People v. Reddick CA3

CourtListener 10339160Calctapp25 feb 2025

Testo completo

Filed 2/25/25 P. v. Reddick CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101259

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 13F07409)

v.

ANTONIO WAYNE REDDICK,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Antonio Wayne Reddick killed two of his passengers while driving
under the influence; he received a sentence of 16 years plus 28 years to life. He appeals
for a third time after we twice remanded the matter to the trial court to consider certain
sentencing issues in light of newly enacted statutory provisions.
Defendant’s appointed counsel asked this court to review the record and determine
whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436.) Defendant filed two supplemental briefs raising multiple arguments regarding the
trial court’s decisions to: (1) not strike any of his strikes, (2) impose the middle term on

1
the principal determinate count, (3) impose the minimum restitution fine and
corresponding parole revocation fine, and (4) impose consecutive terms. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial Proceedings, First Appeal, First Resentencing, and Second Appeal
In 2013, defendant sideswiped a van, drove off at high speed, ran multiple red
lights, and crashed into another car, killing defendant’s two passengers, and seriously
injuring the driver of the other car. (People v. Reddick (Mar. 6, 2020, C086057) [nonpub.
opn.] (Reddick I).)
A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)),1 one count of driving under the influence
causing injury (former Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), one misdemeanor count of hit and
run with damage to property (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)), and one misdemeanor
count of driving without a valid driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). The
jury found true that defendant had a prior serious felony (former § 667, subd. (a)) and two
prior strikes (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)). As to the driving under the
influence count, the jury also found true that defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). (Reddick I, supra, C086057.)
The two prior strikes were based on a September 12, 2008 conviction for second
degree robbery (§ 211), and a September 12, 2008 conviction for attempted robbery
(§§ 211/664). According to the probation report, the robbery and attempted robbery
occurred on the same day. During the robbery, defendant and three other men entered
and robbed the victim’s business, and one of the subjects was armed with a gun. A clerk
on duty was punched and knocked unconscious before the subjects took the money and
fled in a car. During the attempted robbery, defendant and another man attempted to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
steal a woman’s purse as she was putting her preschool-age child in her car. One of the
two men struck her several times in the face and head, knocking her to the ground.
The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for an aggregate determinate term of
24 years, followed by an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life. On direct appeal, this
court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for the trial court to
conduct a mental health eligibility hearing pursuant to section 1001.36, exercise its
discretion whether to strike the prior serious felony enhancement, and to resentence on
the great bodily injury enhancement. (Reddick I, supra, C086057.)
On remand, the trial court found defendant ineligible for mental health diversion.
The trial court struck the punishment for the prior serious felony enhancement and
sentenced defendant to prison for a determinate term of 16 years plus an indeterminate
term of 28 years to life, including the middle term on the principal determinate count.
(People v. Reddick (Dec. 9, 2022, C094388) [nonpub. opn.] (Reddick II).)
On appeal, this court remanded the matter for the trial court to consider whether
the lower term was appropriate under newly-amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)
given defendant’s alleged psychological trauma. The trial court was further directed to
recalculate defendant’s custody credits. (Reddick II, supra, C094388.)
B. Second Resentencing
In December 2023, defendant asked the trial court to impose the lower term on the
principal count because his childhood trauma contributed to the current offenses.
According to defendant, his father was in prison for much of his childhood, and he
committed suicide when defendant was 15 years old. Defendant’s mother also physically
abused him, and he had been the subject of juvenile dependency proceedings and placed
in a group home. Defendant felt abandoned by his mother. An investigator from the
public defender’s office interviewed defendant’s stepsister, who is five years younger
than defendant. She explained defendant’s behavior “started to change” when he was 11
or 12 years old, with defendant sometimes acting aggressively toward her. Defendant

