CourtListener 10339281•People v. Young CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 2/25/25 P. v. Young CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B334422
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA001203)
TORAINO YOUNG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The trial court denied defendant Toraino Young’s
(defendant’s) petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6 (former section 1170.95) at the prima facie stage based on
its conclusion that the record of conviction demonstrates as a
matter of law that defendant was the murder victim’s actual
killer.1 We are asked to decide whether there is a sufficient basis
for the trial court’s actual-killer-as-a-matter-of-law finding.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Criminal Conduct and Trial
As we discuss post, the trial court relied on this court’s
partially published opinion resolving defendant’s direct appeal
from his judgment of conviction (People v. Young (1992) 11
Cal.App.4th 1299 (Young I)) to make its ruling on defendant’s
section 1172.6 petition. For that reason, the summary of
defendant’s offense conduct that follows is taken from Young I.
One night in July 1989, Steven Soyars (Soyars) drove his
friend, Estella Cabrera (Cabrera), to her home in Los Angeles.
When Cabrera went inside, another car pulled into the driveway
behind Soyars. The occupants of that car—defendant and
another man—then approached Soyars wearing masks and
carrying guns.
Defendant pointed a gun at Soyars and told him to move to
the back seat of his car. Soyars complied, defendant got into
Soyars’s car, and defendant’s companion backed the other car out
of the driveway. Cabrera witnessed what was going on and
yelled from the house that she was calling the police. Defendant
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
drove away in Soyars’s car, with Soyars still inside, and after
driving for about 500 feet, defendant told Soyars to get out of the
car. Defendant demanded money, and Soyars gave him his
wallet.
A Los Angeles Police Department officer was on patrol
nearby. The officer drove past defendant, who was still driving
Soyars’s car, and made a U-turn to follow him. Defendant then
accelerated, and the officer pursued him. During the ensuing
chase, defendant drove in excess of 50 miles per hour on
residential streets, veered onto the wrong side of the road, and
ran multiple red lights. Ultimately, at one intersection where he
ran a red light, defendant collided with a minivan and a Volvo.
The Volvo catapulted into the air and landed on its roof; its
driver, Martin Brumer (Brumer), died at the scene. Defendant
fled on foot, but pursuing officers apprehended him.
At his later criminal trial on a charge of murder and other
offenses, defendant testified in his own defense and, in the words
of Young I, told “an incredible story [in] which [he] admitted
having the collision” but claimed someone gave him permission to
drive Soyars’s car. The trial court instructed defendant’s jury on
felony murder using a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.21.2 The
2
The instruction provided: “The unlawful killing of a human
being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which
occurs [during the commission or attempted commission of the
crime] of robbery or kidnap for robbery is murder of the first
degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit
such crime. [¶] The specific intent to commit robbery or kidnap
for robbery and the commission or attempted commission of such
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
3
court also instructed the jury on unjoined perpetrators using
CALJIC No. 2.11.5.3
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and
found true a robbery-murder special circumstance (§§ 187, subd.
(a), 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). The jury also convicted
defendant of second degree robbery (§ 211) and evading a police
officer causing death (Veh. Code, § 2800.3). The trial court
sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of
parole plus determinate terms for the offenses other than the
murder charge. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction in
Young I.
B. Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
Defendant filed his section 1172.6 form petition for
resentencing in November 2022. Defendant asked the trial court
to appoint counsel to represent him, which the court did.
The People opposed defendant’s petition and submitted
with their opposition a copy of the Young I opinion, the jury
instructions given in defendant’s trial, and the jury verdict forms.
The People acknowledged the jury was instructed on felony
murder but argued defendant was “prosecuted and convicted as
3
The instruction provided: “There has been evidence in this
case indicating that a person other than defendant was or may
have been involved in the crime for which the defendant is on
trial. [¶] There may be many reasons why such person is not
here on trial. Therefore, do not discuss or give any consideration
as to why the other person is not being prosecuted in this trial or
whether [he] has been or will be prosecuted. Your [sole] duty is
to decide whether the People have proved the guilt of the
defendant on trial.”
