CourtListener 10346973•In re R.C. CA1/4
Testo completo
Filed 2/27/25 In re R.C. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re R.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, A169569
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Contra Costa County
v. Super. Ct. No. J2200620)
R.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In this Welfare and Institutions Code section 6021 proceeding, Minor
R.C. seeks review of a juvenile court ruling rejecting his section 786 request
for dismissal of the delinquency charges against him, and for sealing of all
records pertaining to those charges.
R.C. argues we must reverse for abuse of discretion because he
substantially complied with the terms and conditions of his probation.
Alternatively, he seeks modification of a probation condition he contends is
unconstitutionally vague on its face.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
1
Because the juvenile court’s section 786 ruling is supported by
substantial evidence of poor school attendance and lack of community service
efforts, indicating failure to substantially comply with two conditions of
probation the court considered to be essential, we will sustain the ruling.
We agree with the People that R.C.’s vagueness claim is untimely and
that as a result we lack jurisdiction to consider it. We therefore dismiss the
appeal to the extent R.C. argues vagueness, and we otherwise affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Juvenile Wardship Petition and Initial Proceedings
On December 20, 2022, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed
a juvenile wardship petition alleging R.C., then 15 years old, had committed
two offenses: possessing a loaded firearm by a prohibited person (Pen. Code,
§ 25850, subds. (a), (c)(4)) and carrying a concealed firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 25400, subds. (a)(1), (c)(4)).
A January 22, 2024 probation report summarizes the factual
circumstances underlying these allegations. The report indicates that in
December 2022, R.C. and two other individuals attempted to rob a drug
dealer they had arranged to meet in a park, supposedly to buy marijuana.
When they met him, they fled with his marijuana. The dealer shot at them
and one of the individuals was hit and died as a result. R.C. was arrested
near the incident with a loaded firearm with a high capacity magazine and a
bag of marijuana in his possession.
In December 2022, R.C. pleaded no contest to the carrying a concealed
firearm allegation; the Contra Costa County juvenile court sustained the
allegation, and granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the other charge.
The case was then transferred to the juvenile court in Alameda County,
where R.C. was determined to be living with his mother, for disposition.
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B. R.C. Is Placed at Home Under Probation Department
Supervision
The Alameda County juvenile court held a dispositional hearing in
January 2023. The court adjudged R.C. a ward of the court and ordered him
placed at his mother’s home under the supervision of his probation officer and
subject to various terms and conditions of probation.
These terms and conditions included that he “not stay away from home
unless with a parent or legal guardian or without prior permission of the
probation officer”; be at his place of residence by 7 p.m. every day unless with
a parent or legal guardian or with prior permission of the probation officer;
“[a]ttend school regularly,” “not own, use, possess or be under the influence of
any alcoholic beverage or illegal substance” and be subject to chemical
testing; not possess, own, or handle any firearm, knife, or weapon, among
other things; and “[p]erform 40 hours of community service work to be
arranged by the minor with the approval of the Probation Officer.” R.C., his
mother, and his father signed the probation department’s home supervision
contract pledging their cooperation.
C. R.C.’s Mixed Performance in the First Part of 2023
In a mid-February 2023 progress report, the probation department
wrote in relevant part that R.C. was yet to attend school because, although
enrolled, he was waiting for a school placement that could accommodate his
Individualized Education Program (IEP). Also, on February 6, 2023, R.C.
tested positive for THC in a urine analysis. He had yet to submit any
completed hours of community service to the department, but told his
probation officer he could perform the hours at his church.
In a late March 2023 report, the department wrote that R.C. was not
yet attending school because he was still waiting for a school placement. He
again tested positive for THC on March 16, 2023, and he admitted to this use.
3
He had not yet submitted any completed hours of community service to his
probation officer.
In April 2023, R.C.’s case was transferred back to Contra Costa County
juvenile court because he had moved to that county with his mother. Upon
this transfer, the juvenile court ordered that all prior orders remained in
effect.
The court then held a disposition hearing, conducting sessions of it on
May 10, 2023 and May 31, 2023. At the May 31 hearing, R.C.’s counsel
explained the difficulties with finding a school placement for R.C. due to his
IEP and indicated hope that a placement could be arranged soon. The court
said it was glad for this progress. It then expressed its concern about R.C.’s
marijuana use, noting that “your mom had indicated that is an issue.” The
court was particularly concerned because, it said, regular marijuana usage
could stunt the development of R.C.’s still-forming brain. It kept in place the
previous terms and conditions of probation that we have discussed and
scheduled a one-year probation review hearing for January 22, 2024. The
court added that it would give R.C. community service credit for good grades,
specifically that it would reduce his service hours by five hours for every “A”
and two-and-a-half hours for every “B.”