3
also ran away from home a few times. Their mother “didn’t know how to handle it,” and
hit defendant a few times with a belt.
Defendant also argued he had a long history of mental illness, including diagnoses
for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. He submitted a report from Dr. Melissa Piasecki,
a forensic psychiatrist, who opined the stress of being abandoned as a child led to
defendant’s substance abuse. And being in the group home led him to associate with
“higher-risk peers,” who were “negative role models.” As a result, defendant “developed
maladaptive coping strategies and lost opportunities to engage in prosocial activities.”
As to the current offenses, defendant said he was experiencing irrational fears about a
Crown Victoria following him when he sideswiped the other car, and he was attempting
to escape this “perceived threat.” Based on defendant’s statements, as well as statements
he made to two prior evaluators, Dr. Piasecki opined the current offense was connected to
defendant’s mental disorder, which was exacerbated by his drug and alcohol use, as well
as lack of sleep. Dr. Piasecki believed defendant was experiencing a psychosis at the
time of the crimes, “with false beliefs of being followed by a threat and a need to escape
from potential harm.”
Defendant also asked the trial court to strike the prior strikes pursuant to Romero2
and section 1385. Defendant argued the current offenses were related to mental illness
and prior childhood trauma. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D), (E); but see e.g. People v. Serrano
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1338 [the Three Strikes law is an alternative sentencing
scheme not impacted by § 1385, subd. (c)].) In addition, defendant was only 24 years old
at the time of the strike offenses and therefore lacked proper judgment. Further, the two
prior strikes occurred on the same day, “during an aberrant period of behavior.”
Defendant’s role in the strike offenses was minimal and he did not use any violence

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

4
(although defendant offered no evidence to this effect). Defendant also had expressed
remorse for the current offenses and participated in rehabilitative self-help programs
including a mental health program and a 2022 substance abuse program.
Defendant’s brief did not address fines or fees.
The prosecution urged the trial court to impose the same sentence as before,
including the middle term on the principal determinate count. The brief attached two
2016 psychologist evaluations, which were prepared to determine whether defendant was
suitable for a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity defense. In January 2016, Dr. Paul
Mattiuzzi opined he “c[ould not] conclude that this offense involved a delusional
paranoia or that mental disorder was a primary factor.” Defendant had done ordinary
tasks that day, including laundry, indicating any fear of the Crown Victoria had not
disrupted his actions that evening. There was no reason to disbelieve that defendant was
merely driving recklessly while intoxicated when he sideswiped a car and fled because he
was afraid of getting arrested. Under the circumstances, Dr. Mattiuzzi found defendant
did not suffer from a mental disorder that impaired his capacity based on the legal
standard for insanity.
Dr. John Shields also evaluated defendant, and, in July 2016, opined defendant did
not qualify for an insanity finding. Defendant had a “notable mental health history,” but
there were “few if any reports of objectively observed symptoms of an acute mental
disorder.” Instead, defendant self-reported symptoms, and it appeared he was
“exaggerating or perhaps fabricating symptoms of mental illness.” Although defendant
had been previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder, it appeared defendant was “in
adequate remission,” unless he became intoxicated. Still, defendant “ha[d] a history” of
“aberrant, assaultive,” and “out of control unmodulated behavior” when he is intoxicated.
Dr. Shields was thus unable to determine that a “genuine mental disorder” existed at the
time of the current offenses. Although he was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the

5
offense, in Dr. Shields’ opinion, “the offense conduct was not aggravated by nor caused
by a genuine mental illness at the time of the offense.”
The prosecution questioned the reliability of Dr. Piasecki’s report, noting that,
according to the police report, defendant sideswiped a Nissan, not a Crown Victoria.
Given that Dr. Piasecki had given “great weight” to defendant’s description of the crash,
the prosecution argued defendant had failed to show there was a psychological or
physical trauma that was a contributing factor to the commission of the instant offense.
But even if defendant had been able to make such a showing, the low term was still
inappropriate because it was contrary to the interests of justice. The aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, including defendant’s extensive
criminal history and prior prison terms.
The prosecution’s brief included a copy of a police report that contained
statements from witnesses to the instant offenses, including the driver of the first car that
defendant sideswiped. In addition, a supplemental police report contained defendant’s
statement at the hospital after the collisions, including that he had done laundry the day of
the incident and had been going to get food at the time of the current offenses. There
were also copies of the 2017 probation report and defendant’s certified rap sheet.
According to the rap sheet, defendant had the following criminal history: a juvenile
violation for carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)); a 2004 conviction for misdemeanor criminal
threats (§ 422); a 2005 conviction for felony vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851); a 2006
conviction for misdemeanor battery of a spouse or cohabitant (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)); 2008
convictions for second degree robbery (§ 211) and attempted second degree robbery
(§§ 211/664); and a 2011 conviction for felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)).
Defendant had been on parole or probation at the time of his 2006, 2008, and 2011
convictions, as well as the instant offenses.
The prosecution further argued it was inappropriate to strike the prior strikes.
Defendant did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law because defendant had

