People v. Wells CA5

CourtListener 10339285Calctapp25 feb 2025

Testo completo

Filed 2/25/25 P. v. Wells CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087024
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CRM028515)
v.

MARLIN MERRILL WELLS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Stephanie L.
Jamieson, Judge.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., DeSantos, J. and Fain, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant and defendant Marlin Merrill Wells (appellant) was convicted and
sentenced to prison in three separate cases for sexually molesting three children over the
span of 30 years: his eight- or nine-year-old stepdaughter in 1983, and a 13-year-old boy
in 1999, both occurring in Washington State; and John Doe, his 14-year-old grandson, in
Merced County in 2014.
While he was completing his prison sentence for the Merced County convictions,
a petition was filed under the provisions of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act)
that alleged appellant was a sexually violent predator (SVP) and should be committed to
the State Department of State Hospitals (the DSH). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)
At the jury trial on the petition, two experts testified for each side, the trial court admitted
certified records of his prior sexual molestation convictions, and the jury found the
petition’s allegations were true. The court committed appellant to the DSH.
On appeal from the commitment order, appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th
529, but also requested this court exercise its discretion to independently review the
record to address two specific issues: whether the court properly admitted evidence
about a prior conviction, and if the jury’s finding on the petition is supported by
substantial evidence.
In response to this court’s Wende letter, appellant separately filed, in propria
persona, a lengthy letter brief that also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the
admission of his prior convictions, and raised other contentions as to the provisions of the
Act. We exercise our discretion to independently review the record, address these
contentions, and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We begin with a brief summary of appellant’s prior sexual molestation convictions
in Washington State to establish the timeline of his offenses. We will address the facts of

2.
the Washington convictions in detail below, based on the evidence introduced at the jury
trial on the SVP petition.
APPELLANT’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS IN WASHINGTON
On November 28, 1983, appellant (born 1939) was convicted in Seattle,
King County, Washington, of the statutory rape of A., his stepdaughter, who was eight or
nine years old when he committed the offense (former RCW 9A.44.070). On May 15,
1984, appellant was sentenced to not more than 20 years in prison. In 1999, appellant
was released on parole.
On September 23, 1999, appellant was convicted in Vancouver, Clark County,
Washington, of two counts of second degree child molestation of B., a 13-year-old boy
(RCW 9A.44.086). On June 15, 2000, he was sentenced to 116 months in prison. In
December 2012, appellant was released from prison and into community custody in
Washington.
APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS IN MERCED COUNTY
In 2014, appellant was convicted in Merced County of sexually molesting
John Doe, his 14-year-old grandson, while he was still on community custody in
Washington. Appellant committed the offenses under the following circumstances.
Preliminary Hearing Evidence1
Los Banos Police Officer Jacob Bento testified that on July 12, 2013, John Doe, a
confidential minor victim (born 1998), arrived at the police department with his aunt, and
said he wanted to make an appointment with detective Justin Melden. Melden was busy
so Bento interviewed John Doe at the police department.
John Doe reported that appellant sexually molested him. Appellant was
John Doe’s grandfather, and appellant’s son was John Doe’s father. In his statement to

1 At the jury trial on the SVP petition, the court admitted the certified records from
appellant’s three prior convictions into evidence, including the preliminary hearing that
led to his pleas for molesting John Doe.

3.
Bento, John Doe stated that in mid-June 2013, his family drove from their home in
Los Banos to Washington State to pick up appellant from some kind of facility. On the
return drive, the family parked near a casino in Washington, and everyone slept in the car
overnight. John Doe stated that while the others were asleep, appellant began
manipulating John Doe’s pants, rubbed him beneath his underpants, and touched his penis
on top of his underwear. John Doe said he pretended to be asleep when appellant touched
him, then got out of the car to get away from appellant.
John Doe stated that when the family returned to their home in Los Banos, he was
told that he was going to share a bedroom with appellant. John Doe said that one night,
he had been partying with friends and became intoxicated. John Doe went to bed while
still wearing his pants, and appellant was not present. He woke up because appellant had
unbuttoned and pulled down his pants, removed his penis from his boxer shorts, and was
squeezing his penis and touching his buttocks. John Doe said he pretended to be asleep
“during most of the touching, but then he couldn’t stand it anymore and woke.”
John Doe said that as he sat up, appellant rubbed his back and asked if everything was
okay.
On July 16, 2013, Melden went to the residence where John Doe lived with his
family. Melden met with both appellant’s son, M.W., and the son’s girlfriend, and asked
to speak to appellant. They initially said appellant was not there, but M.W. eventually
admitted appellant was present. M.W. also said he thought John Doe (his own son) was
lying about the allegations but then he talked to appellant, who admitted there had been
some inappropriate contact.
Melden testified he met with appellant and advised him of the warnings pursuant
to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Appellant said “he has a problem. He woke
up next to [John Doe] with his hand on the juvenile’s penis, and he referenced two prior
incidents that he was arrested in and stated that he needed help.” Melden asked about the

4.
incident in the car while driving back from Washington. Appellant said he touched
John Doe’s thigh but in a nonsexual manner.
Plea and Sentencing Hearings
On October 7, 2014, appellant pleaded no contest to four counts of committing
lewd or lascivious acts on John Doe, where the victim was 14 or 15 years old and
appellant was at least 10 years older than the minor, on or between June 1 and July 12,
2013. (Pen. Code,2 § 288, subd. (c)(1).)
Appellant admitted he had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12) and one prior prison term enhancement (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), based on his
rape conviction in Seattle, Washington in 1983.3
On December 29, 2014, the trial court sentenced appellant to the indicated
second strike sentence of 11 years, and ordered him to register as a sex offender (§ 290).
SVP PROCEEDINGS
On April 9, 2020, while appellant was completing his prison sentence in the
Merced County case, the district attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 6600 et seq., alleging appellant was an SVP, he had an expected
parole date of April 19, 2020, and he should be committed to the DSH for an
indeterminate term. In support of the petition, the People filed certified mental health
evaluations prepared by Dr. William Damon and Dr. Gangaw Zaw on behalf of the DSH.
On May 5 and 8, 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing and found probable
cause to hold appellant, and set the matter for a jury trial on the petition. Thereafter,

2 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
3 The information alleged a second prior strike conviction and prior prison term
enhancement based on appellant’s conviction for the sexual molestation of B. in
Vancouver, Washington in 1999, but the allegations were dismissed as part of the
negotiated disposition.

