
from IRS without my consent to my convicted felon ex husband
who is out on bail. Which I heard Mr. Creal took 20% of that
since he was the accountant. That’s fraud. He also has been the
accountant for 2 businesses that I have interest in. He has been
helping in creating unreported income for the two businesses and
has been making a mess as a professional. This man followed me
today to my attorney[’]s office and I think he was damaging and
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touching my car. I stepped out and told him that he does not
have a right to do so. Please see attached pictures. I also have
full video. Later I found out he also was actually covering the
cameras in order to hurt me. I made a police report and I will file
a complaint. Just stay away from this man. And you will stay
away from IRS investigations.”
Creal learned of the review one month later when his
daughter brought it to his attention. He contacted Yelp to take
down the review but Yelp refused because it appeared Nasiri had
“consumer experience.” Creal knew he could reply to the review,
but was concerned Nasiri would respond to his reply,
exacerbating matters.
In the subsequent months, Nasiri made similar posts about
Creal on the internet. In five of these posts, she included a
redacted federal criminal judgment along with captions that read
“Convicted felons for conspiracy and fraud.” In another post that
included a photo of Creal on the day he had the interaction with
Nasiri at Jett’s office, Nasiri claimed, “Creal is trying to [d]amage
and touch my car.” Nasiri also posted comments about Creal on
the website RipOff Report, stating Creal committed fraud, theft,
and harassed Nasiri.
Creal believed Nasiri’s internet posts would “kill” his work
as an expert, deterring newly referred clients who searched his
name on the internet. Creal explained the situation with Nasiri
in several depositions in other cases where he was retained in
2018 and 2019. Creal felt obligated to give advanced notice to
those parties who retained him as an expert just in case the issue
with Nasiri came up at deposition.
In December 2017, Creal retained an attorney to contact
Nasiri and request that she remove the Yelp review. Creal wrote
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to Jett, demanding Nasiri remove the Yelp review. On January
10, 2018, Nasiri posted a redacted version of the letter on Yelp
with a caption that read: “Hilarious, bullying me to hide the
truth.” She posted again on January 22, 2018, claiming Creal
hired “an attorney to harass” her. Creal did not respond to these
posts, and directed his attorney to file a complaint.
In discovery obtained from Yelp, Creal learned that another
negative review on his Yelp page posted by someone identified as
“Pablo A” was connected to an e-mail address associated with a
person who had worked for Nasiri. The post read: “I had a
consultation with this firm. My friend referred me to Kenneth
Creal. After two months he wanted 50% of the cash for the
service to make everything ‘his way.’ I don’t really know why he
has 4 people who gave him 5 stars they’re probably people who
are related to him. I could just say he has a shady business and
he’s very unethical.”
Creal was shocked when he saw Nasiri’s posts on Yelp
because they were false and implied criminal conduct. Creal was
particularly concerned about the posts that alleged criminal
conduct, stating: “If people believe that, I’ve been in this
community for 40 years. I was born in Hawthorne with the
family businesses that we’ve had. I’m known in my church
affiliations. I’m known by thousands of people. Anybody reading
this wouldn’t touch me with a 10-foot pole. They wouldn’t come
to me professionally. And understanding how the Internet
works, this would be up on the Internet for the rest of my life.”
Creal described the posts as “humiliating.”
Creal described the financial condition of his firm the five
years prior to Nasiri’s posts. He provided tax returns and
financial statements from 2012 to 2018. The revenue for the firm
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in 2012 was $909,691, which grew every year until 2018 when it
was $1,582,630. After Nasiri’s posts through 2019, Creal’s firm
had almost no growth. In addition to Creal’s tax returns, this
pattern was reflected in Creal’s records with respect to
onboarding new clients, which saw a significant decrease after
Nasiri’s posts.
Nasiri eventually took down the original Yelp review after
her deposition was taken in this case on February 4, 2019.
Creal called Nasiri as an adverse witness under Evidence
Code section 776. Nasiri is a practicing dentist with dental
practices in Santa Ana and Beverly Hills.
Nasiri admitted she wrote the October 26, 2017 Yelp
review, as well as other posts on Yelp and Ripoff Report. She also
admitted that she posted the pictures associated with those
reviews. Nasiri admitted she never contracted with or personally
hired Creal. While Nasiri maintained that Creal “manipulated”
her tax return, she never produced the tax return that Creal
allegedly manipulated. Nasiri claimed she heard Creal took a
20 percent fee but did not know one way or the other if he
actually did or not. She also admitted that she did not
investigate this claim before posting it. Nasiri never saw Creal
damage her car, and gave conflicting testimony during discovery
and at trial with respect to whether Creal touched or scratched
her car. Nasiri never saw Creal at her home or work. Nasiri
admitted the redacted federal criminal judgment she posted had
nothing to do with Creal.
Creal called two expert witnesses, Kim Onisko and Henri
Isenberg.
Onisko was a CPA with certifications in financial forensics,
fraud examination, and business evaluation. Onisko testified a
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significant portion of a CPA’s new business comes from social
media and the internet. She opined that posts like Nasiri’s would
be “disastrous” for a firm like Creal’s.
Onisko evaluated the potential harm Nasiri’s posts had on
Creal’s business by looking at Creal’s tax returns. Onisko noted
that Creal’s firm grew at an average rate of 11.7 percent a year
for the five years prior to Nasiri’s posts. Onisko used a five-year
average to approximate Creal’s firm’s yearly average growth.
She found in the two years after Nasiri’s posts, the firm only
grew 0.3 percent. After taking into account other outside factors
like the strength of the economy, the growth of other accountancy
firms in the same period, and the specific parameters of Creal’s
firm, Onisko opined the firm’s growth stalled as a result of
Nasiri’s posts.