D. The Probation Department’s January 2024 Progress Report
On the day of the January 22, 2024 review hearing, the probation
department filed a progress report with the court. The department wrote
that R.C. had tested negative for all illicit substances in four drug tests,
administered in June, August, September, and December of 2023. He began
attending a school that could accommodate his IEP on November 28, 2023.
He did not have any disciplinary issues at the school and had not sustained
any new law violations since he was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court
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system. His first semester report card from the school, attached to the
report, indicates he received two C- grades, one C, one B, two A’s, and a grade
that is not clear but appears to be either a C+ or a C-.
However, the department further reported, R.C. had been absent from
the school without excuse for five days of the approximately four and a half
weeks of school days that had occurred since his enrollment. The report card
indicates he was only present for 12 of 21 school days since his enrollment,
having also had four excused absences.
Further, the department wrote, R.C. had not participated in the court-
ordered 40 hours of community service required of him. It detailed an
extensive effort to assist R.C. in fulfilling this requirement.
That is, in June 2023, the department provided him with a list of non-
profit organizations in East Contra Costa County with which he potentially
could do his community service hours. However, his mother (Mother) did not
want him participating with organizations in that area and said he would
complete his community service hours at a non-profit organization located in
San Francisco.
In August 2023, the reporting probation officer advised R.C. to start
volunteering at a non-profit in order to complete his community service
hours. R.C. “insisted he would complete his hours in San Francsico, as his
uncle was able to transport him there.”
Subsequently, the probation officer again reminded R.C. about his
community services hours, told him to start completing them, and provided
him with a list of non-profit organizations in the Brentwood area, where he
lived. In January 2024, the officer gave him a referral to a Concord
community youth center that could provide him with a variety of community
service opportunities.
5
Also, the department wrote, a youth intervention specialist was
assisting R.C. with finding organizations with which he could engage in
community service. She also reported that his school principal was willing to
talk to R.C. about fulfilling his community service requirement on campus.
Despite all of these efforts, the only indication that R.C. attempted to
participate in community service was his report to the department that he
attempted unsuccessfully to volunteer at an animal shelter that did not need
volunteers at the time. The department recommended that the court
schedule another review hearing in two months to give R.C. the time to
complete his community service requirement.
E. The January 2024 Review Hearing
At the January 22, 2024 review hearing, R.C.’s counsel asked the
juvenile court to find that R.C. had satisfactorily completed his term of
probation and order his record sealed, which the court was authorized to do
under section 786. Citing In re A.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 697 (A.V.), R.C.’s
counsel conceded that R.C. had not satisfied his 40-hour community service
requirement. However, counsel argued, under the law R.C. had
“satisfactorily completed a term of probation” because the law did not require
that he “perfectly” comply with all of his terms and satisfy “every single
term.” Counsel further contended that “the most important thing” was that
R.C. had not committed a new offense and tested negative on all drug tests.
He also noted that R.C. had received two A’s and a B the previous semester,
contending these were grades that should count towards his 40 community
service hours under the guidelines previously set by the court.
R.C.’s counsel then represented that “one of the challenges” R.C. faced
in completing his community service requirement was “related to his
mother’s health.” Counsel said she suffered from Type 1 diabetes and had
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“frequently been in and out of the hospital.” Counsel continued, “When I first
met [R.C.] over a year ago, she was actually in a coma for . . . 2 weeks, and
she is frequently hospitalized because of dips in her health. And so [R.C.]
has, after school, had to pitch in a lot to help care for his younger brother to
help out around the house, which has meant that he has had less free time to
do community service and other things.” R.C. had tried to volunteer at the
animal shelter, and was focusing on school, caring for his younger brother,
and helping out around the house,” which counsel contended was enough to
satisfactorily complete his term of probation.
The prosecutor opposed R.C.’s request. He argued R.C. had not
satisfactorily completed the term of his probation because, even putting aside
the community service issue, R.C.’s unexcused absences from about a quarter
of his school days since his latest enrollment were “concerning.” He asked
the court to continue with R.C.’s term of probation so that R.C. could
complete them appropriately. The probation department representative at
the hearing agreed with these comments.