4
the actual killer” because no instruction on aiding and abetting
was given to the jury. Defendant filed a reply in which he chiefly
argued the trial court may not engage in fact-finding at the prima
facie stage of section 1172.6 consideration.
The trial court held a hearing and denied the petition at
the prima facie stage, without issuing an order to show cause. In
doing so, the court acknowledged it was relying on the factual
summary included in Young I, which “show[ed] that the
prosecut[ion] portrayed [defendant] . . . as the actual killer” and
he “was not accused of acting with anyone else when he killed the
victim.” In addition (and in the alternative), the trial court
believed the jury instructions also established as a matter of law
that defendant was the victim’s actual killer. The court cited
both “[t]he absence of jury instructions on imputed malice or
accomplice liability” and the fact that the evading an officer count
“required a finding that [defendant] ‘proximately caused the
death of another person[.]’ . . .”
II. DISCUSSION
Although the factual summary in Young I indicates
defendant was Brumer’s actual killer, section 1172.6 prohibits
the court from relying on a prior appellate opinion to make such a
determination. The section 1172.6 court therefore erred by
relying on Young I to find as a matter of law that defendant was
the victim’s actual killer. The court’s alternative reliance on the
jury instructions given at defendant’s trial is also defective
because neither a “proximate cause” of death finding nor certain
features of the instructions defendant’s jury was given establish
as a matter of law that defendant was the actual killer. That
5
determination must come, if it comes, only after issuance of an
order to show cause.
A. Reliance on the Facts Recited in Young I Was Error
At the prima facie stage of section 1172.6 review, a trial
court must determine whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if the petition’s allegations were proven. (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) In making its determination at the
prima facie stage, the court should not make credibility
determinations or engage in “‘factfinding involving the weighing
of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at 974.) We review
de novo a trial court’s determination that a petitioner failed to
make a section 1172.6 prima facie showing. (People v. Ramos
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 463.)
The Attorney General maintains the trial court was
entitled to rely on the facts recited in Young I to determine
defendant was the actual killer. That is wrong, and the only law
cited in support of that argument is a Court of Appeal case,
People v. Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, that predates
pertinent amendments to the text of section 1172.6 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2 [Sen. Bill No. 775]).
As amended (and in effect at the time of the prima facie
hearing in this case), section 1172.6, subdivision (d) states a trial
court “may . . . consider the procedural history of the case recited
in any prior appellate opinion” at an evidentiary hearing on a
petition for resentencing. As precedent holds, this provision
prohibited the section 1172.6 court from relying on Young I’s
6
factual summary to find defendant was Brumer’s actual killer.4
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292 [by allowing
consideration of “‘the procedural history’” in prior appellate
opinions, the Legislature impliedly prohibited consideration of
“factual summaries” in prior appellate opinions]; People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [“If [the factual summary in an
appellate opinion] may not be considered at an evidentiary
hearing to determine a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for
resentencing, we fail to see how such evidence could establish, as
a matter of law, a petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing at the
prima facie stage”].)
B. The Court’s Alternative Rationales Are Also Flawed
The trial court alternatively concluded the jury must have
found defendant was the victim’s actual killer because it
convicted him of evading a police officer proximately causing
death. This too is erroneous. The jury instruction on the evading
an officer charge required only a finding that defendant
“operat[ed] a motor vehicle with intent to evade . . . a pursuing
peace officer[ ],” not a finding that defendant collided with the
4
The Attorney General suggests the trial court was not
engaged in fact-finding when it “[c]onsult[ed]” the opinion in
Young I and “learned” about defendant’s role in Brumer’s death.
The Attorney General contrasts these activities with the sort of
“factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion” that our Supreme Court held is impermissible at the
prima facie stage in Lewis. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 972.)
Lewis was decided before the Legislature amended the statute to
prohibit reliance on factual summaries in prior appellate
opinions.