5.
appellant was transferred from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
to the DSH at Coalinga State Hospital.
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT JURY TRIAL ON PETITION
On September 14, 2023, appellant’s jury trial began on the SVP petition.4 The
witnesses consisted of two experts called by the People, two experts called by appellant,
and the admission into evidence of certified copies of the records from appellant’s prior
sexual molestation convictions committed against A. in 1983, B. in 1999, and John Doe
in 2014.
As will be fully discussed below, at a jury trial on an SVP petition, “the People
must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the person has suffered a
conviction of at least one qualifying ‘sexually violent offense,’ (2) the person has ‘a
diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of
others,’ and (3) the mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in future
predatory acts of sexually violent criminal behavior if released from custody.” (People v.
Yates (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 474, 477 (Yates).)
THE PEOPLE’S EXPERT WITNESSES
Dr. Damon
Dr. Damon, a clinical psychologist, was employed by the DSH to evaluate inmates
to determine if they meet the criteria as an SVP under the Act. Dr. Damon evaluated
appellant four times at Coalinga State Hospital, with the last evaluation occurring in
July 2023. He reviewed appellant’s criminal history and interviewed him about his

4 On February 23, 2023, Judge Carol Ash convened appellant’s first jury trial on the
SVP petition. On March 10, 2023, after one day of deliberations, the jury informed the
court that it was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared.
The following evidentiary summary is taken from appellant’s second jury trial on
the SVP petition, presided over by Judge Stephanie L. Jamieson, where the jury found the
petition was true.

6.
convictions for sexually molesting the three minor victims, and appellant discussed the
facts and circumstances of the prior offenses.
As to the first requirement under the Act, Dr. Damon testified all of appellant’s
prior sexual molestation convictions were qualifying offenses under the Act.
Appellant’s 1983 Conviction in Washington
Dr. Damon testified appellant committed his first sexual offense in 1983, when he
was 42 or 43 years old. Appellant made the following statements about this offense. He
had been living with his second wife and her eight-year-old daughter, A., for a couple of
years. Appellant found out his wife was cheating on him, he became angry, and he
“began engaging in sexual behavior with [A.]” to get back at his wife (the child’s
mother).
Appellant said he would wait for his wife to leave the house, take the child to his
bedroom and remove her clothes, and touch her vagina. Appellant admitted he inserted
his finger and penis into A.’s vagina, masturbated in her presence, and told A. not to tell
anyone. Appellant said he engaged in this conduct weekly or every other week, for
eight to nine months.
Appellant admitted he found the behavior arousing. He knew it was wrong at the
time, he tried to fight the urges to engage in sexual behavior with the child, but he was
only successful about 50 percent of the time. Dr. Damon testified that in subsequent
interviews, appellant downplayed both the nature and frequency of his sexual
molestations of A.
Dr. Damon testified appellant’s conviction for sexually molesting A. in
Washington was the equivalent of a violation of section 288, subdivision (a), commission
of a lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years, and it constituted a
qualifying sexually violent offense under the Act.

7.
Appellant’s 1999 Conviction in Washington
Dr. Damon testified appellant also discussed the facts leading to his 1999
conviction. The victim was B., a 13-year-old boy, who lived next to appellant’s sister, J.
Appellant said he sexually molested B. at least 10 times in six months. Some of the
incidents occurred on J.’s property, when appellant and B. worked on cars together, and
appellant rubbed the boy’s penis both over and under his clothes. On other occasions,
appellant pulled the boy into a shed and orally copulated him, rubbed his penis against
the boy’s penis, and masturbated.
Appellant said he also molested B. when appellant went out of town to a car show
with J., J.’s boyfriend, and B. Everyone slept in one tent located on the property of J.’s
friend. Appellant said that on both nights, he waited for the other adults to fall asleep,
and then he masturbated and orally copulated B., and rubbed his penis against B.’s
buttocks.
Appellant talked about another incident that occurred when they were out of town.
Appellant had been at the car show with B., and they walked back to the tent because B.
had to take his medication. Appellant “had to stop several times on the walk back [to the
tent] due to his hip pain.” When they reached the tent, appellant performed an act of
masturbation on B.
Appellant admitted he was attracted to and sexually aroused by B., and knew his
behavior was wrong. He tried to fight his urges to engage in sexual behavior with B., but
he was only successful 50 percent of the time and was not concerned about the
consequences. Dr. Damon testified that in subsequent interviews, appellant again
downplayed the nature and frequency of his sexual conduct with B.
Dr. Damon testified appellant’s convictions in Washington for sexually molesting
B. were the equivalent of violating former section 288a, subdivision (c)(1), oral