After counsel submitted the matter, the court stated, “I would disagree
with [R.C.’s counsel’s] categorization of what the law requires, and I don’t
think that this is a close call. The court focused first on R.C.’s poor school
attendance, noting, “It appears from this report card that [R.C.] attended 12
days of school last year, for this particular semester, and thus far, according
to the probation report, he already has 5 absences,” although the court was
confused about the timing of these absences.
The court turned to R.C.’s failure to fulfill his community service
requirement: “[R.C.] has also been provided ample opportunities to comply
with the requirements to complete his community service hours, and there
have been a number of different workarounds that Probation has tried to
7
provide for him to get started on those. He has yet to do so, and that is going
back from—the first time we spoke about this was back in May.” The court
then ruled, stating, “So I am afraid that there is not an indication in this
particular case . . . that he has substantially complied with the terms of his
probation. [¶] So we will be coming back in a couple of months.”
After the court ruled, Mother asked to speak. She told the court that it
was “not like” R.C. had not done his community service. She was in the
hospital “every other week,” had “flatlined” two months before in front of her
children, and had just gotten out of the hospital a couple of days before. She
was “very, very sick.” As a result, it was hard for R.C. to attend any
community service opportunity because she was the only driver in the house.
She added that he missed school when he had COVID and she had to go the
hospital.
The court expressed its sympathies to Mother for her poor health. It
then recalled that R.C.’s uncle was going to take R.C. to his community
service and that his father was “involved.” Mother responded that “[h]e” was
not helping, R.C., was not really “seeing him like that,” and “he” was not
going to take him to community service because he lived “way in Hayward”;
the nature and context of these remarks indicates Mother was referring to
R.C.’s father, whom she had said a few moments before lived in Hayward.
The court responded that the probation department would see what could be
done to help R.C. complete his community service hours on his school
campus, encouraged R.C. to do so, scheduled the next review hearing for
March 27, 2024, and ended the hearing.
R.C. filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s denial of his “motion
to terminate his probation satisfactorily pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code [section] 786.”
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II. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Rejecting R.C.’s
Motion
R.C. first argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by rejecting his
motion for a ruling that he had satisfactorily completed his term of probation
and an order sealing the record of his case, making much the same
arguments as those he asserted below. We are not persuaded.
1. Relevant Legal Standards
Section 786 provides in relevant part that a minor who satisfactorily
completes a term of probation shall have his petition dismissed and his
records sealed. (§ 786, subd. (a).) Section 786 states that “satisfactory
completion” “is deemed to have occurred if the person has no new findings of
wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude during the period of supervision or probation and if the person has
not failed to substantially comply with the reasonable orders of supervision
or probation that are within their capacity to perform.” (§ 786, subd. (c)(1).)
R.C. relies heavily on A.V.’s interpretation of these requirements. The
A.V. court, a panel of Division One of this District, explained, “[S]ection 786
requires only ‘satisfactory completion’ with probation and, to underscore the
point, specifically defines ‘satisfactory completion’ as ‘substantial[]
compl[iance].’ (§ 786, subd. (c)(1).)” (A.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 709.)
The court continued, quoting the Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law,
“Substantial compliance is not perfect compliance. Substantial compliance is
commonly understood to mean ‘compliance with the substantial or essential
requirements of something (as a statute or contract) that satisfies its purpose
or objective even though its formal requirements are not complied with.’ ”
(A.V., at p. 709.)
9
A juvenile court must determine, in its “discretionary estimation,”
whether a minor has “ ‘substantially complied’ with the essential
requirements of his probation, such that he ha[s] demonstrably achieved the
rehabilitative goals of probation.” (A.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 711.)
Accordingly, we review the court’s ruling here for abuse of discretion. (Id. at
p. 701.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
Also, under the abuse of discretion standard, we review the record to
determine if the court’s factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence. (E.g., In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288.) In determining
whether there is such substantial evidence, “ ‘ “an appellate court reviews the
entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value,” ’ ” from which a rational fact finder could reach the factual finding at
issue. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630–631.)