Onisko opined that had Creal’s firm had continued to grow
at the same historic rate, it would have generated additional
revenue of $180,228 in 2018 and $371,094 in 2019. Onisko
confirmed that a 90 percent client retention rate was consistent
in the industry. Based on that retention rate, Onisko testified
that the revenue Creal should have earned in 2018 and 2019
would have continued into the future through 2028, but declined
each year by 10 percent. Onisko calculated past damages at
$345,128 and future damages at $973,082, totaling $1,318,210.
Henri Isenberg testified as an expert in online reputation.
He testified Nasiri’s posts were visible to anyone searching the
internet for Creal because the Yelp page generally appeared as a
top search result on various search engines. Further, “snippets”
from the Yelp reviews could be seen directly on the search engine.
He opined that approximately 63 people per month were visiting
Creal’s Yelp page between 2017 and 2019. Isenberg testified that
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someone could easily find Nasiri’s Yelp reviews if he or she
searched Creal’s name. He opined the increasing number of
individuals searching for Creal’s name online during the time
while Nasiri’s posts were visible and the corresponding stall in
the growth of Creal’s business and new client acquisition were
evidence that Nasiri’s negative reviews caused a decline in
business.
II. Nasiri’s evidence
Nasiri called two expert witnesses in accounting and public
relations.
Robert Farias was a CPA. He opined Creal suffered no
economic damages. Farias opined the data provided by Creal
regarding lost profits was incomplete and that there was no way
to distinguish between the effect of Nasiri’s posts and other
factors such as trends in the economy, changes in the law, the
demand for expert testimony, and new employees. For example,
Farias testified it would be difficult to tell from only the profit
and loss statements how many hours were actually billed by
Creal’s firm or what its billing rates were.
Robert Fisher operated his own public relations firm and
had been qualified as a public relations expert. Fisher was
familiar with Yelp and explained that Yelp makes it easy for
business to respond to negative reviews. He opined that
businesses should respond to negative Yelp reviews, and that
Creal should have responded to Nasiri’s reviews to “correct the
record.”
Although the trial court did not issue any initial findings on
liability, it indicated to the parties it would be moving to the
punitive damage phase.
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III. Punitive damages
Creal called Nasiri as a witness and introduced documents
from Nasiri’s family law case to demonstrate Nasiri’s net worth.
This included schedules of assets and debts signed by Nasiri on
February 27, 2017 and on January 15, 2021. In the 2017
schedule, Nasiri listed $13,238,050.50 in community and
separate property assets and $1,380,720 as the amount of money
owed or encumbered. In the 2021 schedule, Nasiri listed
$4,626,942 in community and separate assets and $6,334,546 as
the amount of money owed or encumbered.
Nasiri testified that she believed a home located on
Roanwood Drive was community property although Abolahrar
was claiming it was his separate property. She estimated the
value of the property in 2021 as $2.2 million. She did not know
the value of the property at the time of trial because she said it
needed repairs. Nasiri also claimed an apartment building on
West 103rd Street was her separate property, but did not know
the value of the property because it also needed repairs.
However, she agreed that she valued the property at $1.1 million
in 2021. Creal also asked about several other properties in which
Nasiri claimed an interest, but Nasiri testified she did not know
the value of the properties. Creal also questioned Nasiri about
various posts from her Instagram profile in which she was
wearing jewelry. When confronted with the retail price of the
jewelry, Nasiri claimed the jewelry was “fake.”
Creal also questioned Nasiri about her interest in various
businesses. Nasiri claimed her dental practice was community
property but did not know the value of the business. Nasiri also
claimed that she had a community interest in her husband’s car
washes, but again did not know their estimated value or how
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much money each business was generating monthly. In her
2017 schedule of assets, Nasiri listed the car washes’ value at
$6 million and $3.5 million. Nasiri also testified she had
borrowed $750,000 from one person, who held a lien on one of the
residential properties. Nasiri stated she was no longer working
full time because of an injury that required surgery. She also
testified that she was in debt $3.7 million because of loans and
attorney fees.
IV. Trial court’s findings
The trial court made the following findings. Creal had been
a practicing CPA for more than forty years and his family had a
long-standing accounting practice. Creal became familiar with
Nasiri after he was retained as an expert for Nasiri’s estranged
husband in their divorce proceedings.
Historically, Creal’s firm had an annual growth rate of
11 percent, but this stalled when Nasiri began defaming Creal in
October 2017. The trial court found, “Nasiri undertook an
unflinching campaign against Creal, calculated to severely
damage his reputation and diminish him financially.” It
described Nasiri’s animus as “particularly alarming” given her
limited interaction with Creal. It noted Nasiri’s anger stemmed
from “her perception of Creal’s involvement in filing a tax return
for her husband, which led to him receiving money from the IRS
to which she believe[d] he [wa]s not entitled.” Despite this
limited interaction, Nasiri’s public accusations went “far afield”
from what occurred, “accusing Creal of fraud, conspiracy,
harassment, stalking, and even falsely inferring that he has a
felony conviction.” The trial court described Nasiri as “unhinged”
and found that it was Nasiri who harassed Creal in a “deliberate
effort[] at shaming and injuring him and his business.”
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The trial court found a correlation between the diminished
growth of Creal’s business and Nasiri’s defamatory actions.
Creal demonstrated Nasiri’s posts emotionally impacted Creal in
the form of continuous stress, anxiety, shame, frustration, loss of
pride and dignity from a diminished reputation. “Even if Nasiri
believes Creal had somehow wronged her (which he had not) her
inordinate actions taken to inflict pain upon him grossly exceed
the harm she accused him of doing. Her vehemence and need for
retribution demonstrates an unhealthy fixation with Creal in her
crosshairs.”