8.
copulation of a child under the age of 14 years, and constituted qualifying sexually
violent offenses under the Act.5
Appellant’s 2014 Convictions in Merced County
Dr. Damon testified appellant also talked about his Merced County convictions.
Appellant said he was released from prison after serving his sentence for molesting B.,
and placed on community supervision in Washington. Appellant said that shortly after he
“got off” supervision, M.W. drove to Washington to take him back to California because
he was going to live with M.W.’s family. M.W. arrived with his girlfriend and his own
two sons (appellant’s grandsons): 14-year-old John Doe and Doe’s 18-year-old brother,
Z.W.
Appellant said that on the drive back to California, they parked overnight and
everyone slept in the car. Appellant slept in the backseat with his two grandsons. He had
never met them and they were strangers to him. Appellant admitted he touched
John Doe’s thigh, but he denied John Doe’s other allegations about what happened in the
car.
Appellant said when they arrived at M.W.’s home in California, he shared a
bedroom and a bed with both John Doe and Z.W. One night, John Doe became
intoxicated and went to bed. Appellant woke up with his arm around John Doe, who
pulled away from him. Appellant admitted “he may have done two things that John Doe
alleged,” and touched his buttocks and his pubic hair above his penis, but denied
removing John Doe’s pants or doing anything else.
Dr. Damon testified appellant’s convictions for violating section 288,
subdivision (c)(1), committing lewd or lascivious acts on John Doe, where the victim was

5 Former section 288a, subdivision (c)(1) has been renumbered as section 287,
subdivision (c)(1) without substantive change. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 49, eff. Jan. 1,
2019; Senate Bill No. 1494 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.); People v. Dorado (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 717, 724, fn. 2.)

9.
14 or 15 years old and appellant was at least 10 years older than the child, were
qualifying sexually violent offenses under the Act since appellant “engaged in the
behavior by force because John Doe was sleeping at the time of the offenses and
therefore could not resist [appellant’s] advances.”
Diagnosed Mental Disorder
Dr. Damon testified the next requirement for the SVP petition was to determine
whether appellant had a “diagnosed mental disorder,” defined as a “congenital or a[n]
acquired condition that affects the emotional or volitional capacity predisposing the
individual to criminal sexual acts to a degree constituting him a menace to the health and
safety of others.”
Dr. Damon diagnosed appellant with “[o]ther specified paraphilic disorder, sexual
interest in … prepubescent and pubescent children,” as defined in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR).
Appellant “engaged in sexual behavior with prepubescent and pubescent children for a
period of approximately 30 years from the early 80s until 2013. And when I talked to
[appellant] initially, he admitted sexual interest in children. And I asked him when is the
first time you experienced that, and he said it was with the first victim, [A.], and when I
asked him when was the last time you experienced that he said with my grandson [John
Doe].”
Appellant was 73 years old when he molested John Doe. Appellant was 80 years
old when Dr. Damon initially interviewed him in 2020. At that first interview, appellant
said he had an average sex drive, fantasies of teen boys were always present, and he
masturbated about once a month. In later interviews, appellant claimed he had minimal
to no sexual drive or interest.

10.
Likelihood to Commit Sexual Offenses
Dr. Damon testified someone is volitionally impaired if the person has serious
difficulty controlling his sexually offending behavior, and the person’s behavior is
unlikely to be deferred or stopped by the risk of criminal punishment.
In Dr. Damon’s opinion, appellant had difficulty controlling his behavior because
he continued to sexually molest children despite prior arrests, convictions, prison
sentences, registration requirements, and mandatory treatment programs while in custody
and on parole. When appellant was initially released from prison after serving the
sentence for molesting A., he violated community release because he had contact with
children in 1991. He was still on supervised release and attending weekly treatment
sessions when he sexually molested B. in 1999. However, appellant claimed he never
had a problem complying with community release, and he could not recognize his past
problems.
Dr. Damon believed appellant was still suffering from his sexual disorder, because
there had to be evidence of no new sexual offenses in five years in an uncontrolled
environment in the community and out of custody. However, appellant sexually molested
B. and John Doe shortly after he was released from custody in his prior cases.
Risk Assessment Scores
Dr. Damon testified appellant posed a serious and well-founded risk of reoffending
because of his mental disorder and volitional impairment. Appellant had a score of
two on the STATIC-99R, an actuarial measure of risk assessment, placing him in the
average risk range. Appellant’s score on the Violence Risk Scale- Sexual Offense Version
(VRS-SO), a dynamic risk assessment tool, placed him in the above average risk
category. When the two scores were combined, appellant was in the average risk
category.
Dr. Damon also considered two case-specific factors that were significant
predictors of sexual recidivism but not fully captured by the actuarial assessments.

11.
One factor was appellant’s emotional identification with children, which was relevant
because when appellant was asked about molesting B., he said, “ ‘I seem to attract young
people. I’m always getting close to them,’ ” and he found it easier to relate to teens than
adults. Dr. Damon believed that when appellant molested B. during the weekend trip to
the car show, appellant essentially went on a “double date” with B., along with J. and her
boyfriend.
Another case-specific factor was appellant’s poor problem solving that led to risky
behavior. When appellant discovered his second wife was cheating on him, he did not
attempt to resolve the issue with her but instead sexually molested her daughter, A.
When appellant was released from prison and into the community, he said he felt lonely
and lacked social support. Instead of seeking additional help through sexual offender
treatment, he sexually molested B. because he said “ ‘Hey, if I go back to prison, I’ll be
with friends.’ ” In 2013, after serving prison sentences for sexually molesting A. and then
B., he slept in the same bed with 14-year-old John Doe and sexually molested him.
Dr. Damon was also concerned about appellant’s postrelease plans to again live
with his son and his family. Appellant did not think this would be a high-risk situation
because he claimed he was not likely to reoffend. Dr. Damon disagreed because
appellant would be living with the same people who let him sleep in the same room with
his grandson.
Dr. Damon believed appellant’s low score on the STATIC-99R likely
underestimated his risk level. If appellant had been similarly evaluated after he was
released from prison for molesting A., his score would have been a negative one with a
below average risk, but he then molested B. If he had been evaluated after serving his
sentence for molesting B., his score would have been zero, again placing him in the
below average risk category, but he then molested John Doe.