2. Analysis
Under such a deferential standard of review, R.C. must clear a high
hurdle to show abuse of discretion here. He does not. Drawing inferences in
favor of the juvenile court’s ruling, as we must, we decline to disturb the
court’s determination that, as of the time R.C. made his section 786 request,
he failed to show substantial compliance with two probation conditions the
court focused upon as essential—that he “[a]ttend school regularly,” and that
he “[p]erform 40 hours of community service.” The court indicated its belief
that R.C. still had a chance to earn eligibility for section 786 relief, but
needed more time to do so. That is a judgment a juvenile court has the
prerogative to make.
10
As for school attendance, R.C. had only recently been able to enroll in
school and had missed most of 2023 school year, the record suggesting that
this was not his own fault. Nonetheless, he had only had 21 days of schooling
in the course of the year, and he did not attend even those modest number of
days with regularity. All told, he attended school for only about 57 percent of
those days—12—which included four excused absences and five unexcused
absences. He offered no evidence to explain those unexcused absences
(although, as we will discuss, he contends that he did). And he does not and
cannot argue that attending school was not an essential requirement of his
probation. Regardless of the fact that a few of his grades were good (although
more of them were not so good), that he did not present evidence explaining
his absence from about a quarter of the school days available to him could be
a basis by itself for the court to reasonably conclude that he was not in
substantial compliance with the terms of his probation and, therefore, had
not satisfactorily completed his term of probation.
When we move past the issue of grades, his school record was better
than his virtually nonexistent community service record. There is no
indication in the record that R.C. completed any of the 40 community service
hours he was ordered to engage in over his one year of probation (not
including any relatively small amount of credit for grades that he might have
been due by court order), or made any effort to complete those hours beyond
one unsuccessful inquiry to an animal shelter. On the other hand, there are
indications in the record that he repeatedly represented that he was prepared
to complete those hours—first at his church and then at an unspecified
organization in San Francisco—but no evidence that he actually tried to do so
at those or any other places. And despite receiving multiple suggestions and
referrals from his probation officer for how he might complete his hours—
11
including regarding a community youth center in Concord, non-profits in his
hometown of Brentwood, and ultimately at his own school—nothing in the
record suggests he acted on any of these suggestions and referrals, or even
was amenable to pursuing them.
Further, R.C. offers no legitimate reason why the court could not
consider his community service requirement to be an essential condition of
his probation. Indeed, the record indicates it was treated by all as such—it
was ordered from the beginning of his probation, emphasized by the court in
May 2023, and repeatedly brought up by his probation officer. The court
could reasonably conclude community service was particularly essential in
light of the serious, anti-social offense that was the basis for his wardship—
he was found to have been carrying a concealed firearm at the age of 15, soon
after the shooting death of one of his associates in the course of an attempted
robbery of a drug dealer, for which R.C. was at the very least present with
that associate and another one.
R.C. does not seriously challenge any of this evidence. Rather, he
points to his lack of further offenses, his grades, his negative drug tests, and
his purported helping out at home as demonstrating that he “completed
nearly all requirements” of his probation and as indicators of substantial
compliance. This ignores the significance with which the court viewed his
school attendance and community service. The court could reasonably
conclude they were core requirements with which R.C. did not substantially
comply, and deny his motion on that basis.
R.C. attempts to explain away his community service non-compliance
by contending he lacked the capacity to perform it. He bases this assertion
on the unsworn representations made at the January 2024 hearing by his
counsel and, after the matter was submitted and the court had issued its
12
ruling, by Mother. But he ignores that these representations, none of which
was subject to cross-examination, were not in evidence and therefore cannot
be credited on appeal. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413–414, fn. 11
[“It is axiomatic that the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence”];
In re Heather H. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 91, 95 [unsworn representations by
counsel are not evidence].)
R.C. contends that the juvenile court “credited mother’s statements
that [R.C.] lacked transportation” by suggesting that the probation
department “see what could be done for [R.C.] to complete his community
service hours on his school campus.” The court gave no such credit and made
no finding regarding Mother’s credibility. Rather, the record is clear that it
ruled before Mother made her comments. Its remark was nothing more than
a suggestion of a path by which R.C. could fulfill his community service hours
before the next review hearing.
All in all, R.C. provides rhetorical support but no evidence in support of
his motion, thereby failing to meet his burden as the moving party. (See
People v. Ochoa (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 15, 29, fn. 3 [“Generally, the moving
party bears the burden to put the supporting evidence before the court.”].)