6
an extensive criminal history “replete with crimes of violence and terror,” including
carjacking, spousal abuse, robbery, and the current crimes, which caused the deaths of
two people and seriously injured another. Defendant also had a history of violating
parole and probation, and he had numerous rule violations while incarcerated. Moreover,
the current crimes could have been avoided had defendant simply stopped after
sideswiping the car. Instead, he fled at a high speed, ultimately leading to the collision
that killed two people and injured a third. Defendant had also demonstrated he was a
danger to society, and he had failed to make efforts to rehabilitate himself.
During a hearing in April 2024, Dr. Piasecki testified her analysis was different
than Dr. Mattiuzzi and Dr. Shields because they had performed “1026 reports,” which
considered whether defendant was sane at the time of the offenses. Her evaluation, by
contrast, considered the broader questions of whether defendant’s mental illness
contributed to the current offenses, and the impact of childhood trauma on mental health.
She did not believe defendant was malingering because there had been documented
observations of mental illness in some of the records, and he had accepted “significant
amounts” of antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medication. In addition, defendant had
said he felt a feeling of foreboding for several days before the current offenses. Still,
defendant was also using methamphetamine at the time, and methamphetamine induces
paranoia and causes racing thoughts. Regardless, Dr. Piasecki thought defendant’s
mental health contributed to the current offenses, especially his paranoia. Specifically,
defendant was suffering from bipolar disorder and post traumatic stress disorder, which
were common for those who had experienced childhood trauma. In her view, defendant’s
childhood trauma also indirectly contributed to the current offenses because it led to his
substance abuse and mental health disorders. Dr. Piasecki had not reviewed the police
report in preparing her evaluation, and she was unsure if any different information
contained in the police report might affect her analysis.

7
During the May 2024 resentencing hearing, the trial court indicated it had read and
considered both parties’ briefs and exhibits. Turning first to whether to impose the lower
or middle term on the principal determinate count, the court stated it did not believe an
underlying mental health disorder or childhood trauma caused defendant’s offenses. The
court noted it had previously made a similar finding in February 2021, when it found
defendant ineligible for mental health diversion. The court recognized that Dr. Mattiuzzi
and Dr. Shields had evaluated defendant in a different context than Dr. Piasecki. Still,
the court found the reports from Dr. Mattiuzzi and Dr. Shields to be more reliable
because they had been performed closer in time to the offenses, and both of these doctors
had read the police reports and additional discovery record. In addition, Dr. Piasecki had
relied more on defendant’s current descriptions of his symptoms at the time of the crimes,
which the court did not find as reliable, especially since defendant failed to tell police at
the hospital that he was afraid he was being pursued by someone who wanted to harm
him. Instead, defendant had said they were on their way to get food when the collision
happened. Although defendant had similarly told Drs. Mattiuzzi and Shields that he was
afraid he was being followed by the Crown Victoria during the current offenses, the trial
court did not find this statement to be reliable because it had been made multiple years
after the offenses. The court also did not find the memories of defendant’s sister to be
reliable, since she was only five or six years old during the period she described. Under
the circumstances, the court held the offenses were not the product of a diagnosed mental
health disorder, nor psychological, physical, or childhood trauma. “What caused the
crimes here was that, while intoxicated, [defendant] decided to get behind the wheel and
drive” so he could get something to eat. As such, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) did
“not apply” to defendant.
The trial court further stated that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to
impose the lower term because the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. Defendant’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous or of increasing

8
seriousness, he had served a prior prison term, he was on parole or probation at the time
of the current offenses, and his prior performance on probation or parole was
unsatisfactory. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(b)(2)-(5).)3
Turning to defendant’s Romero motion, defense counsel confirmed he had
received and reviewed the probation report. Defense counsel did not object to the
report’s factual representations, which he found to be “robust and complete.” Addressing
the merits of defendant’s Romero motion, the court stressed defendant had extensive
criminal history, which spanned from a juvenile offense in 2000 through the current
offenses in 2013. The court noted defendant had committed the strike offenses (i.e., the
robbery and attempted robbery) a little more than five years before the current offenses.
The court reiterated the robbery “involved being armed with a firearm, and a clerk on
duty was punched and knocked unconscious.” The victim of the attempted robbery was a
woman trying to put her preschool-age son in her car, and one of the assailants “struck
her several times in the face and head, knocking her to the ground.” The court further
noted that defendant committed the current offenses while on parole for the strikes. The
strike offenses “were not the result of a single period of abhorrent behavior; rather . . .
they were sandwiched between a pattern of ongoing criminality.” His criminal history
also involved violent behavior and demonstrated “lack[ ] [of] concern for the well-being
and safety of others.” Although defendant had shown remorse, he had demonstrated
“recklessness” and “an inability to control his behavior,” indicating he continued to pose
a danger to the community. He also had not done well on parole or probation. The court
acknowledged defendant’s rehabilitation efforts, including mental health counseling and
a substance abuse program in 2022. However, he needed to do more to address his