The trial court awarded Creal $1,318,000 in special
damages. These were calculated based on lost profits and
reduction in the growth of Creal’s business that began in 2018
following Nasiri’s postings. Based on Creal’s profit and loss
statements, the trial court awarded damages to the firm of
$345,000 for the years of 2018 and 2019 and future loss profits of
$973,000 for a total of $1,318,000.
The trial court awarded Creal $250,000 in general damages
for his loss of reputation, shame, mortification, and hurt feelings.
“Nasiri’s defamatory postings were readily accessible to the
public as they were widely published on several sites on the
internet. She generated many postings over time and most
remained publicly visible for years. Any person doing a casual
internet search—including existing and prospective clients of
Creal—could see her comments and pictures.” It found the “tone
and tenor of Creal’s testimony comport[ed] with an individual
who has been severely mortified, shamed and hurt without lawful
opportunity for any recourse other than this court’s ruling.”
The trial court awarded Creal $30,000 in punitive damages.
It based its award on the fact that Nasiri was a practicing
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dentist, her ownership of several homes in exclusive areas, and
her claim that she held in a community interest in her ex-
husband’s car wash businesses worth millions of dollars each.
The trial court also disbelieved Nasiri’s testimony that the
expensive designer jewelry she was seen wearing was fake.
The trial court found Nasiri’s net worth was at least eight million
dollars. Further, it found that Creal had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that Nasiri acted with malice and oppression
and that punitive damages were necessary given Creal’s damages
were attributable to Nasiri’s own despicable conduct.
The trial court denied Nasiri’s motion for a new trial.
V. Attorney fee award
Creal moved for attorney fees under Code of Civil
Procedure1 section 2033.420, which allows a party to move for
attorney fees if the other party “fails to admit the genuineness of
any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so
. . . , and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves
the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter.”
(Id., subd. (a).)
Creal directed the trial court to a number of requests for
admissions that Nasiri denied or gave equivocal responses.
These requests asked Nasiri to admit: she made a false
statement; Creal never represented Nasiri as an accountant or
performed work on her behalf; Creal only performed work for
Nasiri’s ex-husband; Nasiri falsely claimed Creal manipulated
her tax return; Creal never took a 20 percent fee; Nasiri had no
basis to accuse Creal of fraud; the statement that Creal was
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
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helping two businesses create unreported income was false;
Nasiri falsely accused Creal of following her to her attorney’s
office; Nasiri falsely accused Creal of covering cameras to hurt
her; Creal did not touch or damage Nasiri’s car at any time; Creal
did not harass or threaten Nasiri or cover up surveillance
cameras; Creal did not have a fiduciary duty to Nasiri; Creal
never concealed or diverted profits from various businesses; and
Creal never fabricated or manipulated accounting records. Creal
claimed Nasiri’s responses made it necessary to conduct further
discovery and motion work to prove their truth at trial.
The trial court determined Creal was entitled to attorney
fees, finding the information contained in Creal’s requests for
admission were uniquely within Nasiri’s knowledge to admit or
deny without the need of discovery or testimony from another
party.
Nasiri filed two separate appeals. In her first appeal,
Nasiri challenged the judgment and order denying her motion for
new trial. In her second appeal, Nasiri challenged the attorney
fee award. We consolidated the appeals for purposes of decision.
DISCUSSION
Nasiri makes several challenges on appeal. First, Nasiri
asserts the trial court erred by issuing evidentiary sanctions against
her for her counsel’s failure to file certain pretrial documents in
conformance with the trial court’s pretrial order. Second, Nasiri
argues the special damages award based on Creal’s lost profits must
be vacated because it was speculative and unsupported by
substantial evidence. Third, Nasiri argues the general damages
award must be vacated because there was no proximate cause
between Nasiri’s conduct and any emotional harm to Creal. Fourth,
she argues the punitive damages award must be reversed because it
was based on speculative evidence and inadmissible hearsay. Fifth,
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she argues the trial court erred in not granting her a new trial on
punitive damages based on newly discovered evidence. Sixth, she
argues the attorney fee award must be vacated because she had
reasonable grounds to deny Creal’s requests for admission.
I. Sanctions
Nasiri argues the trial court erred in imposing sanctions
against Nasiri personally because her counsel, not Nasiri, failed
to comply with the trial court’s deadlines in filing her pretrial
documents, including motions in limine, oppositions to Creal’s
motions in limine, jury instruction requests, or a joint exhibit list.
A. Additional background
Nasiri initially represented herself until she retained a
lawyer approximately five months before the initial trial date set
for July 24, 2019. It appears the trial court continued the trial
date on its own motion to November 20, 2019 after the parties
entered into a stipulation to continue trial to a date no later than
November 30, 2019 to accommodate Nasiri’s counsel, who had
just come into the case.
On October 21, 2019, one month before the trial date,
Nasiri’s counsel, Paul Carter, applied to be relieved as counsel
due to a material breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.
Carter stated there was “a breakdown in their attorney client
relationship which is affecting all aspects of defense counsel’s
representation.” He explained Nasiri had obtained new counsel,
Hector Marrache, but Marrache would only substitute in if the
trial court continued the November 20, 2019 trial date. The trial
court denied the application without prejudice for renewal if
Marrache actually substituted into the case. Once Marrache
substituted in, the trial court continued the trial to February 13,
2020.
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On January 28, 2020, Marrache applied ex parte to be
relieved as counsel. Like Carter, Marrache claimed there was a
“breakdown of the attorney-client relationship that makes the
continued and effective representation of . . . Nasiri unreasonably
difficult.” Like Carter, Marrache explained that Nasiri had
obtained new counsel, but they were concerned with the timing of
the trial and their substitution into the case.