His appeal fails for this reason alone. Even if we were to consider the
unsworn representations of R.C.’s counsel and Mother as having some
weight, they do not establish that R.C. lacked the capacity to perform his
community service. His counsel merely stated that as a result of Mother’s
poor health, R.C. “has had less free time to do community service and other
things,” thereby indicating R.C. did have the capacity, i.e., some free hours,
to perform at least a portion of his required hours. His reported inquiry to
the animal shelter is a further indication of this.
13
Despite Mother’s representation that her chronic illness meant that
she, the only driver in the household, could not take R.C. anywhere to
perform his community service, she never stated that R.C.’s uncle—whom she
had previously represented to the probation department would take R.C. to
San Francisco to perform his community service—was unavailable when the
court raised that possibility. Mother merely indicated that R.C.’s father was
not available. The representations of R.C.’s counsel and his mother indicate
only that R.C.’s priorities were in helping out his family in light of his
Mother’s illness and did not include community service. R.C. offers no
reason, and we see none, for why the court was required to accept his
priorities as a valid excuse for his repeated failure and apparent
unwillingness to comply with an essential condition of probation—that he
perform his community service hours.
Furthermore, Mother’s assertion that R.C. did not attend school both
because he had COVID and she had to go to the hospital falls short of being
convincing in light of the evidence that R.C. could be excused from school,
and was excused four times in 21 days. It is the unexcused absences that
most concerned the court. The court could reasonably infer from the record,
even considering Mother’s post-ruling representations, that R.C. did not
establish a good reason for them.
R.C. also contends he performed better than the minor in A.V., pointing
out that the appellate court there affirmed the juvenile court’s determination
that the minor had substantially complied with the terms and conditions of
his probation. (A.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 711.) We disagree that the
minor performed worse than R.C. Although the minor had mixed grades in
school, the case discussion indicates he attended it far longer and more
regularly than R.C. While he used marijuana and cocaine and failed four
14
chemical tests early on, thereby violating his deferred entry of judgment
(DEJ) probation terms and leading to the court vacating DEJ, he then passed
14 chemical tests. (Id. at pp. 702, 711.) He also completed 150 hours of
community service, a drug and alcohol program, was exemplary in his
behavior at home, and held employment after school. (Id. at p. 711.)
R.C.’s performance did not compare favorably with that of the minor in
A.V., particularly regarding school attendance and community service. But
regardless, the A.V. court merely affirmed a juvenile court ruling under the
abuse of discretion standard—meaning that it did not find the juvenile
court’s discretionary determination that the minor had substantially
complied with the terms of his probation to be unreasonable. In short, its
holding does nothing for R.C.’s cause here.
Finally, R.C., citing A.V., contends the juvenile court abused its
discretion by failing to follow the “ ‘passing grade’ ” legal standard of
substantial compliance contained in the legislative history of section 786.
(See A.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 708–709.) His counsel argued below
that this standard requires only the equivalent of a “ ‘D’ minus” grade, and
that R.C. had “definitely done far better” than that. The court responded, “I
would disagree with that categorization of what the law requires, and I don’t
think that this is a close call.” It then discussed R.C.’s poor record of school
attendance and lack of community service.
We see no legal error in the court’s remarks for two reasons. First, we
do not agree with counsel that A.V. stands for the proposition that a mere “D
minus” type of overall probation performance constitutes satisfactory
completion of a term of probation. The legislative history R.C. cites refers to
a “ ‘passing grade,’ ” but then comments merely that “ ‘[m]any probation
orders in delinquency cases are checklists of conditions that are difficult or
15
impossible for many adolescents to perform at an ‘A’ grade level’ ” (A.V.,
supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 708); this hardly indicates the Legislature’s
approval of an overall “ ‘D’ minus” probation performance, assuming for the
sake of argument that R.C. merits such a grade.
Second, as we have discussed, A.V. makes clear that “substantial
compliance” means “ ‘compliance with the substantial or essential
requirements of something . . . that satisfies its purpose or objective . . . .’ ”
(A.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 709.) The court’s remarks indicate it
considered R.C.’s school attendance and community service performance to be
essential requirements of his probation. As we have discussed, substantial
evidence supports the court’s conclusion that he did not meet these
requirements.2
In short, R.C.’s abuse of discretion argument lacks merit.
