People v. Jenkins CA4/1

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Filed 2/25/25 P. v. Jenkins CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082930

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE406824 )

CHARLES JENKINS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge. Affirmed with instructions.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Charles Jenkins appeals his conviction for six sex offenses against
his daughter and stepdaughter. Jenkins claims the prosecutor erred by
cross-examining Jenkins about a third victim and by asking one of the

victims if she was pregnant.1 Finding no merit to either claim, we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Jenkins is J.O.’s biological father. In 1986, after her mother died, then
12-year-old J.O. began living with Jenkins. Soon after J.O. moved in,
Jenkins began coming into her room at night. At first Jenkins would just
check on J.O., but then he started rubbing J.O.’s back in a sexual manner
and cuddling with her. Jenkins then progressed to touching J.O.’s breasts,
butt, and vagina, as well as masturbating on her bed. Jenkins also tried to
get J.O. to watch pornography with him and made her touch his penis.
One night in 1989, when J.O. was 15, Jenkins came home drunk and
tried to have sex with J.O. Jenkins forced J.O. onto her bed, laid on top of
her, and began removing her clothes. As J.O. struggled to get away, Jenkins
inserted his fingers in her vagina. J.O. then broke free, kicking Jenkins and
hitting him with a lamp. After hitting Jenkins with additional household
items, J.O. barricaded herself in her room and escaped through her window
to her boyfriend’s house. J.O. lived with her boyfriend’s mother, Joan Bier,
from that point until she graduated high school.
Around 1990, Jenkins began dating his current wife, Marie Jenkins.

Ms. Jenkins and three of her daughters, M.W., Mary Ogborn,2 and R.D.,
moved in with Jenkins a few months later. Around the time M.W. was

1 Jenkins uses the term “prosecutorial misconduct,” but that “ ‘is
somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it suggests a prosecutor must act
with a culpable state of mind. A more apt description of the transgression is
prosecutorial error.’ ” (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th
790, 853.)
2 Ms. Ogborn, who is an adult, was called by Jenkins to testify and did
not report being molested. Therefore, we use her full name.
2
10 years old, Jenkins repeatedly molested her. One time, M.W. awoke with
her hand on Jenkins’s erect penis. On a separate occasion, M.W. woke up to
Jenkins’s mouth on her vagina. In another incident, while M.W. slept,
Jenkins inserted something into her anus, causing her to bleed. And on at
least five occasions, M.W. awoke to Jenkins putting something inside her
vagina. She presumed it was his fingers.
M.W. tried to tell Ms. Jenkins about the anal penetration incident after
it happened, but Ms. Jenkins believed M.W. had just started her period.
When Ms. Jenkins confronted Jenkins about M.W.’s accusation, he claimed
he accidently wiped M.W. too hard while helping her go to the bathroom.
M.W. also disclosed the oral copulation to her mother. The abuse stopped
after Jenkins hit R.D. and the girls were placed in foster care.
While in foster care, M.W. was afraid to report Jenkins because she
worried she would be permanently separated from her mother. When she
turned 18 years old, M.W. told her biological father about the abuse she
suffered. M.W.’s father told her the statute of limitations on Jenkins’s
offenses had expired, which M.W. believed.
In 2020, after watching her son turn 10—M.W.’s age when Jenkins first
started molesting her—and learning from other resources that Jenkins could

still be prosecuted, M.W. decided to contact law enforcement.3 J.O. agreed to
do the same after M.W. contacted her through social media and they both
reported Jenkins’s crimes to the police. They also called Jenkins several
times to confront him. In a call with J.O., Jenkins admitted mistreating J.O.