On January 31, 2020, the parties filed a joint witness list.
Creal also filed a motion to preclude Nasiri’s expert testimony,
a proposed exhibit list, a statement of the case, and a trial brief.
Nasiri’s counsel filed a statement to be read to the jury.
On February 3, 2020, the trial court granted Marrache’s
request to be relieved. On February 5, 2020, Nasiri, again in pro.
per., applied ex parte for a continuance on the grounds her new
counsel needed time to prepare for trial. Creal opposed the
continuance, arguing Nasiri exhibited a pattern of changing
counsel within a month of the trial date and then finding new
counsel to substitute in only if the trial court were to grant a
continuance.
On February 6, 2020, the trial court held a final status
conference and denied the ex parte application to continue
without prejudice. However, the trial court allowed Nasiri to
renew the application if she obtained counsel of record. At the
hearing, Nasiri’s new counsel appeared in a limited scope, and
requested a continuance because he had recently been retained.
The trial court denied the request but continued the status
conference on its own motion to February 18, 2020. The trial
court also inquired whether the parties had filed their trial
documents. Creal’s counsel informed the trial court it had filed
various trial documents but Nasiri and her counsel had failed to
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meet and confer; therefore, the documents were not joint
documents. In response, the trial court issued an order to show
cause why monetary or evidentiary sanctions should not be
imposed on Nasiri and set the matter for hearing at the final
status conference.
On February 14, 2020, Nasiri applied for a continuance on
the grounds she could not represent herself and was still trying to
retain counsel.
On February 18, 2020, Nasiri’s new counsel substituted in
and requested a continuance. The trial court stated trial could
not occur that day because it was engaged in another matter.
After the parties met and conferred, the trial court continued the
trial to May 6, 2020. Regarding the order to show cause, Nasiri’s
counsel argued Nasiri should not be penalized by Marrache’s
actions, and Creal would not suffer prejudice if Nasiri could
oppose Creal’s motions in limine, file her own motions in limine,
and add exhibits material to her defense. Creal asserted
sanctions were appropriate because Nasiri had not complied with
the trial court’s deadlines, and that he had tried to meet and
confer with Nasiri regarding the joint trial documents to no avail.
Creal argued Marrache had been relieved on February 3, and
that Nasiri could have filed her own documents between then and
February 18 or filed a response to the order to show cause. Creal
further argued he would be prejudiced because Nasiri sought to
add exhibits which had not been produced in discovery, and
Nasiri should not be granted additional time to oppose motions in
limine.
The trial court found Nasiri had failed to comply with the
pretrial requirements, and ordered that the pretrial cutoffs,
including motions and discovery, would not be extended.
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It further ordered no new witnesses or exhibits could be added to
the lists; no new jury instructions could be proposed; no new
motions in limine could be filed; and existing motions in limine
could not be opposed if that had not been done already.
Nasiri moved for reconsideration of the sanctions order.
Nasiri voluntarily withdrew that motion four months later before
receiving a ruling.
On April 9, 2020, the trial court vacated the final status
conference due to COVID. The trial court set a trial setting
conference for June 24, 2020. On June 24, 2020, the court
scheduled trial for December 2, 2020, and a new final status
conference for November 18, 2020.
On August 10, 2020, Nasiri filed a section 473 motion to
vacate the February 18, 2020 order. The motion argued that
Marrache failed to handle pretrial matters prior to leaving the
case, which was excusable neglect. Marrache provided a
declaration, detailing his work in January and February 2020
and his belief the final status conference would be continued.
Nasiri sought to present additional documentary evidence at
trial, including proof she had paid the IRS the $65,000 at issue,
her former husband’s schedule of assets and debts, tax returns,
and bad Yelp reviews from third parties.
The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that it
was untimely and that Marrache’s failure to comply with the
pretrial requirements did not constitute excusable neglect.
On November 12, 2020, Nasiri applied again to vacate the
sanctions order, which the trial court denied.
B. Section 575.2
Nasiri argues the trial court erred in issuing the sanctions
because the failure to comply with the final status conference
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order was attributable to Marrache, not Nasiri herself. Further,
she argues the trial court had a sua sponte duty to apply
section 575.2, subdivision (b), which prohibits sanctioning an
innocent party for the conduct of their counsel.
“The Legislature has authorized superior courts to
promulgate local rules and to impose sanctions for local rule
violations. Specifically, section 575.1 broadly authorizes superior
courts to enact local rules ‘designed to expedite and facilitate the
business of the court.’ ” (Shiheiber v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 688, 695 (Shiheiber), quoting § 575.1,
subd. (a).)
“In turn, section 575.2 contains an enforcement
mechanism. It states in relevant part: ‘Local rules promulgated
pursuant to Section 575.1 may provide that if any counsel, a
party represented by counsel, or a party if in pro se, fails to
comply with any of the requirements thereof, the court on motion
of a party or on its own motion may strike out all or any part of
any pleading of that party, or, dismiss the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that
party, or impose other penalties of a lesser nature as otherwise
provided by law, and may order that party or his or her counsel to
pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses in making the
motion, including reasonable attorney fees.’ ” (Shiheiber, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 695, quoting § 575.2, subd. (a), italics
omitted.) “At the same time, section 575.2 precludes an award of
sanctions against an innocent client. Section 575.2,
subdivision (b) states: ‘It is the intent of the Legislature that if a
failure to comply with these rules is the responsibility of counsel
and not of the party, any penalty shall be imposed on counsel and
19
shall not adversely affect the party’s cause of action or defense
thereto.’ ” (Shiheiber, at p. 695, quoting § 575.2, subd. (b).)