B. We Lack Jurisdiction to Consider R.C.’s Constitutional Claim
R.C. also argues that one condition of his probation, which states, “Do
not stay away from home unless with a parent or legal guardian or without
prior permission of the probation officer,” is unconstitutionally vague on its
face, requiring modification. The People oppose, arguing we lack jurisdiction
to consider this claim because it is untimely and made pursuant to a defective
notice of appeal, that R.C. forfeited it by his failure to object to the condition
below, and that R.C. is wrong on the merits. In his reply brief, R.C. “concedes
2 R.C. also argues that In re Timothy N. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 725 is
“instructive” in its definition of what constitutes the successful completion of
probation. That case in inapposite, having been decided before section 786’s
enactment (Stats. 2014, ch. 249, § 2) and having involved the lower court’s
interpretation of an undefined term—“ ‘successfully complete probation’ ”—in
the parties’ plea agreement, not a court ruling pursuant to any statutory
terms relevant to this case. (In re Timothy N., at p. 727.)
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that based on the notice of appeal, he cannot challenge his probation
conditions,” but “nonetheless urges the Court to address this issue to the
extent that it interferes with his ability to complete community service,”
which potential interference he briefly mentions in his opening brief as well.
We agree with the People that we lack jurisdiction to consider R.C.’s
constitutional challenge to the court’s imposition of this condition because it
is untimely made, an argument that R.C. does not address.
A minor may appeal a judgment in a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 601 or 602 proceeding “in the same manner as any final judgment.”
(§ 800, subd. (a)(1).) The judgments or orders of a juvenile court “ ‘which are
appealable are restricted to those enumerated in section 800 . . . .’ ” (In re
Henry S. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 248, 255.) “ ‘[T]he “judgment” in a juvenile
court proceeding is the order made after the trial court has found facts
establishing juvenile court jurisdiction and has conducted a hearing into the
proper disposition to be made.’ ” (Ibid.) In other words, the appealable
“judgment” in a juvenile court proceeding is the dispositional order. (Ibid.;
see In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 531–532 [noting the same regarding
appealable orders under section 395, the equivalent of section 800 in
dependency cases].) And “ ‘ “[a] consequence . . . is that an unappealed
disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be
attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” ’ ” (In re S.B., at p. 532
[regarding section 395].)
In juvenile cases, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after
the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed,”
with exceptions not applicable here. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).)
The timely filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional. “ ‘Compliance with
the time for filing a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
17
[Citations.] If a notice of appeal is not timely, the appellate court must
dismiss the appeal.’ ” (Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 842, quoting
Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 582,
disapproved of on another ground in Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024)
16 Cal.5th 643, 663, fn. 14.)
Here, the challenged probation condition was first ordered by the
Alameda County juvenile court in a January 2023 dispositional order. As we
have discussed, R.C.’s case was later transferred back to the juvenile court in
Contra Costa County, where it had been initiated. The latest order
containing the condition, and the one R.C. relies on for his constitutional
claim, was a dispositional order issued by the Contra Costa County juvenile
court on May 31, 2023. Assuming for the sake of argument that the portion
of the May 31, 2023 order containing the condition was appealable despite
the finality of the initial dispositional order, the latest R.C. could have
challenged the condition he complains of was at the end of July 2023, 60 days
after the issuance of the May 31, 2023 order and almost six months before
R.C. filed his appeal from the January 22, 2024 review hearing order.
Therefore, he did not timely appeal from the condition he challenges, we lack
jurisdiction to consider his constitutional claim, and we must dismiss that
part of his appeal.
In light of our conclusion, we do not discuss the other issues the parties
raise regarding this claim, except for R.C.’s request that we address his
constitutional claim to the extent the vagueness of the challenged condition
interferes going forward with his ability to complete community service.
Because R.C. did not raise this argument below and it was never ruled on by
the juvenile court, he failed to preserve it for appeal. We do not generally
issue advisory opinions as a court of first instance, and decline to do so here.
18
(See, e.g., Barber Group, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
1025, 1035, fn. 2 [in writ of mandate appeal, declining to consider “in the first
instance” jurisdictional questions that the administrative agency did not
adjudicate], quoting People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 746 (plur. opn.)
[“We will not . . . adjudicate hypothetical claims or render purely advisory
opinions”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The part of R.C.’s appeal in which he raises his constitutional claim is
dismissed. The order appealed from is otherwise affirmed.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.
19
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