7
victim. To be sure, it did require the jury to find defendant
“proximately caused the death of another person,” but a person
may be the proximate cause of another’s death without being the
actual killer of the deceased. (See, e.g., People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, 17-18 [“‘Proximately causing and personally
inflicting harm are two different things. The Legislature is
aware of the difference’”]; see also id. at 4 [“the term ‘actual
killer’ as used in the revised felony-murder rule of section 189,
subdivision (e)(1) refers to someone who personally killed the
victim and is not necessarily the same as a person who ‘caused’
the victim’s death”].)
The trial court also determined the jury must have found
defendant personally killed Brumer because there was no
instruction at trial on general principles of aiding and abetting,
aiding and abetting a felony murder, or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. That is irrelevant, however, because
these instructions were not necessary to permit the jury to find
defendant guilty of felony murder even if he was not the actual
killer. The felony murder instruction informed the jury that
defendant was guilty of first degree murder if it found there was
an unlawful killing that occurred during the commission of
robbery and defendant specifically intended to commit robbery.
In other words, the instruction did not require the jury to find
defendant personally committed the unlawful killing (it is
possible, for instance, the jury believed Brumer’s actual killer
was the unjoined perpetrator referenced in the other instruction
it received).
Finally, the Attorney General argues that because “the
special circumstances instruction . . . did not contain any
language regarding an aider and abettor or co-conspirator and
8
the intent to kill” and “[s]uch language would have been present
in that instruction if [defendant] had been prosecuted as an aider
and abettor to the underlying crime during which the murder
occurred.” Defendant’s jury would not have been privy to the
Attorney General’s view of customary instructional practice,
however. To the contrary, the special circumstance instructions
defendant’s jury received authorized the jury to find the
circumstance true if “[t]he murder was committed” while
defendant was engaged in the commission of (or immediate flight
from) a robbery or kidnap for robbery and required no finding
that defendant committed the murder. Just as with the absence
of aiding and abetting instructions, the jury had all it
theoretically needed in the instructions it received to find
defendant guilty of felony murder even if he was not the actual
killer.
Because the jury could have convicted defendant of felony
murder and there is nothing in the prima facie record that
demonstrates as a matter of law that defendant was the victim’s
actual killer (or that the jury necessarily so found), reversal and
remand for issuance of an order to show cause is required.
9
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to issue an
order to show cause and to thereafter proceed as required by
section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
I concur:
MOOR, J.
10
The People v. Toraino Young
B334422
HOFFSTADT, P.J., dissenting.
I agree with the majority that a defendant is not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing under Penal Code section 1172.6—and
that defendant’s petition for relief may be summarily denied—if
“the record of conviction unequivocally establishes that [the]
defendant was the ‘actual killer.’” (People v. Garcia (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 956, 969 (Garcia); see also People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 [actual killer not entitled to relief
under section 1172.6].) I also agree that, for these purposes, the
record of conviction includes the jury instructions given at trial as
well as the jury’s verdict, and will assume that it does not include
the recitation of facts regarding the offense set forth in a prior
appellate decision. (People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
296, 301; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50
(Harden); cf. People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227,
1238 [applying limitation on looking to facts in appellate
decisions to prima facie stage].) Where I disagree with the
majority is that I conclude that this standard for summary denial
has been met here because “it would have been impossible . . . for
a jury to have made the findings it did” on the instructions given
“without finding that [Toraino Young (defendant)] was [the]
actual killer.” (Beaudreaux, at p. 1248.)
Defendant was the sole named criminal defendant charged
at his trial. The jury was not instructed that it could convict
defendant of murder based on his aiding and abetting someone
else in committing the killing or in committing some lesser crime
that naturally and probably resulted in death. The jury was not
instructed that it could convict defendant of murder based on
someone else committing a lesser felony the natural and probable
consequence of which was death. Instead, the jury was
instructed that it could convict defendant of murder if he
“unlawfully kill[ed]” someone else either (1) “with malice
aforethought” or (2) “during the commission or attempted
commission of robbery or kidnap[ping] for robbery.” This second
option embodies a felony-murder theory because it holds a
defendant liable for murder based on a killing he committed
during the commission of a robbery (rather than a killing he
committed with malice aforethought). But a person who is
convicted of a murder on such a felony-murder theory is also the
actual killer if he “personally committed the act(s) that directly
resulted in the victim’s death.” (Garcia, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 971.)