“Trial courts must balance the ‘opposing responsibilities’ of
‘actively assum[ing] and maintain[ing] control over the pace of
litigation’ and ‘abid[ing] by the guiding principle of deciding cases
on their merits rather than on procedural deficiencies.’
[Citation.] Decisions implicating both responsibilities ‘must be
made in an atmosphere of substantial justice. When the two
policies collide head-on, the strong public policy favoring
disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy favoring
judicial efficiency.’ ” (In re Harley C. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 494,
508.)
We review an order for sanctions for abuse of discretion.
(Pollock v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1348, 1358; Elkins v. Superior Court (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1337, 1364.) “ ‘[A] trial court’s exercise of discretion
will not be disturbed unless the record establishes it exceeded the
bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence
[citation], failed to follow proper procedure in reaching its
decision [citation], or applied the wrong legal standard to the
determination [citation].’ [Citation.] A discretionary ruling will
not be reversed merely because of a difference of opinion between
the appellate tribunal and the trial judge.” (Conservatorship of
Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1482.) “[W]e may properly
evaluate the record to determine if it contains substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings on sanctions.
[Citation.] Absent a proper basis for those findings, a sanctions
award represents a prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Id. at
pp. 1481–1482.)
20
Nasiri argues the sanctions order was an abuse of
discretion because there was no evidence that Nasiri, as opposed
to her counsel, was responsible for the timely filing of the various
trial documents. Nasiri directs us to the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Local Rules, rule 3.25(f)(1), which places
responsibility on counsel to get the preliminary trial documents.
Similarly, the trial court’s minute order directed “parties/counsel”
to prepare joint trial documents and file pretrial motions.
Accordingly, Nasiri asserts it was Marrache’s responsibility to file
joint pretrial statements, witness lists, jury instructions, motions,
and oppositions. In other words, Nasiri asserts she was an
innocent party as contemplated by section 575.2 and therefore
the evidentiary sanctions imposed against her were improper.
Assuming it was Marrache’s responsibility to comply with
the pretrial deadlines despite the fact that Nasiri was
representing herself at the time the trial court imposed sanctions,
there was evidence that Nasiri was not an innocent party with
respect to that noncompliance. The record shows a pattern of a
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship between Nasiri and
her counsel just before the case was supposed to go to trial.
Nasiri changed counsel multiple times throughout the litigation,
and she had done so twice before trial was set to commence.
Further, in each instance, while Nasiri would eventually find new
counsel, that new counsel would refuse to substitute in if the trial
court refused to grant a continuance. This pattern was sufficient
grounds for the trial court to impose sanctions against Nasiri.
Further, section 575.2 does not preclude “the trial court in
a proper case from looking behind the conduct of an attorney to
determine if responsibility for noncompliance rests with the
client.” (In re Marriage of Colombo (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 572,
21
578–579.) Based on Nasiri’s pattern of conduct, the trial court
could reasonably conclude the fault to comply with its pretrial
requirements rested, at least in part, with Nasiri based on her
repeated failure to cooperate with counsel. This was not an
abuse of discretion.
C. Section 473
Nasiri argues the trial court erred in denying her
section 473 motion because her counsel’s failure to comply with
the pretrial deadlines was due to excusable neglect. We disagree.
“ ‘[A] trial court order denying relief under section 473,
subdivision (b) is “ ‘scrutinized more carefully than an order
permitting trial on the merits.’ ” [Citation.] “Because the law
favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘any doubts in applying
section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief
from default [citations].’ ” [Citation.] But that said, “[a] motion
to vacate a default and set aside judgment [citation] ‘is addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse . . . the exercise of that discretion will not
be disturbed on appeal.’ [Citations.] Moreover, all presumptions
will be made in favor of the correctness of the order, and the
burden of showing abuse is on the appellant.” ’ ” (McClain v.
Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 413 (McClain).)
“ ‘The standard for appellate review of an order denying a
motion to set aside under section 473 is quite limited. A ruling
on such a motion rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse of discretion, resulting in injury
sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of
justice. Where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an
issue, an appellate court is not authorized to substitute its
22
judgment of the correct result for the decision of the trial court.’ ”
(McClain, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.)
“To obtain discretionary relief under section 473, the
moving party must show the requisite mistake, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect.” (McClain, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.)
“ ‘A party who seeks relief under section 473 on the basis of
mistake or inadvertence of counsel must demonstrate that such
mistake, inadvertence, or general neglect was excusable because
the negligence of the attorney is imputed to his client and may
not be offered by the latter as a basis for relief.’ [Citation.] In
determining whether the attorney’s mistake or inadvertence was
excusable, ‘the court inquires whether “a reasonably prudent
person under the same or similar circumstances might have made
the same error.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, the discretionary
relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney
error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could
have made.’ [Citation.] ‘Conduct falling below the professional
standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly
advance an argument, is not therefore excusable. To hold
otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory
requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept
of attorney malpractice.’ ” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting
Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258.)
Here, Nasiri’s former counsel provided a declaration,
explaining his failure to comply with the trial court’s pretrial
deadlines. He declared that the attorney-client relationship had
begun to breakdown in early January 2020. At some point, he
was no longer communicating with Nasiri, but through her new
counsel. During the latter part of January 2020, he worked with
Nasiri’s new counsel in getting all joint trial documents ready for
23
filing. He spent a substantial amount of time going through the
file, especially evidentiary documents for the list of exhibits, as
well as reviewing all of the discovery, prior pleadings, and
gathering information regarding witnesses for the defense.