3 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

9
substance abuse. In sum, defendant remained in the spirit of the Three Strikes law, and
the court declined to strike his strikes.
The trial court then sentenced defendant to prison for an aggregate determinate
term of 16 years plus an indeterminate term of 28 years to life, as follows: 12 years for
the first count of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (the middle term of six
years doubled due to the strike), four years consecutive for the second count of gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (one third the middle term of six years doubled
due to the strike), 25 years to life for the driving under the influence of alcohol and/or
drugs causing injury (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)), plus three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement, and 180 days concurrent in county jail for each of the two misdemeanor
counts. The trial court noted it was imposing consecutive sentences because “each count
involved separate victims with separate injuries.” The court exercised its discretion and
did not impose punishment for the prior serious felony enhancement.
The court awarded 3,927 days of custody credit (1,352 actual days in local
custody, 202 days of presentence conduct credit, and 2,373 actual days in prison). The
court also imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a corresponding $300
parole revocation fine (suspended unless parole is revoked) (§ 1202.45), a $9,658.11
victim restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $200 court operations fee (§ 1465.8, subd.
(a)(1)), and a $150 criminal conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code, § 70373).
While the court was pronouncing sentence, defense counsel addressed fines and
fees and asked the court to impose the minimum restitution fine (i.e. $300) or strike it, so
defendant could direct any repayments to the $9,658.11 victim restitution fine. Defense
counsel did not argue defendant was indigent or otherwise ask for an ability to pay
hearing.
Defendant timely appealed.

10
II. DISCUSSION
A. Romero Motion
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and
asking this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable
issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by
counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the
opening brief.
Defendant filed two supplemental briefs challenging the trial court’s denial of his
Romero motion. He argues the trial court: (1) violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights by making factual determinations about his prior strikes that had not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to a trier of fact; (2) misinterpreted and failed to properly
consider the nature of his strikes, namely that they were a single period of aberrant
behavior and he was only the lookout or the driver, meaning he had a minimal and non-
violent role in the crimes; (3) failed to appropriately consider that the current crimes were
not violent, and that he never intended to kill or cause great bodily injury to either of the
two victims in his vehicle; and (4) erroneously disregarded his “future prospects in
determining [his] current/future dangerousness or threat to society.” We find defendant’s
arguments meritless.
As courts have explained, a trial court must decide whether to strike a prior strike
by considering factors that are intrinsic to the Three Strikes law’s sentencing scheme.
(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) These factors include: (1) the nature
and circumstances of the current conviction; (2) the nature and circumstances of the prior
strike conviction; and (3) the defendant’s “background, character, and prospects.” (Ibid.)
If the defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, the court may, in
furtherance of justice, treat the defendant “as though he [or she] had not previously been
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Ibid.; see also Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530; § 1385, subd. (a).)

11
We review a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373 (Carmony).) In the absence of an
affirmative record to the contrary, we presume the trial court properly exercised its
discretion and considered all relevant factors. (Id. at p. 378; People v. Myers (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) A defendant bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence
to support his Romero motion. (People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 (Lee).)
Regarding defendant’s first argument that the trial court violated his federal
constitutional rights by determining his prior strikes were committed on separate
occasions, defendant points to no authority requiring a trial court to rely only on facts
proven beyond a reasonable doubt when considering a defendant’s Romero motion.
Given that the jury found defendant’s two prior strikes to be true beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that defendant bore the burden of providing evidence to support his request to
strike at least one of his strikes (Lee, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 129), we find no error.
For similar reasons, we find no merit in defendant’s argument that the trial court
misinterpreted the underlying facts of his strikes. The record reflects that the trial court
relied on the probation report’s description of those crimes. Despite defendant’s
contentions, defense counsel confirmed he had received and reviewed the probation
report, and he had no objections to its factual representations. Defendant bore the
evidentiary burden in his Romero motion (Lee, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 129), and he
cannot claim now on appeal that the trial court erred when he offered no evidence during
the sentencing hearing that contradicted or clarified the probation report’s descriptions of
the robbery and attempted robbery and his role in the crimes. (See In re Rodgers (1980)
28 Cal.3d 429, 437, fn. 6 [an appellate court is “ ‘limited to a consideration of matters
contained in the record of the trial proceedings,’ ” and “ ‘ “[matters] not presented by the
record cannot be considered on the suggestion of [parties] in the briefs” ’ ”].)
We further reject defendant’s arguments that: (1) the trial court should have struck
one or more of his strikes because they were a single event, his role in the strikes was