12.
Appellant’s Age and Health
At the time of the jury trial on the SVP petition, appellant was 83 years old.
Dr. Damon testified appellant had health and vision problems and needed a walker, but
these factors would not decrease his ability to reoffend. The research generally showed
the risk of sexually reoffending decreased at age 40, and decreased again at age 60.
Appellant was in his early 40s when he molested A., he was in his late 50s when he
molested B., and he was 73 years old when he molested John Doe.
Dr. Damon testified appellant’s age and health problems did not impede his ability
to sexually reoffend because he did not rely on strength, speed, or endurance to molest
the minor victims. Instead, his criminal history showed that he used opportunity and
manipulation to reoffend and sexually molest children. In addition, appellant had
reoffended even when suffering from physical problems. Appellant said he had shingles
in his eye in the late 1990s, which led to vision problems, but he reoffended after that
time. Appellant already had mobility issues when he molested B., because both appellant
and B. said as they walked back to the tent, they had to stop several times because of
appellant’s hip pain. However, appellant still molested B. when they reached the tent.
Dr. Damon concluded that appellant “has already engaged in sex offending
behavior at times when he was supposedly at reduced risk. So the idea that well, he
won’t do it now just does not seem very convincing to me.”
Dr. Zaw’s testimony
Dr. Zaw, the People’s second expert, was a consulting psychologist with the DSH,
and previously a treatment provider at Coalinga State Hospital. She conducted
four evaluations of appellant, most recently in the summer of 2023.
Dr. Zaw testified that based on her review of appellant’s records and his own
statements during their meetings, appellant had a total of seven convictions for
committing qualifying sexually violent offenses against three victims: A., B., and
John Doe.

13.
Dr. Zaw diagnosed appellant with pedophilic disorder, a chronic condition that
“doesn’t go away.” The criteria for pedophilic disorder was that over a period of
six months, a person has fantasies, urges, or behaviors involving a prepubescent child or
children generally 13 years or younger, the person acted on those urges, and there’s
impairment resulting from those urges or behaviors. Dr. Zaw’s diagnosis was based on
evidence that he molested the first victim, A., over a period of six months, and then
molested the second victim, B., over another period of six months.
Dr. Zaw testified appellant’s behavior made him both volitionally and emotionally
impaired, because he repeatedly reoffended each time he was released from custody,
placed in the community, and had the opportunity to molest a child, and he failed to
recognize the harm he was causing to the victims. In 1999, appellant reoffended by
sexually molesting B. even though he was still on supervised release and receiving
treatment arising from his conviction for molesting A. His lack of sexual misconduct in
prison was not relevant because there were no children around him.
Dr. Zaw scored appellant a two on the STATIC-99R, placing him in the average
range to reoffend. She also scored him using the VRS-SO, and concluded he was most
comparable to the “high risk, high needs” population.
Dr. Zaw testified appellant posed a serious and well-founded risk of sexually
reoffending. It was significant that he again reoffended when he was 73 years old and
molested John Doe. These later offenses showed that even with his low score, appellant
was not an average risk individual or the typical offender reflected in the STATIC-99R
routine sample group.
Dr. Zaw acknowledged appellant’s age and health problems, but testified he was
generally healthy, he was not paralyzed or bedridden, he could perform the activities of
daily living, and his energy level was “still pretty high.” Appellant was capable of
reoffending based on how he committed the prior sexual molestations.

14.
Dr. Zaw testified she was concerned appellant did not have a treatment plan set up
for his release. Appellant said “he’s planning to move in with his son and I know he’s
planning to move out of state .…” Dr. Zaw did not know if he would have exposure with
his grandchildren, and it seemed he would be in “kind of the same situation that was
similar before he came to prison and the hospital.”
APPELLANT’S EXPERT WITNESSES
Dr. Korpi
Dr. Douglas Korpi, a psychologist, was a forensic evaluator who had conducted
SVP evaluations for 20 years. He reviewed the entirety of appellant’s records, and met
with appellant for one evaluation in May 2021.
Dr. Korpi acknowledged appellant was convicted of committing qualifying
sexually violent offenses committed against the three victims. Dr. Korpi also diagnosed
appellant with pedophilic disorder and other specified pedophilic disorder, that meant he
was interested in both children and teenagers, and the disorder would not go away.
Dr. Korpi further testified appellant’s mental disorder resulted in volitional impairment,
and his history showed that it was hard for him to control his behavior. Appellant had not
completed the modules in the sex offender treatment program since he had been at
Coalinga State Hospital. Appellant told Dr. Korpi that when he was released, it would be
“nice” to attend sex offender treatment but did not think he needed to.
Dr. Korpi testified appellant did not meet the SVP criteria because he was not
likely to reoffend. He scored appellant at two on the STATIC-99R, that placed him in the
average range, with a five to 11 percent probability of reoffending over five years.
Dr. Korpi also used the STATIC-2002R, and appellant’s score was six, with a 19 to
23 percent probability of reoffending over five years. Dr. Korpi used the STABLE test to
assess appellant’s dynamic risk factors, instead of the VRS-SO test that was more open to
subjectivity.