He neglected to file oppositions to Creal’s motions in limine
because his “focus was primarily on getting the other trial
documents, especially the witness list and exhibits list, ready for
filing.” He stated: “There was a lot of movement in the case in
January with coordinating expert depositions; meeting and
conferring with defense experts; preparation for those
depositions; going through hundreds of new documents produced
by [Creal] on January 9, 2020; waiting for expedited transcripts
from depositions needed by defense experts to be reviewed and
analyzed prior to those experts’ depositions; the MSC; breakdown
in the attorney-client relationship; and coordinating document
preparation with [Nasiri’s] ‘new’ attorneys. In addition, my office
staff was working in the background on coordinating, setting, and
confirming expert depositions, court reporters, obtaining missing
depositions [from] the file, gathering and assembling documents
for the experts to review, etc.”
Based on this explanation, we find the trial court was well
within its discretion in finding former counsel’s neglect was not
excusable. Essentially, he claimed his failure to prepare the
pretrial documents was due to being overwhelmed with trial
preparation and there was some confusion coordinating with
Nasiri’s new counsel about who would do what. However, the
“ ‘press of business’ alone generally does not constitute grounds
for relief.” (Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1423.)
“To constitute grounds for relief, an exceptional workload
generally must be accompanied by some factor outside the
24
attorney’s control that makes the situation unmanageable, such
as a mistake ‘caused by a glitch in office machinery or an error by
clerical staff.’ [Citations.] Other such factors might include
extraordinary changes in the law firm.” (Ibid.) Here, the other
factor identified by Nasiri’s former counsel was his inability to
coordinate with new counsel. However, his inability to
communicate and properly coordinate with new counsel was not
outside of his control. Indeed, other parts of his declaration
demonstrate he was communicating with new counsel on other
matters related to trial preparation.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding Nasiri’s
former counsel’s neglect was not excusable.
II. Challenges to the damages award
Nasiri makes various challenges to the trial court’s
damages award. First, Nasiri argues the trial court erred in
overruling objections to Creal’s expert’s testimony regarding
Creal’s claimed lost profits because the testimony was speculative
and unsupported by substantial evidence. Second, she argues
there was no substantial evidence that Creal’s general damages
were proximately caused by Nasiri’s conduct. Third, she argues
the punitive damages award was unsupported by substantial
evidence and that the evidence should have been excluded as
speculative hearsay without foundation.
A. Lost profits
Nasiri asserts the special damage award of $1,318,000 was
based entirely on the diminished growth of Creal’s business and
reduction in growth of business profit. Nasiri argues Creal’s
damages were improperly based on a “ ‘contemplated extension of
his business,’ ” which was too speculative and remote. She
acknowledges that although a claim can be based on past profits,
25
it cannot be based on speculation business would increase in the
future. We disagree.
“ ‘[T]he loss of prospective profits are recoverable where the
evidence makes reasonably certain their occurrence and extent.’
[Citation.] Such damages must ‘be proven to be certain both as to
their occurrence and their extent, albeit not with “mathematical
precision.” ’ ” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773–774 (Sargon).) “Lost
profits need not be proven with mathematical precision, but they
must also not be unduly speculative.” (Id. at p. 753.)
“Regarding lost business profits, the cases have generally
distinguished between established and unestablished businesses.
‘[W]here the operation of an established business is prevented or
interrupted, as by a . . . breach of contract . . . , damages for the
loss of prospective profits that otherwise might have been made
from its operation are generally recoverable for the reason that
their occurrence and extent may be ascertained with reasonable
certainty from the past volume of business and other provable
data relevant to the probable future sales.’ [Citation.] ‘Lost
profits to an established business may be recovered if their extent
and occurrence can be ascertained with reasonable certainty;
once their existence has been so established, recovery will not be
denied because the amount cannot be shown with mathematical
precision. [Citations.] Historical data, such as past business
volume, supply an acceptable basis for ascertaining lost future
profits. [Citations.] In some instances, lost profits may be
recovered where plaintiff introduces evidence of the profits lost by
similar businesses operating under similar conditions.’ ”
(Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 774.)
26
The record shows this was the exact type of evidence Creal
produced to support his claim of lost profits. As an established
business, Creal presented evidence of historical data, past
business volume, client retention rates, and a comparison with
other similar businesses in the form of a national study that
showed other accountancy firms continued to grow at a similar
rate to what they had in prior years. Creal used this data to
show the amount of profits to be expected in the future, and
included a reduction for saved costs due to handling less business
and a reduction to present value. Creal also testified that there
were no changes in his firm such as the services offered or
changes in staff. While Creal’s resulting calculation of lost
profits was inherently speculative as there was no way of proving
the actual number of potential new clients that were deterred by
Nasiri’s internet posts, a certain amount of speculation was
permissible and Creal supplied substantial evidence in support of
his calculation. (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 775.)
Nasiri also argues that Creal’s evidence of an average
11.7 percent growth rate was speculative. However, as we have
just stated and as our Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[t]he
lost profit inquiry is always speculative to some degree.”
(Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 775.) “Inevitably, there will
always be an element of uncertainty. Courts must not be too
quick to exclude expert evidence as speculative merely because
the expert cannot say with absolute certainty what the profits
would have been. Courts must not eviscerate the possibility of
recovering lost profits by too broadly defining what is too
speculative. A reasonable certainty only is required, not absolute
certainty.” (Ibid.)
27
Nasiri cites to Kuffel v. Seaside Oil Co. (1970)
11 Cal.App.3d 354 (Kuffel) in support of her argument that
Creal’s claimed 11.7 percent annual growth rate was unduly
speculative. In Kuffel, the plaintiffs operated a gas station and
entered into an exclusive supply agreement with the defendant to
sell defendant’s brand of gasoline. (Id. at pp. 358–359.)