3 Pursuant to Penal Code sections 801.1, subdivision (a), and 803,
subdivision (f), despite the passage of time, the offenses were not barred by
the statute of limitations. All further undesignated statutory references are
to the Penal Code.
3
while she was a child without stating any specifics. During a call with M.W.,
Jenkins admitted molesting M.W. when she was 10 years old and apologized.
When interviewed by the police in 2020, Jenkins admitted an incident
where he came home “drunker than hell” and tried to cuddle with J.O. in her
bed. Jenkins also said he did not remember abusing M.W., but acknowledged
it was possible based on his history of being abused as a child.
In 2022, the Office of the San Diego District Attorney charged Jenkins
with one count of sexual penetration with J.O. (§ 289, subd. (a); count 1), and
five counts of lewd acts upon a child with M.W. (§ 288, subd (a); counts 2–6).
At his first trial in 2023, the jury was not able to reach a verdict on any
count, so the trial court declared a mistrial.
J.O. and M.W. testified at Jenkins’s second trial several months later,
detailing Jenkins’s abuse. After stating she was “nauseous and [ ]
overwhelmed” at the beginning of her testimony, the prosecutor asked M.W.
if she was pregnant. M.W. confirmed she was, revealing she had recently
suffered several miscarriages.
The jury saw footage of Jenkins’s interview with the police, and
Jenkins’s brother testified that Jenkins admitted trying to have sex with
J.O., causing her to move out. The jury also heard from Ms. Bier, who stated
J.O. moved into her house in 1989 and stayed there until she graduated from
high school. Ms. Bier knew J.O. ran away from home based on her
relationship with her father. M.W.’s biological father testified as well,
confirming that when M.W. disclosed the abuse to him as a young adult, he
informed M.W. that prosecution for Jenkins’s crimes was time-barred.
The People offered expert testimony from a forensic interviewer and a
detective to explain that children commonly delay disclosing sexual abuse.
The factors that contribute to delays include the relationship with the abuser,

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the absence of support from the non-abusing parent, and fear of being
removed from the home. Several of Jenkins’s neighbors also testified for the
People, describing frequent fighting and drinking at Jenkins’s home,
including several instances where M.W. sought police intervention because
she was afraid of Jenkins.
Jenkins testified in his own defense. He admitted coming home drunk
and trying to cuddle with J.O., claiming that because she was on drugs J.O.

“flipped out.”4 Jenkins otherwise denied molesting J.O. and M.W. The
prosecutor attempted to question Jenkins about his alleged abuse of R.D., but
the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections to that line of inquiry.
Jenkins also offered testimony from his stepdaughter Ogborn, his other
daughter Samantha Coon, and two neighbors, all of whom denied seeing
Jenkins doing anything sexually inappropriate.
The jury found Jenkins guilty of all six counts, and the trial court

sentenced Jenkins to prison for 18 years to life.5 Jenkins’s appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Prosecutorial error, as a matter of state law, occurs when a prosecutor
“engage[s] in deceptive or reprehensible tactics in order to persuade the trier
of fact to convict.” ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 718.) “In order
to be entitled to relief under state law, defendant must show that the
challenged conduct raised a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
verdict.” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 828, fn. 35.) A

4 J.O. admitted using methamphetamine to cope with Jenkins’s abuse,
including on the night of the offense in count 1.
5 Jenkins’s prison term consists of five concurrent 15-year-to-life
sentences for counts 2 through 6, plus a three-year term for count 1.
5
prosecutor’s actions violate federal constitutional protections when there is “a
pattern of conduct that is serious and egregious, such that the trial is
rendered so unfair that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right
to due process of law.” (Lightsey, at p. 718.) Relief is unavailable under
federal law if “the challenged conduct was . . . harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Blacksher, at p. 828, fn. 35.)
B. The Prosecutor Did Not Disregard the Trial Court’s In Limine Rulings
and His Conduct Did Not Impact the Jury

Jenkins believes that prior to trial, the trial court excluded any
reference to Jenkins’s alleged molestation of R.D. Jenkins claims the
prosecutor flagrantly disregarded that ruling by asking Jenkins on cross-
examination whether he knew that R.D. accused Jenkins of touching her
vagina. We disagree with Jenkins’s characterization of the trial court’s
ruling and find no prosecutorial error. We further find even if we were to
construe the prosecutor’s conduct as error, it was harmless because it did not
affect the jury’s verdict.
1. Additional Background
At a pretrial conference on July 21, 2023, the prosecutor stated the only
change to the People’s witness list from the first trial was the addition of R.D.
as a potential witness. The prosecutor intended to elicit testimony from R.D.