15.
Dr. Korpi testified his opinion that appellant was not likely to reoffend was based
on appellant’s advanced age and current medical problems, which he considered the only
relevant factors in this case. Appellant had coronary artery disease, high blood pressure,
high cholesterol, prostate problems, and vision and hearing problems. Appellant’s hips
were degenerating, he had to use a walker or cane, and he was a fall risk. Dr. Korpi
acknowledged appellant was stable with medication.
Dr. Korpi testified appellant’s history showed his sexual appetite was slowing
down, consistent with aging and medical problems, because his body was falling apart.
“[W]e look at the arc of his life. I mean … he started out, the sex-offending lasted
against the very first victim [A.] for about a year, and very robust sexual acting out. And
the second victim [B.] was for about six months. Not quite as a robust sexual appetite.
And then the last victim in 2013 [John Doe]—which, by the way, we wouldn’t expect,
given his age of 73 at that time—any way, the last victim was, you know, only twice and
happened over a brief period of time. So we can see … he’s slowing down in terms of his
sexual appetite.” Appellant was “no longer a serious and well-founded risk.”
Dr. Korpi conceded it was “weird” that appellant reoffended when he was 73 years
old and sexually molested John Doe, “[s]o this is a weird case,” and appellant was a
statistical anomaly outside of the actuarial studies. However, he concluded appellant’s
physical condition was worse now that he was 83 years old, so that he was no longer the
same risk he was when he was 73 years old.
Dr. Abbott
Dr. Brian Abbott, a clinical psychologist, conducted forensic psychological
evaluations for SVP proceedings. He evaluated appellant in October 2022.
Dr. Abbott assumed but did not offer an opinion as to whether appellant’s prior
sexual molestations were qualifying convictions because that was for the jury to decide.
Dr. Abbott testified appellant did not currently suffer from any legally defined
mental disorder within the meaning of the Act because he did not have a sexual

16.
preference for nonconsenting partners, including prepubescent children. While appellant
had been sexually aroused by underage children, Dr. Abbott testified that fact was
insufficient evidence to conclude he suffered from pedophilic disorder.
Based on appellant’s records for the previous six to 12 months, Dr. Abbott did not
see any recent indicia that appellant had serious difficulty with volitional control of his
prior behavior. Dr. Abbott conducted a risk assessment of appellant and agreed that his
score on the STATIC-99R was two. Appellant’s risk assessment score placed him in the
average risk category, with a recidivism rate of approximately 3.6 percent over a period
of five years.
Dr. Abbott believed it was improper to use other risk assessment tools because of
appellant’s advanced age of 83 years old. Dr. Abbott concluded that even if appellant
suffered from a diagnosed mental disorder as defined by law, he still did not pose a
serious and well-founded risk of reoffending. He had a five-year risk of 3.6 percent,
which would continue to decline with each year of advancing age, and the risk was not
more than a mere possibility. Appellant’s risk of reoffending “was so low that it did not
meet the standard of a substantial danger that is a serious and well[-]founded risk,” and
he did not consider appellant’s risk to be high or more than a mere possibility.
Verdict and Commitment Order
On October 5, 2023, the jury found the petition’s allegation true, that appellant met
the definition of a sexually violent predator. On October 6, 2023, the trial court filed the
order that committed appellant for an indeterminate term to a secure facility designated
by the DSH.
On October 11, 2023, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, appellant’s counsel filed a brief with this court pursuant to Wende
and Ben C., but counsel also asked this court to exercise its discretion to independently
review the record and address two specific issues: whether the jury’s finding on the

17.
petition is supported by substantial evidence, and whether appellant was prejudiced by
the admission of evidence about a nonqualifying prior sexual offense conviction.
In response to this court’s invitation pursuant to Wende, appellant filed, in propria
persona, a 33-page letter brief that raises numerous issues, including whether the jury’s
verdict is supported by substantial evidence, and arguments about the validity and
constitutionality of the Act.
We exercise our discretion to review the issues raised in both the Wende brief and
appellant’s letter brief since there is some overlap in these contentions.
I. The SVP Act
We begin with reviewing the relevant statutory provisions. “The Sexually Violent
Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. … the Act) allows the state to petition
superior courts for the involuntary civil commitment of certain convicted sex offenders
whose diagnosed mental disorders make them a significant danger to others and likely to
reoffend after release from prison.” (Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177,
184 (Walker).)
An SVP is defined “as ‘a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes
the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will
engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.’ ” (People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th
109, 126.)
“An alleged SVP is entitled to a jury trial, at which the People must prove
three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the person has suffered a conviction of at
least one qualifying ‘sexually violent offense,’ (2) the person has ‘a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others,’ and (3) the
mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in future predatory acts of sexually
violent criminal behavior if released from custody.” (Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at
p. 477.)

18.
A. Qualifying Offenses
To satisfy the first element, a finding that someone is an SVP requires only a
single qualifying conviction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘Sexually
violent offense’ means the following acts when committed by force, violence, duress,
menace, fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person, or
threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person, and that are
committed on, before, or after the effective date of this article and result in a conviction
or a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, as defined in subdivision (a): a felony
violation of Section 261, 262, 264.1, 269, 286, 287, 288, 288.5, or 289 of, or former
Section 288a of, the Penal Code, or any felony violation of Section 207, 209, or 220 of
the Penal Code, committed with the intent to commit a violation of Section 261, 262,
264.1, 286, 287, 288, or 289 of, or former Section 288a of, the Penal Code.” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b).)
However, “[i]f the victim of an underlying offense that is specified in
subdivision (b) of [Welfare and Institutions Code] Section 6600 is a child under the age
of 14, the offense shall constitute a ‘sexually violent offense’ for purposes of
Section 6600.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600.1.)
When the victim is 14 years of age or older, “[f]or a conviction to be ‘sexually
violent,’ the acts underlying the conviction must have been committed ‘by force,
violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or
another person, or threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other
person.’ ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 6600, subd. (b).)” (People v. Burroughs (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 378, 403 (Burroughs).)
The term “force,” as used in the context of forcible sex offenses, has no special
legal meaning. (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023.) The question is simply
whether the defendant used force to accomplish an act of intercourse against the victim’s
will, not whether the force used overcame the victim’s physical strength or ability to