The plaintiffs sued to recover lost profits after the defendant
fraudulently induced them to terminate the agreement. (Id. at
p. 360.) The Court of Appeal reversed the damages award in
favor of plaintiffs because their calculation of lost profits was
grossly erroneous and based on several unwarranted
assumptions. (Id. at p. 365.) It found the plaintiffs failed to
consider market conditions and similar factors, assuming they
would have sold as much gasoline following the termination of
the contract as they sold before. (Ibid.) The plaintiffs also
ignored potential population and traffic changes, future road
layouts and efficient business management, all of which are
principal factors responsible for the growth of a retail gasoline
business, and instead, relied solely on their own testimony to
calculate the increases and the decreases in the sale of gasoline
during the seven-year period immediately preceding the
termination of the contract. (Id. at p. 366.) They also assumed
that they would have increased their annual gasoline output
without considering any increases in overhead expenses. (Id. at
p. 367.)
The same evidentiary shortcomings in Kuffel are not
present here. Creal’s expert’s opinion was based not only on
Creal’s revenue history, but also on comparisons with other
accountancy firms during the same period. He also factored in
Creal’s client retention rate, which was consistent with the
28
industry. Further, Creal’s expert factored in the saved costs that
would have been incurred due to an increase in business. He also
reduced the lost profits calculation to present value.
Nasiri also claims the special damages award must be
vacated because Creal did not demonstrate that the special
damages were proximately caused by Nasiri’s conduct. She
directs us to the absence of evidence that any particular
individual saw her posts.
While we agree with Nasiri that there was no direct
evidence from Creal that any particular member of the public
saw Nasiri’s posts, Creal provided circumstantial evidence that
the posts were viewed, and that the posts had a negative impact
on Creal’s business. Creal’s expert explained that Nasiri’s posts
could be viewed by any individual who conducted an internet
search of Creal’s name, and that the number of searches for Creal
and his firm had increased over several years. However, in spite
of this increase in searches, the number of Creal’s new clients
declined. He opined that he would have expected an increase in
new clients based on the increased number of internet searches.
However, because the number of new clients actually decreased
after Nasiri’s posts, it was reasonable to conclude that the posts
negatively deterred new clients from engaging Creal’s firm.
Further, Creal presented evidence that other factors, such as a
change in the economy, a change in services, or the loss of a large
client, were not responsible for the firm’s stall in growth.
Accordingly, we find the special damages award was not
unduly speculative and was supported by substantial evidence.
B. General damages
Nasiri argues the award of $250,000 general damages is
unsupported by substantial evidence. She asserts Creal was
29
required to demonstrate the $250,000 damage award was
proximately caused by a loss of reputation, shame, or injured
feelings; however, Creal offered no testimony of any serious
physical reactions or emotional damage. We are not persuaded
by Nasiri’s argument as the trial court properly inferred from
Creal’s testimony that he suffered emotional damage. Further,
because the trial court found Nasiri committed defamation per se,
Creal was not required to prove actual damages.
When a plaintiff prevails on a claim of defamation per se,
the plaintiff need not prove actual damages because damages are
presumed. (Tilkey v. Allstate Insurance Company (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 521, 542 (Tilkey); Finney v. Lockhart (1950)
35 Cal.2d 161, 163.)
Here, the trial court properly concluded that Nasiri’s
statements constituted defamation per se, i.e., “the meaning is so
clear from the face of the statement that the damages can be
presumed.” (Tilkey, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at 542.) Nevertheless,
the trial court also found that Creal actually did suffer some
emotional damage based on the “tone and tenor” of Creal’s
testimony. Specifically, the trial court found that Creal’s
testimony “comport[ed] with an individual who has been severely
mortified, shamed and hurt without lawful opportunity for any
recourse other than this court’s ruling.” Thus, even though Creal
was not required to prove actual damages, the record
demonstrates he did so in any event.
Nasiri acknowledges that damages may be presumed in a
defamation case; however, she asserts this applies only to
nominal damages. The authorities cited by Nasiri do not support
this assertion. In Contento v. Mitchell (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 356,
the court explained: “Where the trier of fact has found the
30
existence of slander per se, and has found the requisite malice in
fact, an award of punitive damages is proper despite the absence
of a specific award of nominal damages.” (Id. at p. 359.) That is
not the issue here as the trial court found that Creal was entitled
to both general and special damages. In Regalia v. The
Nethercutt Collection (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, the plaintiff
proceeded on a slander per quod theory, which required the
plaintiff to prove actual damages. (Id. at p. 370.) Here, Creal
proved that Nasiri’s statements were defamation per se;
therefore, he was not required to prove actual damages. General
damages are conclusively presumed to result from a statement
that is libelous per se; the plaintiff need not introduce evidence of
actual damages to obtain an award of damages. (Barnes-Hind,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 382.)
C. Punitive damages
Nasiri argues the award of punitive damages must be
vacated because it was unsupported by substantial evidence, and
the evidence offered in support should have been excluded as
speculative hearsay without exception.
We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence for abuse of discretion. We review whether the
judgment was supported by the evidence under the substantial
evidence standard. (See Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 442, 451; Dumas v. Stocker (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d
1262, 1266 (Dumas).) “An important consideration in assessing
punitive damages is the net worth of the defendant. [Citation.]
The award must bear some reasonable relationship to the net
worth of the defendant, and where the award is grossly
disproportionate to the defendant’s wealth, a presumption arises
31
that it was the result of passion and prejudice.” (Dumas, at
p. 1267.)
Nasiri argues the trial court allowed Creal to establish the
estimated value of her interests in real property by improperly
presenting figures from the website Zillow that contained the
purported value of each property. She also argues Creal could
not rely on family law filings, specifically, the schedule of assets
that Nasiri signed under penalty of perjury. We find these
arguments do not warrant reversal of the punitive damage
award.