pursuant to Evidence Code section 11086 that Jenkins sexually abused her
which would support an inference that Jenkins had a propensity for
committing sexual offenses against minors.
After Jenkins briefly asserted R.D.’s testimony did not qualify under
Evidence Code section 1108, the discussion shifted to the admissibility of

6 Evidence Code section 1108 allows admission of prior sex offenses as
propensity evidence.
6
evidence regarding Jenkins’s alleged physical abuse7 of his daughter and
stepdaughters. Jenkins argued physical abuse was irrelevant, and nothing
changed since the first trial where the trial court excluded physical abuse
evidence. The prosecutor asked the court to revisit its ruling on the physical
abuse, claiming it was relevant to the victims’ delayed disclosures as well as
rebutting defense witnesses. The trial court ultimately stated that its prior
ruling remained, and the People could not introduce physical abuse evidence
in their case-in-chief.
Later in the same pretrial conference, the trial court denied Jenkins’s
motion to exclude evidence of uncharged sex offenses against R.D. and J.O.
The trial court found that evidence “absolutely relevant,” and “highly
probative.”
On July 25, 2023, prior to the beginning of trial, the prosecutor stated
R.D. might not be available by the time the People rest, so he may call R.D.
as a rebuttal witness or seek leave to reopen the People’s case. In response,
Jenkins moved to limit R.D.’s testimony, arguing that some of it would
not describe sexual offenses as that term is defined in Evidence Code
section 1108. The trial court disagreed with Jenkins and denied his motion.
Ultimately, R.D. did not testify. When Jenkins testified, he denied
sexually inappropriate behavior with children. The prosecutor then asked
Jenkins, “[y]ou know that [R.D.] wrote to Detective Knuteson that you
touched her vagina?” The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection
that the question was based on facts not in evidence and admonished the jury
to disregard it. The prosecutor had sought to impeach Jenkins with an email

7 The parties used the term “physical abuse” to refer to non-sexual
abusive touching. We do the same in this opinion.
7
from R.D. to Detective Knuteson. Defense counsel objected, and during a
sidebar conference the trial court found the email inadmissible.
At a subsequent sidebar conference, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial, claiming Jenkins could not receive a fair trial after the jury heard of
a third victim, R.D. The trial court stated that while evidence of sexual
abuse against other victims could be admissible, such abuse was unsupported
under the circumstances. The trial court denied the motion, but stated the
prosecutor is “coming close to warranting a mistrial. Absolutely no reason for
evidence as to prior acts, especially unfounded.”
2. Analysis
Jenkins cites the trial court’s rulings from July 21, 2023, to support his
argument that the trial court excluded evidence of Jenkins’s alleged sexual
abuse of R.D. However, as shown above, the trial court made no such ruling.
Instead, the trial court ruled that Jenkins’s alleged sexual abuse of R.D. was
admissible but denied the People’s use of physical abuse evidence. The court
ruled similarly on July 25, 2023, denying Jenkins’s request to limit R.D.’s
sexual abuse testimony because the trial court found R.D.’s testimony
admissible under Evidence Code section 1108.
Accordingly, we disagree with the premise of Jenkins’s argument. The
ruling that the prosecutor allegedly disregarded was never made, so
Jenkins’s claim of prosecutorial error fails.
In any event, even if error, the prosecutor’s conduct was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the prosecutor’s attempt to question
Jenkins about R.D. was one brief moment in a 10-day trial.
Second, the question about R.D.’s allegations went unanswered, and
the trial court admonished the jury to disregard it. “When a trial court
sustains defense objections and admonishes the jury to disregard the

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comments, we assume the jury followed the admonition and that prejudice
was therefore avoided.” (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 595.) The
trial court also instructed the jury that “[n]othing that the attorneys say is
evidence,” attorneys’ “questions are not evidence,” and “[i]f I sustained an
objection, you must ignore the question. If the witness was not permitted to
answer, do not guess what the answer might have been or why I ruled as I
did.” We presume the jury understood and followed these instructions.
(People v. Wilson (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1014.)
Finally, this was not a simple “he-said / she-said” case as Jenkins
suggests. There were two victims in this case, and the testimony of each
supported the other. Indeed, the jury found that the count against J.O. was

corroborated by independent evidence.8
In addition to the victims’ testimony, the jury heard Jenkins’s interview
with the police where he acknowledged that he may have molested M.W. and
admitted that he was “drunker than hell” and tried to cuddle with J.O.
during the incident in count 1. The jury also heard from Jenkins’s brother
that Jenkins admitted trying to have sex with J.O., causing her to move out.
Ms. Bier confirmed that J.O. ran away from Jenkins and never returned to
live with him, while J.O.’s biological father confirmed that M.W. refrained
from reporting Jenkins because she thought the time to do so had expired.
J.O. and M.W.’s testimony was also consistent with the opinions of the
People’s two experts regarding delayed disclosures.