19.
resist. (Id. at p. 1028.) “Duress,” in the context of rape, sodomy, and oral copulation,
means “ ‘a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution
sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act
which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which
one otherwise would not have submitted.’ ” (People v. Schulz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 999,
1005.) Duress “can arise in a variety of ways related to psychological and/or situational
factors between the perpetrator and the victim.… ‘ “Where the defendant is a family
member and the victim is young, … the position of dominance and authority of the
defendant and his continuous exploitation of the victim” is relevant to the existence of
duress.’ ” (People v. Guenther (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 483, 516 (Guenther).)
“These principles translate readily to other circumstances involving an uneven
power dynamic between a victim and perpetrator inhabiting a position of authority.
While the ‘relative ages and sizes’ [citation] of the perpetrator and victim may not be as
relevant to proving psychological compulsion or duress where … the victim is an adult,
other factors related to ‘ “the position of dominance and authority of the defendant” ’
[citation] remain salient.” (Guenther, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 483, 516.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (a)(3) states “[t]he
existence of any prior convictions may be shown with documentary evidence. The
details underlying the commission of an offense that led to a prior conviction, including a
predatory relationship with the victim, may be shown by documentary evidence,
including, but not limited to, preliminary hearing transcripts, trial transcripts, probation
and sentencing reports, and evaluations by the [DSH].” The People may also introduce
certified copies of records from any custodial facility “ ‘ “in which” the defendant has
been imprisoned to prove that a person has been convicted of a crime,’ including a
sexually violent offense.” (Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 477, fn. 2.)
These provisions “allow[] the prosecution to prove the facts of a defendant’s prior
qualifying convictions not just with certain documents (like evaluations) but also with

20.
multiple-level-hearsay statements contained therein (like police and probation reports,
and victim and witness statements they include).” (Walker, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 198.)
The Act’s broad hearsay exception was enacted “ ‘to relieve victims of the burden and
trauma of testifying about the details of the crimes underlying the prior convictions,’
which may have occurred many years in the past.” (Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 477–478; Walker, at pp. 198–199.)
“Whether an offense is ‘sexually violent’ is an issue a jury is competent to
determine ….” (Burroughs, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) The trier of fact considers
the offender’s prior convictions for sexually violent crimes “ ‘ “solely for evidentiary
purposes” to help establish … current mental disorder and the likelihood of future violent
sex crimes.’ ” (People v. Vasquez (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1225, 1232.)
B. Diagnosed Mental Disorder
For the second element, the Act defines a diagnosed mental disorder “as ‘a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that
predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting
the person a menace to the health and safety of others.’ [Citations.] To establish this
element, the People will have one or more experts evaluate the person, review
documentary evidence (such as state hospital records, police and probation reports, and
prison records), and render a diagnosis.” (Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.)
C. Likelihood of Future Criminal Behavior
“For the third element, the People must show that, if released, the alleged SVP will
likely engage in sexually violent criminal behavior due to the diagnosed mental disorder.
[Citations.] The Act requires proof of a clear link between the second and third elements;
that is, the finding of future dangerousness must be shown to derive from ‘a currently
diagnosed mental disorder characterized by the inability to control dangerous sexual
behavior.’ [Citations.] Again, in the SVP trial the People will present expert testimony—
usually based on diagnostic tools that predict future violent sexual behavior—to establish

21.
the alleged SVP’s dangerousness and likelihood to reoffend.” (Yates, supra, 25
Cal.App.5th at p. 478.)
D. Commitment Order.
“The trial represents the final step in the ‘complex administrative and judicial
process’ required to civilly commit an individual as an SVP.” (Walker, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 190.) The statute lays out “a number of procedural protections for the conduct of
trial, including the right to a jury and to the assistance of counsel and relevant experts.
[Citation.] At trial, the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the person is an SVP.” (Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 370.)
If the trier of fact finds the individual is an SVP, the court issues an order for an
indefinite commitment “from which the individual can be released if it is shown that the
individual no longer qualifies as an SVP. [Citations.] Under this system, a person who is
committed as an SVP must be reexamined annually by a qualified mental health
professional to determine whether commitment is still appropriate.” (Camacho v.
Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 370–371; Walker, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 190.)
II. Constitutional Claims
In his letter brief, appellant raises various constitutional challenges to the Act’s
provisions and argues a civil commitment is unconstitutional, and his due process rights
were violated because the statute does not require evidence of a current act of sexual
molestation.
Similar constitutional challenges to the Act have been rejected. The Act does not
violate a defendant’s rights to due process and equal protection, it is not invalid under the
ex post facto clause, the provisions are not void for vagueness, and the civil commitment
does not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. (Needham v.
Superior Court (2024) 16 Cal.5th 333, 352; People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172,
1188–1211; Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1142–1143; People v.
Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 572, and cases cited within; People v. McKee (2012)

22.
207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1347.) In addition, a statute substantially similar to the Act has
been held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court. (See, e.g., Kansas v.
Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 350 [upholding Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act
allowing commitment of people with a “ ‘mental abnormality’ ” who are likely to engage
in “ ‘predatory acts of sexual violence’ ”]; Hubbart, supra, at pp. 1143, 1153–1155.)
III. The Jury’s SVP Finding Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
In the Wende brief, appellate counsel requests this court to consider whether there
is substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding on the SVP petition “[i]n light of
appellant’s advanced age and average actuarial score on the Static[-]99R.”
In his letter brief, appellant also asserts there is insufficient evidence to support
each element required to prove the SVP petition. Appellant argues the jury’s true finding
on the petition must be reversed because there is no evidence of a substantial danger that
he will commit future crimes, his “alleged” mental disorder is “inactive” and will stay
that way with treatment, there was insufficient evidence of his future dangerousness
based on the experts’ diagnostic tests, the experts’ determinations of his future
dangerousness was “meaningless” and not supported by substantial evidence, and the
experts committed “professional negligence.”
A. Review of the Jury’s Finding
A person alleged to be an SVP is entitled to a jury trial where the People must
prove the three requisite elements for an SVP petition beyond a reasonable doubt. (Yates,
supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 477.) On appeal, this court “reviews the sufficiency of the
evidence in [the Act] cases under the same substantial evidence test used in criminal
appeals. [Citation.] ‘In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Reversal for
insufficiency of the evidence is warranted only if it appears that ‘ “upon no hypothesis