Here, it is impossible for the jury not to have concluded on
the instructions given that defendant personally committed the
acts that resulted in the victim’s death. In Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th 45, the court held that a defendant prosecuted under
a felony-murder theory was the actual killer—and her petition for
relief under section 1172.6 was properly denied without an
evidentiary hearing—when the jury was instructed that she could
be convicted of murder only if she “unlawfully kill[ed] a human
being” (as opposed to having “committed an act that caused the
death of another person”) and could receive a sentencing
enhancement only if she “personally inflicted great bodily injury.”
(Id. at pp. 54, 58, emphasis omitted.) The instructional
requirement that defendant “kill” paired with the requirement of
2
personal infliction of the injury causing the death meant that the
defendant in Harden was the actual killer as a matter of law.
The same analysis applies here. As in Harden, the jury was
instructed that it could convict defendant of murder only if he
“unlawfully kill[ed]” another person. Further, the special
circumstance required proof that “[t]he murder was committed
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or in the
immediate flight after committing a robbery” or “kidnap for
robbery,” and the crime of evading police causing death required
proof that defendant “willfully drove a motor vehicle in a manner
to flee or elude a pursuing police officer” and “proximately caused
the death of another person.” Given these instructions, read as a
whole, the jury could have returned the verdicts and findings it
did only if it found that defendant personally committed the act
that directly resulted in the victim’s death—that is, only if he was
the actual killer.
The majority comes to a different conclusion for what I
perceive as two different reasons.
First, the majority reasons that the jury’s finding that
defendant “proximately caused” another’s death (which, as noted
above, is an element of the evading police crime) does not
necessarily establish that defendant was the actual killer
because, as noted in People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 17-
18, a person can be the proximate cause of another’s death
without being the actual killer. But, as Harden noted, the
murder instructions in Lopez did not require a finding that the
defendant “unlawfully kill[ed]” the victim and did not require a
finding of personal infliction of injury. (Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 58.) The same distinction from Lopez exists
here: The murder instructions in this case required a finding of
3
“unlawful[] kill[ing],” which combined with the special
circumstance and evading police instructions, required a finding
that defendant was the person driving the motor vehicle that
caused the death, thereby personally inflicting the injury
resulting in death.
Second, the majority reasons that the jury instructions “did
not require the jury to find defendant personally committed the
unlawful killing—and it is possible the jury believed [the victim’s]
actual killer was [an] unjoined perpetrator referenced in” the
CALJIC No. 2.11.5 instruction it received, thereby giving the jury
“all it theoretically needed . . . to find defendant guilty of felony
murder even if he was not the actual killer.” To be sure, the jury
in this case was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.11.5, which
provides that “[t]here has been evidence in this case indicating
that a person other than defendant was or may have been
involved in the crime for which the defendant is on trial” and that
the jury should focus on “decid[ing] whether the People have
proved the guilt of the defendant on trial.” But that instruction,
as Harden noted, serves to “discourage improper conjecture”; it
does “not provide the jury with a path to convict [a defendant] of
felony murder on a theory other than [the defendant] being the
actual killer.” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 59; People v.
Lemcke (2001) 11 Cal.5th 644, 655 [a single instruction may not
be judged in isolation, but must be “considered in the context of
the instructions as a whole and the trial record”].) Nor do any of
the instructions in this case create a path for holding defendant
criminally liable for the acts of any “unjoined perpetrator”: The
sole function of the felony-murder instruction in this case was to
give the jury a way to find defendant guilty of murder—without
4
also finding malice aforethought—for an “unlawful kill[ing]”
defendant himself committed.
Because defendant was neither instructed nor convicted on
a now-impermissible theory of murder, I would affirm the trial
court’s summary denial of his section 1172.6 petition.
HOFFSTADT, P.J.
5
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