8 This finding was made pursuant to section 803, subdivision (f), which
extends the statute of limitations for certain sex crimes, including the
violation of section 289 in count 1. Section 803, subdivision (f)(2)(C) requires
that “[t]here is independent evidence that corroborates the victim’s
allegation.”
9
Based on the strength of this evidence, the brevity of the challenged
questioning, and the trial court’s instructions, we find that even if the
prosecutor’s conduct was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Err by Questioning M.W. About Her Pregnancy
Jenkins argues the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony from M.W.
that she was pregnant, suffered several miscarriages, and feared her
testimony may cause another miscarriage. Jenkins argues this was
prosecutorial error because the information was irrelevant and used to evoke
sympathy for M.W. We disagree.
1. Additional Background
The complained of questioning occurred at the beginning of M.W.’s
testimony as follows:
[Prosecutor:] Good morning, [M.W.]
[M.W.:] Good morning.
[Prosecutor:] How are you feeling right now? It
sounds like you are a little emotional.
[M.W.:] Very much so. I’m nauseous and very
overwhelmed.
[Prosecutor:] Are you currently pregnant?
[M.W.:] Yeah.
[Prosecutor:] Is that a yes?
[M.W.:] Yes.
[Prosecutor:] Okay. How far along are you right
now?
[M.W.:] We are in our second month, but we
had a lot of losses this last year.
That’s my biggest thing right now.
[Prosecutor:] What?

10
[M.W.:] Losing this baby again with the other
ones.
So I really—I’m really hot and sweaty,
overweight, nothing fits, and I can’t—
[Prosecutor:] Well, if you feel sick at all, can you
just let us know? Okay?
The Court: Do you need some time to compose?
[M.W.]: Can I use the restroom upstairs?
The Court: Let’s take our morning recess.9
2. Analysis
A witness’s demeanor and manner of testifying are relevant to
credibility. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (a).) It was therefore reasonable for the
prosecutor to ask M.W. if she was pregnant to explore why she was nauseous
and overwhelmed while testifying. Further, Jenkins’s characterization of the
exchange is inaccurate. M.W. brought up her miscarriages, not the
prosecutor as Jenkins claims. M.W. also never said she feared testifying
would cause another miscarriage. M.W. merely stated that losing her baby
was her “biggest thing right now.”
Under these circumstances, the prosecutor’s brief inquiry into M.W.’s
pregnancy was not deceptive or reprehensible. Nor was it a pattern of
serious and egregious conduct. Jenkins has therefore failed to show

prosecutorial error.10
D. The Abstract of Judgment Should be Corrected
Jenkins claims the abstract of judgment incorrectly refers to
section 289 in count 1 as “[r]ape by foreign object.” He asks that we correct

9 The trial court denied Jenkins’s request for a mistrial based on this
testimony, finding evidence of M.W.’s pregnancy admissible.
10 Finding no error on this ground, we reject Jenkins’s claim of
cumulative error.
11
the abstract of judgment to state, “sexual penetration” or “sexual penetration
by force.” The People do not oppose using “sexual penetration by force.”
Subdivision (a)(1)(A) of section 289 defines the crime in count 1 as “an
act of sexual penetration when the act is accomplished against the victim’s
will by means of force . . . .” It is therefore consistent with the language of
the statute to refer to the crime as “sexual penetration by force.” That phrase
was also used in the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we will order the trial court
to amend the abstract of judgment as agreed by the parties.
IV. DISPOSITION
The trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment by deleting the
phrase “[r]ape by foreign object” in count 1 and replacing it with “sexual
penetration by force.” Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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