12
minimal and non-violent, or he never intended to harm his passengers during his current
crimes; and (2) the trial court erroneously failed to adequately consider his future
prospects or whether he posed a future danger to society. Although the trial court could
have weighed the various considerations differently than it did, we find no abuse of
discretion here. The court heard robust arguments from both parties, including evidence
and argument from defense counsel regarding defendant’s participation in self-help
programs in prison. In contrast, the prosecution argued defendant continued to pose a
risk to society based on his extensive criminal history and poor prior performance on
parole and probation. We further note that section 667.5, subdivision (c)(9) defines
“[a]ny robbery” as a violent felony. The trial court’s ruling was not “so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 377.)
B. Imposition of Middle Term
Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
whether defendant posed a future danger to society when declining to impose the lower
term. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (See
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.) “A court abuses its sentencing discretion
when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper matter in reaching its
decision, or is unaware of the scope of its discretion so that it does not exercise informed
discretion at all.” (People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765.)
Rule 4.421 sets forth circumstances in aggravation that a court may consider in
sentencing, including whether a defendant has numerous prior convictions as an adult,
has served a prior prison term, was on parole or probation when the crime was
committed, and whether the defendant’s prior performance on probation or parole was
unsatisfactory. (Rule 4.421(b)(2)-(5).)

13
Section 1170 generally provides for midterm sentences. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).)
Section 1170 also contains a presumption in favor of the lower term if certain mitigating
circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of an offense, including if the
defendant suffered psychological or childhood trauma such as abuse. (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(6)(A); see also rule 4.423(b)(2)-(4) [circumstances in mitigation include when a
defendant was suffering from a mental condition that significantly reduced culpability for
a crime, defendant experienced physical childhood trauma that was a factor in the
commission of the current crime, or the current offense is connected to a defendant’s
mental illness or childhood trauma].) If the presumptive lower term factor contributed to
an offense, the trial court may impose the middle term only if it finds that the aggravating
circumstances as laid out in rule 4.421 outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(6).) A court may still impose the lower term even if none of the mitigating factors set
forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) are present. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(7).)
Defendant cites to no authority requiring the trial court to consider a defendant’s
future prospects or future dangerousness when considering whether to impose the lower
term. Instead, the trial court here properly considered whether the upper or middle term
was appropriate under section 1170 and rules 4.421 and 4.423. The court first explained
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) did not apply to defendant because the current crimes
were not the product of a diagnosed mental health disorder or psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma. And, given defendant’s extensive criminal history and poor prior
performance on parole and probation, the middle term was appropriate because the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Under the
circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion.
C. Restitution Fine
Defendant further argues the trial court erred in imposing the restitution fine
without first determining his ability to pay. Defendant, however, never asked for an

14
ability to pay hearing. Although defendant mentioned fines and fees during the
resentencing hearing, it was only in the context of requesting the trial court either strike
or impose the minimum $300 restitution fine, so that any payment would be directed to
the victim restitution fine. Given that defendant never requested an ability to pay
hearing, defendant has forfeited the issue on appeal. (§ 1202.4, subd. (d) [not requiring a
separate hearing before imposing a restitution fine]; see also People v. Greeley (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624 [“a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of fines, fees,
and assessments at sentencing forfeits the right to challenge those fines, fees, and
assessments on appeal”].)
D. Consecutive Sentences
Finally, defendant argues the trial court was unaware of its sentencing discretion
and should have sentenced defendant concurrently as opposed to consecutively. (See
People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 41 [where a defendant has one or more prior
strikes, a trial court has discretion to impose concurrent sentences for current felonies that
were committed on the same occasion or arose from the same set of operative facts, even
if those felonies were serious or violent].) Given that the trial court explained it was
imposing consecutive sentences because “each count involved separate victims with
separate injuries,” we conclude the trial court properly understood its discretion. (See
People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 [“Absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it”].)
Having examined the entire record, we find no other arguable error that would
result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.

15
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

HULL, Acting P. J.

/S/

KRAUSE, J.

16

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.