23.
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the judgment].” ’ ” (People v.
Orey, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 560–561.)
B. Analysis
There is overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s finding that the petition was
true and appellant is an SVP. There were four experts who testified in this case: two for
the People and two for appellant. All four experts reviewed the certified records for
appellant’s prior sexual molestation convictions committed on the three minors, and the
court admitted those records into evidence. The experts also interviewed appellant, and
testified to his statements about the nature and circumstances of those offenses.
Both prosecution experts, and one of appellant’s experts, agreed the evidence
established that appellant’s prior convictions for sexually molesting A. in 1983, B. in
1999, and John Doe in 2014, constituted qualifying offenses within the meaning of the
Act. The same three experts also agreed appellant had a diagnosed mental disorder that
made him a danger to the health and safety of others, defined as sexual interest in
prepubescent and pubescent children. All four experts generally agreed that appellant’s
scores on the actuarial tests minimized his risk to reoffend.
The major disagreement between the experts was the impact of appellant’s age and
physical conditions on his future risk. Drs. Damon and Zaw testified for the People that
appellant’s low actuarial scores underestimated and did not accurately capture appellant’s
actual risk level. They relied on appellant’s history that showed he would have been
scored at zero to a low risk of reoffending after his prior convictions for molesting A. and
B., and he continued to reoffend shortly after being released from custody for each of his
prior offenses, even when he was still on supervised release and attending sexual offender
counseling. The People’s experts also testified appellant reoffended after he started to
suffer from medical problems, such as shingles and mobility issues. They testified that
appellant’s age and physical condition would not reduce his actual risk to reoffend
because he did not rely on strength, speed, or endurance to molest the victims. Appellant

24.
instead relied on opportunity and manipulation to reoffend. He was generally healthy, he
was not paralyzed or bedridden, he could perform the activities of daily living, and his
energy level was still high.
Dr. Korpi, appellant’s expert, acknowledged it was “weird” that appellant was
73 years old when he molested his grandson, John Doe, and admitted appellant was a
statistical anomaly outside of the studies. However, Dr. Korpi believed appellant was not
likely to reoffend based on his low risk levels measured by the actuarial tests and his
current medical conditions. Dr. Korpi reached this conclusion based on the fact that
appellant only molested John Doe twice, and testified that showed his sexual appetite had
slowed down with age and his increasing health problems.
Dr. Korpi’s conclusions on this point are undermined by the preliminary hearing
for the charges based on John Doe, introduced into evidence as part of the record of
conviction. The evidence showed appellant started to molest John Doe immediately upon
meeting him in approximately mid-June 2013, when appellant’s family picked him up in
Washington and slept in the car on the drive back to California. Appellant’s molestations
of John Doe did not end because appellant lost interest. Instead, John Doe and his aunt
arrived at the Los Banos Police Department on July 12, 2013, to make an appointment
with a detective to report appellant’s crimes. Bento interviewed John Doe that day, and
the boy disclosed appellant’s sexual molestations. John Doe’s own father did not believe
his son when he told him about the molestations. The record thus shows appellant’s
sexual molestations of John Doe ended only because the boy reported him to the police,
and refutes the conclusion that appellant’s sexual interests were slowing down because he
was 73 years old.
In his letter brief, appellant asserts there was no evidence he showed “signs and
symptoms” of a mental disorder in the six months prior to his trial on the SVP petition.
Appellant claims his due process rights were violated because he could only be

25.
committed as an SVP if he was diagnosed with a mental disorder at the time he was
sentenced for molesting John Doe in 2014.
Dr. Zaw testified for the People that appellant’s lack of sexual misconduct in
prison was not relevant because there were no children around him. Indeed, arguments
similar to those raised by appellant were rejected in People v. McCloud (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 1076, 1090. In McCloud, the appellant argued that even if there was
sufficient evidence he suffered from a current mental condition as defined by the Act,
there was no evidence that he was unable to control his behavior and likely to reoffend
because “his crimes were committed long ago” and “his time in prison has been without
incident.” (Ibid.) McCloud rejected that argument and held that experts testified the
appellant’s difficulty controlling his behavior “was evidenced by the fact that he had
committed rapes in the past, had been sanctioned with long term imprisonment, and had
nevertheless reoffended shortly after his release.” (Ibid.) “That [the appellant] had not
exhibited difficulty controlling his behavior while in custody did not alter [the experts’]
opinion concerning his impaired volitional capacity because ‘[i]n a confined environment
the demonstration of behaviors can be highly restricted.’ We note that [Welfare and
Institutions Code] section 6600, subsection (d), provides: ‘ “Danger to the health and
safety of others” does not require proof of a recent overt act while the offender is in
custody.’ ” (Ibid.) We find McCloud persuasive and reject appellant’s arguments herein.
There is thus overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s finding that appellant
was an SVP within the meaning of the Act.
IV. Appellant’s Prior Convictions
Both appellate counsel in the Wende brief, and appellant in his letter brief, raise
issues about the trial court’s admission of appellant’s prior convictions at his jury trial on
the SVP petition. We separately address these contentions.

