CourtListener 10339248•People v. Sebold CA6
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Filed 2/25/25 P. v. Sebold CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052162, H052329
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR000831)
v.
HEATHER LYNN SEBOLD,
Defendant and Appellant.
In case No. H052162, defendant Heather Lynn Sebold appeals from a judgment
sentencing her to three years in prison for a domestic violence conviction after she
admitted a probation violation. In case No. H052329, she appeals from a later order
modifying her sentence and reinstating probation. Appointed counsel filed an opening
brief summarizing the case but raising no issues. We notified defendant of her right to
submit written argument on her own behalf, and she did not do so. Independently
reviewing the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we identified an issue
regarding presentence credit and requested supplemental briefing. Both parties
confirmed an error in the credit awarded to defendant; we agree and will correct the error.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
A. THE UNDERLYING CASE
In January 2022, after drinking alcohol all day, defendant had a verbal and
physical altercation with a man she was living with. According to the probation report,
she attacked him with a knife and attempted to stab him in the upper chest or neck.
When the man’s son intervened, defendant attacked him and cut his forehead with the
knife. Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a), 664; unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code), two counts of
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)),
and misdemeanor assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)). As to the attempted murder counts, it was alleged that defendant personally
used a deadly weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
Defendant pleaded guilty to the domestic violence and misdemeanor assault
charges in February 2022, with the understanding that she would be granted probation.
In October 2022, the court placed her on three years’ probation, including the condition
that she serve 90 days in jail. The remaining counts were dismissed.
B. VIOLATIONS OF PROBATION
In January 2023, defendant was alleged to have violated probation by failing to
submit to a drug test and report a change of address. Probation was reinstated in August
2023 and extended to May 2026 with the additional condition of 275 days in jail. In
December 2023, defendant was alleged to have committed another violation by failing to
report to probation after her release from custody. She admitted the violation in
March 2024.
In April 2024, the court terminated probation and sentenced defendant to the
middle term of three years on the domestic violence count. The court awarded 376 days
of presentence credit, based on 188 days of actual custody and 188 days of corresponding
conduct credit. (A concurrent term of 100 days jail on the misdemeanor assault count
was deemed served as of sentencing.) Defendant appealed the sentence (case
No. H052162).
C. SENTENCE MODIFICATION
Defendant requested a sentence modification, and a hearing on the request was
held in June 2024. At the hearing, the court asked defense counsel whether defendant
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was “willing to waive all credits over 250 days for all purposes?” After speaking with
defendant, counsel confirmed defendant was “in agreement to waive all credits in excess
of 250 days” if probation were reinstated. The court granted the request and reinstated
probation for three years, on the condition that defendant serve 365 days in custody after
waiving “[a]ll credits over 250 … for all purposes.”
After defendant confirmed that she understood and accepted the new conditions of
probation, the court clerk inquired as to defendant’s “current credits” and the court asked
the probation officer, “Having waived everything over 250 how should they read on the
minute order?” The probation officer replied, “I believe through today’s date she has
497, 249 plus 248. [¶] And if the court is having her waive credits over 250 days,
125 plus 124 would be her new credits as of today.” The minute order indicates that
defendant received 249 days of presentence credit, based on 125 days of actual custody
and 124 days of conduct credit. Defendant again appealed (case No. H052329).
II. DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the record in case No. H052162 and found no arguable issue.
After reviewing the record in case No. H052329, we requested supplemental briefing on
the question of whether awarding defendant only 249 days of presentence credit was
correct.
The parties agree that because defendant waived presentence credit over 250 days,
she was entitled to exactly 250 days of credit. We agree and will modify the trial court’s
order accordingly. The California Supreme Court has held that defendants may waive
their entitlement to presentence credit. (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1050,
1054–1055 (Johnson).) By its express terms, defendant’s waiver applied only to any
presentence credit over 250 days. She was therefore entitled to 250 days.
We also asked the parties to address the proper apportionment of presentence
credit between actual custody days and conduct credit, which was not addressed by the
parties on the record at the sentence modification hearing. As the parties note, the trial
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court’s award of 249 days derived from applying the formula set forth in section 4019.
Under that formula, eligible defendants receive two days of conduct credit for every two
days actually spent in custody; a defendant who spends an odd number of days in custody
is not entitled to a corresponding day of conduct credit for the final day of actual custody.
(People v. Whitaker (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1358.) A defendant who serves
125 actual days in custody would thus be entitled to a maximum of 124 days in
corresponding conduct credit.
Here, at the time of the sentence modification, defendant had accrued 249 days of
actual custody credit and would have been entitled to 248 days of corresponding conduct
credit. The parties appear to correctly agree that the scope of defendant’s Johnson waiver
was not limited by section 4019; in other words, she could enter a valid waiver that left
her with presentence credit not fitting the statutory formula. (See, e.g., People v. Tate
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 332, 337–338 [waiver of only conduct credit].) Defendant
suggests we award her 125 or 126 actual days (along with the corresponding days of
conduct credit necessary to result in 250 total days of presentence credit) so as to
minimize deviation from the section 4019 formula. But because neither 125 nor 126 days
of actual custody would result in 250 days of total credit under the standard section 4019
calculation, some deviation is necessary, and we cannot presume defendant understood
her waiver would leave her with a lesser number of actual custody days than the 249 she
had served. (Cf. People v. Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 831 [defendant who
waived credits over 365 days understood he would retain 183 actual days and 182 days of
conduct credit].) We will instead modify the order to reflect 249 days of actual custody
and one day of conduct credit, as the Attorney General acknowledges is permissible and
appropriate on this record.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment dated April 4, 2024, is affirmed. The order dated June 4, 2024, is
modified to award defendant 250 days of presentence credit, consisting of 249 days of
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actual custody and one day of conduct credit. As so modified, the order is affirmed. The
trial court is directed to prepare an amended minute order reflecting the modification.
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____________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________
Wilson, J.
H052162, H052329
The People v. Sebold
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