First, there is no indication in the record that the trial
court relied on the Zillow estimates to determine Nasiri’s net
worth. Rather, the trial court stated it was relying on the family
law filings. Further, whatever the Zillow estimates may have
been, the fact remained that Nasiri admitted to having an
interest in numerous pieces of real property in exclusive areas.
It was reasonable for the trial court to infer that based on
Nasiri’s claimed interest, her net worth was substantial relative
to the amount of punitive damages awarded.
Second, to the extent Nasiri claims the trial court
improperly relied on her family law filings, in which Nasiri
claimed to have an interest in these properties, Nasiri’s own
admissions during her testimony established that she held an
interest in these properties.
Thus, the trial court’s findings regarding Nasiri’s estimated
net worth were supported by substantial evidence.
III. Motion for new trial on punitive damage award
Nasiri argues the trial court erred in denying her motion
for a new trial based on new evidence concerning her net worth.
Nasiri submitted evidence of a family court ruling issued after
32
the trial in this case concluded. In that ruling, the family court
found that the two car wash businesses were Nasiri’s husband’s
separate property. This ruling conflicted with the trial court’s
finding that Nasiri and her husband co-owned the car washes,
which were valued at $9.5 million. Because the trial court partly
calculated the punitive damage award based on the significant
value of these car washes, Nasiri asserts the trial court should
have granted her new trial motion on this ground.
“ ‘A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a new trial
motion, and the court’s exercise of discretion is accorded great
deference on appeal.’ ” (Hasso v. Hapke (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
107, 119.) “The trial court’s determination on a motion for a new
trial will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a
manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion.” (Wood v.
Jamison (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 156, 162.) Further, when a
motion for new trial is based on newly discovered evidence, the
evidence must be material, i.e., “it is likely to produce a different
result.” (Trovato v. Beckman Coulter, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th
319, 327.)
Here, the trial court found that the new evidence consisting
of the family court’s finding that the car washes claimed by
Nasiri as community property were actually her ex-husband’s
separate property was not material to its award of punitive
damages. As the trial court correctly noted, the family court
made no findings about Nasiri’s net worth as of December 2021,
when the punitive damages were awarded in favor of Creal.
Further, the family court was presented with different evidence
by different parties than what was before the court here.
Moreover, an examination of the family court’s ruling
demonstrates it found Nasiri’s community and separate property
33
interests were still substantial and that Nasiri was still making
considerable income. We also find the trial court properly
disregarded the family court ruling in that it made no effort to
value all separate property holdings and the evidence presented
was wanting, inconclusive, or lacked credibility in many respects,
leaving the family court to conclude valuations were only
sparsely supported.
Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Nasiri’s motion for a new trial based on new
evidence.
IV. Attorney fees
Nasiri argues the attorney fee award must be vacated
because she had reasonable grounds to deny the requests for
admission that were the basis of Creal’s attorney fees motion.
Creal responds that Nasiri’s appeal of the attorney fee award is
untimely. We agree with Creal.
A. Additional background
On March 11, 2022, the trial court issued its award of
damages in favor of Creal. The judgment was filed on March 30,
2022. The judgment indicated that Creal “may also be entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees in accordance with [section] 2033.420 in
an amount to be determined following the filing of a motion for
attorneys’ fees.” Thereafter, Nasiri filed her notice of appeal on
July 8, 2022. Nasiri’s notice of appeal indicated that she was
appealing from the March 30, 2022 judgment and the trial court’s
denial of her motion for new trial.
On May 4, 2022, Creal moved for attorney fees under
section 2033.420. The trial court granted that motion on
October 12, 2022, and Nasiri was served with a notice of order
awarding attorney fees on October 14, 2022. On October 25,
34
2022, the trial court filed an amended judgment, which was
served on Nasiri on November 3, 2022. Nasiri attempted to file
her notice of appeal from the attorney fee award on December 14,
2022. Her notice of appeal indicated she was appealing from the
October 25, 2022 amended judgment. Her notice of appeal was
rejected on December 20, 2022, and again on December 23, 2022
after an attempt to refile. Nasiri’s appeal was ultimately
accepted on January 6, 2023.
We consolidated Nasiri’s two appeals and deferred our
decision on whether her second appeal was timely.
B. Nasiri’s second appeal was untimely
A party has 60 days from the date he or she is served by a
party with “a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).) The word “ ‘judgment’ ”
includes “an appealable order if the appeal is from an appealable
order.” (Id., rule 8.104(e).) Under section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(2), postjudgment orders granting or denying motions for
attorney fees are deemed to be appealable. (Apex LLC v.
Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1015.) “It is well
settled . . . that ‘[w]here the judgment is modified merely to add
costs, attorney fees and interest, the original judgment is not
substantially changed and the time to appeal it is therefore not
affected.’ ” (Torres v. City of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
214, 222.)
Here, Nasiri was served with notice of attorney fees order
on October 14, 2022; therefore, the 60-day deadline to file her
notice of appeal from that order was December 13, 2022.
Disregarding any technical difficulties Nasiri may have had in
filing her notice of appeal, resulting in it being received on
January 6, 2023, her notice of appeal was still filed one day late
35
on December 14, 2022. Therefore, her appeal was untimely.
“ ‘[T]he timely filing of an appropriate notice of appeal or its legal
equivalent is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction.’ ” (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020)
8 Cal.5th 875, 881.)
Further, we reject Nasiri’s argument that her appeal from
the first judgment was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
issue of whether Creal was entitled to attorney fees under
section 2033.420 as that issue had not yet been decided by the
trial court, which specifically reserved the decision for further
briefing and determination.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and postjudgment orders are affirmed.
Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
36
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