26.
A. The Wende Brief
In appellant’s Wende brief, appellate counsel asked this court to address the
following issue:

“Did the trial court err by considering evidence regarding appellant’s
1981 conviction from New Mexico, which it had ruled, in limine, to be
inadmissible and which, accordingly, was not testified to by the
prosecution’s witnesses (although it was included among other layers of
hearsay in documents admitted as evidence by stipulation of the parties)? If
so, in light of the other admissible evidence regarding appellant’s other
sexual offense convictions, was the error prejudicial? (Italics added.)
There is no evidence in this record that appellant was convicted of committing a
sexual molestation offense in New Mexico or that he was convicted of any prior offenses
in 1981. Counsel may have erroneously included this argument in the Wende brief.
To the extent counsel sought to challenge the evidence of appellant’s prior
convictions, we note that during pretrial motions before the jury trial on the SVP petition,
appellant’s counsel conceded appellant’s convictions for molesting A. and B. constituted
qualifying offenses under the Act because both victims were under the age of 14 years,
and the record supports that concession.6
However, counsel moved to exclude evidence about appellant’s prior convictions
for sexually molesting John Doe in violation of section 288, subdivision (c)(1), and
argued the convictions were not qualifying offenses since John Doe was 14 years old, and
there was no evidence the offenses were committed with force or fear, as required by
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). The prosecutor replied
appellant committed the molestations “due to fear and duress” since “the minor child was
asleep at the time that [appellant] had touched his genitals. And … though he was awake

6 As noted ante, “[i]f the victim of an underlying offense that is specified in
subdivision (b) of [Welfare and Institutions Code] Section 6600 is a child under the age
of 14, the offense shall constitute a ‘sexually violent offense’ for purposes of
Section 6600.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600.1.)

27.
when he felt the touching, he pretended to not be awake. He pretended to still be asleep
in hoping that it would stop, that [appellant] would just leave him alone. It is the
People’s position that that is duress and fear and that even though he was awake, he
remained still afraid to do anything.”
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to exclude and held the threshold
question of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a sexually violent offense was a
question of fact for the jury to determine.
To the extent appellate counsel challenges the Merced County convictions as being
qualifying offenses, the court correctly declined to exclude this evidence. There is
substantial evidence that appellant’s molestations of John Doe were qualifying offenses,
based on Dr. Damon’s testimony that appellant “engaged in the behavior by force because
John Doe was sleeping at the time of the offenses and therefore could not resist
[appellant’s] advances,” and his opinion about appellant’s use of force is supported by the
record. There was also evidence of duress based on appellant’s status as a family
member, since “ ‘ “the position of dominance and authority of the defendant and his
continuous exploitation of the victim” is relevant to the existence of duress’ ” and the
“uneven power dynamic between a victim and perpetrator inhabiting a position of
authority.” (Guenther, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 516.)
B. Appellant’s Letter Brief
In his letter brief, appellant argues the prior qualifying convictions should not have
been admitted into evidence because they were prejudicial and too remote.
Appellant’s prior convictions were not introduced under the provisions of
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352, or subject to exclusion for being remote or
constituting prejudicial character evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Branch (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 274, 280–283.) Instead, the trial court properly admitted the prior
convictions as relevant for the People to prove the first requirement for an SVP petition,
that “the person has suffered a conviction of at least one qualifying ‘sexually violent

28.
offense.’ ” (Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 477.) The trier of fact considers the
offender’s prior convictions for sexually violent crimes “ ‘ “solely for evidentiary
purposes” to help establish … current mental disorder and the likelihood of future violent
sex crimes.’ ” (People v. Vasquez, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1232.)
The jury herein was instructed as required by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 6600, subdivision (a)(3), that it could not conclude appellant was a sexually
violent predator “based solely on his alleged prior convictions without additional
evidence that he currently has a diagnosed mental disorder .…” (CALCRIM No. 3454.)
V. Appellant’s Other Contentions
In his letter brief, appellant offers his interpretation of the purported premise of the
Act: “[T]hat one who does not have an intimate (even sexual) relationship with another
consenting individual, be suddenly branded an SVP and held indefinitely because of this
lack of relationship being somehow closely related to deviant sexual behavior[.]”
Appellant asserts that given this illegal purpose, he was “committed” to the DSH only
because he was not cohabitating with anyone, that such an inference amounted to a
“massive invasion of rights (including privacy),” and it was “unethical and
unprofessional” for the experts to conduct “such a strenuous investigation into someone’s
life that may not necessarily be relevant to showing evidence of future criminality due to
the lack of a companion.”
In making these arguments, appellant has not cited specific evidence or testimony
at his jury trial on the petition to support his claim that he was “committed” because he
was not cohabitating with anyone. The lone reference to appellant’s living conditions
occurred when Dr. Damon addressed appellant’s lack of volitional control and likelihood
to reoffend. Dr. Damon testified that when appellant was married to A.’s mother, she
would have been a consenting adult for a sexual relationship, but instead he chose to
sexually molest a child and that showed his lack of volitional control.

29.
More importantly, appellant misstates the purpose of the SVP law. The Act
“allows the state to petition superior courts for the involuntary civil commitment of
certain convicted sex offenders whose diagnosed mental disorders make them a
significant danger to others and likely to reoffend after release from prison. The purpose
of the [Act] is to protect the public from a select group of criminal offenders (sexually
violent predators, or SVPs), and to provide these offenders with the necessary treatment
for their mental disorders.” (Walker, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 184.)
As set forth ante, the experts for both the People and appellant focused exclusively
on appellant’s prior sexual molestations of the three minors, and his record of reoffending
shortly after being released from custody, and never relied on his “cohabitation” history
to conclude his prior convictions were qualifying offenses and he was a sexually violent
predator.
Appellant further claims his due process rights were violated because the court
imposed a “sentence” on him in violation of section 1170, subdivision (b), and
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Section 1170 addresses the determinate
sentencing law. (§ 1170, subd. (b).) While a person who is alleged and found to be an
SVP retains many procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants, the special
proceedings on an SVP petition are civil in nature and the determinate sentencing law is
inapplicable. (Burroughs, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 383–384.)
After independent review of the record, we find no reasonably arguable factual or
legal issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s civil commitment order is affirmed.

30.

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